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It is the purpose of this paper to set forth the most important phases 
in the philosophy of William James with the view of evaluating the contri- 
bution which he made to religious thought. It is the opinion of the writer 
that the greatest service which James rendered to religion is in the field 
of philosophy rather than in that of psychology. This position is in sub- 
stantial agreement with that of Professor J. S. Bixler when he says, in 
Religion in the Philosophy of William James, that the issues which James
raises in the former field "must form an integral part of any discussion
1 
of the subject, and the emphases he makes are of permanent importance",
whereas in the latter field James was a pioneer and much of the work he did 
here has been superseded by more recent investigations. It is, as Profes- 
sor Bixler says, "his reflective thought on the problem of man's duty and 
destiny his philosophy of religion, that is to say which is of permanent
interest rather than his psychology of religion with its hypotheses as to how
2 
religious experience occurs at all suggestive as the latter are." Just as
his earlier work in psychology was later used to substantiate and develop his 
philosophical system, his work in the psychology of religion was really a 
stepping stone towards the construction of a religious philosophy. Through- 
out his entire lifetime his primary interest was philosophy. Consequently, 
it has seemed both desirable and necessary to follow his general philosophical 
system in trying to arrive at his contribution to religious thought, rather 
than to deal in detailed fashion with his efforts in the psychology of religion, 
His thought has been followed largely from the point of view of the philoso- 
phy of religion where his chief interest lay and where he made the most valu- 
able and the most lasting contribution to the religious thought of his tine.
1. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1926, Pref., p. viii.
2. Ibid., p. 202.
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The philosophy of James easily and naturally falls into four divi- 
sions:
First, there is his empiricism which is basic to his entire system 
and which determines his attitude towards all questions which come under 
his consideration. His training in British empiricism left him with a 
desire to trace every portion of reality through the course of experience 
and rendered it impossible for him to accept as real anything which lay 
beyond the reach of experience. This fundamental conviction in his think- 
ing colors his view of God, of man, and of the world. His theory of 
knowledge and of the general nature of reality are a direct product of 
his empiricism.
Second, his fideism constitutes an important part of his philosophy. 
This aspect of his thought flows from his empirical approach to philosophy 
since his thoroughgoing empiricism makes faith necessary if he is not to 
remain in complete ignorance of a large portion of reality, since a vast 
amount of reality lies beyond the reach of the empirical method. Such 
realities as God, freedom, and immortality cannot be dealt with by an em- 
pirical theory of knowledge. Thus he must resort to faith.
Third, pragmatism is perhaps the best known doctrine connected with 
James's philosophy. It, too, derives ultimately from his empiricism in 
that if knowledge of things which are not immediately present in experi- 
ence is at all possible, it must be reached by the use of ideas, images, 
and so on; and for James, anything is an idea which serves in a functional 
capacity in the business of knowing.
Fourth, pluralism is also a fruit of his empiricism. His unquali- 
fied acceptance of the data of the senses and of the feelings, as given 
in immediate experience, led him to the conviction that the infinite 
variety and number of such data mitigated against the belief in the essen- 
tial unity of the world. There remain to the last loose ends of reality 
which cannot be brought into any scheme of unity which may be imposed 
upon the universe, and reality is too vast to be brought within the ex- 
perience of a single knower.
This exposition of James*s philosophy has, for the most part, fol- 
lowed the above fourfold classification. Part I, consisting of chapters 
one and two, gives his theory of immediate knowledge and his view of the na- 
ture of the self, both of which issue directly from, and are basic to, his 
empiricism. Chapter one gives his view of consciousness which renders 
unnecessary the traditional hypothesis of the soul. James's theory of 
consciousness is given at some length not only because of its bearing up- 
on the existence of the soul but also because it is fundamental to his 
whole system of thought. The statement of his argument is followed by a 
criticism of his position with an attempt to show that it sets in motion 
anti-religious tendencies and ultimately leads to conclusions inimical to 
religion, that it constitutes an inadequate foundation upon which to build 
a philosophy, and fails satisfactorily to explain the facts of conscious- 
ness. Chapter two sets forth his view of the self as an empirical sub- 
stitute for the soul. his view here is given as fully as space permits 
because his doctrine of the "stream of thought", when converted to meta- 
physical uses, becomes basic in his view of reality as an "experience-
vi
continuum," The inadequacy of his conception of the self, when brought 
wholly within experience, is shown. This is followed by an argument 
which maintains that such an entity as the soul is demanded by certain 
facts of our conscious life which are otherwise unintelligible. Finally, 
a brief statement concerning the nature of the soul is given. The phase 
of his empiricism which is dealt with in these two chapters, while con- 
taining much that is valuable to philosophy and psychology, cannot be re- 
garded as a definitely valuable contribution to religion. In spite of 
his deep interest in religion, his empiricism thus far must be considered 
as anti-religious in purporting to be a doctrine of the real nature of man, 
Part II, consisting of chapters three, four, and five, deals with the 
fideistic aspect of James's philosophy. The logical order of development 
would place the section on pragmatism before that which treats of his fi- 
deism, inasmuch as the latter applies to the realm of knowledge which re- 
mains untouched by the former. Our reason, however, for considering the 
fideistic aspect of his thinking first is because it really constitutes 
an earlier phase in the development of his philosophy and because in his 
later treatment of pragmatism he deviates considerably from his earlier 
fideistic position; in many instances his later view contradicts much 
that his earlier one maintains. Chapter three sets forth his theory 
of belief and will which forms the groundwork for his general doctrine 
of faith, as well as the basis for his defense of religious faith. His 
doctrine of the "will to believe" grows out of his general theory of be- 
lief and will: here he identifies belief and will and establishes
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the doctrine of freedom of belief with that of the freedom of the will. 
In this stage of his development he arrives at the conclusion that person- 
ality is the surest clue to reality, and that it is the determinant of all 
values. His emphasis upon the "control" of reality is overdone here and 
if it were consistently followed through would lead him ultimately to a hu- 
manistic position as extreme as that of F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey. 
His later development of the pragmatic doctrine, although stressing man's 
creativity with reference to truth and reality, corrects this extreme 
view which colors his doctrine of belief. Chapter four follows his ef- 
fort to resolve the age-long conflict between reason and faith. His 
reasons for elevating will above the intellect are set forth somewhat in 
detail, and his contribution to religious thought at this point is given 
along with a criticism of the subordination of reason to will and feeling 
in religion. Chapter five expounds his doctrine of the "will to believe" 
and considers especially its application to religious faith. The real 
value of this doctrine is set forth, accompanied by a criticism of its ob- 
vious deficiencies. It is shown that while this view has a certain 
value within a somewhat limited scope, it cannot be accepted as adequate 
as a genuine foundation for religious faith because faith has as its very 
essence the affirmation of the reality of its object, and because, while 
values form a strong argument for the worth of religion, they do not neces- 
sarily carry conviction as to its truth. It is argued that religion, 
like science, cannot separate itself from metaphysics, and that any attempt 
to make such a separation weakens the foundation of religious faith.
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Part III, chapters six and seven, deals with pragmatism. Chapter 
six gives a brief sketch of the development of the doctrine of pragma- 
tism, showing the situation in philosophy out of which it arose and 
setting forth some of the factors which helped to originate it. The 
pragmatic theory of method and meaning is given with an attempt to dis- 
tinguish carefully between James's strict pragmatism and his fideism, 
which he often confuses. The importance of this distinction is obvious 
when it is realized that the former, as a philosophical method, is not 
favorable to religion, whereas the latter may be considered as offering 
support to religion. His theory of method is criticized with the intent 
of showing that it is not philosophically sound nor valuable as a means 
of deciding worthwhile controversies. Chapter seven sets forth his 
pragmatic doctrine of truth. The pragmatism of James is distinguished 
from that of other pragmatists of the more humanistic school. A gener- 
al criticism of his pragmatic view is given with an attempt to show that 
its futurism, its practicalism, and its relativity both as to truth and 
values render it unsatisfactory from a religious point of view. The 
bearing of pragmatism upon religion is dealt with for the purpose of show- 
ing that the pragmatic attitude is favorable to religion whereas the prag- 
matic doctrine of both method and truth contains germinal ideas which, if 
developed consistently, ultimately lead to anti-religious conclusions.
Part IV, consisting of chapters eight and nine, treats of his plural- 
istic doctrine and its implications for religious thought, and of his 
doctrine of God. Chapter eight states the reasons for his antipathy to 
monism of every sort. It treats with his break with logic in the effort
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to solve the problem of compounding consciousness. In order to show 
how his break with logic came about his view of the nature of reality 
is given; he is brought finally to see that reality is at bottom illog- 
ical and that there is always an alogical element in experience. It 
is shown that his break with logic was really due to the fact that his 
thinking was based upon idealistic assumptions, and that if he had not 
proceeded upon this basis it would not have been necessary for him to 
reject reason. The corollaries of pluralistic teachings are given with 
a criticism and appreciation as constituting part of his system of reli- 
gious philosophy. His emphasis upon the value of the individual is re- 
garded as an effective antidote to the enervating teachings of absolute 
idealism which regard the individual's existence as possessing no reality 
of its own. He errs, however, in the direction of deism in attributing 
to the individual an unqualified separateness from God. It is shown 
that his doctrine of freedom, while offering a way of escape from the 
chains of rigid determinism, does not solve the problem of freedom, from 
the religious point of view, because of his resort to absolute contingency 
and outright creativity on the part of the individual. His doctrine of 
meliorism is stated and criticized. Chapter nine deals with his doc- 
trine of God, setting forth his conception of the meaning and value of God 
in human life, his reasons for belief in a finite God, and a criticism of 
the conception of a finite God and of his solution of the problem of evil.
Chapter ten states briefly, by way of conclusion, some of the ways 
not previously stressed in which the philosophy of James influences reli- 
gious thought today.
Any student of James faces a very grave difficulty in trying to 
render in his own words the thought which James expressed in inimitable 
fashion. Consequently, those who study James usually find that it is 
not only the line of least resistance, but often the only safe way, to 
quote from James rather than attempt to give in their own words what 
James has said. James's vibrant enthusiasm and forcefulness of expres- 
sion are largely lost in an effort to expound his teachings. Because 
of this fact most of those who write on James find it expedient and often 
necessary to give James's thought in his own language with great fre- 
quency. This is especially true when dealing with the more difficult 
passages of his writing. further, although James is regarded as a 
master of the English language, his extravagant use of words is not al- 
ways conducive to clarity. Frequently he has been misunderstood due 
to his eagerness to make a strong case in argument which betrays him into 
overstatement. Also, he often uses more words than are necessary in 
giving expression to his thought. For instance, anyone who has read his 
essay entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?" in English has been impressed 
with its ambiguity. But if the same argument is read in his essay in 
French called "La Notion de Conscience", his thinking seems to be much 
clearer and his meaning quite easier to comprehend. This is due to the 
fact that his vocabulary, when writing in French, is so much more lim- 
ited than when writing in English. Nor is it easy to interpret all of 
James's statements as having a particular meaning; many of his statements 
seem to be amenable to more than one interpretation. It is also true 
that many seemingly contradictory statements are to be found in James's 
works. Professor R. B. Perry, who has studied James perhaps more
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carefully than any modern philosopher, once told the writer that he finds 
it very difficult, after many years of study, to know just what James is 
trying to say in certain points of his system.
It may appear to the reader of this paper that the writer is out of 
sympathy with James more than is actually true. James's fine spirit 
and earnestness in dealing with religious questions, his deep and last- 
ing interest in religion, his sincere efforts to get at the facts of re- 
ligion, his consuming passion to give religion a substantial footing in 
the fields of science and philosophy, his testimony to man's constant need 
of religion, his confident assurance of its power and value in human life, 
his own personal faith, his silent courage, his unshakable convictions  
these things are of necessity omitted from such a treatise as this. It 
may be said that James's conclusions concerning religion and its place in 
human life are usually right, but he errs in his methods of approach and 
in the details of his arguments; his penetrating insights seem always to 
be accurate and illuminating. Strange inconsistencies are to be found 
in James's thinking which cannot be harmonized until one has studied the 
life of the man himself. He gives a very unorthodox support to ortho- 
doxy at many points; he is far from orthodox. He opposes the "vicious 
intellectualism" of rationalistic philosophy, but he does not permit 
faith to supplant or supersede reason. He attacks the mechanism and 
the agnosticism of a materialistic science, but he tries to make religion 
more scientific and more acceptable to scientific thought. He is utterly 
opposed to determinism, but his conception of the self plays into the 
hands of the protagonists of a deterministic philosophy, and his doctrine
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of freedom involves a mechanical view of the future which is similar 
to that which the determinists apply to the past. He sponsors a view 
of reason in religion which makes way for the acceptance of revelation 
but there seems to be no need of any revelation of divine truth given 
once and for all. He attempts to bring God down into the commonplaces 
of human living, and conceives of God as a friend and ally of man but 
there is no place in his thinking for such a doctrine as the incarnation. 
He recognizes man's eternal yearning for immortality but his own belief 
in it seems to waver to the end. He speaks of the value of prayer and 
declares that it is the most important thing in religion, but he never 
prayed himself and asserted that he was unable to do so. Such incon- 
sistencies as these seem to be cleared up only in the personal life of 
the man himself.
Perhaps it is proper and fitting, before bringing this preface to a 
close, to explain why the writer has drawn so much from the writings of 
Professor R. B. Perry, of Harvard University. Professor Perry has 
studied James more thoroughly and masterfully than any other man, and
A_^-
none other has written so much or so ably upon the philosophy of James. 
He is undoubtedly the greatest living authority on the thought of James. 
He has rendered James more understandable to those who have studied him 
less, and to those who have studied him with less ability than Professor 
Perry. Further, the writer is indebted to Professor Perry in his study 
of James in that it was his privilege to take a course of lectures given 
by Professor Perry at Harvard University in the academic year 1938-39 on 
"William James and Henri Bergson" which was a comparative study of the 
thought of these two men. Also, Professor Perry directed the writer's
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reading of William James in a tutorial course taken at Harvard Univer- 
sity the same year. Consequently, the interpretation of James given 
in this paper has been considerably influenced by Professor Perry. His 
interpretation of James's general philosophical point of view has been, 
for the most part, accepted and applied throughout this paper. This is 
especially true in some of the more difficult portions of James's thought. 
Also, the writer is indebted to J. S. Bixler, Professor of Theology in 
the Divinity School of Harvard University, whose lectures on "Current 
Theology", which included a comparative study of 'William James, Josiah 
Royce, John Dewey, and others, enabled him to make a comparative study 
of these philosophers. In exposition, criticism, and appreciation the 
writer has gleaned much from others who have pioneered the way in these 
fields of thought, and it is no doubt true that others are entitled to 
credit in many instances in which no mention is made of them or of their 
writings.
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TKS RELATIONAL Til^JUY 0? COIJSCIOUoi&SS
The name of William James is popularly associated with the philosophy 
of Pragmatism, and it may appear strange to say that tnis doctrine does not 
contain the most fundamental aspect of nis thought, or that it is not the 
most far-reaching contribution which he made to the philosophy of his time. 
Pragmatism, while an integral part of his general system, is not the most 
important part of his philosophical construction which, in its broader as- 
pect, is an empiricism or philosophy of experience. There can be no doubt 
that James considered the matter in this light. In the preface to The 
leaning of Truth he says, Tf l am interested in another doctrine in philosophy 
to which I give the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the
establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate im-
1 
portance in making radical empiricism prevail." Professor R. B. Perry,
who is probably the greatest living authority on the philosophy of uilliam 
James, writes in this connection, in his latest book, as follows: "Not only 
has he expressly and repeatedly stated that he considers his 'radical em- 
piricism 1 to be more important than his pragmatism; not only has he intro- 
duced the pragmatic method as an accessory to immediate acquaintance or as 
a compensation for its absence; but the delicate characterization of exper- 
ience discoveries of data hitherto ignored, and vivid portrayals of the
2 
cosmic scene constitute the choicest fruits of his philosophical genius."
1. The leaning of Truth, .A Sequel to "Pragmatism", New York and London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1909, p. xii.
^. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William Jarnos, Hew Haven: Yale University 
Press; London: r.uMuIir^y Lilford, Oxford University Press, 1938, pp. 66-67.
MI an empiricist, Jam.es follows in the tradition of the British school 
of empirical philosophy, but he dares to carry his empiricism further than 
any of his predecessors had done. nis criticism of his empirical ancestors 
is that they had not gone far enough. To quote Professor H. 3. Perry a ;ain, 
"It raay, I think, be said that James's works contain the most thoroughgoing 
attempt which has ever been made to carry all the terms of discourse back to
r7 
«-/
the original data of sense, or to other immediately discriminated qualia." 
The "radical" nature of James's empiricism may be seen from the following 
brief summary which he makes of it. It is comprised of a postulate, of a 
"statement of fact", and of "a generalized conclusion". The postulate is
"that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be
4 
things definable in tei-Lis drawn from experience." Things which are not,
or which cannot be, experienced may exist without number, but they can play 
no part in philosophical discussions. James attributes the idea which this
postulate embodies to Shadvvorth Hodgson's notion "that realities ere only
5 
what they are 'known as'." Here we have "the principle of pure experience"
6 
as a "methodical postulate". The "statement of fact" is "that the relations
between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters
of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things ru ' 
7 - " ' 
themselves." This doctrine of relations is central to James's empiricism
and distinguishes his "radical empiricism" from the empirical philosophy of
such thinkers as Hume acd J. ,j. Mil, to which it bears close resemblance in
8 
other respects. It embodies his attempt to overcome such disjunctions in
3. Ibid., p. 82.
4. U. T_., p. xii.
5. Pragmatism, A Je^v i[ame for Some Old V>ays of Thimciac;, London and i.ew 
York: Lon^Hns, Green and Co., 1907, p. 50; Gf. also, 1^. T_., p. 43.
6. Cf. Essays in Radical empiricism, London and ^ew York: Lon^aans, Grc-en 
and Co., Edited by K. 3. Ferry, ISIS, pp. ix, 159, 160, 241.
7. L. T_., p. xii.
8. Gf. E. R. £., pp.
philosophy as those between consciousness and physical nature, between 
thought and its object, between one mind and another, and between one 
"thing" and another, without the help of any "extraneous trans-empirical
connective support", but by regarding such dualities as arising out of
9 
differences of empirical relationship among common empirical terms. The
actual relation which pragmatism bears to his general system may be seen 
from the fact that, while the pragmatic theory of "meaning" and "truth" 
attempts to overcome the disjunction between "idea" and "object", his fun- 
damental theory of relations as given above is not essential to pragma- 
tism. Thus, when pragmatism and empiricism are considered as methods they
10 
are essentially the same, but as doctrines, they are independent. Finally,
radical empiricism contains "a generalized conclusion": "that therefore the 
parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are 
themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs,
in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in
11 
its own right a concatenated or continuous structure." This statement of
the doctrine shows that radical empiricism is not only a theory of knowledge 
which includes pragmatism, but that it is also a metaphysical construction
which eliminates the "hypothesis of trans-empirical reality", and which in-
12 
terprets reality as an "experience-continuum".
James not only regarded his empiricism as more fundamental and more 
important than any other part of his philosophy, but he also considered it 
as especially congenial to religion. This is evident from the following 
declaration: "Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto,
9. Ibid., p. xi; Also, L. T_., p. xiii.
10. Of. J£. h_. _£., pp. xi-xii.
11. T_. _T., pp. xii-xiii.
12. Of. JE. PI. -K., pp. xii, 195; k. T_., p. 152; Of. Also, A Pluralistic Uni- 
verse , Jew York and London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909, Lectures V, VII.
through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irre-
ligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy
1.3 
will be ready to begin." It is obvious that such a doctrine does have an
important bearing upon religion since it involves the treatment of such 
fundamental subjects as consciousness, the self, freedom, and the nature of 
reality. Whether or not Janes is justified in holding that his empiricism 
is especially compatible with religion cannot be determined until after we 
have examined his system at these salient points which are directly related 
to religion. Our immediate concern pertains to his view of consciousness 
which flows directly from his empiricism. 7/e shall reserve for the follow- 
ing chapter our treatment of his view of the self, which came earlier in his 
development of empiricism, since it suits our purpose better to follow this 
order rather than that which James's own thinking followed. '.Ve shall not 
consider the wider metaphysical implications of his doctrine of empiricism, 
as set forth in his A Pluralistic Universe, until after we have dealt with 
other aspects of his system.
Ue have nor to examine his view of consciousness. He sets forth his 
theory of consciousness in the development of the theory of immediate knowl- 
edge. It is characteristic of his empiricism to elevate this type of knowl- 
edge, which he calls "knowledge by acquaintance", to a position of supreme 
importance as constituting knowledge in the ultimately preferred sense. The 
importance which he attaches to immediate knowledge arises from the fact that 
it flows from experience itself, and, for James, the verdict of experience 
is always final; knowledge is not fully consummated until it coincides v.ith 
reality. This is possible only in experience. It is in immediate knowl- 
edge, then, that the nature of the reality presented is revealed. The 
other type of knowledge which he recognizes and which he terms "knowledge
about", is derived from ideas. "Knowledge about" is a substitute for, 
and a supplement to, "knowledge by acquaintance", due to the lir.ited range 
of the latter. Both kinds of knowledge are necessary, but immediate knowl- 
edge is regarded as being coi.-ipleter and more conclusive. Thus we Tiay re- 
gard his theory of "knowledge by acquaintance", which involves his treatment 
of consciousness, as the foundation of his entire system of empirical phil- 
osophy.
In 1904 he published an article entitled "Does Consciousness Exist?"
in which he gives his epistemological theory, and in v;hich he emphatically
15 
denies the existence of consciousness, as one ordinarily understands it.
That is, he denies that there is any such entity as the soul-sub stance of
traditional philosophy. He points out the fact that, in the course of time,
16 
the conception of the soul has been replaced by the transcendental ego. In
the writings of such thinkers as Schuppe, ilatorp, I.linsterburg, and others,
the transcendental ego "attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition,
17 
being only a name for the feet that the 'content 1 of experience is known."
He expresses the opinion that when once consciousness "has evaporated to this
18 
estate of pure diaphaneity", it is on the point of disappearing altogether.
"It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first prin- 
ciples. Those who still clirv; to it are clingins to a mere echo, the faint
19 
rumor left behind by the disappearing 'soul f upon the air of philosophy."
This denial of a soul-substance does not, however, mean for James a denial of 
mind altogether, but the rejection of the conception of mind as a spiritual 
substance possessing some peculiar stuff or quality of being. That is to say,
14. The Principles of Psychology, London: Macmillan Co., 1891, Vol. I, p. 221
15. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific iiethods, Vol. I, Uo. 18,
1904, Reprinted in ji. Iu £., pp. 1-38.
16. _E. R_. i_., p. 1.
17. Ibid., p. 2.
18. Ibid., p. 2.
19 - Ibid., p. 2.
he repudiates "consciousness" as the ghost of the quasi-material soul. He
does not dispense with consciousness as a unique function in experience by
20 
means of which things become known; he does not doubt the function of knowing.
But his view of the non-existence of consciousness, as an entity, as a perma- 
nent ego, was of long standing. "For twenty years past," he writes, "I have 
mistrusted *consciousness' as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have
suggested its non-existence to ray students... It seems to me that the hour is
21 
ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded."
By rejecting consciousness, as a distinct substance, James is preparing 
the way for the formulation of a relational theory of consciousness which 
arises from his biological conception of mind and which is based on his doc- 
trine of "pure experience." Biologically, he regards the mind as essentially
22 
a selective agency, "a theatre of simultaneous possibilities." The action
of the mind is not creative, but at every stage of its development, on every 
level of complexity, its operations are selective. It follows from the nature 
of mind, then, that it derives its content entirely from the environment, and 
its sole contribution to that content is its work of selection. Thus con- 
ceived, the mind is really nothing in and for itself; it is simply the rela- 
tion which exists between objects when they become known, and its being and 
substance come from the^ objects. It is defined in terms of cognition, and 
is regarded as merely a capacity, a grouping, an objective relation added to 
objects when they become known. In the earlier phases of James's empiricism, 
which we shall consider in the following chapter, he attempts to bring within 
experience such dualities as self and not-self, knower and known, and idea and 
object, which traditional thought has regarded as falling outside experience,
20. Ibid., pp. 3,4.
21. Ibid., p. 3
22. Principles, Vol. I, p. 288
or, at least, as occupying a different plane of experience from sense and
23 
feeling. Having carried his empiricism thus far, his next crucial step
towards constructing a theory of consciousness, as a peculiar type of rela- 
tion between objects, rather than as a distinct substance implying a meta- 
physical subject, is to bring within experience the distinction between 
mind and body. Now in order to do this, experience must be made to em- 
brace the physical world as well as consciousness. But before experience 
can thus be extended, it must be severed from its association with con- 
sciousness. In other words, experience must be neutralized by annulling 
the traditional distinction between mind and matter.
He begins by asserting that philosophers have been wrong in accepting
24 
Descartes *s definition of thought as absolutely unextended. He denies that
the psychical and the physical are completely heterogeneous. The reality 
which is sensibly given and the sensation which we have of it are absolutely
identical. The "public" life of things, from which our theoretic construc-
25 
tions come, is homogeneous, and numerically one, with our internal life.
While objects and images are to be distinguished, the one from the other, 
images take the place of objects to lead us to them, and there is no reason
for attributing to images any essential difference of nature from that of
26 
objects. Thought and actuality are made of the same identical stuff.
His study of external perception leads him to the same conclusion concerning 
the homogeneity of the psychical and physical. Here, as elsewhere, the in-
ternal and external are fused indissolubly. This would be impossible, he
27 
argues, if the object and the idea were absolutely disparate. The un-
23. Perry, ogzit,. p. 76.
24. E. R. E_. p. 30.
25. "La Notion de Conscience." Archives de Psychologie . Vol. V, No. 17, 1905 
Reprinted in E. R_. E. pp. 206-233. Of. p. 213.
26. Ibid., pp. 214, 216.
27. Ibid., pp. 216, 217.
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certain status of secondary qualities, as shown by the history of philosophy, 
serves to strengthen his conviction that the psychical and the physical are 
essentially homogeneous. The secondary qualities are objective for common
sense; for the physicist, they are subjective. Even the primary qualities,
28 
he thinks, "are undergoing the same fate."
As to appreciations, they also form an ambiguous sphere of being. They
29
belong with emotion on the one hand, and have objective "value" on the other. 
We repeatedly assign to things external to us the feelings which they arouse 
in UB. We speak of "a painful experience," of "a sad sky," of "a perception 
of loveliness," and of "a frightful storm." Such experiences seem to waver 
between "inner" and "outer"; they may be taken as either or both. The dis- 
tinction of objective and subjective comes later, and arises out of some
30 
urgent practical need of life. "There is no original spirituality or
materiality of being, intuitively discerned, then; but only translocation of
experiences from one world to another; a grouping of them with one set or
31 
another of associates for definitely practical or intellectual ends."
Thus subjectivity and objectivity are simply classifications into which ex- 
perience falls for us, in keeping with our temporary purposes. Further, 
James maintains that the affectional states are quasi-bodily. These states 
cannot be classed as belonging to either the mental or the physical realm. 
The sane thing may affect the body and the mind. "Our body itself is the 
palmary instance of the ambiguous. Sometimes I treat my body purely as a 
part of outer nature. Sometimes, again, I think of it as *mine,* I sort it 
with the 'me,' and then certain local changes and determinations in it pass
28.'The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience,"Journal 
of Philosophy. Vol. II, Ho. 11, 1905. Reprinted in J. R. E. pp. 137-154. 
Of. p. 147.
29. Ibid., p. 34.
30. Ibid., p. 146.
31. Ibid., p. 148.
for spiritual happenings. Its breathing is my 'thinking, 1 its sensorial
adjustments are my 'attention,* its kinesthetic alterations are iny 'efforts, 1
32 
its visceral perturbations are my 'emotions.'" Introspective analysis
leads him to conclude that there is no such thing as "simon-pure" activity,
33 
activity an sich; there is nothing like the spiritual activity of the mind.
What he "feels distinctly" is found to "consist mainly of the collection of
34 
these peculiar notions in the head or between the head and throat." If
the word activity means anything at all, he says, "it must denote what there 
is f ound. . .tThat it is 'known-as' is what there appears. The experiencer of 
such a situation possesses all that the idea contains. He feels the tendency, 
the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up, 
just as he feels the time, the space, the swiftness or intensity, the move-
ment, the weight and color, the pain and pleasure, the complexity, or what-
35 
ever remaining characters the situation may involve."
His rejection of a mental substance and of the spiritual activity of the 
mind carries along with it also the denial of the reality of a spiritual sub- 
ject. He regards the common description of consciousness as an entity, as 
pure activity, as spiritual, directly knowing itself, as a "pure chimera." 
He construes the individual self as a peculiar grouping of the elements of 
experience, which "comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of 
vision, centre of action, centre of interest. Where the body is is 'here'; 
when the body acts is 'now'; what the body touches is 'this'; all other things 
are 'there' and 'then* and 'that'. ..The body is the storm centre, the origin 
of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train.
32. Ibid., p.
33. "The Experience of Activity,* The Psychological Review, Vol. XII, 1905. 
Reprinted as Appendix in P. _tJ. , pp. 370-394. _Cf. pp. 380 ff.
34. Principles, Vol. I, p. 301.
35. P. U. pp. 376-377.
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Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word 
'I, 1 then, is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this,* and f here. f 
Activities attached to 'this' position have prerogative emphasis, and, if ac- 
tivities have feelings, must be felt in a peculiar way. The word 'my' desig- 
nates the kind of emphasis...The 'my' of them is the emphasis, the feeling of
36
perceptive-interest in which they are dyed." The annulment of the distinc- 
tion between the psychical and the physical has been accomplished, and the 
physical body takes the place of the metaphysical subject. In spite of the 
fact that it may sound materialistic, he voices his conclusion in the matter 
as follows: "Let the case be what it may with others, I am as confident as I 
am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize em- 
phatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, 
reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The 'I think* 
which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe* 
which actually does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides 
breathing (intracephalic muscular adjustments, etc...), and these increase the 
assets of 'consciousness, f so far as the latter is subject to immediate per- 
ception; but breath, which was ever the original of 'spirit,' breath moving 
outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the es- 
sence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as 
consciousness. That entity is fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete
are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as
37 
things are." Thus, as a good empiricist, James searches for the meaning
of the word "conscious" in experience and concludes that if it is conceived
38 
as an aboriginal stuff or "all enveloping container," it has no meaning.
56. Ibid., p. 380^
37. E. R. E. pp. 36-37.
38. Perry, op. c'it. p. 94.
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We have now to consider the description of the "sum of concrete reali- 
ties" which James thinks the word "consciousness" ought to cover; that is, 
the moaning he attaches to the word in terms of experience, or what con- 
sciousness is in a world of "pure experience." The one primal stuff of
which the world is composed, according to James, is "pure experience," which
39 
is neither psychical nor physical. It is "neutral." The term "pure"
indicates that the distinction between the mental and the physical has not 
yet been applied to its components. Thus "pure experience" is the "instant 
field of the present," and is only virtually or potentially either subject or
object as yet. "For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or
40 
existence, a simple that" which has not entered into any context or assumed
a functional role. As such, it cannot be defined, but can only be experi- 
enced. It is the stuff of experience in general. There is, however, "no
general stuff of which experience at large is made. There are as many stuffs
41 
as there are 'natures 1 in the things experienced." Experience, then, is
only a class name "for all these sensible natures, and save for time and
space (and, if you like, for 'being*) there appears no universal element of
42 
which all things are made." Any one bit of pure experience is "made of
that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness,
43 
heaviness or what not."
These pure experiences, for James prefers to speak of this original 
stuff in the plural, are capable of entering into an indefinite number of 
varied relations, relations which are themselves essential parts of experience, 
That is to say, it is possible for the same undivided portion of pure experi- 
ence to play different roles in the various contexts in which it finds itself.
39. E. R. E. p. 4.~~~~~
40. Ibid., p. 23.
41. Ibid., p. 26.
42. Ibid., p. 27.
43. Ibid., p. 27.
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We need only to admit "that every smallest bit of experience is a multurn in 
parvo plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or 
function, way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else; and 
that a bit of reality when actively engaged in one of these relations is not 
by that very fact engaged in all the other relations simultaneously. The 
relations are not all what the French call solidaires with one another. 
Without losing its identity a thing can either take up or drop another thing,
like the log...which by taking up new carriers and dropping old ones can
44 
travel anywhere with a light escort." Now, according to this principle,
the portion of experience which enters and forms the content of consciousness, 
may also be considered as the same portion or bit of experience which, when 
in another relation, goes to make up physical nature. In short, the same 
element of experience can belong to both realms at the same time. Thus it 
is possible to explain knowing, in such a universe as this, as a special kind 
of relation existing between two portions of experience. The relation itself 
is a part of pure experience. Since the elements of experience are neither 
psychical nor physical prior to this new relation, there is neither subject
nor object; but in this new relation one of the terms becomes the subject,
45
or knower, and the other the thing known. James maintains that this in- 
volves no inconsistency. It is the problem of how one identical point can
be on two lines. This is possible, provided it is situated at their inter-
46 
section.
Let us take, for example, the experience of the room in which the reader 
is sitting. Its walls, tables, chairs, and so on, form a collection of 
physical things, belonging to the physical world. There is in this experi- 
ence, in addition to this group of physical associates, the internal, personal
44. P. U. pp. 322-323.
45. jS. R. E. p. 4.
46. Ibid., p. 12.
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world of the reader, which world is related in his personal biography, just 
as the physical things are related to the history of the room. There are, 
then, two processes involved in this experience of the room; they are the 
physical and the personal. Now, these two processes flow together and co- 
alesce, in this experience, just as the two lines fuse at their place of
intersection. That is, the pure experience of the room is a place of inter-
47 
section of these two processes. In one of these contexts the room belongs
to the realm of the physical, it is the room in which the reader sits; in the 
other context it is "one's field of consciousness." In other words, the same 
room plays a double role; in one grouping it figures as a thought, in another 
grouping as a thing. The room, as a physical thing, differs in many respects 
from the room as mental or personal. As a room, it owes its existence to the 
plans of an architect, and to the labor and skill of carpenters. It has 
existed for several years; it may continue to exist indefinitely in the future, 
Fire can easily destroy it and its contents. But as mental, or in personal 
experience, it has existed for only a moment or two. You can blot it out of 
existence by closing your eyes. When you leave it, it may remain as a pleas- 
ant, or unpleasant, memory for years. In both cases, however, it is the same 
room of which we are speaking; it forms a part of material nature and is also 
a fact of inner consciousness. The difference between the physical relation- 
ship and the mental may be expressed negatively by saying that the latter
lacks dynamic efficacy. Mental fire does not burn, mental knives do not cut
48 
or harm, and mental guns do not kill. There are also important positive
characteristics of the mental order which occur in James's account, and which 
Professor Perry states as follows: "There is the process of reflection, in 
which a first experience is corrected and transcended by a supervening
47. Ibid., p. 12l
48. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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experience. There is the cognitive reference in which one experience
'points to' an ulterior experience. Finally, there is the factor of in- 
terested selectivity, so conspicuous throughout all of James's descriptions
49 
of mind." But in no case are the elements of experience to be regarded as
intrinsically conscious or personal in themselves. It is always the sane 
elements of experience which, according to their context, figure both as 
physical and as mental, just as the same room in our illustration plays the 
role of a thing in one grouping and in another that of a thought.
This same principle applies, James maintains, when we pass from percepts 
to concepts, from things present to things a long way off. "If we take con- 
ceptual manifolds, or memories, or fancies, they also are in their first in- 
tention mere bits of pure experience, and, as such, as single thats which
50 
act in one context as objects, and in another context figure as mental states."
The room here also plays a double role in that again it is counted twice over;
51 
it is both the "object-thought-of", and the "thought-of-an-object". "As
'subjective' we say that the experience represents; as 'objective' it is rep-
52 
resented." But this experience is not double; it is simple. That which
represents and that which is represented are numerically the same. Such 
terms, therefore, as "subject" and "object", "represented" and representative", 
and "thing" and "thought", stand for a distinction which is merely temporary
and practical. For all practical purposes and needs it is an important dis-
53 
tinction; but it is functional rather than ontological. In memory, a distant
scene which we recall, is related to our present surroundings by certain facts 
and events which are entirely homogeneous on one side with our present
49. Perry, op. cit., p. 96.
50. _S. R. ii., p. 15.
51. Ibid., p. 22.
52. Ibid., p. 25.
53. Ibid., pp. 23, 233.
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environment, and on the other with the object or objects remembered. This 
content of thought does not first appear as something internal which we then 
project to some remote distance; it presents itself as if it were the remote 
fact. Our consciousness of it is the retrospective way of designating the 
content itself, once that content has been separated from its physical "in- 
termediaries", and connected with a new group of associations such as the 
emotions it arouses in us, the attention we give it, and so on. So long 
as we think of this phenomenon in its first group of associates it remains
an "objective" phenomenon. As soon, however, as we place it in the new
54 
grouping it is called a "thought".
These parts of experience are related, or known, in the peculiar way 
which has been described, because of the fact that certain experiences are 
able to lead to certain other experiences, by means of intermediary exper- 
iences. And these experiences are defined in such a way that some find
themselves playing the role of things known, and others that of the knowing
55
subject. Both roles can be clearly defined without once leaving the pat- 
tern of experience and without an appeal, or reference, to anything trans- 
cendent. Neither a metaphysical subject nor an act of consciousness is 
necessary to explain the tvay in which things become known. A new set of 
relations, that is, consciousness, is added to the terms or elements of ex- 
perience. "Consciousness", therefore, "connotes a kind of external rela- 
tion, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity 
of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their 'con- 
scious' quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations-
56 
these relations themselves being experiences to one another." Co.i-
54. Ibid., p. 214.
55. Ibid., p. 13, 14.
56. Ibid., p. 25.
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sciousness, then, like the knowing subject, is found to consist in a peculiar 
relationship between the terras of experience. It differs from other things 
as one grouping differs from another grouping of the sane elements or terms; 
just as the Democratic party, for example, differs from the people of the 
United States. It exists in this sense, but does not enjoy separate exist- 
ence; that is, it has no existence entirely different from, or apart from, 
other things, as one object exists outside another in the physical world. 
"Thus while it means nothing to say that yellow is made of conscious stuff, 
or is contained within a conscious receptacle, it does mean something to say 
that when the yellow of the rose is connected by expectation with other sen- 
sory data, such as fragrance, or with melancholy memories or romantic hopes,
57 
then these elements compose consciousness." Thus these elements, while
not in themselves conscious or mental, constitute a peculiar arrangement 
the structural characteristic of which is consciousness; these same elements 
are capable of entering into other particular combinations which constitute 
the physical world and other orders of being. Since, then, the physical 
and mental world may overlap in common phenomena or pure experience, there is 
no occasion to appeal to a transcendent externality.
This principle is used also to explain "how two minds can know one thing,"
and to show how the same thing may be known by the same mind at different
58 
times. These bits of reality or "neutral" elements are capable not only
of connecting consciousness with the various objective orders of being, but 
also of connecting other streams of consciousness, or other minds. They are 
able to enter into two or more conscious arrangements or groupings at the
57. Perry, op. cit. p. 94.
58. "A World of'Pure Experience." Journal of Philosophy. Vol. I, Nos. 20 and 
21, 1904. Reprinted, with alterations in E. R. J3., pp. 39-91. Also, "How 
Two Minds Can Know One Thing," Journal of Philosophy. Vol. II, No. 7, 1905. 
Reprinted in E. R. ji., pp. 123-136.
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same time. That is, they can be objects for many different minds. Their 
capacity to act as common objects to two or more minds enables different 
minds to become co-terminous and commutable. Similarly, the same rr.ind is 
enabled to know the same thing at different times. "The different pulses 
of one consciousness may thus overlap and interpenetrate. And where these 
pulses are successive, the persistence of these common factors, marginal in 
one and focal in the next, gives to consciousness its peculiar connectedness
and continuity. There is no need, therefore, of a synthesis ab extra; there
59 
is sameness and permanence and universality within the content itself."
This original and ingeneous theory of consciousness represents the
<*"
philosophical genius of James at its best and sets forth the ablest attempt 
in modern philosophy to avoid both episteraological and psycho-physical dualism. 
It has had a profound influence upon American philosophy and has served as 
the point of departure for the- American school of Neo-Realism. This school, 
however, has gone beyond James in its repudiation of the acts of conscious- 
ness; it has gone so far as to abolish awareness. But James, as we have 
seen, does not deny the function of knowing. Professor R. B. Perry, who 
gives his neo-realistic view in his well known work, Present Philosophical 
Tendencies, to which we have referred above, writes in his most recent book 
on James's philosophy as follows: "It is regrettable that James was not more 
persistently and stubbornly consistent in his own radicalism. If experience
is to have the physical and metaphysical scope which he attributed to it, it
60 
must be boldly emancipated from all conscious or mental implications."
Despite the fact that James frequently writes as though experience and con-
61 
scious experience were the same thing, Professor Perry rightly insists that
59. R. B. Perry, "The Philosophy of William James," Appendix to Prese"nt 
Philosophical Tendencies, London and New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1929. p. 354.
60. In the Spirit of Y/illiara James, p. 100.
61. _E. J. _£. pp. 46-47, 65-66.
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if consciousness is a special relation of the elements of experience, then
62 
the logical issue is to regard the other relations as non-conscious. The
neo-realists are carrying James's theory of consciousness to its logical 
conclusion in maintaining that consciousness is merely a relation between 
or among physical objects. In this respect the ^'iinerican school differs 
from the English school of i-jao-ilealism in that the latter holds that con- 
sciousness is a relation between a psychical subject and physical objects. 
This difference is no doubt due to the fact that James's influence upon the 
former is very strong and direct, while the English lieo-Realists are influ- 
enced by the view of G. 2. Loore, as set forth in his well known essay, "The
63 
Refutation of Idealism." E. o. Holt, another prominent representative of
the American school of Neo-Realism, defines the knowing process in terms of 
the response of the nervous system to a cross-section of the environment. 
He says, "the phenomenon of response defines a cross-section of the environ- 
ment without, which is a neutral manifold. Now this neutral cross-section 
outside of the nervous system, and composed of the neutral elements of 
physical and non-physical objects to which the nervous system is responding 
by some specific response,  this neutral cross-section, I submit, coin- 
cides exactly with the list of objects of which we say that we are conscious, 
This neutral cross-section as defined by the specific reaction of reflex- 
arcs is the psychic realm: it is the manifold of our sensations, percep-
64 
tions and ideas: it is consciousness." It is obvious that this definition
of consciousness bears a close resemblance to James's view, although it goes 
further than James's theory does in that it does "boldly emancipate" the
62. Perry, op. cit., p. 98.
63. I.lnd, II. 3., Vol. 1-3I, 1903. Of. G. .HJ. i.Ioore, Philosophical Studies, 
New York: narcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., London: iCegan Paul, Trenoh, Trubner 
and Co., Ltd., 1922, pp. 1-30.
64. E. B. Holt, Tne Concept of Consciousness, London: George Alien and 
Co., Ltd., 1914, p. 182.
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65
"neutral" elements "from all conscious or mental implications." lir. Holt 
makes it clear in the Preface to his book that he regards his view of con- 
sciousness as similar to, and an outcome of, James f s theory. He says, "The 
definition of consciousness proposed in the following pages is in no small
part inspired by the Radical Empiricism of Professor James; and is, I believe,
66
throughout consonant with that view." F. J. E. Woodbridge, another prom- 
inent American philosopher, defines consciousness "as a kind of continuum
of objects," and he says that "objects are connected in consciousness in
67 
such a way that they become known. He adds, "It is important to note that,
while this is so, knowledge is wholly determined in its content by the rela- 
tions of the objects in consciousness to one another, not by the relation of 
consciousness to the objects." It is obvious that in the case of each of 
these thinkers whom we have mentioned as advocating a relational theory of 
consciousness, there is a striking similarity to James's view; and in each 
case James's theory seems not to go far enough to meet the logical demands 
of the situation. In other words, once we go as far as James's theory 
goes in rejecting consciousness, there is no satisfactory stopping place 
short of an outright denial of the acts of consciousness altogether.
This doctrine of James has borne fruit in another direction, namely, 
upon the behavioristic school of psychology. Encouraged and influenced by 
James's denial of consciousness as a distinct substance, this school has 
gone all the way and rejects consciousness altogether. It endeavors to 
interpret all conscious processes entirely in terms of the behavior of the 
individual. The behaviorist strikes from his scientific vocabulary "all
65. Perry, op. cit. p. 100.
66. OJD. c'it. pr~xTii.
67. F. J. E. Woodbridge, Nature and Llind, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1937, pp. 309, BTT.
68. Ibid., p. 311.
20
subjective terras such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose,
69
and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined." He re- 
gards the behavior or activities of the human being as the subject matter
of psychology, and claims that consciousness is neither a definable nor a
70 
usable concept. Thus limiting himself to what he can observe, he says,
"we can observe behavior"; that is, "what the organism does or says...say- 
ing is doing -that is, behaving, speaking overtly to ourselves (thinking)
71 
is just as objective a type of behavior as baseball." i/e are not attempt-
ing to place the responsibility upon James for the extremes of either of 
these two modern schools of thought in our suggestion that he has consider- 
ably influenced them, but we do believe that there is some justification for 
holding that his position, while he simply means to deny a permanent ego, and 
not tne function of knowing, ultimately leads to such extremes, and taat, to 
that extent, he has had much to do with these attempts to repudiate conscious- 
ness as an act or state of awareness. 'v'e may conclude then, as F. H. Ten-
nant says, that the "recent phase of the effort to get rid of the concept of
72 
consciousness, seems to have been initiated by Professor W. James." Nor is
<
it merely a case of these thinkers claiming the distinction of James's in- 
fluence, as Professor J. 3. Bixler seems to regard it. In protest against 
associating James with such extreme doctrines, he writes as follows: "The 
fact may be worth dwelling on that James was particularly keenly aware of 
the importance and significance of human volitional activity. It is desir- 
able to make this emphasis at a time like the present when certain scientific 
disciplines, claiming direct descent from James, are pressing the mechanistic
69. J. B. V.'atson, Behaviorism, New York: The People's Institute Publishing 
Co., 1924, 1925, p. 6.
70. Ibid., p. 3.
71. Ibid., p. 6.
72. F. it. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1928, Vol. I, Appendix, Note A, p. 566.
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73 
view of human life." He is forced to admit in the next sentence that
"James has given us a scientific description of experience with the indi-
74 
vidual consciousness left out." For despite the fact that James seems
never to have denied consciousness as a function of knowing, he appears to
have come very close to it when, for instance, he asserts that thinking is
75 
identical with breathing; and sometimes he appears to define mental action
in terms of bodily action as the following statement shows: "So far as we
are 'persons', and contrasted and opposed to an 'environment', movements in
76 
our body figure as our activities." Having gone as far as he appears to have
gone, it certainly would be simpler and more logical to identify the mind
77 
with the body, as Professor perry seems to do. If James's successors have
seen the logical conclusion of his view it nay well be because they stand 
upon his shoulders and look in the same direction in which he was headed; 
but they see further and perhaps more clearly. This seems to be more prob- 
able than Professor Bixler's contention, which evidently implies that they 
make claims to which they pre not entitled concerning James's influence upon 
their thinking in respect to consciousness.
7/e have dwelt somewhat at length upon the influence of this doctrine 
upon these extreraer forms of thought because it is obvious that any view 
which is capable of being carried logically to such extreme conclusions 
will arouse suspicion so far as religious philosophy is concerned. Also, 
we have stressed the fact that James regarded his empiricism as the most im- 
portant part of his philosophy, and that his epistemology is basic to that 
system. Furtner, we noted that he conceived his empiricism to be especially
73. J. o. Bixler, religion in the Philosophy of :;«illiar:i Janes, Boston: 
Marsnall Jones Company, 1926, Preface, p. x.
74. Ibid., p. x.
75. £. K. Z. , pp. 36-37.
76. P. U., p. 379, note. Cf. R. 3. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 
p. 285.
77. Ibid., p. 285.
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favorable to religion. It does not need any argument to show that any view 
which discards the soul, and lends itself to such mechanical interpretations 
as those we have suggested, cannot be considered as favorable to religion. 
It must so far forth be regarded as definitely anti-religious. And this is 
true in spite of the fact, as Professor Bixler remarks, "that no one has
sketched more boldly than he the possibilities which can only be made actual
78 
through individual personal choice." For it is obviously inconsistent to
deny the permanent reality of the self while the importance of "individual 
personal choice*1 is emphasized; if consciousness is the scanty thing which 
his theory makes it out to be, he is hardly justified in attributing to it 
the efficiency which he says it has. It is hardly less absurd to recognize 
the reality of consciousness while its efficiency is denied, than it is to 
reduce it to a minimum while claiming for it a maximum of efficacy. Plainly, 
such a view of consciousness as James gives us renders it necessary for us to 
account for the place which is occupied in the structure of the world by such 
realities as choice, purpose, goodness, and so on,   for he does strongly 
emphasize the fact that they hold an essential place in the general inter- 
pretation of the universe,   by a consciousness devoid of activity. For 
when knowledge, along with art, morality, and religion is seen to be ways 
in which the activity of the mind expresses itself, it is no longer possible 
to remain content with an interpretation of consciousness as merely an ob- 
jective relation between objects known. If ethical, social, and religious 
values are the fruits of spirit and mind, the only adequate view of mind is 
the concept of inner activity which is not amenable to discovery or descrip- 
tion. And there is no good reason for supposing that these values can be 
fully accounted for without any reference to the activity of the mind. In 
78. Op. cit. p. x.
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short, as J. 3. Mackenzie argues, there are various ways in which to ap- 
proach this problem, such as the empirical, the mystical, and the metaphys- 
ical; and the last way does not consist in rendering such an account of the 
nature of knowledge as to show that nothing can be real except that which 
knows or is known. It is not altogether epistemological, but consists
rather in showing the place which such values as we have mentioned occupy
79
in the structure of reality. To attempt this while regarding conscious- 
ness as impassive is futile. Thus the empirical approach is not the only 
one open to us; nor is it the most satisfactory. Vie agree with John Dewey 
when he says that the doctrine that things are only and just what they are 
"known-as", which is James's "methodical postulate", is the "root paralo- 
gism of all idealisms, whether subjective or objective, psychological or
80 
epistemological." Further, James's account of consciousness, setting out
from the standpoint of presentationism, as it does, considerably weakens 
his argument for freedom. He could hardly make a greater concession to 
the determinists whom he battles constantly, and who regard any attempt to 
deny the reality of the self or subject of experience as a victory for them. 
As J. ?;ard says, "determinism and sensationalism alike, in common with all 
naturalistic thinking, set out from the objective standpoint, as if it were 
absolute. The subjective factor in all experience, which the natural
sciences can safely ignore, can, they assume, be ignored by the moral and
81 
historical sciences too." Professor ,ard says further, in exposing the
absurdity of the conception of the mind as "only a bundle of percepts and 
motives", ivithout a subject of experience: "Jut since presentationism
79. J. 3. Liackenzie, "IvJLnd and Body", I.JLnd, IT. 3. Vol. AX, Ho. 80, 1911, 
p. 504. Of. pp. 489-506.
80. J. Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Assays, 
New York: Henry Holt and Co., 191C, p. 228.
81. J. tfard, Tne Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism, Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1911, p. 290.
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cannot consistently regard presentations themselves as purposive, there can
82 
be no purpose in the Many at all." It is obvious, then, that James f s
theory of consciousness does lend itself to a mechanical interpretation as 
regards freedom, and, as we shall see later, it is because he concedes so 
much to the mechanistic view with reference to the effort of attention, as 
the crucial factor in freedom, that he is forced to inject an element of 
chance into his conception of freedom. But he could have saved his doc- 
trine of freedom from this more objectionable feature by construing the self 
in more "activistic" terms.
Another reason why his interpretation of consciousness arouses suspicion 
from the standpoint of religion is its failure satisfactorily to account for 
the persistence of the individual life. This question is of chief practical 
importance for religion. He follows Locke and Kant in making the distinction 
between substantial identity and personal identity, and he stresses the impor- 
tance of only the latter, the continuity of consciousness being the one thing 
of importance, whereas the "substratum of that continuance" was a matter of 
indifference to him. Professor Ward rightly urges the objection against a 
similar position taken by Lotze, that if we regard the matter in this light
we have little ground for assurance as regards immortality. He says, "he
83 
would be but a very shallow thinker who could be assured in such a case."
For if consciousness has no substratum, as James maintains, we are left in 
a hopeless quandary concerning the entire question of immortality. This is 
especially true if we are to interpret his philosophy as never quite fully 
going over to panpsychism which, according to Professor Perry, he "was 
repeatedly on the verge of accepting, which he constantly praised, but to
82. Ibid. t p.
83. Ibid., p. 390.
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which he seems never to have given his explicit and unreserved assent."
For if it is not possible to regard the mind or the self as having a more 
persistent mode of being than that of the physical organism, the death of 
the latter would also mean the end of the individual life. It is quite true 
that our conscious life is very intimately related to a particular organism, 
and is closely bound up with the condition of the brain and nervous system 
as well as with other aspects of the physical organism. But unless it were 
shown that soul and body are identical, the close correlation between the 
conscious life and the bodily organism would not necessarily imply that the 
individual's existence comes to an end with the decay and dissolution of the 
latter. We are not arguing that the category of substance furnishes an 
argument for the continuity of the individual life after the death of the 
particular organism; but it does seem obvious that once we discard the con- 
ception of substance, we render inconceivable the possibility of continued 
existence, unless some such conception as panpsychism comes to our aid. Re- 
ligion cannot rest content with any view of the soul that leaves such a vital 
question as this without a more satisfactory answer. James's position, how- 
ever, does serve to bring out an important fact as regards this question, 
namely, that the mere persistence of the individual subject will not satisfy 
us, but that our supreme interest is in the continuity of our personal life. 
Of course we cannot infer the latter from the former, but our quarrel with 
James's view is due to the fact that his denial of the substantiality of the 
self renders the conception of the existence of the personal life unintellig- 
ible. James rightly emphasizes the fact that the soul itself is not the man, 
This aspect of the matter may easily be ignored in our efforts to establish 
the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Christian thought places
84. R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1935, Vol. II, p. 592.
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emphasis upon the value, dignity and perpetuity of the human body as well as 
upon that of the soul, and regards the complete man as being body and soul 
together in one. E. Gilson writes in this connection as follows: "At bottom 
the whole difficulty comes to this: man is a unity given as such and the 
philosopher is bound to take account of the fact. When I say that I know, 
I do not mean that my body knows by means of the soul, or that the soul knows 
by means of the body; but that this concrete being 'I, 1 taken in its unity,
performs an act of knowing. The same thing holds when I say that I_ live,
85 
or simply that I_ am; f l f means neither the body nor the soul, but the man."
He goes on to say that the whole man alone deserves the name of substance, 
but that he owes his substantiality to that of the soul. "For the human 
soul is act, and is therefore a thing for itself and a substance; the body, 
on the contrary, although without it the soul cannot develop the fullness of
its actuality, has neither actuality nor subsistence, save those received
86 
from its form, that is to say from the soul." Thus the dissolution of the
body, which owes its being to the soul, cannot involve that of the soul; nor 
does the soul alone constitute the complete man. Gilson does not regard 
the substance "man" as a combination of two substances, but as a complex
substance the substantiality of which derives from only one of its two con-
87
stitutive principles. To quote him further: "Souls have now become im- 
mortal substances, which cannot develop their activity, without the co- 
operation of sensorial organs; in order to obtain this co-operation they 
actualize a matter; it is due wholly to them that this matter is a body, and 
yet they are not themselves save in a body; the man, therefore, is neither 
his body, since the body subsists only by the soul, nor his soul, since this
85. E. Gilson. The Spirit of Mediaeval" Philosophy, English Translation by 
A. H. C. Downes, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936, p. 181.
86. Ibid., p. 187.
87. Ibid., pp. 187-188.
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would remain destitute without the body: he is the unity of a soul which
88 
substantializes his body and of the body in which this soul subsists."
We have quoted this author somewhat at length to show that James's "philos- 
ophy of the body" does emphasize the important truth that substantial iden- 
tity is not enough, and serves as a corrective to any view which treats the 
soul and body as two entirely separate and independent entities while only 
the importance of the immortality of the soul is stressed. But the recog- 
nition of this aspect of the matter does not render it necessary to deny 
the reality of a permanent self altogether; this procedure is even more un- 
satisfactory than the one-sided interpretation often given to this question.
This leads us to consider another objection to James's theory of con- 
sciousness, from the religious standpoint  that which arises out of its at- 
tempt to account for the whole man in terms of evolution. It is character- 
istic of evolutional philosophy to hold that the elements such as Time, Space, 
Causation, Logical Unity, and Ideality, in the human mind, are the results of 
the process of evolution. According to this doctrine, these elements are
built outright in the course of evolution from what seems to be their as-
89 
sumed non-existence, and are regarded as explicable by evolution. It does
not admit «i priori consciousness "in the individual person as an individ-
90 
ual, nor in the human mind at all, as specifically human." For the most
part, as we have seen, James's theory of consciousness arises out of this ev- 
olutionary conception of mind which, supported by the scientific history of 
the globe and of the race, maintains that man attained this faculty by infin- 
itely gradual steps. But the Christian religion refuses to accept the teach- 
ing that the whole man is a product of the evolutionary process. What is meant
> p> 188t
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by Man is not, and cannot be, in his entirety, the result of evolution; this 
is a fundamental tenet of the Christian faith. G. H. Howison expresses his 
conviction concerning the incompatability between Christian thought and an 
all-inclusive evolutionary view of man in the following words: "Man the spirit, 
man the real mind, is not the offspring of Nature, but rather Nature is in a 
great sense the offspring of this true Human Nature...But it is time we all 
understood how finally at variance with the heart of the Christian Faith and 
hope is any doctrine of evolution that views the whole of human nature as the 
product of 'continuous creation':- as merely the last term in a process of 
transmissive causation. The product of such a process could not be morally 
free, nor, consequently, morally responsible. It must needs be a mass of 
'inherited tendency'; and, howsoever fair its effect might appear, no life
of genuine dutifulness, no life of goodness freely chosen, could enter into
91
its being." Further, we are faced with a greater difficulty when we re- 
call that James's doctrine of a finite God makes God Himself subject to the
evolutionary process. He conceives God as having an external environment,
92 
"being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves," and as
capable of "increase of very being." It follows that if God is a finite, 
struggling, growing Self, "just like ourselves," subject to similar en- 
vironmental conditions, in the upward surge of the evolutionary process, 
there appears to be no good reason to attribute to the reality of His self- 
hood a status any different from that which James assigns to the human self. 
Both would appear to be the outcome of a long evolutionary process and both 
would be subject to similar limitations. Moreover, if the whole of man is 
to be accounted for in terms of evolution, we would be justified, in view 
of this situation, in considering the entire being of God as a product of the
91. Ibid., pp. 48, 51.
92. P. U. p. 218, Cf. p. 124.
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same evolutionary process. Whether or not there is any justification for 
elevating evolution to an ultimate principle will not be discussed until we 
come to the treatment of the wider applications of James f s theory of reality; 
at present we are simply pointing out the logical implications of his doc- 
trine of consciousness as a vital part of his general scheme of thought. 
This criticism would not, of course, apply to any view which, while regarding 
Ivlind as one element in Nature,- and as such involved in the evolutionary 
process- accounts for its appearance in Nature by reference to an Immanent 
or Transcendent Mind. For instance, William Temple holds that the "more 
completely we include Mind within Nature, the more inexplicable must Nature 
become except by reference to Mind... the more we identify ourselves with
the rest of the natural order, the more we are compelled to assert the
95
reality of a supernatural Creator.*' But this is quite a different con- 
ception from that of James which replaces the M supernatural Creator" with a 
God who is, at best, a larger finite self than man, but who is just as much 
subject to the process of evolution as other selves. It is obvious that 
any view of the self which is capable of these interpretations cannot be 
easily reconciled with the religious view of man and of God; and, any at- 
tempt to evaluate the contribution which James makes to religious thought 
cannot afford to ignore the religious consequences of one of the most 
fundamental parts of his system.
Our criticism of his theory of consciousness thus far consists in show- 
ing why we regard it as unsatisfactory from the point of view of religion. 
We have now to consider some of the most conspicuous points of weakness, and 
some of the more obvious difficulties, which the doctrine presents apart from 
its objectionable features for religion; it cannot be assumed to be false
93. Villiam Temple, Nature, Man and God, London: Macnillan and 
Company, Ltd., 1934, pp. 132, 1347
30
simply because it runs counter to certain religious teachings. In the 
first place, according to James's doctrine of "pure experience," the dis- 
tinction between the psychical and the physical is functional rather than 
ontological. That is to say, before any such distinction is made in ex- 
perience, the stuff of experience is "neutral." He does not, however, 
satisfactorily explain how this "pure experience" which, by hypothesis, 
contains no such distinction, which is, indeed, without any definable 
nature,  a mere "that,"  can affect from within this difference which 
comes as a result of the peculiar relation into which the elements of ex- 
perience enter. In other words, if experience, as such, has no inner 
duplicity, it is inconceivable how he can avoid the necessity of a knower 
before an element of experience can be "taken" in one context as a knower, 
and in another as a thing known. His view seems to imply an actual ex- 
perient before the distinction between the psychical and the physical can 
come about at all. In short, the very statement of the doctrine implies 
what he openly rejects. Any other interpretation of it fails to account 
for the fact that this peculiar relation does not obtain between just any 
two elements of experience of whatsoever kind. If this capacity is found 
only where mind is,there must be something accompanying this capacity which 
is different in nature from, and distinct from, other portions of experience. 
Moreover, it is not clear how one is to distinguish "pure experience" from 
indeterminate being, or mere nothingness. Still more, the contention that 
"pure experience" is prior to the distinction between the psychical and the 
physical does not appear to be compatible with his view that nothing shall
be considered as real except "what can be experienced at some definite
94 
time by some experient," whether one's self, a neighbor, or by itself.
94. E. R. E. p. 160, p. 88.     
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It has already been shown that the logical outcome of James's view of 
consciousness is the doctrine of Neo-Realism. This serves to indicate that 
his doctrine of "pure experience" does not provide a solid foundation on 
which to build a system of philosophy. It is a transitional philosophy, 
suspended in mid-air; it is a half-way house on the road to Neo-Realism. 
Professor D. C. Macintosh calls it a "disguised psychological idealism," 
which, he says, arises when the doctrine "that objects depend for their ex- 
istence upon their being experienced as objects, is applied to the subject
95
as one of the objects. 1* Both selves and things, subjects and objects, de- 
pend for their existence upon their relation. Prior to self-consciousness, 
experience is "pure" or "neutral"; there is no self. Now it is obvious, as 
Professor Macintosh points out, that such a view is of unstable equilibrium, 
for, if contents are independent of any relation to a conscious subject, as
this doctrine holds, it is only natural ultimately to conclude that they are
96 
real independently of their being experienced. Or, to quote Professor
R. B. Perry: "If pure experience is indeed neutral, then it is capable of
being actual in the absence of that peculiar modification of itself which
97 
constitutes consciousness." Thus when "psychological idealism" is no
longer applied to the object, the result is the New Realism which is a 
thoroughgoing epistemological monism, frequently called "pan-objectivism." 
Thus the philosophy of "pure experience," is merely a transitional stage, 
and as such, is inadequate as a permanent basis for a philosophy.
It is open to question, to pass on to the consideration of another dif- 
ficulty which James f s doctrine presents, whether a strict rendering of his 
account of knowledge really gives us what we usually mean by the term
95. D. C. Macintosh. The Problem of Knowledge, New York: The L'ac- 
millan Company,1915, p. 109.
96. Ibid., pp. 109-111.
97. In the Spirit of William James, p. 98.
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knowledge. He maintains that, in the experience-train, one experience 
leads to another until finally the object of thought is actually disclosed 
and known. If we take him literally, we really have no right to say that 
an object is known in the sense that we recognize it as the object "meant" 
or anticipated, until it is actually presented in experience. As A. K. 
Rogers suggests, the earlier step in the series of experiences which lead up 
to the experience in which the object is disclosed, is now not there to con- 
stitute the object known, and "it will be no more than itself f enjoying*
itself, on a par with any other bit of pure experience that one might se-
98 
lect." This version of the matter would appear to render "knowledge of
acquaintance" practically meaningless, and "knowledge about" impossible. 
For to quote Rogers once more, "unless knowing be regarded as not in itself 
an experiencing at all, but only the impersonal fact that some later exper- 
ience is on the way, - the knower can only be the pure experience just pre- 
ceding, and one experience can only know its immediate successor; but this
99 
is wholly out of relation to what we concretely mean by knowledge."
The question of the ultimate distinction between the psychical and the 
physical leads us to the very crux of the problem of knowledge. To attempt 
to annul this distinction does not solve the problem; it is tantamount to a 
refusal to accept the problem as it presents itself. It is to strip knowl- 
edge of its most characteristic feature, namely, the reference to a reality 
distinct from itself. Knowledge does not appear to have any meaning if it 
does not mean that a subject knows an object. This carries with it the idea 
of separation and difference as the very conditions of knowledge. If, as 
we have intimated, James is not really speaking of "knowing" when he says
98. A. K. Rogers,"Some Recent Theories of Consciousness,"Mind, N. S. 
Vol. XXIX, No. 115, 1920. p. 303. _Cf. pp. 303 ff.
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33
100
that two elements come together in "a unity of experience", less impor- 
tance nay be attached to his view that the elements of experience are es- 
sentially tho same in nature. That is to say, if he means to show that 
two elements of experience are capable of combining among themselves, with- 
out any reference to such an agency as the self, it does not prove that 
knowledge is possible without making the distinction between the psychical 
and the physical. But this distinction appears to be involved in both 
the necessity and possibility of knowledge. To use the words of A. Seth 
Pringlc-.t'attison, "It is individuation, distinctness in existence, that 
calls for knowledge and gives it scope. Feelings, images, ideas, beliefs, 
volitions these are the components of consciousness, they have an exist- 
ence generically distinct from that which we attribute to things as real 
beings, whether material or spiritual. By means of certain of these con- 
scious facts those called cognitive the being in whom they occur believes
that he is made aware of the existence, nature, and actions of existences
101 
other than himself." Normally, knowledge is mediate; it is the result of
a process; and it involves transcendence on the part of the object with ref- 
erence to the knowing thought. That is, it points towards, looks forward 
to the object which may be known later. In a word, the world of objects is 
trans-subjective, lies beyond, the world of consciousness. Consequently, 
it implies the very sort of dualistic transcendence of the world of real 
things to the world of consciousness which James repudiates. Thus we are 
led to conclude that the distinction between the psychical and the physical
is ultimate, so far as knowledge is concerned, and that the subject-object
102 
relation is the irreducible basis of thought.
100. A. K. Rogers, Ibid., pp. 302-£U5.~~
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It is very true that the things which we perceive, remember, and image
are objects of consciousness. But it does not follow that the things 
which we perceive, remember, and image, belon: to an inner mental world. 
As J. Laird points out, "linen I see a blue sky on a winter's day and notice 
sadly how different the trees are from their budding greenness in spring, 
the blue is not conscious of the green, or the green of the blue, and the 
principle of difference is not conscious of either. It is I who am con- 
scious, I who apprehend the green and the blue and the difference. Lly con- 
sciousness is not a character of the things I observe or think or imagine, 
and it is very doubtful whether it is ever written on the faces of the things
I know. i,.y consciousness is my awareness or apprehension of these things,
103 
together with the feelings and strivings which accompany ray apprehension."
Thus such experiences cannot be regarded as subjective and objective accord- 
ing to their functional role. Further, James's conclusion that the affec- 
tional states are either mental or physical seems to arise from an obvious 
failure to distinguish between feeling and sensation. It is a very doubt- 
ful procedure to resolve feeling into sensation. Lr. G. F. Stout holds 
that the variability of the affactional attitude and the relativity of the
affectional values serve to distinguish affectional states from sensa-
104 
tions. He finds a further characteristic difference in the fact that
"distinct affective states are not capable of existing together in a sinul-
105 
taneous plurality as sensations are." Also, feelings are not governed by
the same laws as the objective factors of experience. They cannot be 
localized like tastes, nor can they be projected into things like colors.
103. J. Laird, ^ Jtudy in Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
New York: The Kiacmillan Co., 19^8, _;>. 163.
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Feeling does not depend upon external objects or peripheral stimulation as 
does sensation. Sensations can be analyzed, associated,and reproduced in 
a way that feelings, for the most part, cannot be. It has not been possible 
to discover special nerves as centers for feeling as has been done for sensa- 
tions. "Feeling-tone*1 is less objective than sensations. There seems to 
be no good reason for regarding the "feeling-tone" of a percept as a part of
the percept or as a quality of a thing. As J. B. Pratt has said, it is
106 
"the way one feels, the state of the self rather than its object." In a
word, then, feelings are peculiarly subjective. They are moments or aspects 
of the attitude of the self and are not presented as introspective objects 
in a diaphanous and inactive consciousness. Professor J. Ward thinks that 
there are good grounds for holding "that feeling is not obscure cognition 
nor sensation objectified feeling; that feeling, in a word, is alvsays sub- 
jective and sensations always objective...according to this view, the duality
107 
of consciousness or the antithesis of subject and object is fundamental."
It is the subjective element or coloring in feelings that enables us to link 
them up to our own individual life, and were it not for their peculiarly sub- 
jective aspect there would appear to be no adequate reason for regarding 
them as our own at all.
James's denial of mental activity also arises out of a failure to con- 
sider all of the facts involved. If all mental processes are no more than 
bodily adjustments there seems to be no justification for maintaining the 
distinction between the mind and the body. It would be simpler, as we have 
indicated, to identify them. But it is one thing to say that our mental 
processes are accompanied by organic sensations, and quite another thing to
106. J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, New York: The l.iacmillan Company,
1937, p. 291.
107. J. Ward,"Modern Psychology: A Reflection,"Mind, N. S. Vol. II, No. 5,
1893. p. 6£. Of. pp. 54-82.
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say that organic sensations constitute mental processes. J. Laird is es- 
sentially right in suggesting that if "assent and dissent consisted of such
sensations, a treatise on the glottis ought to replace the literature deal-
108 
ing with theory of knowledge." There is one fact which appears to be
fatal to any attempt to deny the activity of the mind, namely, that of "mean- 
ing," or the "intentional" character of consciousness. Yfo have already said 
that knowledge implies transcendence on the part of the object as regards
the knowing thought. As E. Husserl puts it, cogito means "I have conscious-
109 
ness of something; I perform an act of consciousness." He says that
"directedness towards," the "being turned towards," is the distinctive mark
110 
of focal actuality; an experience that is a consciousness of something is
111 
said to be intentionally related to this something. He goes on to say:
"If an intentional experience is actual, carried out, that is, after the 
manner of the cogito, the subject 'directs 1 itself within it towards the in- 
tentional object. To the cogito itself belongs an immanent 'glancing- 
towards* the object, a directedness which from another side springs forth 
from the f Ego, f which can therefore never be absent. This glancing of the 
Ego towards something is in harmony with the act involved, perceptive in 
perception, fanciful in fancy, approving in approval, volitional in will, 
and so forth. This means, therefore, that this having in one's glance, in 
one's mental eye, which belongs to the essence of the cogito, to the act as 
such, is not in itself in turn a proper act, and in particular should not be 
confused with a perceiving {in however wide a sense this term is used), or
108. J. Laird."Introspection,"Mind, N. S. Vol. XXVIII, No. 112, 1919, 
pp. 403-404. Of. pp. 386-406.
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with any other types of act related to perceptions." Thus both elements
of consciousness, namely, "idea" and "meaning," are necessary to constitute 
a complete psychosis. We do not have a complex psychical whole when either 
the "idea" or "meaning" is ignored. In short, it is not possible to con- 
ceive the "idea" alone as the sole constituent of consciousness when refer- 
ence to something which it means is essential to its very existence. Now 
"meaning," by virtue of its very nature, cannot be discovered and described 
by the presentationist; it always eludes his grasp. To conclude, therefore, 
that activity does not exist, when this fact is ignored, is to rest one's 
conclusion on partial evidence, omitting essential factors in the situation. 
Another fact which James's effort to abolish mental activity apparently 
overlooks is that of attention. It does not fall upon the objective side 
of experience. Take, for example, selective attention, which fixes upon a 
thing to the exclusion of all that is irrelevant until the physical existent 
becomes a psychically non-existent. This process results in greater clarity, 
steadiness, and control in the object. No doubt some of the differences 
which occur in this process may be attributed to differences in the object. 
But there are others which cannot be assigned to the object, such as the 
certainty of the differences which are observed, and whatever changes that
may occur in one's attitude towards the object as a result of the act of
113 
attention. In order to show more clearly that attention falls upon the
subjective side of experience, it may be well to follow at some length 
Professor J. Ward's analysis of experience. He defines psychology "as the 
science of individual experience  understanding by experience not merely, 
not primarily, cognition, but also, and above all, conative activity or
112. Ibid., p. 121.
113. Of. J. Laird, A Study in Realism, p. 166.
38
114
behavior." He regards experience itself as the commerce between subject
115 
and object. He distinguishes between the "subjective" and "objective"
aspect of experience as follows: the subjective standpoint is that of the
116 
"living subject in intercourse with his special environment", while the
objective standpoint is that of "science in which the characteristics of in-
117 
dividual environments are in general ignored." The latter standpoint con-
118 
sists of presentations, such as sense data, images, and so on. Feeling
119 
and attention constitute the subjective side. He limits "feeling" to
120 
pleasure and pain, and extends the denotation of the term "attention" so
as to include what we should call inattention. "Instead, therefore, of 
the one summum ^enjis, 'state of mind or consciousness' with its three co-or- 
dinate subdivisions, cognition, emotion, conation," says Professor Uard, 
"our analysis seems to lead us to recognize three distinct and irreducible
components, attention, Feeling and Objects or Presentations, as together con-
121 
stituting one concrete state of mind or psychosis." It is not necessary to
follow Dr. ',,ard in denying that there is acquaintance with attention and feel- 
ing in order to recognize the value of his analysis in bringing out the fact
that attention and feeling both belong to the subjective aspect of experi-
122 
ence. His view of this matter also serves to bring into the foreground the
fact that a denial of the activity of the mind, or of a distinct stuff of 
consciousness, is equivalent to the argument that the subjective side of ex- 
perience is really part of the objective side, an argument which we believe
114. J. Uard, Psychological Principles, Cambridge; Cambridge University
Press, 1920, 2nd Edition, p. 28.
115. Ibid., pp. 16, 17.
116. Ibid., p. 17.
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118. Ibid., p. 46.
119. Ibid., pp. 55 ff.
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to be untrue to the facts.
Another serious objection to the doctrine of consciousness which 
Jan.es sets forth is its phenomenalistic basis. If the real world is 
one in which anything in order to be real must be an object to some ex- 
perient, must be amenable to discovery and description within that world, 
then it is a foregone conclusion that the conscious life can be completely 
analyzed into ideas or presentations. Now, this principle may apply to a 
world of "pure experience 1', but it does not hold good of the real world: 
the world in which we live is not bound by any such principle. That is 
to say, consciousness would probably be what James says it is in a world of 
"pure experience", but it cannot be admitted taat his description of con- 
sciousness is true in the larger world. Consciousness, defined exclusively 
in terms of cognition, does not cover all ^experience. Thus the failure 
to find mental activity in a world of "pure experience" does not prove that 
such activity does not exist, nor does the failure to find the self in this 
more limited world prove that the self is merely a figment of the imagina- 
tion. It is no more possible to analyze a volition into ideas than it is 
to reduce tons to inches. To attempt to know activity as a presentation 
is to attempt to know it as it cannot be known. 3. Alexander says, "I do
not in introspection turn my mind upon itself and convert a part of myself
123 
into an object." He goes on to say that since the object is distinct from
the knowing mind, it is never possible for the mind to be an object to it-
124 
self in the same way that physical things can be objects to it. But this
fact does not warrant us in assuming that there is no self. No recent 
attempts to find the self in the realm of phenomena have been any more suc-
125. 3, .Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, London: Ivlacmillan Co.,Ltd., 
1920, Vol. II, p. 89. 
124. Ibid., p. 89.
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cessful than Hume's earlier one because of the fact that it is of the very 
nature of mind to be incapable of being an object to itself. Professor 
Daniel Lament puts this truth as follows: "The notion that I can take ray 
'I 1 out of the dark room in order to observe it from the dark room is not
an idea at all. It is a freak of the imagination. The f l f remains the
125 
subject all the time and can never be object to itself." And Berkeley
was confident, long ago, that "a little attention will make it plain to 
anyone, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of 
motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature
of Spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but
126 
only by the effects it produceth." Berkeley realized, however, that the
conception of the self is inescapable, and we may wisely follow him in
recognizing that while the self cannot be represented by an "idea", we do
127 
have a "notion" of an agent or the self. Thus our chief objection to
presentationism is that it is inadequate. AS Dr. J. t'tard frankly says, 
"it may be adequate to nine tenths of the facts, or - better perhaps - to
nine tenths of each fact, but it cannot either effectively clear itself
128 
of, or satisfactorily explain, the remaining tenth." He then adds, "No
one has yet succeeded in bringing all the facts of consciousness, as Pro- 
fessor James thinks we may, under the simple rubric: 'Thought goes on. f
Impersonal unowned experience, a mere Gogitatur, is even more of a contra-
129 
diction than the mere Co^ito of Descartes."
125. Daniel Lamont, GhristTnd the ...orld of Thought, jjdinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1934, p. 54.
126. George Berkeley, "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge", Section 27, The :.orks of George Berkeley, by <t. C. Eraser, Ox- 
ford: The Clarendon Press, 1901, VOL. I, p. 272.
127. Ibid., p. 272.
128. J. hard, "The Problems of General Psychology", The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. XIII, No. 6, 1904, p. 606. Cf_. pp. 60b-621.
129. Ibid., p. 606.
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Finally, the logical outcome of any doctrine of the mind which ig- 
nores the subjective aspect of feeling and effort, the most characteristic 
feature of the mind, is a thoroughgoing sensationalism. It conceives the 
active forms of consciousness in terms of sensation complexes and the 
higher modes of the cognitive experience as a succession of images which 
are fundamentally sensational. It is obvious that any such description 
of knowledge, thought, emotion, and volition, does not do justice to the 
fuller and richer life of the mind. In other words, it substitutes a 
highly abstract and unreal conception of the mind for the mind as it really 
is. Further, it is doubtful whether anyone other than a new born babe may 
experience pure sensa. The mature mind appears to know nothing of such 
actualities; for very few, if any, of our sensations come entirely void of
meaning. As F. R. Tennant rightly asserts: "The pure sensum which is im-
130 
pression and nothing else, can no more be 'caught* than Hume's 'I'." Thus
our examination of James's view of consciousness, based on the doctrine of 
"pure experience", leads us to the conclusion that the philosophy of exper- 
ience is an abstraction which fails to give a full account of the facts of 
consciousness; and we are led to conclude, also, that any philosophy which 
fails to take into consideration all of these facts and thus ultimately re- 
jects the reality of the soul must be regarded as untenable. J. B. Pratt 
is essentially correct when he puts the matter as follows: "At any rate, be 
sure of this: no philosophy can long remain credible to man which would 
destroy man's faith in his own self. In spite of your Naturalism, your 
behavioristic psychology, your monistic epistemology, philosophy shall 
once more teach the reality of the soul. And when philosophers shall have 
abandoned the vain attempt to interpret the psychical in terms of the phys- 
130. F. R. Tennant, op. cit., p. 36.
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ical or the physical in terms of the psychical, when they shall have re- 
turned to the inevitable human belief that individual selves are real and 
that the spiritual life means more than logical implication, there will
be some hope of attacking with a fair chance of success the great problems
131 
of philosophy."
131. J. B. Pratt, Adventures in Philosophy and Religion, New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1931, p. 140.
II
THE SELF AS AN EMPIRICAL SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SOUL
James's open and outright rejection of the soul did not occur, as has 
been made clear in the preceding chapter, until several years after he had 
written his epoch-making work on psychology. In The Principles of
Psychology, while asserting that the substantial soul "explains nothing
1 
and guarantees nothing," and that "no one can be compelled to subscribe to
2 
it for definite scientific reasons," he tentatively accepts the hypothesis
of a soul. And in spite of his confidence concerning the "complete super- 
fluity," of the soul-theory, "so far as accounting for the actually verified
3 
facts of conscious experience goes," he recognizes and candidly acknowledges
4 
the logical force, and "respectability of the spiritualistic position."
He concludes his convincing polemic against the "Mind-dust Theory" by the
statement that the soul-theory is the "line of least logical resistance, so
5 
far as we have yet attained." He gives as the reason for suggesting the
doctrine of the soul at this juncture, his desire to show the "advanced 
thinkers" how strong an argument it really is. But as a psychologist, he 
discards it as the "out-birth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim,
according to Dr. Hodgson is: 'Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert
6 
to be the explanation of everything else. 1 " He postpones further inquiry
concerning the existence of the soul on the ground that "as psychologists,
1. Vol. I, p. 350.
2. Ibid., p. 348.
3. Ibid., p. 348.
4. Ibid., p. 181.
5. Ibid., p. 181.




we need not be metaphysical at all." But James is never quite able to let
the matter rest there and wrestles with this problem practically all at his 
life. In spite of his outright denial of the soul, which we have given, he can 
never quite bring himself to forget entirely the strength and tenability of 
the position which he repudiates. It seems to be a striking paradox that 
as his prejudice against the soul increases he becomes more increasingly cer- 
tain that the soul does serve as a useful and even a necessary hypothesis in 
a philosophy that remains within the bounds of reason. Just nine years be- 
fore his great denial of the existence of the soul he writes; "I am free to 
confess that in my own case the antipathy to the Soul with which I find my- 
self burdened is an ancient hardness of heart of which I can frame no fully 
satisfactory account even to myself. I passively agree that if there were 
Souls that we could use as principles of explanation, the formal settlement 
of the questions now before us could run far more smoothly towards its end. 
I admit that a soul is a medium of union, and that brain processes and ideas, 
be they never so 'synchronical,* leave all mediating agency out. Yet, in
spite of these concessions, I never find myself actively taking up the soul,
8 
so to speak, and making it do work in my psychologizing."
By a strange coincidence, this rather contradictory position of James's 
largely accounts for his view of the self which is generally regarded as the 
most satisfactory account of the self ever rendered by an empirical philoso- 
pher who rejects the soul. That is to say, his recognition of the strength 
of the argument for a soul, and the value he attributes to the theory as a 
principle of explanation, along with his inveterate prejudice against it, 
seem to combine in forcing him either to be thoroughly convinced the soul is
7. Ibid., p. 546.
8."The Knowing of Things Together," The Psychological Review, Vol. II,
No. 2, 1895, pp. 119-120.
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a "pure chimera," or that it is an indispensible factor in any philosophical 
construction. And, as we shall see, his denial of the soul in the preceding 
chapter is not his final word; that is, it does not relieve the tension for 
him, nor does it end his struggle. But his own view of the self is an at- 
tempt to show that it is possible to give a psychological account of the 
self which covers everything which the age-long belief in the soul had been 
invoked to explain. He realizes, of course, that if he leaves the soul out 
of his description of the self, his task becomes all the more difficult if 
he is not to repeat the errors of his predecessors who made similar denials 
concerning the soul, but who failed to offer a satisfactory substitute for 
the soul. He could not fail to take into consideration the inescapable 
fact of personal unity. For as Professor A. N. Whitehead says, "Any 
philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal identity. In some sense 
there is a unity in the life of each man, from birth to death. The two 
modern philosophers who most consistently reject the notion of a self-identi- 
cal Soul-Substance are Hume and William James. But the problem remains
for them...to provide an adequate account of this undoubted personal unity,
9 
maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstance." Precisely because
he fully realizes that this difficulty does confront any philosopher who 
rejects an abiding self, James sets himself to the task of rendering an 
empirical account of the matter which would be free from the defects which 
characterize such a theory as Hume f s. Consequently, some of the richest 
fruits of his philosophical powers are brought to light in his treatment of 
the self; and although we do not follow him all pS the way in his view of 
the self, we cannot fail to recognize the value of much of the work he has
9. A. N. Whitehead."Objects and Subjects," The Philosophical Review] 
Vol. ZLI, No. 2, 1932, p. 142.
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done in this field and we cannot be blind to the worthy contribution he 
has made to philosophy and psychology in his penetrating and illuminating 
analysis and description of consciousness.
,7e can best understand James f s doctrine of the self in the light of 
the teaching of Locke concerning personal identity. He held that per- 
sonal identity "consists not in identity of substance but in identity of
10 11 
consciousness;" it is constituted by the "sameness of a rational being".
His view is expressed as follows: "For it being the same consciousness 
that makes a man himself to himself, personal identity depends on that 
only - whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be 
continued in a succession of several substances. For as far as any in- 
telligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same con- 
sciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has
1£
of any present action; so far it is the same personal self." It is pos- 
sible, according to Locke, for the same consciousness to be connected with 
different substances while it retains its personal identity. And con- 
versely, if the same substance is preserved without the same consciousness,
13 
there is loss of personal identity. To use his famous illustration, to
14 
be the same person with Nestor one must be conscious of Nestor's actions.
Thus the mere ontological self-identity of a soul does not constitute per- 
sonal identity; it must have a consciousness that remembers past experi- 
ences, and it must also remember them as having been its very own. Locke's 
doctrine takes the question of personal identity out of the debatable 
realm of substance and places it in the verifiable realm of con
10. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London; George 
Routledge and Sons^~llev< York: E. P. Button and Co., Ch. 27, Par. 19, p. 252.
11. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 9, p. 247.
12. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 10, p. 247.
13. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 13, p. 249.
14. Ibid., Ch. 27, Par. 14, p. 250.
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scious selfhood. This is the aspect of Locke's view that James regards 
as being of chief importance. He says, "The importance of Locke f s doc- 
trine lay in this, that he eliminated * substantial' identity as transcen- 
dental and unimportant, and made of 'personal' identity (the only practi- 
cally important sort) a directly verifiable empirical phenomenon. Y/here
15 
not actually experienced, it i_s_ not." He conceives this view of Locke's
16 
as constituting "the great revolution toward empiricism", and he derives
the fundamental principle for his own empirical conception of the self 
from Locke's interpretation. As a result of Locke's version of the sub- 
ject, "Personality is now explained as a result and not assumed as a prin- 
ciple. It is not something which, by simply being, gives rise to conse- 
quences, but something which is made from moment to moment by a cause which
17 
can be assigned." In other words, for James, the cognitive subject, the
knowing self, is placed within the field of its own knowing; the knower is 
to be found among the known. The personal subject is no longer permitted 
to stand aloof from the common run of percepts; it must prove its exist- 
ence, and disclose its nature, according to the same methods which are ap- 
plied to other objects of knowledge. In short, if it exists at all, it 
must have its dwelling in the perceptual realm. It will be remembered 
that while Berkeley brought the physical object entirely within the percep- 
tual field, he had made an exception of the agent or the self which is
18 
known only by its effects, but of which we have a "notion". James refuses
to stop where Berkeley did and submits the self to the same test to which 
Berkeley had subjected the physical object.
15. "Person and Personality", Johnson's Universal Cyclopaedia, Edited by 
C. K. Adams, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1900, Vol. IX, p. 227, Cf_. 
pp. 226-228.
16. Ibid., p. 227.
17. Ibid., p. 227
18. Op_. cit., Section 27, p. 272.
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Locke retained a belief in souls as substances, however, and in their 
identity. But Hume went further than Locke in that he rejected substance,
whether spiritual or material, altogether. He held that the identity
19 
which we ascribe to the mind is "only a fictitious one". This identity,
for him, is "of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and
20 
animal bodies." He maintained that our identity "depends on the relations
of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy trans-
21 
ition they occasion." There is, he held, "properly no simplicity" in the
22 
mind at one time, nor "identity in different". He conceived the unity of
the self to be like the unity of a republic; that is, it would have the 
kind of unity which a changing group has, the kind of unity that one reads 
into it. Now James follows Locke with reference to the principle of per- 
sonal identity, but does not follow him in his belief in a spiritual sub- 
stance. He is in agreement with Hume in his rejection of a soul-substance, 
but is not satisfied to follow Hume's conception of identity and unity. 
James's recognition of the useful part played by the soul in explanation of 
personal unity forces him to search for a conception of the self which gives 
it real unity rather than the loose sort which had apparently satisfied 
Hume. But he is at one with both Locke and Hume in attempting to render 
an account of the self which is wholly within the bounds of experience. 
The merit of his view of the self lies in the fact that, while based upon 
a thoroughgoing empiricism, it covers all the functions and distinctions 
which are usually assigned to a soul or a transcendental ego. His success 
in achieving this task is chiefly due to the fact that he finds the sameness
19. David Hume. "Treatise on Human Nature", Part IV, Section VI, The" 
Philosophical Works of David Hume, Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Block; Boston: 
' ^fci«f ,Brown and Co., 1854, Vol. I, p. 320. 
2ai Ibid., p. 320. 
21. Ibid., p. 324. 
32. Ibid., p. 313.
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of the self to consist either in the unity of the momentary state, as the 
"passing thought" feels it all at once; or in the continuity of such states,
the unifying thoughts of which receive and appropriate the content of those
23 
which have preceded them.
In order to see how James arrived at this conception of the self it will
24 
be necessary to follow his empirical account of consciousness at some length.
James describes consciousness as essentially personal. "Every thought is a
25 
part of a personal consciousness." Every thought, wherever found, has an
"owner", is "owned." Thoughts do not float around by themselves. Even
secondary selves, which develop in abnormal mental conditions, claim a name
26 
and develop a memory. In a word, all thought tends towards the personal
form of consciousness, A second essential characteristic of consciousness
27 
is that it is always on the move; it is ever changing. No state of mind
28 
can ever return identically the same as it was before. We never get the
same bodily sensation twice, nor precisely the same mental state. Here he 
opposes the associationists who held that ideas may be simple or complex. 
A combination of the simple gives us the complex, and analysis of the com- 
plex produces the simple. James, while not averse to proper analysis, re- 
fuses to believe that an analytic treatment of mind should be construed to 
mean that the real life of the mind consists of an aggregation of elements 
or a collection of simple ideas. Also, for the associationists, the same 
idea can appear in various combinations without losing its identity. But 
James says, "A permanently existing 'idea' or 'Vorstellung' which makes
23. Principles, Vol. I, pp. 338 ff.
24. Of. Principles, Vol. I, Ch. IX,"The Stream of Thought" also, Ch. X, 
"The Consciousness of Self."
25. Ibid., p. 225.
26. Ibid., pp. 227-229.
27. Ibid., pp. 229 ff.
28. Ibid., p. 230.
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its appearance before the footlights of consciousness at periodical intervals,
29 
is as mythological an entity as the Jack of Spades." He attributes this
error to the confusion of the objects thought of with the thought of the ob- 
jects; the mistaking an analysis of the object for an analysis of the thought
30 
of it. He also finds fault with the associationists, at this juncture,
because they ignored "feelings of relation," which he regards as a serious
31 
"omission of introspective psychology." He says, "The principal effort
of the Humian school has been to abrogate relations, not only from the sphere
32 
of reality, but from the sphere of consciousness." James tries to restore
those relationships which give form or order to the objective world and which 
introspection had failed to find. He proposes to correct the failure of a 
faulty introspection by going back to original experience as it was before 
introspection had broken it into bits. He makes a conscious and systematic 
attempt to secure recognition of the vague, the fugitive, and the transitory 
in consciousness as opposed to the "block-house" conception of mental life 
which prevailed. His return to original experience convinces him that the 
elements have been abstracted from a context and that the relationships have 
existed all of the time for those who really looked for them. "Restoring 
the context one finds the elements embedded in a matrix of relationships. 
Avoiding the natural preoccupation with focal points and substantive nuclei, 
one can detect not only distinct qualities and things, but spatial and
temporal juxtaposition, causal nexus, identity, difference and contrast,
33
and a hundred other relations..." Many of these relationships are repre- 
sented in speech while others play no part in ordinary discourse and are not
29. Ibid., p. 236.
30. Ibid., p. 236.
31."On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology,"Mind, Vol. IX, No. 33,
pp. 1-26, 1884.
32. Ibid.., p. 4.
33. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 89.
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so represented. But James maintains that "there is not a conjunction or 
a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or in- 
flection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or 
other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between 
the larger objects of our thought... .v;e ought to say a feeling of and, a
feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as
34 
we say a feeling of blue, or a feeling of cold." It is characteristic of
these "feelings of relation" so to modify ideas as to render it impossible 
for them to be the same again. Thus every conscious state, to use the
words of Professor E. G. Boring, is "a function of the entire psychophysi-
35 
cal totality", and the "mind is cumulative and not recurrent."
The most important function of "feelings of relation" is that of unit- 
ing ideas and thereby rendering consciousness sensibly continuous, which
36 
constitutes another prominent feature of our mental life. Thought flows
on with unbroken continuity, like the stream of time. To be sure, there 
are time-gaps such as occur in sleep; but Peter will always awake as Peter, 
and Paul, as Paul. The changes which occur in our waking life are always 
smooth, but our mental life does not always follow the same pace. It,
"like a bird's life, seems to be made of an alteration of flights and
37 
perchings." There are "resting places" and "places of flight". He calls
the former "substantive parts", and the latter "transitive parts", of the
38 
stream of thought. Now thought proceeds from one "substantive part" to
another, and the chief use of the "transitive parts" is to lead from one
34. Mind, Op. cit., p. 5.
35. E. G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, New York and 
London: The Century Co., 1929, p. 499.
36. Principles, Vol. I, pp. 237 ff.
37. Mind, o£. cit., p. 2.
38. Ibid., p. 3.
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substantive conclusion to another. He strongly opposes the way in which
the associationists and Herbartians represented the stream of thought,
40 
namely, as a "'manifold* broken into bits, called discrete", because his
introspective analysis leads him to conceive the stream of thought as 
presenting itself as a continuum. He says that the traditional viev/ of 
the mind is tantamount to saying that a river consists of nothing but bar- 
relsful, bucketsful, cupsful, spoonsful, of water, while the free ?;ater 
continues to flow all around and between the containers. For him, it is
just precisely this free flow of consciousness which the introspective ef-
41 
forts of his time overlooked, which oversight accounted for the prevalence
of "elementarism" with reference to the mind. This conception of the mind 
in terms of a "stream of thought" is original with James and constitutes a
radical departure from traditional thought. Professor R. B. Perry regards
42 
this feature of James's thought as his "most important insight". James
also holds that, regardless of how complex the object may be, the thought
43 
of it is an indivisible unit. Each wave or pulse of consciousness is a
single and complete psychosis or state of mind. These pulses cannot be 
reduced to simpler elements; they are of but a moment's duration and possess 
a unique identity.
We have now to consider his conception of the Self which arises out of 
the doctrine of the "stream of thought". The fact that James places the 
self, as we have intimated, in the perceptual field, does not mean that he
39. Ibid., p. 5.
40. Ibid., p. 6.
41. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
42. R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of Valliam James, Vol. II,
p. 77.
43. Principles, Vol. I, p. 276.
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denies or ignores the duality of self and not-self. On the contrary, in- 
stead of one self, he finds several selves. After giving an "omnibus"
definition of the self as follows: "A man's Self is the sum total of all
44
that he can call his", he goes on to describe the self in terms of a hier- 
archy with four levels. First, there is the "material self", which in-
45 
eludes one's body, one's family and friends, and one's possessions. All
of these things are considered a part of the self because they arouse in 
one the same emotions; and loss in respect of any of these things brings a
distinct shrinkage in one's personality. The "social self" comes next and
46
arises out of the recognition which one gets from one's associates. Every- 
one seeks the approval, admiration, and esteem of others. One's appearance, 
conversation, and general comportment, determine vrtiat others think of one. 
V/ith each person of one's acquaintance there is a "special reputation" to 
preserve. Consequently, one is different with different people; and "a
man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him
47 
and carry an image of him in their minds." The "spiritual self", the third
level of the self, consists of one's psychic faculties or dispositions, the
bodies of knowledge, habits of thought, feeling, and actions. These, in
48 
their sum total, constitute the self "which we most verily seem to be".
One's mental ability, power of moral discernment, and strength of will, 
bring one greater satisfaction than anything else one may have. It is the 
"spiritual self that unifies, so far as is possible, one's many discordant
desires. The "pure Ego" constitutes the fourth part of the self; it is the
49 
knower, the self of selves. This self is not psychologically distinguish-
44. Ibid., p. 29T!
45. Ibid., pp. 292-293.
46. Ibid., pp. 293 ff.
47. Ibid., p. 294.
48. Ibid., p. 296.
49. Ibid., p. 297.
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able from the "spiritual self", but is necessary for certain philosophical 
systems. Vie find that a certain portion of the subjective stream is ab- 
stracted from the rest, and seems to form a sort of inner centre, or core,
50 
which appears to have greater permanency than the remaining part. This
inner nucleus seems to disown the other portion, while it remains. This 
central part of the self constitutes the active element in consciousness. 
"It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sen- 
sations, and by giving or withholding its assent it influences the movements 
they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest....It is the source of ef- 
fort and attention, and the place from which appear to emanate the fiats of
51 
the will." Due to the fact that this part of the self is more persistently
 > - __^
present than any other single element of the mental life, the other ele- 
ments seem to gather round it and to belong to it. This nucleus of the 
self is felt just as the body is felt. Now, as we have already seen in 
dealing with his theory of consciousness, James finds that the sense of the 
self is derived from the fusion of sensory impressions, usually reduced to
a matter of postural strains and stresses, centering especially in the
52 53 
head. The word "I" is primarily a noun of position. The words "Me", and
"Self", "so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are
objective designations, meaning all_ the things which have the power to pro-         . 54
duce in a stream of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar sort." 
Self-love, whether bodily, social, or spiritual, is not love for one f s 
"mere principle of conscious identity". "Bodily selfishness" is a
50. Ibid., p. 297.
51. Ibid., pp. 297-298.
52. Ibid., p. 301 ff.
53. P. U., p. 380.
54. Principles, Vol. I., p. 319.
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descriptive term applied to the external acts ivhich interest in one's
body prompts. Social self-love grows out of one f s interest in, and regard
for, what others think of one, and thus it is an interest external to one f s
55 
own thought. Spiritual self-love is one's interest in one's mental powers,
56 
moral sensibility and so on. Thus, in each case, self-love is love for
something external and objective. "Its own body, then, first of all, its
friends next, and finally its spiritual dispositions, must be the supremely
57 
interesting objects for each human mind."
This leads us to the consideration of his theory of personal identity. 
There are, roughly speaking, two phases in his treatment of this principle. 
First, he finds identity to consist in the sameness of the things in which 
the self is interested. I see at different times what I take to be the 
same object. Of course, this does not mean that my perception of it is 
the same each time, but that each time I perceive this object it is the 
selfsame thing. Again, when I think about some person or event on two 
different occasions, I am not having exactly the same thought each time, 
but I am thinking about the same thing at different times. Similarly, my 
thoughts, interests, and plans are never the same from day to day; but it 
is always the same things about which I think, in which I am interested, 
and concerning which I make plans. In short, experiences are transitory 
and they never recur in just the same way, but they derive their apparent 
sameness from their power to mean the same things. "The sense of our own 
personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions 
of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the 
resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the continuity before the mind,
55. Ibid'., pp~32Q-321.
56. Ibid., p. 323.
57. Ibid., p. 323.
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of the phenomena compared." The second part of his theory of identity 
goes further, however, and attempts to account for the more subtle as- 
pects of the unity of consciousness. He holds that identity consists in 
the appropriation of past experiences by each succeeding wave or pulse of 
consciousness. The past experiences come marked by a "warmth and inti- 
macy" by means of which they qualify as being the peculiar property of the 
newly born owner. "For how would it be," he asks, "if the Thought, the 
present judging Thought, instead of being in any \,ay substantially or 
transcendentally identical with the former owner of the past self, merely 
inherited his 'title 1 , and thus stood as his legal representative now? 
It would then, if its birth coincided exactly with the death of another 
owner, find the past self already its own as soon as it found it at all, 
and the past self would thus never be wild, but always owned, by a title 
that never lapsed. We can imagine a long succession of herdsmen coming 
rapidly into possession of the same cattle by transmission of an original
title by bequest. &ay not the 'title 1 of a collective self be passed from
59 
one Thought to another in some analogous way?"
According to this version of the self, instead of an abiding self, or 
a permanent ego, we have numerous successive selves, or egos, no one of 
which is conscious of itself, but conscious only of "its glorious ances- 
tors". I become identical with my own past only as my momentary self in- 
herits my past and lays claim to it as its own. My past can never be 
claimed by another person because his momentary self would not feel the 
tang of "warmth and intimacy" in respect of ray past, that mine would. For 
tae same reason I could never identify the past experiences of another as
58. Ibid., p. Sb4.
59. Ibid., p. 539.
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mine; they lack the "herd mark" which characterizes my experiences. These 
pulses of thought which claim one's past experiences come and go with each 
passing moment; they live but a moment before death lays its cold hand upon 
them. They quickly pass out of existence, but before doing so, they gen- 
erously bequeath their own self-hood, of which they were never conscious, 
along with all of the past selves, to their successor. Thus birth and 
death, and transmitting and receiving, of self-hood continue throughout the 
whole course of the individual's existence. "V«ho owns the last self owns
the self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the
60 
possessed." In this unique way James's "stream of thought" presents the
self empirically without denying or disregarding the duality of self and 
not-self, without rejecting personal identity, and without omitting the cog- 
nitive subject, which he construes as the "judging thought". In his opin- 
ion, this account of the matter renders the soul "at all events needless
for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they ap-
61
pear." Consequently, there is no occasion for bringing in that superflu- 
ous hypothesis.
We shall now examine this view of the self and point out its obvious 
weaknesses as a doctrine which tries to render a full account of the facts 
of consciousness without the conception of a soul. We can readily agree 
with Professor J. \vard f s estimate of this version of the self when he says
that it is "the most successful attempt I have seen to resolve the knower
62 
into the known". James appears to have succeeded in giving us a self
which possesses everything, even a certain sort of continuity; but the 
continuity is only apparent rather than real. At any rate, it is so far
60. Ibid., p. 540.
61. Ibid., p. 344.
62. "Textbook of Psychology", Hind, N. S., Vol. I, No. 4, 1892, p. 537.
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forth an improvement upon Hume's conception of the self. The first thing
to be said about this account of the self is that, although it is supposed 
to be en empirical rendering throughout, there appears to be no empirical
evidence for it; and this seems to be true in spite of the fact that James
63 
says it is a "patent fact of consciousness". As J. B. Pratt has said, you
do not "find your stream of consciousness going along bumpity-bump in the
64 
fashion indicated by the proposal." The doctrine of "perishing pulses of
thought" within the empirically continuous stream of thought, simply does 
not appear to be a fact which introspection establishes. If James f s con- 
ception were the true description of the matter, it would be something that 
one could easily verify; but this is just what one cannot do after searching 
for the available evidence of such a phenomenon. Further, such an inter- 
pretation of consciousness is based upon the assumption of a relation in 
content which it is plainly not possible to find there. As K. Dunlap ar- 
gues in this connection, "That I experience a certain red may be defined as 
a relation between red and other factors of content, and we do actually ex- 
perience relations in this connection; but the relations we find in the
content are all relations which determine the red as it is experienced, and
65 
are none of them, severally or together, identifiable as the experience."
The same writer points out that a theory of this kind seems to overlook the 
fact that when we explore the content in quest of any kind of relation, we
do so on the assumption of a perspective that is entirely external to the
66 
content. This is a similar assumption which underlies the assertion that
the universe is composed of "pure experience", which is mental if taken in
65. Principles, Vol. I, p. 339.
64. J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism, pp. 280-281.
65. K. Dunlap, A System of Psychology, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1912, p. 338.
66. Ibid., pp. 238-239.
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one context, and physical if regarded in another. In other words, when 
the self or subject is discovered in experience, it is objectified, and 
implies another mental agent not found along with it, since it is the dis- 
coverer of the self. This objection is not removed by saying, as Pro- 
fessor R. B. Perry does, "But when the new subject in turn is reflected 
upon, it reveals the same nature as the old. Beyond a certain point the 
repetition of this operation of reflective self-awareness yields nothing
new, but only corroborates its previous findings, just as one can conclude
67 
after several turnings what, if anything, is behind one f s back." The
fact that nothing new is disclosed beyond a certain point does not prove 
that there is nothing there; it may be that what is there does not submit 
to our methods of inspection.
It appears to be obvious, also, that the doctrine of countless minia- 
ture selves does not fit consistently into his general teaching concerning 
the "stream of thought". In reality, it seems highly questionable whether 
the "stream of thought", or rather, any segment of consciousness, can be 
divided into complete bits of pulses, which succeed one another, each being 
capable of description in terms of a separate "pulse of thought", the death 
of which coincides with the birth of its successor. There is such unity 
and continuity in the "speciously present consciousness" as it flows on, 
like the stream of tine, that any particular portion of it can be desig- 
nated as a new ego, separated from what precedes and what comes after it 
only by abstraction. rfhat James's theory of many selves really does, as 
£. B. L"c Gil vary suggests, is to make an interruption in the continuous 
movement of thought in order to unite it. Instead of using one kind of 
67. R. 3. Perry, In the Spirit of nilliam Janes, pp. 87-88.
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glue as Hume did with his principle of association, James uses two:
68 
"quality of warmth and intimacy", and "feelings of transitions". In
Ivir. McGilvary's opinion, "The stream of thought is the fact, the pulses
69 
of thought are not facts." He goes on to point out that James is "after
the 'transcendentalist' as well as after the facts, and in his endeavor to 
prove that introspection does not reveal an unalterable time-neutralizing
ego, he went to the extreme of asserting the existence of little egos,
70 
constantly neutralized by time and transmuted each into its successors."
Since these little egos are not conscious of their own selfhood, the 
only way they can know themselves is by proxy. Each one must pass on to 
its successor the power of knowing itself which it never was fortunate 
enough to possess. "If they really were the innermost sanctuary, the 
ultimate one of all the selves whose being we can ever directly experience, 
it would follow that all that is experienced is, strictly considered, ob- 
jective; that this Objective falls asunder into two contrasted parts, one 
realized as 'Self 1 , the other as 'not-Self*; and that over and bove these 
parts there is nothing save the fact that they are' known, the fact of the 
stream of thought being there as the indispensable subjective condition of 
their being experienced at all. But this condition of the experience is
not one of the things experienced at the moment; this knowing is not imnie-      71 
diately known. It is only known in subsequent reflection." Now if there
is no consciousness of consciousness, it is impossible to see how con- 
sciousness can be anything for itself. It might conceivably be something
68. "The Stream of Consciousness", Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, No. 9, 
1907, p. 230, Gf_. pp. 225-235.
69. Ibid., p. 226.
70. Ibid., p. 230.
71. Principles, Vo. I, p. 304.
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for its successor, and yet it does not appear to make sense to say that 
the predecessor does not feel itself at all, while its successor feels that 
the predecessor felt itself to be unbroken. In other words, the successor 
attributes to its predecessor a feeling which it never really had, but we 
are to accept the former f s feeling as valid. The actual situation would 
appear to be otherwise; the thought is the only one in position to render 
valid testimony. If it knows itself as continuous, then it does know 
itself; but if it does not know itself, it does not know itself as continu- 
ous. The knowledge it inherits concerning the continuity of its predeces-
72 
sor implies that it was present to receive the inheritance. There is no
justification for breaking up the continuity of thought merely for the pur- 
pose of reuniting it. ^.s a matter of fact, James is confronted with a 
similar difficulty throughout the development of his philosophy of experi- 
ence in that his assertion that reality is a continuum contradicts his 
statement that perceptual reality comes in bits or drops.
It is apparent that James overlooks the difference between a claim to 
identity and actual identity. A mere claim to identity proves nothing. 
It must be supported by facts before it can be accepted as valid. It is 
open to question whether he has successfully made out a case for the 
"quality of warmth and intimacy" which is strong enough to bear the weight 
he places upon it. A mere feeling of kinship or of ownership does not 
constitute either one of these relations. AS to memory, as Dev/itt H. 
Parker observes, the fact that each new act looks to an identical and 
unique past does not give the remembering experiences any real identity; 
their relation to a unique object the individual's personal history 
72. Of. E. 3. lie Gil vary; op. cit., pp. 232-233.
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places them in a class by themselves. "The self identity of the truth
73 
remembered by supposedly different memories cannot make them identical."
When personal identity is elaborated into feelings of activity, of warmth 
and intimacy, or of bodily states, it is explained away rather than recog- 
nized as a fact; and no effort is made to show how it is possible. A sim- 
ilar criticism applies to his theory that identity consists in the same- 
ness of the things in which the self is interested. But little plausibil- 
ity can be ascribed to this view. it certainly does not accord with our 
experience to regard the evident identity of thought, feeling, and interest 
as an identity of their objects. For if this were the true view of the 
question, we might ask why it is that Mussolini does not identify himself 
with the ancient rulers of Rome who attempted to establish the "Eternal 
Cityn , and whose problems were very much like his own. Or, again, why do 
we not identify ourselves with our associates since we are all engaged in 
a common task, and are all occupied with similar interests, even frequently 
seeing eye to eye with regard to the same things? In a word, this account
of identity does not satisfactorily explain the distinctive identity of a
74 
man with himself.
There are other obvious defects in this doctrine of the momentary self. 
It makes a rather ambiguous use of the term "ownership". Each owner "in- 
herits" or "owns", during its life, all of the riches of the individual's 
past. That is, it inherits this from its predecessor and in turn passes it 
on to its successor. Each is "born an owner and dies owned." But just what 
is the meaning of "ownership" here? If a passing thought "owns" an object,
75. DeWitt H. Parker, The Self and Nature, Cambridge; University Press, 
1917, p. 35.
74. Cf. Ibid., pp. 33 ff.
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it must mean that it is conscious of that object, otherwise the term "own- 
ership" has no meaning. But a great deal of the time we are conscious of 
objects which have not come to us from immediate sense perception, but 
which, nevertheless, played no part in our experience in the immediately 
preceding moment. This is the case when our present experience is affected 
by something of which we were not conscious in the immediate past, but which 
has been carried over in memory from a more remote experience. Now, if the 
experience which has just perished did not own this reference to the past, 
it is inconceivable how the present experience can "inherit" it from its 
predecessor which never owned it. Obviously, such a view is intelligible 
only on the assumption that each pulse of thought contains everything in 
every other pulse of thought which has gone before in the experience of the 
individual. Otherwise, it is inconceivable how a certain psychosis could 
possess elements which were not present in the immediately preceding psycho- 
sis, but which were owned by an experience in the more distant past.
According to the hypothesis of successive selves, we cannot account for 
such ordinary slips of memory as the failure to remember a familiar name, or 
street number, which, after a succession of pulses of thought, comes rushing 
into our mind after we have ceased to think of it, as though it had been 
there all the time. Further, this theory does not adequately account for 
anticipation. When we look into the future, and, let us say, anticipate 
some unusual experience which awaits us, the anticipatory thought rushes 
ahead of the "quality of warmth and intimacy", and it does so with the ex- 
pectation that the very same self which looks forward to the experience 
shall ultimately realize and enjoy it. Similarly, the doctrine of count- 
less miniature selves renders disappointment meaningless. If it is not 
the same identical self which both anticipates, and fails to achieve a
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certain objective, there is no reason why disappointnent should ever occur 
at all. For one to suffer disappointment, the same self must persist 
throughout the experience-train. The same thing holds good of the "judg- 
ment of regret", or of the sense of guilt. If the self consists of a 
series of little selves, each dying at the birth of its successor, none of 
which can live for more than a moment, David's repentance for his crime 
born of lust, and Paul f s lifelong regret concerning his early persecution 
of Christians, are rendered inexplicable, and meaningless. But in every 
case, this carrying over into the present of that which belongs to the 
past, either immediate or remote, would be the natural concomitant if there 
were an enduring and continuing self or subject. But these many and com- 
mon instances of everyday life cannot be reconciled with the hypothesis of 
innumerable selves coming to life and passing out of existence in the same 
moment of time. Such experiences are adequately accounted for only on the 
assumption that midst the fleeting and transitory moments which constitute 
our mundane existence, there is an abiding and continuing self which carries 
on from birth to death, and wnich, while not indifferent to time, does not 
succumb to its neutralizing power.
Finally, we do not see that it is any easier to unite two transient 
experiences without a permanent self than it is to unite the experiences of
an entire lifetime. AS a matter of fact, this "snowball hypothesis", to
75 
use the term applied to it by F. R. Tennant, calls for greater credulity,
and more nearly borders on the miraculous, than the doctrine of a permanent 
self. vVe can much more readily conceive of the possibility of one subject 
which binds together all of our experiences, a self that persists and learns 
75. F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. I, p. 86.
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by its mistakes and failures, than we can imagine a series of little selves 
which are endowed with such unusual powers as they vrould have to be given 
in order to accomplish the same task. It indeed appears to be a Herculean 
task which such a theory imposes upon these "homunculi" when they are con- 
ceived as unifying themselves so as to constitute a personal life. Plainly, 
we cannot regard them as capable of performing the Gargantuan tasks for
>
which such a view necessarily makes them responsible. They would have to 
be capable of projecting into a remote future ideals which require many 
years of persistent striving to attain; they would have to have the power 
of tenaciously clinging to those ideals, and of pursuing them, at whatever 
risk or sacrifice necessary until they are in some measure realized; and 
they must be able to complete some plan which has been begun, but which, due to 
interruptions, or temporary lack of interest, has been put aside for perhaps 
several years. We are led to conclude, then, that while James f s doctrine of 
momentary selves is the best solution to the problem of the self when a 
permanent self is rejected, it is unsatisfactory as an adequate account of 
the self; and that since its acceptance must be without the support of actual 
facts, and demands of us a credulity not involved in the belief of an abiding 
subject, we are justified in claiming that as an empirical substitute for the 
soul, it is inadequate.
V«e have now to state somewhat briefly some of the reasons why we think 
a continuing self is the only conception which does adequately account for 
all of the facts involved, and at the same time, offers a satisfactory solu- 
tion to this difficult problem. We are quite aware, however, that the 
view of a permanent ego has its difficulties, some of which seem beyond 
solution; but it is our conviction that, in spite of these difficulties, it
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is a more tenable theory than any which denies the existence of an enduring
self. In the first place, the fact that all experience is personal im- 
plies the existence of a subject; that is, experience itself demands such 
an existent. James, as we have seen, insists as strongly as anyone pos- 
sibly could that consciousness tends to assume the personal form, and that 
all experience is owned. But, as Professor G. V,. Allport argues, psy- 
chology "must take seriously James*3 dictum that every mental operation
occurs in a 'personal form*, and must take it more seriously than James
76 
himself did." Precisely because we do take it more seriously than James
did we are unable to stop where he did with reference to the self. For 
when we begin to speak of experience v.e must immediately postulate three
sorts of things: the items experienced, the experiencing of these, and
77
that which experiences them. That is to say, if we are to talk of exper- 
iencing at all, we imply an "I" which experiences. For, as J. &. IvlacTag- 
gart asserts, it is impossible that there should be any experience which is 
not a part of a self. For him the fact that there can be no experience
which is not experienced by a self is evidence as a "synthetic truth about
78 
experience." In other words, such a thing as impersonal experience, that
is, experience which does not belong to a self, is inconceivable. Once we 
are thoroughly convinced that experience is personal, we are led to see 
that the existence of a permanent self is implied by the continuity of 
thought.
76. G. V/. Allport, Personality; A Psychological Interpretation, New York; 
Henry Holt and Co., 1937, p. 552.
77. Cf. K. Dunlap, "The Self and the Ego", The Psychological Review, Vol. 
XXI, No. 1, 1914, p. 68.
78. J. E. LacTaggart, The Nature of Existence, Edited by C. D. Broad, Vol. 
II, p. 82, Cf. also, p. 81.
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This continuity is revealed by such facts as retention, recognition,
79 
and familiarity. To use the illustration of F. R. Tennant, if one has two
successive experiences of anything, for instance, blue, this unique ex-
11 2 
perience of blue has a subject. 0 has 3 while 0 appears to another
2 
subject, S , who knows nothing about the quale except by imoression.
22 1 
Nevertheless, 3 recognizes 0 as being like 0 , as blue again, and as
21 2 
familiar. Now if 3 never saw 0 , there is no way by which 0 could be
compared with it and recognized as the same. It appears that the only 
possible explanation of an experience of this sort is to postulate an en- 
during self. A further inescapable characteristic of recognition is that 
one realizes the sameness of one's present with one's past experience. 
'/hen, for example, I recognize a picture of Edinburgh Castle, I do not 
merely see the picture before me, but I also recognize it as the picture 
of something which I have seen upon different occasions in the past. 
Thus I regard my present self as experiencing now what I, the same self,
have experienced at some past time, and the sense of familiarity is too
80 
obvious to doubt.
Obviously, then, the appearance of identity is beyond question 7i/hen 
we recognize a sensation, a thought, or a universal, in experiences which 
more or less resemble those which have occurred at some previous time. 
In other words, whenever, in memory, we find recognition that the present 
fact is identical in meaning with the fact experienced by the same subject 
on a former occasion, it implies identity of the present with the past 
self, whose experiences are now being recalled. J. S. IJills' puts the 
matter correctly when he says that memory "is not merely having the idea
79. Op. cit., p. 84.
80. Of. luary »V. Calkins, A First-Book in Psychology, New York: The Lac- 
millan Co., 1914, 4th Edition, p. 136.
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of that fact recalled:....It is having the idea recalled along with the 
Belief that the fact which it is the idea of, really happened, and more- 
over happened to myself. 1. eruory, therefore, by the very fact of its 
being different from Imagination, implies an Ego who formerly experienced 
the facts remembered, and who was the same ego then as nov,. The phenome- 
non of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the same fact, or
81 
two different modes of viewing the same fact." As a matter of fact,
every past experience which I can remember as having once been a present 
experience of my own, is in a real sense a part of one and the same self. 
As E. 3. Brightrnan has said, by "a network of memories, each including an
act of self-identification, all my past experiences are bound into my
82
whole past self." J. 3. Baillie argues that the testimony of memory-judg- 
ments which consist in the implicit awareness of the continuity of the self 
or subject, is in the form of an affirmation, rather than in that of an as- 
sumption or proof. For him, our self-identity forms the basis of memory-
judgnonts which by the act of judgment render it explicit in a specific
83
way. "Every time I judge," he says, "that this or that happened in my ex- 
perience, I am affirming the continuity of ray individual experience, and 
point to certain parts of it which have made up its content....In memory- 
judgments we become aware of the continuity of our individual experience;
and this is almost a tautology; for be in--; aware of our continuity is just
84
what memory-judgments consist in." Thus it would appear that the contin- 
uity of individual experience is an inexplicable phenomenon apart from the
81. James Lill, Analysis of the phenomena of the Human kind, Edited by 
J. 3. iuill, London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869, Vol. II, Note 
vZ 9 p. 174.
82. L. 3. Brightman, Personality and Religion, New York; The Abingdon 
Press, 1934, p. 34.
83. ,T . B. Baillie, "On the Uature of Memory-iCnowledge", i...ind, N. S., Vol. 
:c:VI, Ito. 103, 1917, p. 263.
84. Ibid., pp. 253, 254.
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hypothesis of a permanent ego.
The testimony offered by anticipation also points towards a future 
self wiiicu is identical with the past and present subject. \Ve have al- 
ready indicated our objection to any attempt to account for anticipation 
on the basis of a succession of transitory selves. But we need to go 
further since anticipation is especially important in religion. V.e need 
to see that this feature of our experience offers more than negative evi- 
dence against tneories whicn deny a permanent self, and that it presents 
a strong positive argument for the continuity of the self. Just as memo- 
ry points to a past identical with the present one, anticipation implies a 
future self which is identical v?ith the present one. J. Laird has said,
"Every pulse of the soul has the signs of its history upon it, and for
85 
this very reason is always prospective too." He says furtner, "Indeed,
there may seem to be no conscious experience, however brief, which does
not reverberate with a personal past, and press onwards, in some kind of
86 
forecast, towards the same personal future." Now it is quite true that
the future which the self anticipates is never fully verifiable because, 
like the "legendary pot of gold at the end of the rainbow", it moves ahead 
of any present advances towards it. But religion would be as "a valley 
of dry bones" were we to rob it of its hope in an inexhaustable future, !<-' 
and to hold up before it a future void of the possibility of achieving a 
greater than that which has been attained. Out of this feature of our 
human existence arise both life's hope and responsibility which impart to 
religion much of its prcfoundest meaning. It is at this point also that 
moral endeavor becomes pregnant with significance and possibility. Pro- 
85. J. Laird, The Idea of the Soul, London and Toronto: Hodder and 
Jtoughton, Ltd., 1924, p. 70. 
86. Ibid., p. 70.
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fessor G. w. Allport writes as follows: "The past is drawn out in succes- 
sive and overlapping conscious moments, backwards, twenty, thirty or forty 
years to early childhood, and the future extends in each overlapping moment 
of planning and imagination. It is through this dovetailing of the suc- 
cessive moments of consciousness that we somehow possess consistent per- 
sonalities surrounding the momentary conscious core. Unless we postulated
for ourselves a permanence of personality we could not possibly account for
87 
the many identical threads running through our conscious states." ;ve can
 »
go still further and say that unless we postulated for ourselves permanence 
of personality, the possibility of developing character would become well- 
nigh inconceivable. The very thought of the future is meaningless apart 
from the postulation of a permanent self, and this for two reasons. First, 
because habit involves choice; there is always an element of choice in the 
formation of habits. This is especially true in the moral and religious 
spheres. Such choice is determined by a subject who looks to the future. 
It is the act and result of conscious choice, performed by a conscious 
subject; unless we are to regard habitual activity as little more than in- 
stinctive behavior, in which case character becomes meaningless. The 
second reason for postulating permanence of personality is because habitual 
activity implies identity. The activity which results from habit plainly 
shows that experiences which belong to the past continue to function in the 
present, and our choices concerning the future presuppose that this same 
principle holds true for the future. Obviously, then, the development of 
character is rendered inexplicable without continuity of the subject.
James himself presents an irrefutable argument for the unity of con- 
sciousness as a fundamental fact which necessitates the inference of some 
87. Gr. i.. Allport, op. cit., p. 159.
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ground of this unity other than consciousness itself. He argues con- 
vincingly against the associationists that no possible number of entities 
can "sum themselves together. Each remains, in the sum, what it always 
was; and the sum itself exists only for a by-stander who Happens to over- 
look the units and to apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the
88 
shape of some other effect on an entity external to the sum itself." He
goes on to say, "Idea of a_ plus idea of b_ is not identical with the idea of 
(a plus b). It is one, they are t?;o; in it, what knows a_ also knows b_; in 
them, what knows _a is expressly posited as not knowing b_; etc. In short,
the two separate ideas can never by any logic be made to figure as one and
89 
the same thing as the 'associated* idea." This argument has never been
successfully refuted, and it applies with equal force and cogency against 
James's own view of the self; James realizes this later. In the chapter 
on "The Compounding of Consciousness", in A Pluralistic Universe, he makes 
his well known "confession" concerning the unsatisfactory nature of his own 
conception of the self.
If we follow James's struggle in this connection somewhat in detail 
we can see more clearly the difficulties involved in a denial of a permanent 
self. He grappled with this problem for many years. He asks, "Shall we 
say that every complex mental fact is a separate psychic entity succeeding 
upon a lot of other psychic entities which are erroneously called its parts,
and superseding them in function, but not literally being composed of them?
90 
This was the course I took in my psychology." This course involves the
denial of the Absolute, and reinstates the God of theism. It also involves
88. Principles, Vol. I, pp. 158-159.
89. Ibid., p. 161.
90. P. U., p. 205.
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the denial of Fechner's conception of an "earth-soul", as well as all other
theories which attempt to compound consciousness. All such denials would
91 
be made in the "name of the incorruptible logic of self-identity." He
then adds, "But if we realize the whole philosophic situation thus pro- 
duced, we see that it is almost intolerable. Loyal to the logical kind 
of rationality, it is disloyal to every other kind. It makes the universe 
discontinuous. These fields of experience that replace each other so 
punctually, each knowing the same matter, but in ever widening contexts, 
from simplest feeling up to absolute knowledge, can they have no being in 
common when their cognitive function is so manifestly common? The regu- 
lar succession of them is on such terms an unintelligible miracle. If you 
reply that their common object is of itself enough to make the many wit- 
nesses continuous, the same implacable logic follows you how can one and 
the same object appear so variously? Its diverse appearances break it 
into a plurality; and our world of objects then falls into discontinuous
pieces quite as much as did our world of subject. The resultant irration-
92 
ality is really intolerable." we come now to his renunciation of logic
as the only way out of the difficulty. "Sincerely, and patiently as I 
could," he says, "I struggled with the problem for years, covering hun- 
dreds of sheets of paper with notes and memoranda and discussions with my- 
self over the difficulty. How can many conscousnesses be at the same time 
one consciousness? How can one and the same identical fact experience it- 
self so diversely? The struggle was vain; I found myself in an impasse. 
I saw I must either forswear that 'psychology without a soul' to which jny 
whole psychological and kantian education had committed me, I must, in
91. Ibid., p. 205. ~~~
92. Ibid., pp. 205-206.
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short, brinij back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states, now 
singly- and now in combination, in a word bring back scholasticism and com- 
mon sense or else I must squarely confess the solution of the problem im- 
possible, and then either give up my intellectualistic logic, the logic of
identity, and adopt some higher (or lower) form of rationality, or finally,
93 
face the fact that life is logically irrational." Due to the encourage- ^
ment and inspiration which he receives from the writings of Henri Bergson, 
James is finally led to give up logic. "Well, what must we do in this
tragic predicament?" he asks: "For my own part, I have finally found myself
94 
compelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably." It may
be remarked, that James could have followed Bergson is_rejecting logic with-
out maintaining such an extreme view of consciousness. Bergson's concep-
95 
tion, according to which "consciousness means memory", does not involve the
rejection of the self in the repudiation of logic. As a matter of fact, 
the theory of consciousness which he maintains and defends is, as H. M.
Kallen observes, "exactly that which, because of his reading of Bergson's
96 
works, Jaines abandons." James's denial of the self, then, seems to arise
out of his inveterate prejudice against a distinct spiritual agent or self, 
for his rejection of logic does not necessarily carry with it a denial of 
the soul.
Just as J. 3. Mill and Hume have seen that the unity of consciousness
97
is unintelligible on associationist principles, we conceive it to be unin- 
telligible on any other hypothesis than that of the soul. Our conscious
95. Ibid., pp. 207-208.
94. Ibid., p. 212.
95. H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Eng. Trans. by T. E. 
Hulme, New York and London: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1912, p. 12, Of. pp. 12 ff.
96. H. I/I. Kallen, "James, Bergson and Traditional Metaphysics", Mind, N. S., 
Vol. XXIII, No. 90, 1914, p. 226, Of. pp. 207-239.
97. J. 3. Lill, An Examination of Sir Vailjam Hamilton's Philosophy, London: 
Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer,T878, pp. 262-262, Cf. D. Hume, op. cit., 
Sec. VI.
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life cannot be understood except by a synthetic method since it constitutes 
an organic whole. Our mental processes within our individual conscious- 
ness appear as a unity which introspection reveals to be complete. That 
all of the thoughts of which we are aware, at any moment, seem to form a 
compact, coherent whole, we cannot doubt. All of them seem, in fact, to 
belong to one's self; this unity apparently continues from moment to moment, 
as retention shows, without ever any evidence of disruption. It may be ar- 
gued that this unity is apparent rather than real, but so long as it is ap- 
parent, it calls for some reasonable explanation. The conception of the 
soul is the most reasonable one. But as Lotze argues our belief in the 
unity of the soul "rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a unity, 
but on our being able to appear to ourselves at all. Did we appear to 
ourselves something quite different, nay, did we seem to ourselves to be an 
unconnected plurality, we would from this very fact, from the bare possibil- 
ity of appearing anything to ourselves, deduce the necessary unity of our 
being, this time in open contradiction with what self-observation set before 
us as our ovm image. "What a being appears to itself to be is not the im- 
portant point; if it can appear anyhow to itself, or other things to it, it
must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute indivisibility
98 
of its nature."
Whether or not we subscribe to any of Kant's special doctrines, we are 
forced to recognize that he has made a significant contribution to philoso- 
phy by his emphasis upon the fact that the unity of consciousness is ex- 
plicable only on the presupposition of a thinker who brings and holds to- 
gether the different objects and separate states involved, who compares and
98. H. Lotze', IJicrocosmus, ing. Trans. by Elizabeth Hamilton and 2. lii. 
Constance Jones, Hew Y^rk: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897, 4th Edition, p. 157,
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comprehends, but who remains separate from the objects and states in con- 
sciousness, and is conscious of them as belonging to him. His famous
dictum, "It must be possible that the I think should accompany all my rep-99      
resentations", remains as an insurmountable obstacle in the path of any
theory which purports to deal adequately with consciousness while it denies 
an abiding subject. For, as Kant points out, "Without our being conscious 
that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment be- 
fore, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. 
Each representation would, in its present state, be a new one, and in no 
wise belonging to the act by which it was to be produced by degrees, and
the manifold in it would never form a whole, because deprived of that
100 
unity which consciousness alone can impart to it.'* He continues, "If in
counting I forget that the unities which now present themselves to my mind 
have been added gradually one to the other, I should not know the production 
of the quantity by the successive addition of one to one, nor should I know
consequently the number, produced by the counting, this number being a con-
10J 
cept consisting entirely in the consciousness of that unity of synthesis."
Tniis Kant plainly shows the necessity of a permanent self.
Another consideration which seems to render the conception of a uni- 
tary psychic being a necessary hypothesis pertains to the facts of the re- 
lation of sensory consciousness to cerebral events. First, there is the 
phenomenon which occurs in the awareness of certain qualities such as the 
sensation of color. For instance, I look at the green of the leaves on
  99. immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, Eng. Trans. F. Ivl. Lluller, 
New York: The i.Iacnillan Co., London: l.lacriillan Co., Ltd., 1907, 2nd Edition 
pp. 745-746.
100. Ibid., p. 85.
101. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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the tree outside my window. The light waves from this mass of greenness 
enter into the retina successively, and regardless of any change in their 
speed which may occur from their passage along the optic nerve, they re- 
main successive. One vibration is not distinguished from another even 
in the visual area of the cortex. Now this succession of the vibrations 
of the electrons, however close, requires time. But these different 
parts of the sensation are so fused in consciousness as to produce one re- 
sulting quality, namely, a color; and this fusion occurs without loss of 
distinctness. According to W. H. Sheldon, this accounts for the fact that 
the unity of the mind which is found in conscious states cannot be expressed 
in physical terms; it is incompatible with physical conditions. For physi- 
cal processes and particles cannot be fused without losing their distinct-
102 
ness. Then there is the fusion which takes place when, for example, the
eye and the ear receive simultaneous stimulation. As William KcDougall 
points out, there is a peculiar coherence of the sensory effects of the
t
stimuli which affect the two sense organs and of the excitations of the op- 
tic and auditory nerves which constitutes a partial modification of con- 
sciousness. Both the stimuli and their immediate effects on the nerves
are quite separate and distinct, while their effects in consciousness are
103 
so fused as to form parts of one whole. Now, as Professor McDougall shows,
if the fusion of effects of simultaneous sensory stimuli to a unitary re- 
sultant, is not a physiological or physical fusion or composition, which 
has never been satisfactorily proved, but is peculiarly a psychical process,
102. W. H. Sheldon. "The Soul and Matter", The philosophical Review, Vol. 
XXXI, No. 2, 1923, pp. 113 ff, Cf_. pp. 103-134.
103. 7to. McDougall, Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism, 
London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1918, 4th Edition, pp. 286 ff.
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it argues for a psychic toeing as an agent of unity, for the unitary re- 
sultant can be conceived as existing only in the psychical sphere. For 
if the nervous system is not tae scene of this fusion of effects, the
problem of the basic unity of the individual consciousness is upon our
1 hands which seeins impossible of solution without the hypothesis of a self.
ne rightly insists that the intellect demands such a conclusion since this 
phenomenon is explicable only by assuming that bot^ processes influence or
act upon some one tning or being. It cannot be a material thing, there-
105 fore, it must be an immaterial thing; it must be the self. Further, the
way in which memory transcends the present and bridges the gulf of time 
between tne present and the past sho^s that there is a direct incompati- 
bility between it and the laws which govern physical processes. it 
misses the essence of memory, as i.-. H. Sheldon argues, to say that some 
event in a remote past left paths in the nervous system which a nervous
discharge tends to follow because the path of the original event dimin-
106 
ishes resistance. For while the neural event is a present fact very much
like the previous one which occurred in the nervous system, it is in no 
sense that past event, whereas in memory the past event is present.
Physically, then, the past event does not exist, but mentally, it is pres-
107 
ent as an element in our conscious experience, and it carries its pastness
with it too, Lfo physical process can account for this feature involved 
in memory; it is intelligible only on the ground that it is the result of 
psychical processes which imply a psychical being. This unique charac-
104. Ibid., p. 293.
105. Ibid., p. 297.
106. Op. cit., p. 109.
107. Gf. Ibid., p. 110.
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teristic of memory leads Henri Bergson to assert that pure perception and
108 
pure memory differ not merely in intensity, but in nature. He maintains
that if we make recollection merely a weakened perception we fail to
109 
grasp the essential difference between the past and the present.
licDougall also refers to this aspect of memory as a major difficulty in
110 
any account of the mind that ignores a distinct mental agent. But in
each of the above cases which we have discussed, to assume a self renders 
the phenomenon referred to explicable. <ve believe, therefore, that the 
conception of a distinct spiritual or montal agent is a necessary hypothe- 
sis, if we are satisfactorily to explain such facts of consciousness.
Any attempt to deny the subject of consciousness is rendered intrinsi- 
cally impossible by the fact of givenness. It is one thing for an object 
to exist, but it is quite another thing for it to appear. And since, as 
F. R. Tennant observes, we cannot derive from the proposition "objects ex-
ist", the proposition "objects appear", "the existence of the subject, as
111 
distinct from what appears to it, is incapable of i^insaying,.'1 For when
objects appear, they must appear to something or someone. C. A. Strong 
writes in this connection as follows: "Givenness might indeed seem at 
first sight to be an intrinsic attribute of what is given. But if it be
remembered that givenness is always to some one  you cannot make a person
112 
a present unless you first have the person." That is to say, an object
IPS, li. Bergson, i/atter and heraory, 5th Edition, English Trans. by Mary 
1,'argaret Paul and W. ocott Palmer, London: George .Ulen and Unwin, Ltd., 
1-iew York: The Ljacraillan Co., 1919, p. 71.
109. Ibid., p. 72.
110. Op_. cit., p. 336, Cf. Ch. 24.
111. F. rt. Tennant, op. cit , , p. 18.
112. G. A. Strong, The origin of Consciousness, London: I/lacmillan and 
Co., Ltd., 1918, p. 37.
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cannot appear unless there is awareness or consciousness of it. But 
this awareness which renders appearance possible cannot, we believe, be 
accounted for other than on the presupposition of a distinct mental being 
possessing an indivisible unity, A well known passage from Lotze is worth 
quoting at some length since it expresses this truth clearly and forcibly; 
"What is apt to perplex us in this question is the somewhat thoughtless way 
in which we so often allow ourselves to play fast and loose with the notion 
of appearance. We are content with setting in contrast to it the being 
that appears, and we forget that appearance is impossible without another 
being that sees it. we fancy that appearance comes forth from the hidden 
depths of being-in-itself, like a lustre existing before there is any eye 
for it to arise in, extending into reality, present to and apprehensible 
by him who will grasp it, but none the less continuing to exist even if 
known by none. v»e here overlook that even in the reign of sensation, 
from which this image is borrowed, the lustre emitted by objects only seems 
to be emitted by them, and that it can even seem to come from them, only 
because our eyes are there, the receptive organs of a cognitive soul, to 
which appearances are possible. The lustre of the light does not spread 
itself around us, but like all phaenomena dwells only in the consciousness 
of him for whom it exists. And of this consciousness, of this general 
capacity that makes the appearance of anything possible, we maintain that 
it can be an attribute only of the indivisible unity of one being, and that 
every attempt to ascribe it a plurality, however bound together, will, by
its failure, but confirm our conviction of the suprasensible unity of the
113 
soul." vfe do not see, then, how the appearance of an object is possible
Op_. oit., pp. 157-158.
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without this awareness of a conscious subject, although v;e do not con- 
ceive the object's existence as depending upon being known. Thus, since 
the subject is involved in affirming existence of an experience, whether 
it be described as a state or as a relation, there seems to be no escape 
from the conclusion that such a subject does exist.
This leads us, by way of conclusion, to say a word concerning the 
nature of the self. This is a question on which one certainly cannot be 
dogmatic, and yot it is necessary to form some conception of the nature 
of the self if our argument for its existence is to mean anything more 
than empty words. Professor J. B. Pratt has given us in his latest book, 
Personal Realism, to which we have referred a number of times, a very sat- 
isfactory account, for the most part, of the nature of the self, and much
that we sliall say at this juncture is derived from his treatment of the
114 
subject. First, the self is to be conceived as a substance, which means
that it is an existent being which possesses qualities. It is "an exist- 
ent substantive", to use Professor Pratt's Kords, "an existent group of
existent qualities"; it is not, therefore, "a merely abstract and colorless
115 
A." It s.er.;s to accompany the dawn of consciousness in infancy, and brings
with it some characters of its ver./ own; it possesses qualities peculiar to
it in addition to those qualities or characters of the body with which Lla-
116
ture provides it. Thus, in addition to one's experience and racial inher- 
itance, certain oualities peculiar to each subject or ego, enter into the 
constitution of character. This latter factor accounts for most of the 
unique, distinctive characteristics of each individual. '/jhatever relation 
the self sustains to the "pure ego" of traditional thought, the former must
114. Cf_., pp. jfeTIs
115. Ibid., p. 2S8.
116. Ibid., pp. 298-299.
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not be conceived too diaphanously. "A self completely out of time, a 
substance without attributes or distinct from them, a permanent and un- 
changing identity, a monad with no windows, a soul euite pure from the
taint oi' the empirical such an imaginary, or unimaginable, entity night
117 
belong in heaven but surely would have no place on earth. 1' On the other
hand, the assertion that the self is a substance should not be construed 
to mean that it is tangible or visible. it cannot be visualized. It 
is a substance, but a substance of its own kind; it is sui generis. Just 
as v.e cannot conceive substance without attributes, we are unable to con- 
ceive the self apart from its qualities and acts. The self, like other
things, is known by rjhat it does. "It is that which has certain charac-
118 
ters and acts in certain ways." It has both unity and variety; oneness
and nultiplicity. Its inherent unity distinguishes it from other sub- 
stances; it is the one being which is essentially one. Vie cannot regard
the self as being in space for neither conscious states nor conscious acts
119 
are spatial; it acts into space. There is wide divergence of opinion as
to whether the self is in time. Again, dogmatism must be laid aside, but 
if v;e regard the self as in neither space nor time it is difficult to see 
what significance could be attached to our conception of it as an existent
\
being; it would belong rather to the realm of essence than to that of ex- 
istence. Unless v,e conceive it as somehow being in time, we separate it 
from its character since we render its development and change impossible. 
As to how the self is known, we cannot regard the soul as phenomenal. 
F. R. Tennant regards the self as "that to waich phenomena appear, and is
117. Ibid., p. 300".
118. Ibid., p. 304.
119. Ibid., p. ^06.
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120 
known otherwise than is the phenomenal." He says that it "is ratner the
one known being that must be called ontal or noumenal, if we are to avoid
121 indefinite regress; or the one ontal thing that is assuredly known." The
self is not to be found among the objects of consciousness; it is not em- 
pirically discoverable. Hume f s famous attempt to discover it in this 
manner led him to conclude: "when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat 
or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any-
122 
thing but the perception." u'e agree with Hurne here; we must admit that
the idea of the self is not derived from immediate perception, but must be 
reached by inference from the general nature and conditions of conscious 
life. As H. Hoffding puts it: "In this Hume was perfectly right. But he 
searches in the wrong place. The nature of the ego is manifested in the 
combination of the sensations, ideas, and feelings, and in the forms and 
laws of this combination, consequently in memory and comparison, from their
purely elementary and automatic forms up to the highest and clearest forms
123 
of which they are capable. Hume cannot see the wood for the trees." To
conclude, then, we may conceive the self as having certain characters or 
functions.. It plays the role of a subject in cognition; it trills in voli- 
tion; and it is the "feeler" of affective states; thus it has determinate 
states and activities. professor 7/illiam r.cDougall has offered a very 
suggestive description of the soul in Body and Lind, although he studiously
120. Op. cit., p. 97.
121. Ibid., p. 97.
122. Op. cit., Bk. I, Part IV, 3ec. VI.
123. H. ilcffding, Outlines of Psychology, English Trans. by L.ary 11. Lorades 
London: l.Cacmillan and Co., Ltd.; New York: The Iv.acmillan Co., 1904, p. 136.
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avoids the use of the tern substance with reference to the self here and in
124 
his later work in psychology as well. He conceives the soul as a "sum of
enduring capacities for thoughts, feelings, and efforts of determinate
125 
kinds." "':& may then," he says, "describe a soul as a beiny that possesses,
or is, the sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and psycho- 
physical interaction, of which the most fundamental are (1) the capacity of 
producing, in response to certain physical stimuli (the sensory processes 
of the brain), the whole range of sensation qualities in their vihole range 
of intensities; (2) the capacity of responding to certain sensation-com- 
plexes with the preduction of meanings, as, for example, spatial meanings; 
(3) the capacity of responding to these sensations and these meanings with 
feeling and conation or effort, under the spur of which further meanings 
may be brought to consciousness in accordance with the laws of reproduction 
of similars arid of reasoning; (4) the capacity of reacting upon the brain- 
processes to modify their course in a v.ay which we cannot clearly define, 
but which v;e may provisionally conceive as a process of guidance by which
streams of nervous energy may be concentrated in a way that antagonizes the
126
tendency of all physical energy to dissipation and degradation." Thus con- 
ceived, the self is actively present in every act and moment of our conscious 
life. Although we cannot establish the existence or describe the nature of 
soul by thy methods of science, considerations such as those we have urged 
above lead us to believe that we are warranted in holding to the belief in 
its existence as an indispensable, but super-sensible being. V-'e believe 
that we are justified in this position until a genuinely satisfactory sub- 
stitute for the soul is forthcoming.
124. Of. '.:.;. LlcDougall. Psyclolo;;/, The Jjiudy of Behaviour, London: .,11- 
liams and Norgate, 1923, pp. 69-VO. Also, An Outline of ^ycholo; , London: 
ilethuen and Co., Ltd., 4th Edition, 1928, p. 40.
125. Body and :_ilnfl, p. 365.
126. Ibid., p. 365.
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This leads us to say that James's view of trie self, aside fror its 
valuable results for psychology in many respects, has made an important 
negative contribution to religious thought. It constitutes a forceful 
argument for thi.- futility of any attempt to present an empirical account 
of the self which denies the reality of a permanent ego. James's theory 
serves conspicuously in this connection because, as we have intimated, it 
is generally admitted that he has achieved greater success in his efforts 
to offer a substitute for the soul than any other thinker who has made a 
similar attempt. But it is a significant feet that no one has seriously 
endeavored to incorporate this ingeneous conception of the self in his 
philosophical construction; even those who regard it witn favor usually are 
content to let the matter end witn an expression of approval concerning it. 
The obvious reason for this attitude as regards James's empirical self is 
that it cannot bear the weight v;hich would have to be placed upon it if one 
tries to make it do the work of the soul. Perhaps Hume manifested the 
greater wisdom after all; for while he initiated scepticism concerning a 
permanent self, he did not try to present a better substitute. Further, 
James's theory of consciousness and of the self nas successfully demon- 
strated the untenability of any thoroughgoing epistemological monism, 
whether it be idealistic or realistic; no shows us that in the last analy- 
sis, the epistemological gulf between mind and object cannot be success- 
fully bridged. Whether it be the denial of the reality of the object as 
in the case of idealism, or that of the reality of the subject, as in the 
case of American neo-realism, any view that attempts to eliminate tne dis- 
tinction between the psychical and the physical achieves only apparent suc- 
cess and when closer scrutiny is exercised, it becomes obvious that impor-
85
tant facts pertaining to our conscious life have been omitted. Idealism 
leads to pantheism and neo-realism leads to matarialisn. If the conten- 
tion that the distinction between the psychical and the physical is an ul- 
timate one must, in the last analysis, be taken to mean that the only
theory of knowledge consistent with theism is an epistemolo<-:ical dualism,
127 
as L. J. Walker maintains, so be it; for it is better to retain the bridge
between the nind and its object than it is to eliminate it if the latter 
procedure involves the obliteration of the self as rcell. Finally, James's 
theory serves to warn those who would retain the conception of a self that 
it cannot be allowed to become too pure an ego wjiich, as Tames says, "at- 
tenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition", and which evaporates to
128 
an "estate of pure diaphaneity". A soul quite removed from all contact
with the empirical is inconceivable; it must be conceived in a much richer 
fashion than this if it is to withstand trie empirical assaults against it. 
Thus James issues a challenge to religious thou^it to remove certain ob- 
jectionable features which have all too frequently accompanied the belief 
in a soul, and to achieve a more satisfactory account of the cnaracter and 
functions of this supra-sensible being which is so necessary to an adequate 
religious view of man and his relation to both the temporal and the eternal
world.
127. L. J. talker, Theories of Knowledge, London and New York; Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1911, 2nd Edition, pp. 68, 687.
128. E. R, ij., p» 2.
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JAMES'S THEORY OF BELIEF AND WILL
3o long as the intellectualist tradition prevailed in Psychology be- 
lief and doubt were regarded as purely intellectual facts or states of 
mind, the result of purely intellectual or cognitive processes. For in- 
stance, in the opinion of James Mil, belief is purely an intellectual
1
state. According to the Association Psychology, belief was described
»
and explained as the persistence of an "inseparable association". James 
was among those who led the way in breaking away from this traditional 
treatment of belief by asserting that belief is an emotion. This view of
the matter is in line *<ith that of Hume which teaches tnat belief belongs
2 
to the sensitive rather than to the cogitative side of our nature; that is,
as James says, it is an affair 01' "sensible pungency". Hume did not, how- 
ever, hold with James, that it is a matter of "emotional pungenc;/", unless, 
as J". Laird points out, "in the general and probably irrelevant sense ac- 
cording to which all Hume's 'impressions of reflexions' may be said to be
*~s 
o
emotions." James's treatment of the psychology of belief is an impor- 
tant contribution to the subject, and carries far reaching and important 
implications for his general philosophic standpoint, and especially for his 
religious philosophy. Eis conception of belief serves to give a basis for
his defense of religious faith, and it is fundamental to his treatment of 
values.
1. James ).;ill, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 344.
2. David Hune, "Treatise on Human Mature", Hume's Philosophical 
Vol. I, Edinburgh: Adar. and Charles 31ack, 1854, :3k. I, Part III, .Sec. V 
& VIII.
3. J. Laird, :-'jiov.aedp,c!_ t Belief and Opinion, I;ow Tork and London: The 
Century Co., 1930, p. l/,^.
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Belief, for James, is primarily an attitude of the raind towards its
4 
objects. ./hen an object before the mind is regarded as being real i\e
have belief, which nay be defined as "the mental st&te or function of cog-
5 
nizing reality". It means every "degree of assurance, including the
6 
highest possible certainty and conviction". «.s a sort of feeling, in
its inner nature, it is more closely related to the emotions than to any- 
thing else; and is similar to "consent" as studied in the psychology of
volition. It belongs to our active nature. It is characteristic of 
both belief and consent that when an idea controls the mind theoretic 
restlessness and hesitation come to an end, and action tends to follow.
On the intellectual side, then, rest and repose are distinguishing fea- 
tures of belief and consent. On the practical side, they are intimately
7 
related to activity. There is the same attitude of mind in disbelief as
in belief; that is to say, the stability of the mind's content is the same 
in botn cases. Bu.t doubt and inquiry destroy this equilibrium and thro?/
the content of the mind into a state of restlessness. Thus doubt and in-
8 
quiry, not disbelief, constitute the psychological opposite of belief.
At this point he is in agreement with A. Bain who holds belief and disbe- 
lief to be identical states, and doubt anci uncertainty to be the opposite
'--4
of belief as a state of mind. Belief and disbelief, then, are but two
aspects of the same psychic state, the latter being an "incidental compli-
10 
cation" of the former.
4. PrincTples, Vol.11, Ch. >:xi.
5. Ibid., p. 283.
6. Ibid., p. 283.
7. Ibid., pp. 284-380.
8. Ibid., p. 284.
9. A. Bain, The ISinotiona and the Will. New York: D. Applet on and Company, 1886, p. 509. —— ———
10. Principles, Vol. II, p . 284.
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A judgment is commonly held to be a proposition which connects the 
"ideas" by a "copula"; and propositions are thought to be of various kinds 
such as affirmative, negative, hypothetical, and so on. Now James says 
that the ideas form exactly the same combination in a proposition which is 
disbelieved or doubted, as well as in a question, as they do in one that 
is firmly believed. Thus the "way in which ideas are combined is a part 
of the inner constitution of the thought's object or content. That object
is sometimes an articulated whole with relations between its parts, amongst
11 
which relations, that of predicate to subject may be one." jivsry proposi-
tion, then, so far as it is affirmed, doubted, or denied, has four elements; 
namely, subject, predicate, and their relation, which form the object of
belief, and the attitude of the mind in respect of this object. This last
element constitutes belief. James, with J. 3. Lill, holds belief to be
12 
"ultimate and primordial". Belief is a state of consciousness sui generis;
13 
it "feels like itself".
Absence of contradiction is the condition of belief. "Any object
which remains uncont radio ted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute
14 
reality." This is in substantial agreement with Bain's view of "primitive
credulity", according to which we begin by believing everything; "whatever
15 
is, is true." This fact is illustrated by supposing a child's first ex-
perience to be in the form of a visual impression of a lighted candle a- 
gainst a dark, empty background. This image constitutes the whole uni- 
verse for the child for the time being. Even if the candle were not real,
11. Ibidp. 286-287.
12. James Mill, op. cit., Note, pp. 412-423.
13. Principles, II, pp. H86, Cf. p. 287.
14. Ibid., p. 289.
15. A. Bain, op. cit., p. 511.
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being only imaginary, and thus not visible to another experient, the inex- 
perienced babe would still accept it, and believe in it, as real. This 
is due to the fact that, in the experience of the child, there is no idea 
of any other reality with which to contrast it so as to arouse doubt or 
cause disbelief. His universe contains no other reality to give birth to 
an opposing idea. Since, then, the candle is his entire universe, the
question of its reality cannot possibly arise; the candle is his all, his
16 
absolute. "It is, it is that ; it is there." It follows that there is
no other alternative, but to believe, since the child cannot conceive any 
otner place or any other object in the space; there is nothing to do, in 
this situation, but to ascribe reality to the object. As opinoza showed 
in his well known example of the boy imagining a winged hors^, belief in 
the existence of the winged horse necessarily follows upon tno idea of it
unless the imagination of the winged horse is accompanied by an idea which
17 
contradicts its existence. It is of the essence of belief, therefore, to
affirm all objects v;hich present themselves to the mind unless they clash 
with other objects which. have been admitted to belief.
The only way in v.-hich this contradiction can occur is for one thought 
to say something about the other which is "inadmissible"; that is, some- 
thing which the mind cannot accept. For example, to say that the child's 
candle, or the boy's v.inged horse exists in "the outer world", v.hen not 
perceived, places an object in "the outer world" which contradicts all 
previous knowledge of that world. It then becomes necessary for him to
n t p< 2QQ.
17. Ibid., p. 288.
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choose between his present perceptions and the other knowledge of the
outer world. The present perceptions must be rejected if the other
18 
knowledge is to be retained, insofar as they are related to that world.
Outward space contains no candles and winged horses. They and their
spaces do have existence as iaental objects, but the realities of the outer
19 
occupy an entirely different space. This sort of difficulty, how­
ever, is not involved in dreaming of a horse with wings. The dream-horse, 
its wings, and its place, are all equally real and all belong together. 
There is no interference of any kind here and, consequently, no contra-
diction arises. But contradiction does begin as soon as the dream-horse 
attempts to enter the "world otherwise known". If, for instance, I iden- 
tify tnis horse and its place with my horse in the stall, and say that 
"I.ly horse has grown wings in the stall," I make an assertion which cannot 
be reconciled with what I know of the world in which my horse and the- stall
exist; mat I know about my horse in the stall is incompatible with the
20 
winged horse of the dreuu.
In this account of the matter, James seems to have overlooked a dis- 
tinction that is frequently made in the development of the consciousness of 
reality. J. L. ;-3alawin holds tnat two stages of development are involved
here. The first is that of "reality-feeling", and the second is that of
21 
belief. According to Baldwin, the former stage "denotes the fundamental
modification of consciousness which attaches to the presentative side of 
of sensational states  the feeling which means, as the child afterward
18. Ibid.,^p. 288.
19. Ibid., p. 289.
20. Ibid., p. 289
21. J. ivl. Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and ..ill, New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1891, p. 159.
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22 
learns, that an object is really there." The latter stage, or belief,
which he defines as "consciousness of the personal endorsement of
23 
reality", denotes the "feeling which attahces to what may be a secondary
or representative state of rnind, and indicates the amount of assurance we
24 
have at the time that an object is there." That is to say, in the first
stage of the development of the consciousness of reality, the idea has its 
own guarantee of its reality, but in the second stage, or in belief, the 
idea is guaranteed by my knowledge of it, or by its relation to ideas which 
have already been admitted to belief. James's illustration of tlic child 
and the candle belongs to the first stage, or to that of reality-feeling
which, according to i3aldwin, "is simply the fact of feeling; nothing more,
25 
but t/j.s much", and does not consitute the real phenomenon of belief. If
this distinction between the mere sense of reality and belief is valid, it 
follows that belief is more complex than James's description has shown it 
to be. The fact that such inconsistencies as winged horses are accepted 
in dreams indicates the presence of the simple "reality-feeling" without 
belief. Positing or affirming involves a distinction in consciousness be­ 
tween the true and the untrue. In saying that any object which "remains
26 
uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality",
James is guilty of the "psychologist's fallacy".
\ie may use the two illustrations which have been considered above to
bring out the distinction between existential and attributive judgments.
22. Ibid., p. 149.————————
23. Ibid., p. 158.
24. Ibid., p. 149.
25. Ibid., p. 150.
26. Principles, Vol. II, p. 289; Of. Jaidwin, op. cit., pp. 159-151.
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"The candle exists as an outer reality" is a case of the former; and "ky 
horse has a pair of wings" is an example of the latter type of judgment. 
It follows from the nature of belief, for James, that "all propositions, 
whether attributive or existential, are believed through the very fact of 
being conceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed at the
same time, by affirming that their terms are the same with the terms of
27 
these other propositions." Thus, while the dream-candle has existence,
it does not have the same kind of existence, that is, existence extra 
mentem meam, which candles of our waking experience enjoy. Our dream- 
horse does have wings, but neither the horse nor the wings can be identi­ 
fied with horses and wings known to us in memory. The ability to think 
of the same thing at different times is essential to our mental life. It 
is possible to think of the same thing in compatible ways, but it is not 
possible to think of the same thing in two contradictory ways at once. It 
becomes necessary, therefore, to choose v.uich way we intend to think of it. 
lie cannot, for instance, conceive the horse in the stall as both having and 
not having wings at the same time. "The whole distinction of real and un­ 
real, the whole psychology of belief, disbelief and doubt, is thus grounded 
on two mental facts—first, that we are liable to think differently of the
same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of
28
thinking to adhere to and which to disregard." Belief is thus a phenom- 
enon of voluntary choice; our choice determines reality for us. The ex- 
istence we cling to becomes real existence for us; all the rest is ignored, 
treated as non-existent. This, according to James, is our practical at- 
titude as regards the things and the existence we reject and disbelieve.
27. Principles, Vol. II. p. 290.
28. Ibid., p. 290.
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The two propositions, in the quotation just cited, seem to be inconsistent, 
if taken as they stand. As J. Laird says, it cannot be true "that we be­ 
lieve where, and only where, we have no voluntary choice, and also that
29 
believing is an instance of vluntary choice." If "will" be taken to mean
"settled principles of action", a sense in which it is sometimes used, it 
is conceivable that belief might be so closely allied witn these, and that 
they might be sufficiently settled, as to render volitional choice virtu­ 
ally impossible. If, however, "will" is used in the sense of voluntary 
choice between two alternatives, there is no substantial difficulty in 
holding; that belief is an affair of the will. The latter usage appears
to be more in line with the general trend of James's argument.
To resume, then, these things which, from the practical standpoint, 
are treated as non-existent, do have existence. But it is not the same 
kind of existence as the real things have. They exist as objects of 
fancy, as errors, and so on. From the theoretical standpoint they must
be assigned a place in the universe as well as the things to which reality 
is ascribed. Being shut out of the real world, the philosopher's v.orld 
must include them. His complete world, then, consists of the "realities'' 
plus the fancies and illusions; and several other sub-universes which are 
but dimly known to the practical man. But the philosopher must take ac­ 
count of these, he must relate them to the whole, and properly place ob­ 
jects in each one. The most important of these sub-universes are:
1. The world of sense, or of physical "things", as apprehended by 
us, witn such qualities as heat, color, sound ana so forth. 
29. J. Laird, op. cit., p. 151; Cf. also, p. 152.
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2. The world of science, or of physical things as they are inter­ 
preted by the scientist. Here, only solids, fluids and their "laws" of 
motion are real.
'6. The v.orld of ideal relations, or abstract truths, expressed in 
aesthetic, ethical, mathematical, logical, or metaphysical propositions.
4. The world of "idols of the tribe", illusions or prejudices common 
to mankind. For example, the motion of the sky round the earth belongs 
to this world.
5. The various supernatural worlds; worlds of fable and fancy. The 
Christian heaven and hell, and the world of Hindoo mythology belong here.
6. The worlds of individual opinion which are as numerous as men.
30
7. The many worlds of sheer madness and vagary.
; ,e place every object of vhich we thinx in one of these worlds. Due 
to the fact that for most people these worlds are not clearly distinguished, 
each v.orld has its own reality only while we attend to it; ivhen we cease to 
think of it, its reality fades out. iVhich one of these various worlds is 
to be "the world of ultimate realities" for any given individual is prac- 
tically determined by his controlling habits of attention. The objects of 
the world which he chooses become absolute authority; they speak the final 
word. ,aatever is found to be incompatible with them must be placed in 
one of the other worlds or entirely discarded. The horse with wings r;:ay 
exist undisturbed so long as it does not try to enter the real world. 
But trouble starts as soon as it begins to trespass upon the real world, 
for here horses do not have wings. All these worlds nave exist-nee, that 
30." Principles,' Vol. II. pp. 292-292.
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is, they possess metaphysical reality. But this does not meet our demand 
for practical reality; we must have reality for ourselves. In order to
have this latter kind of reality, an object "must not only appear, but it
31 
must appear both interesting and important." Objects which fail to meet
these requirements are relegated to non-existent worlds. Reality, then,
for practical men, "means simply relation to our emotional and active'62 
life," and we ascribe reality to anything that excites and stimulates our
interest. If we do not recognize an object, if v,e refuse to give it our 
attention, it is unreal and disbelieved. In this connection, James fol­ 
lows Hume who defines belief as "a lively idea related to or associated
33 
with a present impression", and who goes on to say, "it is evident, that
belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas but in the manner 
of their concejtion....and in philosophy, we can go no further than as­ 
sert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas 
of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more
force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them
34 
in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of our actions."
Bain also holds that belief is essentially related to action, that is to
35 
volition. According to him, "action is the basis and ultimate criterion
36 
of belief." In spite of this fundamental agreement with James, both Hume
51, Ibid., p. 295.
32. Ibid., p. 295.
33. David Hume, op_. cit., Bk. I, 3ec. VII, p. 129.
34. Ibid., Bk. I, 3ec. VII, p. 130.
35. A. Bain, op. cit., p. 505.
36. Ibid., p. 506.
97
and Bain reach quite different conclusions from his, in that for both of 
them we believe because we have no other alternative and an element of
constraint enters into our actions as a result of our beliefs; whereas,
37 
for James, as we have seen, belief is a matter of voluntary choice.
To assert the reality of an object in no way changes its intrinsic 
content. In fact, the object is not affected at all. As Hume says,
"when I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and raien I believe
38 
him to be existent, my idea of him neither increases nor diminishes."
39 
Adding reality to it "only fixes it and stamps it in to us." That is to
say, if we believe in an object and ascribe reality to it, we establish 
relations between it arid ourselves. These relations are real, for the
time being, and given reality to their objective term. "The foils et origo
of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view,
40 
is thus subjective, is ourselves." If we were purely logical thinkers,
lacking emotional reactions, we would ascribe reality to all objects of 
which we think. But since this is not the case, we ascribe a greater de­ 
gree of reality to the things which re "select and emphasize and turn to
41 
with a will." Thus our Ego is the starting point of reality; reality
begins here and imparts itself to all those things which sustain an inti­ 
mate and continuous relation to life. Our own reality, then, "that sense
of our own life which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ulti-
42 
mates for our belief." It is impossible to doubt our own present existence,
arid we ascribe reality to all that is connected with it, just as Descartes
37. Ibid., p. 506; Hume, op. cit., Bk. I, Sec. VII.
38. Hume, op. cit., Bk. I, oec. VII, pp. 125-126.
39. Principles. Vol. II, p. 296.
40. Principles, Vol. II, pp. 296-297.
41. Ibid., p. 297.
42. Ibid., p. 297.
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made the indubitable reality of the cogito do service for trie reality of
all for which the cogito stood. Thus the reality of self, the feeling 
of self is our most fixed point of reference. All reality comes to us 
through our own experiences, and the self and its needs constitute the 
centre of experience. Thus the Ego, considered as an active and tJno-
tional term, serves as the nail on which the world of living realities
43 
hangs. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that Janes f s emphasis
upon the "active and emotional" side of us as the really living part, and 
his view that our beliefs are determined by the living part, appear in­ 
consistent with the position that doubt and inquiry, not disbelief, are
44 
the opposites of belief. For, as J. Laird argues, doubt and inquiry may
themselves be very live things, and are liable strongly to affect action
45
even when they paralyze it. Also, they have the power to disturb us emo­ 
tionally. If belief is regarded as the "live" part of us, its opposite 
would seem to be "indifference". In Laird's opinion, belief in this sense 
is a category of value in the wide sense of the term "value"; insofar as a 
thing matters to us it may be said to have value or d is value. In short,
value attaches to that towards which we are not indifferent; whereas its
46 
opposite is that about wuich we are not concerned.
Sensations are the strongest rivals among the objects r.hich present 
themselves for belief. This is because of their power to compel our at­ 
tention due to their "sensible vividness or pungency *' whicn is the vital 
factor in settling the dispute between the objects which clamor for recog­ 
nition by the mind. Before reality will be given to a conception, it must
43. Ibid., p. 297. ~ ~~
44. Ibid., p. 284; Cf. Above, p. 88.
45. J. Laird, op. cit., p. 152.
46. Ibid., p. 152.
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"terminate in the world of orderly experience." Before belief attaches 
to a conceived object it must have some permanent and vivid sensible ob­ 
ject for its term; that is, it must show sensible effects just as "verifi­ 
cation" is always demanded in science. But all sensations do not enjoy 
the same degree of reality. :'The mind chooses to suit itself, and decides
what particular sensation shall be held more real and valid than all the
48 
rest." Some, because of permanency, or for practical or aesthetic
reasons, happen to interest us more than others. These are selected by 
attention and given a higher degree of reality, vvhile the rest are rele­ 
gated to the position of mere signs and suggestions of the more fortunate
contestants. For example, the real sound of a cannon is the sensation
49 
which it makes when the ear is close by. James follows Lock in holding
that sensations which produce pleasure or pain exert the strongest control
50 
over belief and are considered most real.
Objects which arouse our emotions and stir our active impulses rank 
next to sensations as regards reality. As a rule, the reality of a con­ 
ceived object depends upon its ability to excite us. Belief usually ac­ 
companies an emotionally exciting idea. "Every exciting thought in the
natural man carries credence with it. To conceive with passion is eo ipso
51 
to affirm. ^e may doubt or disbelieve other objects, but we have no
doubt or hesitancy concerning the object of passion. IVe strongly believe 
it. Thus all conceived objects which arouse hate, desire, or fear are be-
47. Principles, Vol. II, p. 501. ~~
48. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 286. 
^t9. Ibid., p. 286.
50. John Locke,op.cit,,Bk. IV, Ch. 2, Para. 14; Also, Ch. 11, Para. 8.
51. Principles. Vol. II, p. 308.
100
lieved. Religious and supernatural beliefs belong to tnis type, and the 
"surest warrant for immortality is the yearning of our bowels for our
dear ones; for God, the sinking sense it gives us to imagine no such Prov-
52 
idence or help." This attitude towards objects of passion is due to the
bodily commotion v/hich such ideas produce. Our own acts and emotions, 
then, our own pleasures and pains constitute the ultimate criterion of 
reality. They are the fixities to which our v^hole chain of beliefs is
fastened, with object clinging to object until the Self is "reached and
53 
held". Also, our belief in objects of theory is determined by the same
general principles. 7»hen alternative theories present themselves, the 
richest, simplest and most harmonious one will be believed. That is to 
say, we believe the one which renders the most satisfactory account of our 
sensible experience, which appeals most to our interests, and which most
successfully meets our aesthetic, emotional, and active needs.
The relation which belief sustains to emotion, volition, and action 
has been touched upon in various stages of James's argument, as we have 
proceeded to develop it, and it will now be well to give this matter final 
consideration and offer our suggestions and criticism with reference to his 
position. The sweeping clain v.hich he makes for the part played by pas­ 
sion and emotion in belief is considerably modified in his enunciation of 
the doctrine of "The jill to Believe." Here he not only admits but af­ 
firms that passional conviction has no legitimate place where anything
52. Ibid., p. 308.
53. Ibid., p. 311.
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can be decided "by its nature on intellectual grounds". That is, in this 
different version of the question under consideration, he does not hold 
that passional decision should ever be opposed to intellectual, but that 
the former is justified only in certain cases where intellect fails. As 
a matter of fact, he so strongly qualifies his defense of passional deci- 
sion, that J. Laird finds "nothing in the argument to forbid tae inter- 
pretation that in the lives of most of us these passional decisions, in
the limited sphere in which James holds that they legitimately occur, are
55 
in reality forced acceptances rather than forced 'options'." Clearly,
his view as set forth in the essay in question is the more tenable, and may 
be taken to represent his settled conviction on the subject. But throu/:-- 
out, James was concerned to show that the whole of our nature demands satis- 
faction, arid is operative in belief, LS opposed to the intellectualist tra- 
dition with its exaggerated emphasis upon intellect. Stripped,then, of 
its extravagances, James's contention that emotion exercises an influence 
upon belief is essentially correct. For, plainly, emotion does influence 
belief, as the common use of the emotional method of persuasion shows. 
In all doubtful matters, as Bain says, when "there are appearances for and
against a given uniformity, emotion, lending itself to one side, makes that
56 
side appear the strongest for the time, and sweeps belief accordingly."
Also, James is quite right in asserting that we readily believe ideas which
54   ^'Le ..ill to Believe and Other Popular T^ssays, Itew Ycr.-: and London: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1097, p. 11.
55. J. Laird, op. cit., p. 153.
56. A. Sain, op. cit., p. 522.
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strongly excite in us some definite emotion such as fear, hate, love and 
hope. Our conviction xvith reference to the objects of such ideas as 
have the power thus to stir us may be strengthened end intensified by 
cherishing the emotion which accompanies our thought of them. Two mental 
processes are at work here. To quote Bain again: "The effect of emotion 
in intensifying an idea cannot be detached in practical working from the 
influence of the feelings in keeping back all incompatible ideas. The 
two mental processes are different, but both unavoidably work together. 
Whenever a feeling strongly occupies the mind, the objects in harmony
with it are maintained in the view, and all others are repelled arid i^-
57 
nored." ,,'hether or not we recognize as legitimate the demands of our
emotional nature ultimately depends upon our conception of reality. That
is to say, if we regard reality as a general term for "that kind of exper-
58
ience whicn satisfies one or more of the needs of the individual", the de­ 
mands of the emotional side of our nature will not be ruled out of court. 
And different kinds of reality are indicated by the various coefficients 
of belief, sensational, logical, moral and aesthetic; and it would seem 
that v;e have the same justification for believing in one as the other, for 
all are based upon the fact that our nature demands, and succeeds in ob­ 
taining, certain kinds of satisfaction. If belief in anything, to use
the words of J. Li. Baldwin, is "the consciousness of the presence of that
59 
thing as fitted to satisfy a need", we are not justified in ignoring the
emotional coefficient of belief and the kind of reality to which it testi­ 
fies. And it is through belief that we are able, after a fashion, to
57. Op. cit., pp. b22-525l
58. J. L. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 171.
59. Op_. cit., p. 171.
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harmonize and adjust these different kinds of reality to one another. 
For, as the author just quoted puts it: "Sensational reality will not 
satisfy our logical demands, for nature is often refractory and illogi­ 
cal. Neither will logic satisfy our moral and aesthetic demands, for 
the logically true is often iiomoral and hideous. It is v.ell, therefore, 
to write large the truth that logical consistency is not the whole of 
reality, and that the revolt of the heart against fact is often as legit­ 
imate a measure of the true in this shifting universe, as is the cold de-
60 
nial given by rational conviction to the vagaries of causal feeling."
As to the relation between belief and v;ill, James holds that both con­ 
sist in nothing more than a certain way of attending to objects, or con­ 
senting to their stable presence before the mind. That is, there is no 
difference in the attitude of the mind towards its object in belief and 
will. There is a difference, however, in the objects themselves in the 
two cases; the objects of belief do not change according to our thought of 
them, while the objects of the will depend upon our thought or actions for 
existence. But this difference in the objects does not affect the atti­ 
tude of the mind toward them. In both instances, the mind recognizes the 
object, consents to its existence, and embraces it as its reality. Thus
both belief and will mean a certain relation between objects and the oelf,
61
and "are two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon".
.,ith reference to the relation between belief and vrill there is room 
for wide divergence of opinion. Our view of this question depends upon 
the position \\e assume as regards the coefficients of reality. Present
60~Jp. cit., pp. 165-169.
61. Principles, p. 321; Gf. also, p. '620.
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reality may be said to be of two kinds; present external reality, and 
present memory-reality. The former is guaranteed by its independence of 
the will and involves "limitation of activity", which presents the coef­ 
ficient of "incontrollableness". The latter, on the other hand, is -•uar-
anteed by subjection to the will and presents "voluntariness" or "control"
62 
as ground of belief. If ve emphasize the memory-side of reality, or
"voluntariness", as ground of belief, and fail to take into account the two­ 
fold nature of the complete criterion of reality, we are apt to make no 
distinction between belief and will. If, however, we recognize "restric­ 
tion of activity", in any of its forms, such as "resistence", "consisten­ 
cy", and so on, it is impossible to regard belief as the same phenome­ 
non as 'fill. In that case, volition "would represent work against lim­ 
itations, belief activity within limitations and adapting itself to limita-
63
tions." James, following Hume here, overlooks this distinction and recog- 
nizes only "voluntariness", or "control". Cl. F. Stout, and J. Ii. Baldwin 
maintain that we cannot ignore the twofold nature of the criterion of ex- 
ternal reality, and they agree in making "feelings of resistance", or "in-
64
controllableness", the prinary coefficient of reality. ;-jtout regards be-
65 
lief as "at once a condition of activity, and conditioned by activity,"
thereby recognizing both factors as necessary. ^s to the element of "in- 
controllableness", rie says that objective coercion "is of the very essence
62 « Gf» J« fc« Baldwin, op.~"cit., p. 165; also, .article on "Belief", by 
G. ?. Stout, and J". L. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 
Ldited by J. L. Baldwin, Vol. I, pp. 110-112. rhe substance of their argu- 
ment is given in this paragraph.
63. Ibid., p. 112.
64. Ibid., pp. 111-112; Cf. G. F. Stout, manual of Psychology, pp. 674 ff.; 
Also, J. ... Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and t.ill, pp. 165-166.
65. Op. cit., p. 674.
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66 
of belief". To quote him further: "Whatever influence subjective needs
67 
as such may have in determining belief, they can never be the sole factor."
While according to Baldwin, "there is a distinct difference in conscious­ 
ness between the consent of belief and consent of will. The consent of 
belief is in a measure a forced consent; it attaches to what is — to what 
stands in the order of things whether I consent or no. Tiie consent of 
will is a forceful consent — a consent to what shall be through me. Fur­ 
ther, in cases in whicn belief is brought about by desire and will, there 
is a subtle consciousness of inadequate evidence, until by repetition the 
item desired and willed no longer needs volition to ^ive it a place in the
series deemed objective; then it is for the first time belief, and then it
68 
is no longer will." To make this distinction, and to insist upon the
primacy of "incontrollableness", however, should not be taken as a denial 
of the influence of will on belief. It simply means that the control 
factor, while also present, is secondary. </nat we are mainly concerned 
to point out, in this connection, is that James's exclusive emphasis upon 
volition or the element of "control", leads him to the erroneous conclusion 
that belief and will are but two names for the same psychological phenome­ 
non. In his development of the doctrine of pragmatism, however, as we 
shall see later, he recognizes the coefficient of "incontrollableness" in 
that he admits a "core" of reality which is independent of the will. Ac­ 
cording to the latter view, it is impossible to identify belief and will. 
Perhaps it is not too much to say that James's entire defense of re­ 
ligious belief hinges upon action. His theory of belief assumes that we 
act according to our beliefs and that we do not act when in doubt. This
66. Qp. cit., p. 675. —————————————
67. Op. cit . , p. 675.
68. 0£. cit., p. 171.
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conception is fundamental to his pragmatic philosophy. It is open to 
question, however, whether this is the correct view of the matter. First, 
it may be remarked that we do not always do those tilings which we believe 
to be practicable for us. l.Iany beliefs which would be practicable for us 
to carry out we do not act upon, while it may be admitted that action is 
preceded by belief. For instance, I believe that it is practicable to 
consult a physician, at least once a year, in order properly to safeguard 
my health, but I do not go to a physician unless some physical disorder 
renders it necessary. Also, the assumption that we do not act when doubt­ 
ful does not always hold good. Ue are frequently called upon to pursue a 
course of action the success, or even the practicability, of which is 
doubtful. Tne larger risks of life, and our greatest adventures, are of 
this type. For example, Charles Lindbergh could not have been assured of 
the success and practicability of his epoch-making flight across the Atlan­ 
tic beforehand. In such cases, one may believe in the possibility of a 
successful issue, but an element of doubt usually exists, at least until a 
certain stage in the course pursued has been reached. Further, it is doubt­ 
ful whether it can be successfully maintained that our beliefs are always es­ 
sentially related to action. AS J. Laird argues with reference to sensory
69 
conviction, sensation does not always appear to be Irated to action. For A*< /
example, upon looking out of my study T/indow a few moments ago, I saw in the 
distance, a young man dressed in a baseball uniform, wearing a red cap, with
,*"
a baseball bat under his arm. He remained v.ithin the range of my vision 
but a few seconds, and yet, as I recall the incident, these impressions are 
69. J. Laird, op. cit., p. 148; Of. pp. 143-150.
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vivid. But I cannot see that this observation, as well as many others 
which come to us daily, is in any sense relevant to any probable action on 
my part. This is also true of many of the beliefs produced by memory. 
It is no doubt true that we remember best and most clearly the taings which 
are useful to us, but we also possess innumerable memories T-vhich appear to 
have no connection whatever with action. This also seems to be the case 
in respect to many logical and scientific beliefs. The fact that I be­ 
lieve that it takes light such and such a time to travel from a certain 
star to the earth seems to have no effect upon my action. ..ithout going 
to the extreme length of holding that all of our beliefs relate to action, 
it may be conceded that the function of intellect is primarily or ultimate­ 
ly practical. AS Bain puts it: "Other things being the same, a person in
the fulness of active energy has an inclination toivards the side that
70 
promises an opening for this superabundant force."
It follows from James's view of belief and will as the same psycho­ 
logical phenomenon that any questions which arise concerning the latter 
will also affect the former. And both must be considered in connection 
with the question of free-will since freedom of belief stands or falls with 
freedom of the will; that is, our beliefs are indeterminate if our vrills
are. "The first act of free-nill....would naturally be to believe in free-
71 
will." It is important, at this juncture, to discuss this question due to
the fact that James's doctrine of "The ,;ill to Believe" assumes the possi­ 
bility of free-belief, and his attempt to establish t.ds possibility is to 
be found in his general theory of belief and will. But this question in­ 
volves the treatment of his view of Attention as related to belief and will,
70. Op. cit., p. b84.
71. Principles, Vol. II, p. JH1.
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for James ultimately reduces the question of free-will, and, consequently, 
that of free-belief, to one of effort of attention. T.'e shall attempt to 
develop his argument in this connection.
Now, for the moat part, a theory of belief is determined by the cri­ 
terion of belief which is accepted as being most important. The various 
theories of belief differ widely in regard to the position accorded to the 
different coefficients of belief, such as sensational, logical, and so on.
Hume and J. 3. Sully consider the sensational, and J. liill regards the log-
72 
ical, coefficient as the principle of belief. Bain differs from all of
these thinkers in maintaining that belief flows from the volitional life.
"Preparedness to act upon what we affirm", is for him, "the sole, the genu-
73 
ine, the unmistakable criterion of belief." James's theory of belief is
the outcome of his attempt to formulate a more comprehensive view which 
gives due recognition to each of the various aspects of belief which these 
tninkers emphasize. "The most compendious possible formula," he says, 
"perhaps would be that our belief and attention are the same fact. For
the moment, what we attend to is reality; attention is a motor reaction;
74 
and we are so made that sensations force attention from us." Belief, will,
and attention, then, are the same mental attitude with different names. 
But in order to see ivhy and now he reduces belief and will to attention, it 
is necessary to consider his conception of the Will.
According to the ideomotor theory, movement follows without Hesitation
75 
or delay upon the notion of it. Nothing stands between the conception of
an act and its performance; we t;dnk it, and it is done. In other words,
72. Huaie. op_. crU. Bk. I. Part III. Sections V-VII; J. 3. Sully, Outlines 
of Psychology. i'ew York: D. Aupleton and Co., 1889, Ch. A.; J. Mill, op. cit.,
ch. ,:i.
73. Op_. cit., p. 505, Gf_. pp. 505 ff.
74. Principles. Vol. II, p. 322, Footnote.
75. Ibid.., Ch. ,O.I, « Tlle . (ill> »
109
consciousness is naturally impulsive, and unless there are other ideas be­ 
fore the mind at the same time to check the impulsive power which the idea 
of movement has, movement tends to occur. "Movement is the natural imme­ 
diate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of the feeling
may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it
76 
is so in the voluntary life." Thus the more fundamental and simple type
of voluntary action is characterized by the absence of a niatus between the 
thought-process and the motor discharge. But when an idea of movement is 
opposed by antagonistic or inhibitory ideas it becomes necessary to neutral­ 
ize their effects by an express fiat, or special act of mental consent to
77 
the movement, before movement can take place. Thus in deliberate action,
a volitional mandate is necessary to a decision. Here the various ideas 
before the mind are related to one another in either a friendly or hostile 
manner. One of the ideas is that of an act. This idea, if left alone, 
leads to action. But the other ideas which are before the mind at the same 
tine are not in agreement concerning the possible action. Some favor ac­ 
tion; others oppose it. Uneasiness and unrest, known as indecision, result 
from this state of affairs. Deliberation continues so long as this situa­ 
tion remains, and the objects in question are Kept before the attention; and 
this process may go on, at intervals, for weeks or months. The desire to 
relieve the tension involved may hasten the decision; or fear that the deci­ 
sion, once it is made, is irrevocable may delay it. Finally, however, the 
original idea either wins or losus in the conflict and a decision is rendered. 
The voluntary fiat is delivered one way or the other. The favorable and un­ 
favorable ideas implicated in this process of deliberation are t&e reasons or
76. Ibid., p. 527."
77. Ibid., pp. 522-526.
110
78
motives which determine the decision.
There are four cnief types of decision. ;,nen the decision is ren­ 
dered on the basis of several good reasons, v;e have the reasonable type. 
A second type of decision is determined accidentally, either from witnout 
or from within. Some outer experience or inward change produces a third 
type in which we suddenly change from a careless to a strenuous mood, or 
possibly the other way. Finally there is the type of decision in which,
with or without sufficient evidence, we decide the issue at stake by the
79 
"slow dead heave" of our own will. The last type of decision differs from
the other three in that it involves a choice between two alternatives both 
of which are steadily held in view, while in the others one of the alterna­ 
tives is more or less eliminated. But in the case in question there is the 
realization that a distinct loss is incurred by relinquishing the possibil­ 
ity contained in the rejected alternative. This situation is accompanied 
by "the feeling of effort". Effort, however, is not present in the majority 
of our decisions. But James regards the existence of effort as an undeni­ 
able fact of consciousness, and as an extremely important fact. Our view of
this question, for James, determines such momentous issues as the existence
80 
of spiritual causality, and of predestination as opposed to free-will.
Let us consider, then, the conditions under which the feeling of voli­ 
tional effort is found. In this connection, it is necessary to qualify the
statement made earlier, namely, that "consciousness is in its very nature
81 
impulsive." This is true only in case it is sufficiently intense. In
78. Ibid., pp. 528-530.
79. Ibid., pp. 531-5135.
80. Ibid., p. 535.
81. Ibid., p. 526, also, p. 535,
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ordinary "healthiness of will", the impulsive power of various kinds of r.c- 
tive maintains a normal ratio. As a rule, the greatest impulsive povter 
belongs to the ideas which represent objects of instinctive reaction, such 
as passion, appetite, or emotion; or those of pleasure or pain; those on 
which we react habitually; or, finally, those present or near in space and 
time. Thus remote considerations, abstract ideas, unaccustomed reasons, 
and motives foreign to our instinctive history possess little or no impul­ 
sive power. Effort is necessary if these are to prevail at all. The nor­ 
mal sphere of effort is to be found where non-instinctive motives to bena- 
vior predominate. It is effort, therefore, that complicates the situation 
in volition. lf lt does so whenever a rarer and inore ideal impulse is called 
upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive and nabitual kind; it does
IK
so whenever strongly inpulsive tendencies are checked, or strongly ob- 
structive conditions overcome." Thus when our lower and higher nature con- 
flict, the better course of action follows the line of greatest resistance. 
The force of our propensities, in such cases, determines the amount of ef- 
fort we exert. The amount of effort expended depends upon the strength of 
our sensual propensity; the former being increased when the latter is large, 
and, conversely, the former being decreased when the latter is small. In 
other words, the ideal impulse alone cannot overcome the force of propen- 
sity. But if effort is increased in proportion to the force of propensity, 
the combined strength of effort and the ideal impulse is sufficient to over- 
power the force of propensity and win the victory. Ideal or moral action,
83 
then, is always in "the line of greatest resistance"; that is, in tiie line
82. Ibid., p. 548.
83. Ibid., p. 549.
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of the ideal impulse which, with the assistance of effort, croves too 
strong for the propensity, the line of least resistance. The decisive 
factor here is effort which, being proportionate to the resistance offered, 
does not appear to be an essential part of the ideal impulse; but appears 
to be adventitious and indeterminate in advance.
The impulsive power of an idea is determined by its ability to "com-
84 
pel attention and dominate in consciousness." This means that if an idea
persists before the mind whatever motor effects belong to it are sure to 
occur. The same principle holds good of the inhibitive power of an idea.
"\Vhat-we-attend-to and what-interests-us" are regarded as synonomous
85 
terms. The chief function of the will, then, is "to attend to a diffi­
cult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat." 
Attention with effort is the essential characteristic of volition. The 
fact that motor consequences inevitably follow when an object is thus held 
before the mind is merely a matter of physiological observation. Thus to 
attend to an idea is the act of Fill; and t.-iis is the only inward volition­ 
al act we ever perform. The only resistance knovra to the will is that of­
fered by an idea. "Jiffort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of
87 
;" and volition is primarily a relation between our 3elf and our states
of mind. Volition also involves the phenomenon of consent, that is, the
88 
"express consent to the reality of what is attended to." It should be re-
marked, before we go on to consider the bearing of this doctrine upon the 
question of free-v?ill, that James's reduction of all voluntary effort to
84. Ibid., p. 559^
85. Ibid., p. 559.
86. Ibid., p. 561.
87. Ibid., p. 562.
88. Ibid., p. 568.
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effort of attention seems to be a doubtful procedure. Jor, while the 
ideomotor theory contains much truth, it is open to question whether or 
not it explains all conscious action. ,;. P. :,.ontague more accurately de­ 
scribes the matter when he asserts that a "prospective act can be at the
focus of attention without being willed and it can oe willed without being
o9 
at the focus of attention."
Our concern with the question of free-will, at this point, is limited 
to the bearing that the issue has upon that of freedom of belief. The 
question of fact here pertains to the amount of effort or' attention or 
consent which we are able at any time to put forth. If the amount, dura­ 
tion, and intensity of effort are fixed functions of the object to which 
we attend, our wills are not free, and our acts are determined in advance. 
If, however, the amount of effort is indeterminate; if it is an independent 
variable, subject to increase or decrease in any given case, our wills are 
free, and our acts are not predetermined. That is to say, freedom is a 
fact if we are free to make more or to make less of spontaneous effort at 
the present moment to secure the victory of the higner motive; otherwise, 
determinism prevails. Our freedom, then, consists in the effort that we 
will to make at the moment. But this question cannot be decided on psycho­ 
logical grounds. While it appears that we are free to increase or diminish 
the amount of effort in tnis situation, it is impossible to ascertain, be­ 
yond a certain point, whether more or less effort might nave been given. 
Theoretically, then, determinism and indeterminism occupy the sane position. 
Ultimately, so far as we are concerned, the question becomes a natter of
89. 17. r. Montague, Belief Unbound: A Promethean Religion for the Lfodern 
.-•grid, iJow Haven: Yale university Press, London: Oxford University Press, 
1950, p. 54.
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personal choice. -.»e may choose one of the alternative theories, or re­ 
main sceptical concerning the problem. But either course VIQ pursue is the 
result of personal choice. THUS, at bottom, either a belief in determinism 
or scepticism involves exactly the same kind of decision as the belief in 
free-will. James chooses the latter alternative for two reasons. His 
first reason is based upon ethical considerations which do not concern us 
further at this tine. His other reason for choosing freedom is that if 
freedom is a fact, the onl./ '..ay to realize it is freely to choose it from
among other possible beliefs. Thus the first act of freedom" "should be to
90 , '
affirm itself;"to freely will to believe in free/will.
The conclusion that free-belief is possible brings us to consider the 
question as to v.hether or not it is possible for us to believe at will 
since belief is an emotional reaction of the whole man, and since our emo­ 
tions are beyond our control. In a word, we cannot believe suddenly, but 
we may do so gradually. Our will can eventually lead us to belief; "we 
need only in cold blood act as if the tuing in question were real, and keep
acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such
91 
a connection vath our life that it will become real." The truth of this
assertion stands or falls t:ith his view that belief and vill constitute the 
same psychological phenomenon, and since our criticism of his position in
this respect has been given above, it is not necessary to repeat vhat nas
92 
already been said. Also, we shall have occasion to refer to this matter
again when we come to consider his application of this doctrine specifical­ 
ly to religious faith. To sum up, we aave seen tnat for James belief is 
the heart of all judgment, and tnat the essence of belief manifests itself
ĉ 0. iTiacipies, Vol. II, p. 575; Of. pp. 569-573.
91. Ibid.,'p. 521.
92. Gf. Above, pp. 103 ff.
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in choice. It is the same mental attitude as will, and both belief and
will are ultimately reduced to attention. Voluntary attention may be con­ 
sidered as free or indeterminate. This renders possible the freedom of 
will, and, consequently, freedom of belief. Thus he helps to pave the way 
for ais defense of religious belief, especially in connection with the pos­ 
sibility of a free will to believe.
It is obvious that other important results flow fron his view of be-
93 
lief as a "psychic attitude towards a proposition." Olearly, belief,
when so construed, cannot be regarded as merely an affair of the intellect, 
but of man's whole nature. We have contended throughout that the whole of 
our nature is involved in belief, and that "all our needs must stand or fall 
together, and no metaphysics which does justice to one coefficient only, and
calls that reality, can stand before the presence of those who find some
94 
othor need '.Tithin them more urgent for the utterance." James's more "acti-
vistic" interpretation of belief does not allow us to re ;ard it as merely an 
affair of objects and relations; for him, the mind is actively engaged in
selecting and controlling its objects. This description of belief enables
95 
us to conceive it "as an ultimate and characteristic fact of human nature."
In regarding belief as flowing from the whole nature of man, James endows it 
v.ith a strength, vitality, and stability which it would not possess if the 
intellectual coefficient alone is made the ground of belief. This view 
also renders it more difficult for intellectual criticism to destroy our be­ 
liefs, especially when they have arisen out of fundamental needs of human 
nature. As F. C. 3. Schiller points out, if our nature is not "v.aoie",
93. Principles, Vol. II, p. 287.
94. J. L. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 172.
95. F. C. 3. ochiller, Problems of_ 3elie£, Hodder and otoughton, ^td., Li­ 
brary of Philosophy and Religion, p. lii.
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conflicting beliefs may be produced by its discrepant parts; and when these
clash, the stability, value, and validity of our beliefs are advorselv af-96 
fected.
James's theory of belief also lays the foundation for the recocnition 
of, and emphasis upon, the supreme value of human personality which plays 
such a large part in his philosophy. F. C. 3. Schiller says that the phil­ 
osophers of James's day regarded him with so much suspicion partly because 
he "nad carried respect for personality to the pitch of professing willing­ 
ness to consider whether personality was not as good a clue to reality as the
method of abstractions; in other words, he was willing to assign it metaphys-97 
ical status and value." For James, reality is shot through with values;
yet they flow from, enter the ?;ord with, and exist for, personality. AS we 
have seen, he holds that the reality of the ,3elf is the fixed point of refer­ 
ence for all reality. All claimants to reality are selected or rejected on 
the basis of their connection with the Self and its interests. That to 
which reality is ascribed must demonstrate that it is intimately related to 
our own life, and that it is superior in this respect to its rival claim­ 
ants. Thus that which wins out in the struggle for reality, that which is 
considered true and rer-1 as opposed to error and illusion, appears to us to 
be truer and more real, that is, superior in value. Personality, then, is 
the source of all reco^iized valuss, and as such, is the one thing of supreme 
value. This implication of personality in value, and of values in all ob­ 
jects of human interest, renders a denial of the value of personality im­ 
possible without, at the same time, rejecting values altogether. ^nd any
96. F. J. d. ^chiller, op. cit., p. 1<*.97. F. C. o. Schiller, kust philosophers Disagree?, London: i..acmillan and
Company, Ltd., 1 CJ~4, p. 52.
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philosophy which attempts to deny the si-oiificance and value of personal­ 
ity does so at its own peril. «,-6 may not follow James all of the way 
concerning his view of values, but we do admit the heart of his conten­ 
tion. He is right in assigning supreme value to personality,
It is obvious from James's conception of belief that doubt assumes 
quite a different position from that which it occupies in traditional 
thought. Doubt and inquiry are the opposites of belief, and arise when 
the present state of affairs proves unsatisfactory. They bring restless­ 
ness and hesitation which are followed by an attempt to regain mental equi­ 
librium and poise. The latter state is realized only after judgment has 
been rendered. Professor William LcDougall puts it: "Belief, in the full­ 
est sense of the word, must be preceded by doubt, by the questioning atti­ 
tude which issues in judgment, returning the answer "Yes" or "No" to the
98 
question." This view of the matter makes doubt at once necessary, and
positive in its ground and aim; it assigns logical value to doubt. Con­ 
ceived in this manner, doubt may be regarded as fruitful and beneficial 
rather than as detrimental. It may serve as a means of strengthening our 
more valuable beliefs, and it may help to eliminate the dead ones. Since 
our doubts are disturbing factors, according to this doctrine, v;e can 
readily understand why they occupy such a large place in our intellectual 
life; it is because our ninds are actively engaged with them in the effort 
to remove them. Our beliefs, on the other hand, enable us to lead a more 
placid existence. But it is our doubts, not our certainties, that stimu­ 
late our intellectual powers, since every judgment is conditioned by doubt.
98. .dlliam IcDougall, An Outline of Psychology, p. S64; Cf. F. G. S. 
Schiller, Problems of Belief, pp. 25 ff.
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Our beliefs must keep forearmed to meet the challenge of doubt; they must
ever be ready to give an answer to every doubt that "asketh then a reason 
of the hope that is in them." This view of doubt is substantially the 
same as the method of science according to which inquiry begins with a 
question \vhich is preceded by a doubt. A belief or theory which cannot 
satisfactorily answer the question which gives rise to the inquiry must 
give way to one that does. Again, we may refuse to follow James all of 
the way in his attempt to make a universal application of a scientific 
principle, but vve can recognize the truth contained in his argument; we 
may admit t,±at many of our beliefs do arise in this fashion, and that 
doubt, when positive in ground and aim, may be inocuous and beneficial v '/A -
rather than dangerous and detrimental. Also, we may recognize, as James 
was wont to emphasize, that whatever our doubts are, we are ultimately re­ 
sponsible for our beliefs, and that we cannot escape personal responsibil­ 
ity for our actions and thoughts. It is true here, as in every other 
realm of life, that "nothing venture nothing have."
IV
REASON AND FAITH: THE LIMITS OF REASON
The relation between reason and faith has been the subject of many 
controversies, and has occupied a large and an important place in kodern 
Philosophy. According to F. Paulsen, the attempt to reconcile the re­ 
ligious view of the world with the scientific explanation of nature may be 
regarded as the primary motive in the entire development of Modern Philos­ 
ophy. He says that modern science is the starting point and precondition 
of this attempt. All thought that is out of line with its fundamental 
idea, namely, the universal reign of law, lies outside the sphere of philos­ 
ophy. The second fundamental conviction in modern philosophy is that the 
teaching of natural science concerning reality does not cover all that can 
be said about it, since there is more to reality than the physical world 
controlled by mechanical laws. nhat is not in accord with this idea is 
also excluded from the realmof Modern Philosophy. This twofold emphasis 
characterizes the trend of the two great currents in which philosophy 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries moves. The truth of the mod­ 
ern physical view of the world is recognized by the "rationalistic-metaphy­ 
sical" course of development which supplements it with a metaphysical view. 
Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz are the leading representatives of this 
trend of thought. The "empirical-positivistic" train of thought which is 
native to England, and represented by Locke, Berkeley, and Hurae, begins 
with the same presupposition, but is led, through epistemological re­ 
flection, to the conviction that the physical view is not absolute truth,
1 
"but an accidental view, a projection of reality upon our sensibility."
1. F. Paulsen, Introduction to philosophy,, 2nd American, from the 3rd 
German Edition, iSng. Trans. by F. Thilly, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1895. Preface, p. xiii. Of. pp. xii-xiii.
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Those two views converge in Kant and interpenetrate in a very strange
manner. "But what is most important ," says paulsen, "from him we date 
the significant turning-point which aims to bring about a peace between 
the religious views of the world and trie scientific explanation of nature
by separating the religious disposition from the intellectual function and
2 
basing the former on volition."
Kant's solution of the problem consists in a delimitation of the 
spu-' res of knowledge and faith. For him, knowledge is valid in the pi'enorn 
enal world, but the moral consciousness and its objects do not belong to 
this world, but to a transcendent o,- ncuiiie.Lul viorld. i.._a, as an active 
and ethic aj. being, x&xes demands upon that re-_-d and intelligible ;vorld;
aiic as moi-til postulates, the reality of JccI, immortality, and freedom are
3 
the work of faith..
V.'itL the rise of Absolute Idealism, under tne influence of Hegel, 
feeling -&& conation were reduced to mere stages in the developritnt of
thought or reason. uhen the influence of tuis movement began to wane
4 
the discussion of the relation of faith and reason <.vas begun aiie;v. For
the r.cst part, the renewed discussion of this question followed the two 
lines laid down b,/ Kant and tu-re arose a sh;:rp distinction between the 
province of theory and that of practice. .4so, there arose t^e distinc- 
tion between " judgi,ients-of-fact" arid " judgment s-of- value;" the for::>jr being 
alloted to science and the latter to religion Liid ethics. i^e " judgrients- 
of-fact" were rooted in the cognitive, and "judgment s-of- value" in tne 
emotional and conative side of our nature. Hitachi's opposition to
2. Ibid., p. xiii.
3. Kant f s Critique of Practical_ Iteascm. and Other ..orj:s on the T:vjory of 
^tLics, Translated by~. ^I~7zl^Ti 7^~rd edition, London: ^ongrvms, :;reen, 
and Co., 1883. "lure Practical Reason,"3k. II, Oil. II., Sections III-VI.
4. Cf. G. Galloway, FcJ-th and Reason in Religion, Lc^clLu: 
Nisbet and Company, 19'":~S~~rpTT9 -'?.
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rationalism led him. to maintain that the religious consciousness is es- 
sentially concerned with "judgments-of value.*' For hin, religious 
truths do not represent intellectual propositions, but values in the ex- 
perience of him who holds their.. They are apprehended and judged by
5
faith. This distinction between scientific and religious knowledge di­ 
vides the realm of knowledge into two entirely separate areas and creates 
a hiatus between them which cannot easily be removed. ,,hile this sepa­ 
ration appears to be to the advantage of faith in that it ^ives it a sound 
basis, it is open to serious objections. In the first place, it exposes 
faith to dangers of subjectivity whic^ Ritschl's insistei.ee upon revelation 
as an objective historic fact whicn guaranteed the value-judgments of faith 
does not completely remove, since an appeal to experienced value is neces­ 
sary to distinguish revealed truth from that which claims to be revealed 
but is not. In the second place, it creates a dualism between religious 
and scientific knowledge which, in certain cases, nay easily result in a 
stalemate since religion could make an assertion on grounds of value which 
science could deny with equal confidence on the grounds that it conflicts
with scientific principles. The question of miracles rria- provoke an ar-
6 
£ur.ient of this kind. It is obvious, then, that this opposition between
reason and faith cannot be accepted as a satisfactory or final solution to
the problem.
James's doctrine of "fideisn" or "faith-philosophy" represents the 
tendency which attempts to resolve this conflict by arguing that the very 
nature of things—the range of man's needs and the severe limitations of 
reason—leaves an opening for faith which is regarded as largely an affair
5-Tiie Uitschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith, Jan.es Orr,
find, edition, London: Hodder ,.n- Stoughton, 1898, 01.. II.
6. Of. (}. Galloway, Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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of man's volitional nature. "Fideism" is one aspect of James's volun­ 
tarism, "pragmatism" is the other; and voluntarism may be regarded as a 
complement to uis empiricism. His voluntarism arises as a result of the 
severe limits which he places upon theoretical knowledge which necessi­ 
tates larger drafts upon unverified knowledge. ^.s Professor R. B. Perry 
says, "There is, indeed, a curious paradox by which those philosophers who
are most strict and narrow in their conception of knowledge are compelled
7 
to make the largest provision for faith." He goes on to say that more
liberal empiricists, like Janes, "broaden the area of knowledge and rely
less on faith, but still fall far short of those rationalists who claim to
8 
'prove all things'." In another connection, Professor Perry says that
while James v.ss deeply concerned with the need of belief and with the ri^ht 
to believe, he did not rely on faith to any great extent himself; and that
he was essentially a critic of the intellect in that he doubted that much
9
could be proved. But be that as it may, v;e are chiefly concerned to fol­ 
low the argument by which he attempts to substantiate his "fideism" and 
give it a philosophical basis. His treatment of the relation between 
reason and faith is not systematic, but is found throughout his various 
writings in several different connections. Viie shall try to arrange his 
argument, from these various sources, so as to give it coherence and co­ 
gency.
He defines faith as "belief in something concerning which doubt is 
still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to
7. Op. cit., p. 171.
8. Ibid., p. 172.
9. R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of Vdlliam James, Vol. II, p. 211,
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act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the
10 prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance." This
definition enables us to conceive faith as preeminently an attitude of 
the will, and, as such, it is intimately related to action and becomes 
an affair of the whole personality. It is also obvious from this defi­ 
nition of faith that it involves risks, and is something which calls for 
serious courage. And, as we have seen, for James faith is expressly 
concerned with values; that which has no value is not admitted to belief. 
It is of the essence of belief to affirm the reality of the objects which 
are regarded as possessing value. In short, it is belief that says what 
facts exist. "Strictly and technically", on the other hand, "reason is 
a faculty, not of facts, but of principles and relations. Out of her own 
resources she cannot say what facts exist; but if one fact be given her, 
she can infer another fact; and she is supposed to be able, by certain 
principles that she possesses, to lay down in advance what relations facts
must stand in to each other; that causes, for example, must precede, not
11 
follow, their effects, and the like."
Thus faith, and not reason, deals v,ith questions of facts. It is 
important to bear this distinction in nind throughout our discussion of 
the relation between reason and faith.
It is possible to distinguish several different steps in his argument 
in defense of religious faith. The first step consists in shovrin^ that 
faith is necessary because of the incapacity of reason to render a rational 
view of the world due to the intractability of data. This argument is 
developed at length in the essay entitled "The Sentiment of nationality"
10. _j. B. t p. 90.
11. "Reason and Faith", Journal of Philosophy, Vol. }^XIV, ito. 8, .xpril 14,
1 CJ27, p. 197, Of. pp. 197-201.
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12 in vuiich he sets fortn the "motives for philosophizing". lie says that
when we achieve a rational view of the scheme of things v;e have a "strong
feeling of ease, peace and rest". The feeling of rationality is charac-
14 terized by the absence of any "feeling of irrationality". So long as
our thought flows with fluency and freedom of movement we are not con­ 
scious of this feeling. But as soon as something occurs which disturbs 
this facile movement of thought MB become aware of extreme discomfort and 
distress. This is immediately followed by an attempt to restore the lost 
equilibrium of the mind so as to enable our mental function to proceed with­ 
out impediment. Although we are not conscious of this feeling of "self- 
sufficiency", so long as we have it, we seek to regain it as soon as we 
lose it. "This feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its 
absoluteness, — this absence of all need to explain it, account for it, or 
justify it, — is what I call the Sentiment of Rationality. ^s soon, in
short, as we are enabled from any cause whatever to think with perfect
15 
fluency, the thing we think of seems to us pro tanto rational."
•,.e may obtain the sentiment of rationality in several ways. First, 
there is the theoretic way. But two requirements must be net before we 
can achieve this fluency of thought theoretically, namely, those of unity 
and clarity. The former demands that the nanifoldness of the world be 
reduced to simplicity. It greatly facilitates the movement of thougi-t to 
be able to conceive the relation of the earth to t^e moon and to the apple 
to be identical; or, as J. J. .111 says, to see that a ahip "floats by the 
same lav.a of specific gravity and equilibrium, as a tree uprooted by the
12. ^. 13., pp. 65-110,
13. Ibid., p. 63.
14. Ibid., pp. 62-64.
15. Ibid., p. 64.
125
16
wind and blown into the water." The latter demands knowledge of the 
unique and particular rather tnan comprehension of the whole. Thus the 
intellect fashions theories according to its innate taste for unity and 
clarity, and our philosophic attitude is determined by the compromise v;e 
are able to make between them. IVhile the data presumably lend themselves 
to either emphasis, it is perilous to emphasize one to the exclusion of 
the other. Any philosophy, then, that does justice to both of these de- 
mands must avoid the "abstract monotony" of a Spinoza, and the "concrete
heterogeneity" of a Hume, and must reach some sort of compromise between
17 
these two extremes. How in order successfully to make this adjustment it
is necessary to classify things into extensive "kinds"; and their relations
18 
into extensive "laws". But this procedure operates from a limited point of
view and necessarily results in abstraction. It does not catch in its net 
the concrete living fact. That is to say, theoretic philosophy cannot get 
hold of the real essence of things; there is always more than it is able to 
grasp. "After all that reason can do has been done, there still remains 
the opacity of the finite facts as merely given, uith most o? their peculiar- 
ities mutually unmediated and unexplained. To the very last, there are the 
various * points of vi^-v;' which the philosopher must distinguish in discuss- 
ing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare ex-
19 
ternality and datum to the other." This deficiency accounts for the un-
satisfactoriness of all our speculations. "On the one hand, so far as they 
retain any multiplicity in their terms, they fail to get us out of the em- 
pirical sand-heap world; on the other, so far as they eliminate multiplicity
16. Three Essays on Religion, Mew York: Henry Holt and Co., 1874, p. 7.
17. ^ 13., pp. 66-67.
18. Ibid., p. 67.
19. Ibid., Preface, p. viii.
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20 
the practical man despises their empty barrenness." Trie most that can
be said for theoretical philosophy, then, is that it is a very unsatis­ 
factory and inadequate substitute for the fullness of the truth. 3ut 
this does not end the natter. For if it were possible to attain the goal 
of simplicity so that by the use of our universal concept we are able to 
render the concrete chaos rational, and to conceive the world simply, our 
progress is only apparent, not real ^or final. ;;e would still have to 
answer the ultimate question of ";.>hy?" which the notion of non-entity 
raises. i'nus the "bottom of being is left logically opaque to us, as
something which we simply come upon and find, and about which (if v;e wish
21 
to act) we should pause and wonder as little as possible." In the last
analysis, then, we are unable to attain a rational theoretical v-'orld con­ 
ception. Having come to tnis impasse in the theoretical realm, we must
seek the solution of our difficulty by seeking a conception of the universe 
that will stir us to action and thereby divert the stream of theoretical 
contemplation into the sphere of the practical, and thus restore the free­ 
dom of the r.ovement of thought which has been blocked at this juncture. 
For t.ois fluency of thought is the one mark of rationality.
It is conceivable that more than one conception of the world may 
equally satisfy our theoretical demands. In this case, hovrever, our 
aesthetic and practical nature will favor the view which satisfies its.
demands as being the most rational of the possible views wnich we :ray take
22
concerning the world. Practical rationality imposes a two-fold test upon
20. Ibid., p. 68.
21. Ibid., p. 73, Cf_. PP. 71-73.
22. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
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any philosophic conception. First, it must "in a general wa., at least,
23 
banish uncertainty from the future." Any system which leaves a question
mark hanging over the future causes rental uneasiness or distress; upsets 
the stability of our outlook and robs us of the ease, peace, and rest 
necessary to the feeling of rationality. Thus it fails to satisfy us. 
The wide-spread influence of the philosophy which explains things per sub- 
stantifym is due to the fact that it satisfies the demands of expectancy. a < 
The second test which a philosophy must meet in order to succeed on a
universal scale is that it must define the future "congruously v:ith our
24 
spontaneous powers." It x:iust not contradict our active propensities and
it must give them an object to press against. A pessimistic philosophy 
fails to feed our desires and tendencies; materialism refuses to recognize 
them. Either defect is fatal to a philosophy.
Jar.es nlaces practical, and theoretical, rationality upon the same
25footing in that the latter is just as subjective as the former. Philos­ 
ophy and empirical science have arisen from nan's indomitable desire to 
fashion the world according to a rational pattern. 3o far the world has 
yielded to man's desires and needs, end the extent of his success in this 
respect in the future can be determined only by further trial. But he 
has the same right to try conceptions of moral, as of mechanical and 
logical, rationality. There is as much justification for rejecting a con­ 
ception of the world which violates his moral nature as there is for re­ 
fusing to entertain one which is incompatible with some aspect of theo­ 
retical rationality. Since both yield subjective satisfaction only,
23. Ibid., p. 77.
24. I'o id., p, 82.
25."Dilemma of Determinism,"Ibid., p. 146 ff.
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they should be given the same consideration; for the demands of one are
26 
just as authoritative as those of the other. And both are equally
necessary in attaining a rational view of the world.
inhile continuing the same general argument, we have reached ?,hat :nay 
be regarded as a second step in his defense of religious faith, that is, 
the attempt to assign intellect a subordinate position in the economy of 
the organism and the assertion of the primacy of our active nature. Tne 
intellect is essentially practical, and is but a servant, and subjective 
expression, of the will. "From the first dawn to its highest actual at­ 
tainment, V7e find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears to exist
at all, appears but as one element in an organic mental whole, and as a
27
minister to higher mental powers,—the powers of will." Tiie subordina­ 
tion of intellect to will flows from the doctrine of reflex action accord­ 
ing to which thought occurs in the mid-section of the reflex arc and is
only a place of transit. Action, stimulated from without, is r.ovin^ back 
to the periphery. It tarries at the centre for counsel, but not for long, 
it must soon issue in reaction upon the outer world. In. case the process 
stops at the mid-section of the reflex arc, or at the thinking stage, and 
fails to lead to action, it would fail of its essential function. "T::e
current of life which runs in at our eyes or ears is meant to run out at
28 
our hands, feet, or lips." Thus both perception und thougnt exist for the
sake of action. It follows from tnis doctrine that the active nature as­ 
serts its rights over cognition; the latter is a ^uide to app: opriate
26. Ibid., p. 147.~~~
27.^eflex ..ction and Theism, "Ibid., pp. 140-141.
28. Ibid., p. 114. Of. Also, f. Dewey, f TiK- Reflex ..re Concept in Psy- 
chology, n^-Q P^/£]^_;^i££li. ;^£view>, Vol. Hi, ^-c. 4, July, 1896., pp. 257- 
370. "
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action, and must always insue in action. how the important thing in th-; 
life of the organism is proper.!;/ to relate itself to its environment. 
Just as the roind vetoes any view of the world tLat seems irrational to 
it, the practical side of our nature refuses to accept ai.y cc .ueption 
v/hich does not enable it properly to relate itself to the world. That 
is to say, the volitional activities :-ust be giv«n full opport_;._ty to op- 
erata. for the results^of their excretion is the ultinate test of theo­ 
retic rationality. Tnis is what is meant b;, the pragmatic method accord-
S9 
ing to v.hich an idea is tested by its practical consequences. It is "hat
James iveans v.hen he says that if the hypothesis of ,ro<i "works satisfactori-
50 
ly in the widest sense of the word, it is true." This being; true, the
irritant thing to know, v.hen an object presents itself to consciousness, 
is That to do about it. .. • soon as we know hcnv to behave toward a tiling 
we are acquainted with it; until then it is stranje to us. The theoret­ 
ical in-uiry, "Uiat is it?" is a much less important consideration in this 
case. Insofar as any philosophy demands that our response be of a specif­ 
ic sort it acknowledges that we know the nature of the universe, for we 
esk the same question when the "cosmos in its totality" confronts conscious 
ness. .,3 have to react upon it one way or another. *uirl "it is nore than 
^robable that to the end of time our power of moral and volitional response
to the nature o^ things will be the deepest organ of oonnunication there-
il 
with we snail ever possess."
I .an has an ineradicable impulse to take life strivingly. Tne. words
to which humanity in ever^/ age readily responds are, "Son of !.an, stand
32 
upon thy feet and I will speak unto thee." -n tle periods in which the
-.•tism, p. 45.
^n T K i -" , O O Q<-><J . .i. o o-VJ . , ^j * <~i • y o
31. !."¥., p. 141.
• --.""• * > P* 88,
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greatest expansion of the human mind has occurred have been those when 
man's active nature has been released by the confident assertion that
"The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to powers which you
33
possess." uhen men are assured that their dormant powers can be quick­ 
ened and exercised in the achievement of some great task their despair 
gives way to hope and faith; something better is envisaged, and a renewed 
humanity sets to work to make it a reality. In short, the appeal to 
man f s use of his powers meets with such a ready response because it 
touches the element of his active nature of utmost importance-r-the 
element of faith. "Lan needs a rule for his vail, and will invent one if
one be not given him." "',<e cannot live or think at all without some de-
34 
gree of faith."
The quotation with which we closed the preceding paragraph leads us to 
what we may distinguish as another step in the development of James's argu­ 
ment for religious faith, namely, that faith is necessary to all thought. 
In other words, all knowledge presupposes faith. Scientific philosophers 
of his day confined the use of faith to one particular proposition, that of, 
the uniformity of nature. But their limitation of its use in this runner 
is puite an arbitrary procedure. They had to make this single exception 
in the interests of cognition. Sinjlarly, faith in a religious dogma, for 
which we have no outward proof, is postulated for our emotional and voli­ 
tional interests. James maintains that the scientist and philosopher can 
no more get along without faith than the man of religion; for our opinions, 
whether religious or philosophical, involve the whole nan and are not the 
product of intellect alone. "It is almost incredible," he says, "that men
33. Ibid., p. ~86~. ~~~
34. Ibid., p. 88; p. 95.
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who are themselves working philosophers should pretend that any philosophy 
can be, or ever has been, constructed without the help of personal prefer­ 
ence, belief, or divination. . . .The coil is about us, struggle as we nay,
35 
The only escape from faith is mental nullity."
This also follows from the doctrine of reflex action. If the process 
which has been set in motion from stimulation from without tarries too long 
at the mid-section of the reflex arc, as has been pointed out, the occasion 
passes and the opportunity is lost. Tii;; action moves on to completion be­ 
fore deliberation at the centre has sufficiently weighed the natter so as to
arrive at a certain conclusion. It is thus a law of life that we act more 
or less ignorantly. The purpose of the intellect, as we have seen, is to 
facilitate and promote action, not to paralyze it. It becomes necessary, 
then, to act without sufficient evidence if intellectual scrupulosity is 
not to paralyze action and impair the function of the intellect itself.
Some measure of "vital heat", so to speak, is necessary if we are to be-
36 
lieve at all. Thus there is no avoiding the fact that some measure of
faith is necessary to render thought possible. 7aith is the same thing 
as a working hypothesis. The only difference is that sone hypotheses can 
be verified or refuted almost immediately while others nay require years or 
even generations for verification. I:, the latter case we act as if our 
hypothesis were true and we expect the results to disappoint us if it is 
false. The longer verification is postponed the more we are inclined to 
accept our hypothesis as true. Religious questions are no exception to 
this principle. "vliile we may doubt our religious creed we may yet be of 
tiv-j persuasion that we have sufficient ground for acting as if it were true, 
and verification may be indefinitely delayed.
3^. Ibid., u. 93.
00 • trrr~-.. B. Perry, o . cit.. o
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•>Ve now advance to another step in his argument which consists of an 
attempt to show that action cannot always wait upon evidence. There are 
cases in which the nature of the hypothesis is such that action cannot be 
delayed without incurring serious loss. As a rule, it may be possible to 
wait for verification, but in the type of hypothesis in question immediate 
decision is necessary; it is so important that we must act now. It is true 
that action upon an hypothesis which has not been verified involves a risk 
due to the fact that the justification of our faith in it, in the absence 
of verification, is to be found in the results consequent upon action. In 
respect of religious faith, however, while it incurs the risk that it may 
prove to be false, there is nothing to lose and everything to gain. It 
envisages something better, and if it is not realized we are no worse off 
than we would have been without our exercise of faith. *'hen we make the 
religious hypothesis, then, we do so in the attitude of nind expressed as 
follows: "I expect then to triumph with tenfold glory; but if it should 
turn out, as indeed it may, that I have spent my days in a fool's paradise,
why, better have been the dupe, of such a dreamland than the cunning reader
37 
of a world like that whicn then beyond all doubt unnasks itself to viev;."
We shall reserve further discussion of this type of Hypothesis for the fol­ 
lowing chapter in v.'hich v,e shall set forth his doctrine of the ".vill to 3o- 
lieve", v;hich attempts to show when it is proper for the v;ill to influence 
belief. ^t present vie are chiefly concerned to ascertain the limits he 
places upon reason which renders some measure of faith necessary, v.hereas 
the doctrine of the M ".;ill to jelieve," sets the limits to faith.
By way of summary, we nay say that James's "fideisn", as vie have fol­ 
lowed it thus far, has two aspects: that which goes beyond all of the pos­ 
sible facts, and comes to the aid of a necessary ajnosticisn, and that
133
38 
which supplements an "accidental ignorance." T^<J former aspect arises out
of Ju.T:ts«s empiricism. ^3 Professor R. 3. Perry puts it, "It is a part of 
Jones's empiricism to hold that after the intellect has done all that it 
can the world rer,iains a brute fact—baffling to reason. But if reason
cannot be satisfied, it can at least be silenced—by the representation of
29
a world which satisfies the will." The latter aspect, flows from the na­ 
ture of man hirrself. Re is made for action. lie cannot always wait upon 
the verdict of intellect, but must act without sufficient evidence.
There is another set of considerations in James's treatment of the 
relation between reason and faith which, while presupposing the principles 
we have set forth above, deals more directly with the nature of reason, 
faith, and religious experience. ./- shall consider his treatment of the 
nature of reason and faith first. It is obvious, from the definition of 
reason and faith which we gave at the beginning of our discussion, that 
reason, which is a faculty of inference, cannot afford a solid basis for 
religious conclusions because trie religious question is entirely a 
question of facts. In other words, if there be a God, reason ir.ay take 
either a pantheistic or a theistic view of things, but it cannot answer 
the question "Does God exist?". iiis reason for this opinion is based 
upon the fact that men who follow reason arrive at quite different conclu­ 
sions concerning the world. For example, he says that Santayans is led 
by reason into atheism, while Royce, following the lead of reason, con­ 
cludes that God's existence is assured. When pantheism, tLeisr. t ^nd 
atheism can alike appeal to reason for support, we are justified ii;
58. Porry, op. cit., pp. 209-210. 
39. Op. cit., p. 209.
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40 
rejecting it as a means of attaining truth in such mutters.
In fact, "Faith uses a logic altogether different from Reason's 
41
logic." Reason is satisfied with nothing less than certainty and final­ 
ity for her conclusions. Faith must rest content with probability and
practical wisdom; "we act on the most r.robable hypothesis, trusting that
42 
the event nay prove us wise." ?aith argues from what ought to be to what
is. The form of the argument of faith runs as follows:
(1) "There is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being
true, nothing self-contradictory;
(B) It miJ..t have been true under certain conditions;
(3) It is fit to be true;
(4) It oug'-it to be true;
(5) It must be true; 43
(6) It shall be true, at any rate for me."
This argument presents no intellectual chain like the sorites of the logic- 
book. "Yet it is a slope of good-will on which in the larger questions of
44 
life men habitually live." ,;e express probability in mathematics by a
fraction, but we can seldom live fractionally. ..hen once we choose the 
more probable alternative, we treat the lesser probabilities as non-exist­ 
ent. Now, to demand, as is often done in the name of reason, that we
45 
wait until the evidence is all in is equivalent to "forbidding us to live."
40."Reason and Faith,"Journal of Philosophy. Vol. /IXIV, No. 8. .-.pril 14. 
1927, pp. 197-198., Gf. pp. 197-201.
41. Ibid., p. 198.
42.Vu.lth and the Right to Believe,"Appendix, Some Problems of Philosophy. 
^ beginning of an Introduction to j/iiil^vyj-.; . t new York and London: Longmans, 
Green and Gor.ipany. ^dited by Henry Janes, Jr., 1911., p. 223.
43. Ibid., p. 224.
44. ibid., t-. 224.
45. J o urnal of Philos^J., , op. cit., p. 199; Of. pp. 198-199; A!SO, Some 
Problems 0? phTTos-.yhy, ppT 227-228.
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further, if reason is accepted as the final arbiter in religious ques­ 
tions and if it Liases its inferences from the ordinary physical and moral 
facts of the world, v;ithout reference to the facts of religious experience, 
its conclusions are more likely to be irreligious than they are to be re­ 
ligious. M ^ome v;ill see in moral facts a power that makes for r^ghteous- 
ness, and in physical facts a power that geometrizes and is intellectual, 
that creates order and loves beauty. But alongside of all such facts 
there are contrary facts in abundance; and he who seeks then can equally
well infer a power that defies righteousness, creates disorder, loves ugli-
46
ness, and aims at death." It is not enough merely to use the facts of re­ 
ligious experience, such as conversions, mystical insights, or providential 
guidance, as a means of confirming our religion, while we atte.upt to es­ 
tablish it from cornnon natural facts. If reason tries to be impartial and 
undertakes to weigh all of the evidence so as to determine which class of 
facts tip the balance, it must decide against the religious view unless we 
give it nore specific religious experiences to go by; "for the last word 
everywhere, according to purely naturalistic science, is the ?;ord of 
Leath, the death-sentence passed by ^"iture on p]ant and beast, and ."ian and
"— i
tribe, and earth and sun, and everything that she has :.;adt ." "jut the 
facts v/hich religious experience offers enable reason to see another possi­ 
bility concerning things and this leaves an opening for faith. J"a:.:es de­ 
scribes these facts of religious experience as "e.^rien^es Of e.ri unexpected
48 
life succeeding upon death." It is the death of self-sufficiency, the
bankruptcy of all naturalistic standards of virtue, the end of self-righteous 
ness. This death is the open door to the universe's deey:-r reaches; end
46. Journal of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 199.
47. Ibid.. p. 199.
48. Ibid., p. 200.
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the only door. It is the only way that man can release the springs of 
his inner life. It is the finding of life in death, hope midst despair, 
power in resignation. "There are resources in us that naturalism, with 
its literal virtues, never recks of, possibilities that ta.se our breath 
away, and show a world wider than either physics or philistino ethics can 
imagine. Here is a world in which all is well, in spite of certain forms 
of death, indeed because of certain forms of death, death of hope, death
of strength, death of responsibility, of fear and worry, death of every-
49 
thing that paganism, naturalism, and legalism put their trust in." Such
experiences as these escape reason, even when she deals with our psycho­
logical experiences, for the simple reason that they are discontinuous with
50 
natural experience. But these experiences come to us and have their
transforming effects in our lives, and, therefore, cannot be excluded from 
our view of the scheme of things. They suggest that reason deals with 
only a fragment of reality and for this reason we are forced to regard its 
conclusions as inadequate; for no religious philosophy is complete which 
fails to consider and properly interpret these facts. The fact that 
these experiences are not amenable to intellectual processes arises from 
the nature of religious experience.
For the most part, James's treatment of religious experience reduces 
religion to the working of non-rational feelings and subconscious impulses. 
Religion is essentially a matter of individual experience; and concerns 
itself with one's personal destiny. As such, it is based upon unsharable 
feeling. "Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feel­ 
ing, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the
50. Cf . The Varieties of Reli-ious experience: ... study in Human iteture , 
London and Ijew xork: Lon^ans, Green and Co., 1928, 36th impression, p. 455,
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world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive 
how events happen, and how work is actually done. Compared with this 
world of living individualized feelings, the world of generalized objects 
which the intellect contemplates is without solidity or life. As in 
stereoscopic or kinetoscopic pictures seen outside the instrument, the 
third dimension, the movement, the vital element, are not there. \,e get
a beautiful picture of an express train supposed to be moving, but where
51 
in the picture. . . is the energy or the fifty miles an hour?" If we
connect with this his doctrine that the ";^ore" with which we feel ourselves
to be related in religious experience is on its "hither" side the subcon-
52 
scious extension of our conscious life, it is not difficult to see why
James regarded these facts of religious experience as being beyond the
reach of intellectual processes. Here, instead of invoking his oft re-
53 
peated charge against the intellect: "Ever not quite", he concludes in
"sad sincerity" that reason's attempt to demonstrate the truth of religious
54 
experience is "absolutely hc-ble.-:". It is important to note, at this
point, that his examination of the "motives for philosophizing" presupposes 
a coordinated will and intellect, but before he has proceeded very far the 
old dualism breaks out between demonstrable knowledge and undemonstrable 
conviction, and he finally decides that since religious experience is es­ 
sentially a matter of unsharable feeling reason is powerless to grasp and 
demonstrate its truth. In other words, thus far, he has not entirely 
succeeded in resolving the conflict between faith and reason.
.ie are now in position to sum up the results which flow from .James's 
treatment of this subject, as we have followed it, and to estimate their
51. iMd., :- P . 501-502.
52. Ibid., p. 512.
53. W. B., Pref., p. viii.
54. Ibid., p. 455.
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importance for religious philosophy. perhaps tae most novel, and cer­ 
tainly the aost far-reaching principle which James brings to li^ht in this 
connection relates to the function of faith; he insists that it is in­ 
volved in all cognitive states. when he asserts that all knowledge pre­ 
supposes faith he lifts the principle that will influences belief from that 
narrow theological circle to which it had long been confined and makes of 
it a general principle. lie brings it forth buttressed by psychological 
and epistemological considerations, on purely philosophic grounds, and 
uses it to wage a vigorous campaign against an extreme rationalism. Pro­ 
fessor J. B. Pratt, in commenting upon the book in which this doctrine is 
enunciated by James, writes as follows: "The merit of Professor James's 
brilliant book lay not so much in its originality, as in its giving this 
century-old doctrine a broader philosophical setting and foundation, by show­ 
ing that not only religious belief but nearly all belief is in part a matter
55 
of will." It is obvious that this doctrine has important consequences.
In the first place, it makes faith a more elementary activity than knowledge. 
When the nind sets out in quest of knowledge it does so in faith, simply be­ 
cause reason seeks to fashion the world according to its bent for clarity 
and unity, while actual knowledge is partial, and every step of advance made 
by knowledge points beyond itself. science advances by trust in hypotheses 
which involves faith that goes beyond the data of immediate experience. If 
this were not true, the scientist would not labor so arduously for verifica­ 
tion. Faith is essential to every theoretical attempt to explain the 
facts of nature; there must be faith that the mind can discover unity and 
clarity in reality, and faith that reality can be simplified and clarified. 
Such faith is elementary in any philosophic construction of thd universe,
55. J. 3. Pratt, '.fliat is Pragmatism?, New York: The Liacmillan Co., 1909, 
p. 194.
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for, as G. Galloway puts it, "the ultimate synthesis by which reason 
seeks to conceive mind and nature as elements in a unity or organic 
whole is at the best a hypothesis, which is never verified in such de­ 
tail as to give it logical cogency. Philosophy has to begin with pre­ 
suppositions, but its ideal is to return on its presuppositions and take
them up into its fully articulated system; and, needless to say, this it
56 
never accomplishes.* Thus a postulate is an assumption which experience
suggests to the actively inquiring mind, but which is not, and, from the 
very nature of the case, cannot be proved until after faith has already 
done its work. In other words, knowledge is always partial and faith is 
operative behind the activity of reason.
In the second place, this principle assigns to faith a wider scope 
than that of reason. Faith is operative not only before reason begins, 
but also after reason ends. Knowledge not only springs from an element­ 
ary faith, but it is completed by faith, for the ultimate synthesis which 
reason seeks but fails to find is achieved by an act of faith. It is 
through faith as well as through reason that man arrives at a conception 
of the world in which human life and experience are assigned a satisfying 
meaning and significance. Thus religious faith is the perfection of 
knowledge. "The ultimate object of all philosophy," writes F. Paulsen, 
"is to bring a meaning into things, or rather reveal the meaning which 
underlies all things. In the last analysis, however, this meaning is not 
a matter of knowledge, but of volition and faith. What the philosopher 
himself accepts as the highest good and final goal he projects into the 
world as its good and goal, and then believes that subsequent reflections 
56. Op. cit., p. 51.
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also reveal it to him in the world." In a word, knowledge begins in
faith and ends in faith. This fact, according to G. Galloway, arises out 
of the nature of faith as compared to that of reason. Reason seeks to 
organize the data of experience into a systematic whole, but in so doing 
it is governed by the principle of continuity; consequently, there must be 
no break in the series of implications which thought pursues in the form 
of reference. Tims it cannot pass from what is given to a transcendent 
ground beyond without losing its specific character as reason. But faith 
is not prinariiy intellectual and is not concerned with theoretical explana­ 
tion. Its primary aim is to seek the satisfaction of the inner nature
which includes the effective and conative life of the soul. It, there- ^/— ' /
fore, refers to a transcendent object by means of which our subjective 
needs are satisfied. But faith does not apprehend this object by the 
method of theoretical knowing, and the certainty which attaches to faith 
is rooted in religious experience, and not in logical deduction. "Reason 
can execute no salto mortale; "If it goes beyond the outward appearance 
of objects, it does so by seeing more deeply into them and explicating the 
unity which underlies them. It makes progress by bringing refractory ele­ 
ments within a totality or organized whole, and by so doing it establishes 
continuity within that whole. How if reason could apply this ideal of 
system to the universe and work it out successfully, it is obvious that the 
ultimate Ground of the universe could not be God as transcendent. The 
kind of God that would be reached by this method could only be the unity of 
the whole, the absolute system itself. . .if we recognize that reason is al- 
57. Qp. cTt., p. 513.
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ways an unfinished process; if knowledge is always confronted by a non- 
rational; if the conception developed by thought of a final synthesis re­ 
mains an unrealized ideal; then the place of faith in life is amply justi­ 
fied. For postulates are necessary by which to organize the ethical and
58 
spiritual values and to secure the fulfillment of the personal life."
It is obvious that a third consequence of this doctrine is to annul 
the objection which science and philosophy lift against faith as an atti­ 
tude of mind to the object, since faith permeates the attitude of both the 
scientist and philosopher. That is to say, we have no organized body of 
knowledge by which we may either supersede or discredit faith. Our systems 
of knowledge are, at the best, partial and incomplete, and there is always a 
residuary element of "brute fact", in each one. They cannot fully grasp 
the totality of the reality with which they deal, and so cannot be regarded 
as final tests of the validity of the postulates of faith. It is this 
truth J. ?/ard is emphasizing when he says,"Faith contradicts nothing that 
science is in a position to affirm, and asserts nothing that science is in
a position to deny. Science cannot disclaim it as error, nor can it ap-
59 
peal to science as truth." For when we follow James's principle to its
logical conclusion, we find that faith is an essential element in reason, 
rather than an adversary of, or a substitute for it, and, as such, renders 
reason less capable of systematically contesting its validity since an 
element of faith is essential to the validity of reason. "In science," 
writes F. R. Tennant, "there is much logical connectedness of propositions; 
but there are fundamental propositions involved from bottom to top, which 
are themselves not formally certified but only pragmatically 'verified 1 ,
58. Op. cit., pp. 55-54. Of., pp. 40-41.
59. J. Ward, The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism, Cambridge: The 
University Press, 1911, p. 417.
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and whose 'verification* circularly involves the propositions in question. 
In other words, there is no antithesis, no hard line to be drawn, between 
knowledge—or what passes for 'knowledge 1 most worth having—and belief; 
the 'knowledge', with which belief was wont to be contrasted, does not ex­ 
ist. Nothing logical constitutes the 'probability' of science's presuppo­ 
sitions; it is constituted simply by faith, of which belief is actually an
60 
outcome." In view of this situation, it is simply gratuitous for the
champions of reason to object to this exercise of faith from which belief 
comes.
This leads us to a fourth consideration which follows from the discov­ 
ery that faith is intrinsic to the foundations of all knowledge, which is 
the fact that science and theology are assigned the same epistemological 
status. If religious faith is essentially the same in nature as the faith 
which is involved in all knowledge, science and theology are on an equal 
footing; "both are substantiations of the hoped for and the unseen; the elec­ 
tron and God are equally ideal posit ings of faith-venture, rationally inde­ 
monstrable, invisible; and the 'verifications' of the one idea, and of the
61 
other, follow lines essentially identical, accidentally diverse." The faith
of science serves to make life rational and the faith of religion helps to 
make life moral, in the highest sense of the word, by the conviction that 
the ideals of our moral life are in keeping with the nature of ultimate real­ 
ity, and that there is a "power that makes for righteousness in the world."
60. Op_. cit., Vol. I, p. 296.
61. Tennant, Ibid., p. 303.
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*no scientific postulate is necessary in order to satisfy man's rational 
nature, and the religious postulate is equally necessary to satisfy our 
highest noral needs. ^id as J. Ito;/ce argues, if one Oives up one faith, 
one ought to give up the other too. That is, if one abandons the funda­ 
mental ^ostulate of religion, that goodness is at the heart of things, one 
ought also to give up the postulate of science which expresses for our 
thought the demand that nature snail answer to our highest intellectual 
needs for clarity and unity. For if both are leavened with faith, it seems
arbitrary to give aP the former while retaining the latter. 3ut, as Royce
62 
says, "to do both is to lack the courage of rational and of moral life."
It is obvious, then, that if, to use the words of ^. J. Balfour, "science 
and theology are so far on an equality that every proposition which consid­ 
erations like these oblige us to assert about the one, we are bound to as­ 
sert also about the other; and that our general theory of knowledge must
take account of the fact that both these great departments of it are infected
63 
by the same weakness," science has no right to object to theology because it
relies upon faith, and theology need not take this objection seriously, in­ 
asmuch as it is unwarranted.
The assertion that both science and theology, and the sciences of valu­ 
ation, are on the same plane in this respect, should not, however, be taken 
to mean that either acts in blind faith. It is faith, to be sure, but not 
blind faith. In the case of science, the rationality of tho world is cour­ 
ageously assumed, not only because the assumption is well worth the risk, 
but also because scientific progress supports it. In the case of religion,
62. j. Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Boston; iloughton, 
i,.ifflin and Ccnpany., Cambridge: The Riverside Press., 1885, p. 331.
63. ^. j. Balfour, ^ne foundations of Belief, i:ew York and London: Long­ 
mans, Green and Co., 1895, p. 29S.
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the assumption that goodness is at the heart of things is prompted by the 
same spirit and V a similar consideration; and in neither case is it a 
matter of sheer necessity. Cairns writes in this connection as follows: 
"Is there not something of fundamental faith in God in that strange preju­ 
dice in favor of order in Lature, on which as we have seen all progress in 
science today, as always, depends? From this point of view we see that 
it is far more than a mere postulate, a "supposition" sucn as Naturalism is 
compelled to suppose it to be. It is a kind of intuitive faith that what­ 
ever she ::,a: seem to be, Nature is really friendly to man and therefore
64 
orderly in all her ways." ile then lifts the question: "Does not the very
existence of science show that there is a deep kinship between the vast sys­ 
tem of Nature and the eager exploring human mind, such as the larger spir-
65 
itual view of Nature maintains on other grounds to be the manifest truth?"
Science is not satisfied to accept the rationality of the world as purely 
accidental, and the theistic interpretation of the world is but the effort 
to carry to completion and more fully to explain, this implicit belief of 
science. As Professor A. N. Whitehead puts it: "The order of the world is 
no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some 
measure of order. The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: That 
the order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the value of the 
world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of 
life, the peace of life, and the mastery of evil, are all bound together— 
not accidentally, but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a
64. D. o. Qairns, Tl.e Riddle of the World, New York; Round Table Press, 
Inc., 1958, p. 151.
65. Ibid., p. 152.
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creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with infinite pos­ 
sibilities; but th«t this creativity and these forms are together impotent
to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony, which is
66 
Jod." Thus it is a mistake to regard James's doctrine that all knowledge
involves faith as a revolt against logic, and as a defense of irrational- 
ism. Its main object was to shake the complacency of those who plainly 
saw no logical difficulty in the assumption that man's proper attitude to 
the "Lniverse" is that of a "disinterested spectator"; and to show that 
while both the scientific and religious hypothesis do not depend upon blind 
faith, all knowledge is permeated by faith, and because of this fact science 
has neither the right nor the authority to challenge the fundamental as­ 
sumptions of religion, on the ground that they proceed from faith. A ^ord 
of caution should be spoken here, however, for in the final analysis, it is 
not r-ossible entirely to differentiate between scientific and religious 
truth. That is to say, that which is true in science cannot be false in 
relijion, and conversely,that ivnich religion holds to be true cannot be re­ 
garded as false in science. V/'-ilo it is true that they deal witL differ­ 
ent aspects of realit,, science uith the ^u^ititutive and religion with the 
qualitative, aspect, realit. is not split up by any such sharp lin^: of 
distinction, nor divided into water-tight cor.partmonts. If religious 
faith be, as we have said, the more detailed explanation of the fnith of 
science, we cannot allow any such gap between them. .<e ;..ust regard both 
as leading us ultimately to t'ua sar.ie reality by different routes, faith 
carrying us farther than reason. This being true, Professor ....Itehead is 
right in asserting that "you cannot shelter theology from science, or 
science from theology; nor can you shelter either of them from me tap::., sic s,
66. A. II. \<nitehead, Reli ;ion in the I lu.ing, Lew Yor.:; ±^.-. ^acmillen Co., 
1927, pp. 119-120. ———
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or metaphysics from either of them. Tnere is no short cut to truth."
But James's rlcctrine does serve to render science nore uodest in her 
claims, and enables religion to proceed with greater confidence. 3ut it 
should not be taken to mean that religious belief is no longer subject to 
dispassionate criticisn, or that religion is entitled to ignore such 
criticism. .^ligion must always proceed with caution for, to quote 
Professor ..hitehead again, "its authority is endangered by the intensity 
of the emotions which it generates. ouch emotions are evidnece of some
vivid experience; but they are a very poor guarantee for its correct inter-
68 
pretation."
It is well, at this juncture, to point out the respects in which 
science and faith resemble j,nd those in which they differ. Tney resemble 
in that both take the form of hypothesis; their respective demands upon 
the universe are in the nature of postulates. Both use the experimental 
method; science says "we must try this thing out in the laboratory," and 
religion says "we must live this taing out in tha world." Finally, both 
seek confirr^-tion or verification by establishing coherent relations with 
the whole of our experience. As to the respects in which faith differs 
from science, th- former does not deal exclusively with sense objects; it 
is not amenable to mathematical formulation; and does not concern itself 
. with irnoirical causes, as is the case with science. Hence, faith is in­ 
capable of the type of verification which characterizes science. The 
latter predicts and controls sense experience and its hypotheses lead to
the particulars to which they refer, as pragmatism maintains. M TLe re-
69 
ligious hypothesis is essentially an unverifiable hypothesis," j_ n the
67. C£. cjt., p. 79.
68. Cv . oit., p. 83.
69. R. 3. Perry, Present Philosophical 'i-encUjicies, p. 210,
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strictly Empirical sense. The religious hypothesis can, however, be ver­ 
ified, in some measure at least, in the total experience of life when it 
shows itself to be adequate to interpret all facts arid values. Another 
important difference between faith and scientific knowledge is the one 
which G. Galloway makes, and which we have already referred to above: that 
while scientific knowledge is governed by the principle of continuity and, 
consequently, is riot able to execute a salto mortale in its processes;
faith is not limited in any such manner and it is of the essence of reli-
70 
gious faith to refer to a transcendent Object. ;J.though the object of
faith is not reached by a process of theoretical knowing, it is none the 
less held to be real and valid, and just as much so as a verified truth in 
the sphere of knowledge. Apart from these differences, then, James is 
justified in regarding the scientific and religious hypotheses as essen­ 
tially the same in nature, and in elevating religion to the same epistemo- 
logical status as that held by science, in vie\r of the fact that faith is 
common to botn of them.
Another important contribution which James makes to religious philos­ 
ophy in his treatment of faith and reason arises from the role which he 
assigns faith in the making of human history. Like the writer of the
hpistle to the Hebrews, he conceives faith as "the substance of things
71 
hoped for, the evidence of things not seen", and his gallery of the
"heroes of faith" covers large vistas of time, and includes the great
70~. Gf. E. 1.. laeman and R. Jestcott- :..ieraan, iiormative psychology of 
Religion, 'New York: Tnonas Y. Growell Co., 1935, Gh. VI*; B. P. 3owne, 
Philosophy of Theism, i.ew York: Harper and Brothers, 1887, Preface; D. C. 
Macintosh, "experimental Realism in Religion", Religious Realism, halted 
by D. C. macintosh, Hew York: The Lacnillan Co.., 1921, pp. 307 f f.; G. 
Galloway, op. cit., pp. 40 ff.
71. Heb., 11:3.
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periods of history in which nen have responded to tna good news that tLo 
inmost nature of reality is congenial to the powers which r.en ^ossesses. 
Thus ha accounts for tha rapid and steady growth of primitive G^riatian- 
ity; for the success of the rrotestant Reformation; for the great evangel­ 
istic waves wLich have sv.e^t over ^urcpe and A^.ri-a; and for the immortal 
ity of influence of such leaders of thought as i.u:;t, fie the, jc-tbi, and
Schiller — all such movenents have succeeded on so vast a scale because
72 
they have awakened the dormant powers of men by an appeal to faith.
Through faith man faces the future hopefully and resolutely. history is 
interpreted in the light of the ideal of the future. This view of the fu­ 
ture determines the significance of past events and through these points of 
history he plots the curve which describes the past as contiguous witn that 
which lies ahead. This motive to change historical values enables him to 
conceive events which ware once of major importance as of little signifi­ 
cance, while events which occurred without contemporary ^jtice eventually 
come to be regarded as epoch-making. According to James, it is faith, not 
knowledge that enables history thus to move forward. Whatever man's 
growth in knowledge may be, his growth in wisdom is certainly not a mere 
record of logical analysis. for the great changes which take place in the 
belief of mankind, the epochs in the intellectual history of the race, ure 
seldom brought about by mere arguments, but, rather, as A . K. Rogers thinks, 
by "the half-unconscious ripening of experience, the transforming, and suf­
fusing with new meaning, of the old facts, brought about by processes lying
73 
back of anything we can put, at the time, in syllogistic form." I'het it
72. Op. cit., pp. 86 ff. —————————— ———
75. A. K. uogers, "Rationality and Belief", ^il o scyhic al i-re view, Vol. X 
No. 1, Jan., 1904, p. 44.
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is by faith rather than by knowledge by which the human race advances is
strikingly brought out by ?. Paulsen in the following statement: "But 
science did not put you there; your own loves and hates, your desires and 
aversions, put you there: not your understanding, but your will. You can­ 
not prove the truth of your view to one who does not share your loves and 
your hates, your hopes and your ideals. All you can do is to appeal to 
the future; but the peculiarity about the future is that it is open to 
faith, not to knowledge. Perhaps five hundred years from now, when the 
new order of things v/ill have arrived, everybody v.ill recognize the true 
importance of the beginnings of the great revolution. >,e all appreciate 
the historical significance of the beginnings of Christianity now, and 
even the reluctant are forced to confess the importance of our Christian 
era. 3ut if some one had told a Greek philosopher or a Ronan historian, 
eighteen hundred years ago, that all the Luropean nations would date their 
era from the birth of a poor little boy, occurring several decades ago in
the land of the Jews, he would most likely have questioned the prophet's
74 
sanity." This principle is of vital importance to religion in the xvorld
of today, in a world in which the liberties and powers of men are being 
suppressed, and servile obedience to totalitarian governments is cor^^nied 
in some of our leading nations. It may be that these people ivill again 
turn hopefully to religion for the assurance that they are more than mere 
cogs in a brutal machine and a pitiless world, and that thep £.re capable 
of rising and moving forward towards a newer a.id nobler destiny than that 
which seems to await them in their present environment. bince the appeal 
of faith has usually met with greatest response midst such conditions as 
these, there is still hope that the renewal of its challenge will come 
74. ?. ^?u]sen, op. cjt. , p. 319.
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before it is too late. JYw rien have seen more clearly than JViiLes that if 
man is to advance rather than retrogress, he must have something towards 
which to move and something to enable him to go forward. for hi fa, faith 
does both; it sets the goal and furnishes the motive.
We have now to consider James's treatment of reason as incapable of 
getting at the truth of religion. It is a mistake to separate feeling 
and knowing; for to do this, if it were really possible, would ultimately 
mean the extinction of both. As -j. Dav.'es ilicks argues, "the rrlnd of an 
intelligent being cannot be split up into separate and air-tight compart­ 
ments; there is within it no feeling that is not more or less rational­ 
ized feeling, no volition that is not more or less rationalized volition; 
nor is there, on the other hand, any thought that is not suffused with 
feeling, and which does not lead to volition. Tho iaind of man is essen­ 
tially a unity in which these various factors necessarily imply each
other. They are, that is to say, correlative ways in which the one cen-
75 , 
tral "unity expresses itself." It is probably true, as G. Galloway points
out, that feeling lies nearer to the centre or essence of the religious
consciousness than thought; but to relegate thought to a purely secondary
76 
position appears to be without warrant and impracticable. The fact that
some measure of intellection characterizes those levels of physical ex­ 
perience which give rise to religion serves to indicate that thought is an 
essential element in the religious consciousness throughout. Further, it 
does not follow, as James seems to think, that because reason is a faculty 
of inference and deals with abstract or general notions, it is thereby es­ 
sentially disqualified for the function of getting hold of the concrete
75. G. Dawes nicss, The philosophical Basis of T:.r.jsm, London: George 
Alien and Unwin Ltd., 1937, p. 130.
76. G. Galloway, The Principles of Religious Development, London: Ilacrrdl- 
lan and Co., Ltd., :jo?, p. 132.
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living realities of religious experience. The concepts of reason nay 
be used here, as elsewhere, as a means of determining the nature of thirds 
which are extremely concrete; and a notion or concept, while itself ab­ 
stract, can reveal to us something of the nature of living realities. 
For example, the word "blue" is used to signify blue, although the v.-ord 
itself is net blue. To ^uote again from G. Dawes Hicks, "Reason is not 
only the facility of distinguishing and discriminating; it is the facility 
likewise of apprehending the real world widely and steadily and connectedly 
. . .Abstraction is undoubtedly one feature, and a very important feature, 
of the activity of thought, but its importance consists largely in this,
that it renders possible modes of insight and discernment that would be
77 
unattainable without it." :itill more, while we rr^y agree with James that
faitli occupies a large place in the progress of the human race, we do not 
believe that it acts alone. Reason also plays an important part in the 
advancement of humanity. It controls, directs, criticizes and corrects 
the insights and energies which flow from faith; and in the development of 
religion, it is thought, not feeling, that generally works for change and 
advance. J^r as Principal T. :ly\el iiughes points out, "the element of 
feeling which seems to be basal in the religious consciousness is the most 
conservative of all the psychic elements." It is thought, not feeling, 
that endeavors to break the bonds of tradition, and tc throw off the 
shackles of custom; it has to do this often, perhaps most of the time, in 
sopite of the conservatism of feeling. "The doom of thought is restless 
enterprise. Arid it is in religion as it is elsev.bore: when thinking be-
77. Op. cjLJN, p;:. 127-1S9.
7'°. T. T "*wel Hii'jLes, Psychology and Reli j. ous Origins, New York: entries 
Scribner's Sons, 1937, p. 31.
152 
79 
comes conscious or reflective, it works for movement." Finally, we c-_-
not acquiesce in James's opinion that reason, if left alone vlth the 
natural facts of the world, is more likely to arrive et conclusions rch-ich- 
are irreligious than it is to reach conclusions which are favorable to re­ 
ligion. The place which natural reli^io^ has occupied in religious his­ 
tory arid thought does not seem to warrant this sceptical attitude tor/ards 
reason as a factor in religion. Plainly, if reason is as incapable of af­ 
fording support for religious conclusions as Janes maintains it is,
Ircfessor ..nitehead could not assert as confidently as he does that "the
80
aces of faith are the ages of rationalism". ,,-ile reason does not demon­ 
strate God, it seems, as we shall see more in detail later, to point in 
that direction sufficiently strong^te make it o more reasonable procedure 
to complete the leadings of reason by faith than to stop or take the oppo­ 
site direction; it is not necessary to increase one's intellectual scepti­ 
cism in order to strengthen one's ar£._:;---t as a moral believer. ,;e nave 
no acre rigi't to reject the results of reason in the realm of religion ze- 
cause they are not infallible or uniform than we have in the field of 
science, and there are good grounds for supposing that reason is valid in 
both fields of thought so far as it is able to carry us; that it cannot 
carry us all the way we have frankly admitted.
It is impossible, also, to subordinate the intellect to the v/ill as 
James's voluntaristic psychology tries to do. ,,hile we recognize the 
elements of value in his pragmatic contention us to the importance of the 
will in religion, we cannot agree that the intellect is the second-rate 
and subordinate thing that his view seems to make it. ..<_• can see no good
79. G. Callo^ay, op. cit., p. 132. 
00. Op. cit., p. 86.
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reason why will should be regarded as the metaphysical first principle, 
while thought is considered a secondary product of the will. >. Gallo- 
way rightly insists that psychology "gives us no warrant for treating
will as the source and explanation of ideation. I'o derivation of th^ 
latter from the former can be made even plausible; and if ideation ap- 
pears later in tine than feeling and will it does not follow that it is
81 
inferior in function and value." Further, without reason the will is
blind. Reason without volition is not enough, but volition without
reason is just as poor a makeshift. "i.ere conation without direction, 
end and aim," writes ,.. 3. oelbie, "comes to nothing, and only in the
harmonious and balanced working of reason, feeling, and will can we find
82 
a true explanation of human thought and life." It is no more possible to
isolate the v;ill as a factor in human experience than it is feeling^ To 
attempt to do either is fatal. Uor is it possible to pit uill and feel- 
ing against intellect; for any philosophy of religion built upon this one- 
sided psychological foundation utterly fails to do justice to the reli- 
gious consciousness in which the three elements, intellect, feeling, and 
will, play an essential part and operate in unison rather than separately 
or by subordination of one to the other. Professor T. Hywel Hughes 
gives this truth emphatic expression when he states that in reality, 
"the weakness of all the views which treat religion as if it were derived 
from any one of the various aspects of man's self-conscious life lies in 
the fact that they r.iuke an unwarranted cleavage in consciousness, and that 
therefore they make man religious only in a part of his being:. ...an is 
not religious, when religion is real to him, in a;is reason or ais v;ill or
81. pp_. cit., p. "82".
82. The Psychology of Religion, Oxford: Tue Clarendon Press, 1926, p. 69
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his feeling only. Ko is religious in them all, in his whole manhood at 
its highest and best, for religion lays every faculty and power under trib­ 
ute. I 4: raises evory aspect of consciousness to a level of higher and
more intense life, and in the integrating power of coir.-.union v/ith God, it
83 
renews and transforms the whole man." ..e are in general sympathy with
Janes'3 effort to show that religion subserves life, but we believe tnst 
this can be shown without making religion essentially a matter of the 
will and feeling whili reason is regarded as playing a secondary role 
throughout. Vte are forced to conclude that reason is essential to human 
nature in its wholeness and that religion flows from man's entire nature 
which cannot be regarded in terras of any ono element of his conscious ex­ 
perience. It does not rcake religion an affair of the whole Dan to ignore, 
or treat as subordinate a constitutive element of that experience. Reli­ 
gion springs fror* man's whole nature and when it becomes fully conscious of 
itself, it affects the whole nan, or as Principal Hughes puts it, "religion 
clairs the whole run and I^G every aspect and facet of his being under 
tribute." Because of this fact \ve believe that Tarnes's ^osition is unre.r- 
ranted and unsound; it fails to do justice to the religious consciousness 
in trying to correct an exaggerated emphasis upon intellect by undue em- 
..hasis upon the importance of will. It does not help us very much to learn 
th-Lt the whole man is involved in religion if it is necessary to strip him 
of one of his most characteristic features before it is possible to .eke 
this claim. For while it nay involve the whole nan, in t-is case, it is 
a much sailor ran. Juch is the inevitable outcome of th^ atte-.pt to ma>e 
r.a., for f^ith b, doin aw^ v;ith reason.
"—• -i— c it• > pp. 93-99. 
£4. Op_. cit., p. 107.
V
REASON AND FAITH: THE LIMITS OF FAITH
In the preceding chapter we followed James's argument which attempts 
to show that belief requires a "will to believe", due to a necessary ag­ 
nosticism which arises from the intractability of data, and because it is 
necessary to supplement an "accidental ignorance". Also, the nature of 
faith and reason, as well as that of religious experience, was shown to de­ 
mand something more than the operation of mere intellectual processes if 
belief is to be attained. We are now in position to consider the condi­ 
tions under which we are justified in allowing the will to influence belief. 
That is to say, if the influence of the will upon belief is necessary in 
certain cases, it is important to examine the canons by which such a will 
should be guided, or to ascertain when it is proper that the will should
determine belief. It is this question that occupies James in the well
1 
known and influential essay entitled "The Will to Believe", which essay
contains his "critique of faith".
In later years, James regretted very much that he had given this es­ 
say the unfortunate title, "The Will to Believe". His critics seized up­ 
on this "catch-penny" title and used it to argue that James was eonmending 
dogmatic and wishful thinking, and advocating arbitrary belief. His sen­ 
timent in this matter is expressed in a letter to J. M. Baldwin, in 1901, 
in response to a request to prepare an article on the "Will to Believe" for 
the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. "It seems absurd," he writes, 
"to make a technical term of the 'Will to Believe*. Would God I had never 
thought of that unhappy title for my essay, but called it a 'Critique of 
1. W. 13., pp. 1-31.——————————
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Pure FaithZ* Why not define the Will-to-swim, or to get rich, or to sit 
down?....What I meant by the title was the state of mind of the man who 
finds an impulse in him toward a believing attitude, and who resolves not 
to quench it simply because doubts of its truth are possible. Its oppo­ 
site would be the maxim: Believe in nothing which you can possibly doubt.
Pray leave it out of your dictionary. It can't be treated technically
2 
and has been the source of utter misunderstanding of my essay." It is
important, therefore, to remove this misunderstanding of his doctrine which 
was a source of profound regret to him, and which has been the cause of 
much unnecessary, as well as unjust, criticism of his view on the part of 
those who feared he was arguing for unrestrained liberty in the exercise of 
faith. First, we should take into consideration the type of audience for 
which this essay was originally intended. "I admit, then," says James, 
"that were I addressing the Salvation Army or a miscellaneous popular crowd 
it would be a misuse of opportunity to preach liberty of believing as I 
have in these pages preached it. What such audiences most need is that 
their faiths should be broken up and ventilated, that the northwest wind of
science should get into them and blow their sickliness and barbarism away.
3 
But academic audiences, fed already on science, have a very different need."
James intends his doctrine for this latter group which he regards as having 
lost its native faith, and as attempting to decide the truth of all ques­ 
tions by strictly scientific evidence. "But there is," he continues, 
"really no scientific or other method by which men can steer safely between 
the opposite dangers of believing too little or of believing too much. To 
face such dangers is apparently our duty, and to hit the right channel be-
2. R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Vol. II, 
pp. 244-245.
3. W. B_., Pref. p. x.
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4
tween them is the measure of our wisdom as men." James was also address­ 
ing himself since he was not credulous, but appears to have suffered from 
incredulity. We should also take into consideration the actual scope of 
the doctrine in question as James seems to have conceived it, notwithstand­ 
ing his frequent extravagances of language which seem to betray his origi­ 
nal intention. L. T. Hobhouse wrote a criticism of the doctrine, without 
explicit reference to James, in which he summed up his interpretation of 
it in two propositions: "By believing a thing we make it true," and, "we
can believe a thing without asking ourselves seriously whether it is true
5 
or false." James wrote him as follows: "My essay hedged the license to
indulge in private over-beliefs with so many restrictions and signboards 
of danger that the outlet was narrow enough. It made of tolerance the es- 
sense of the situation; it defined the permissible cases; it treated the 
faith-attitude as a necessity for individuals, because the total 'evi­ 
dence 1 , which only the race can draw, has to include their experiments 
among its data. It tended to show only that faith could not be absolutely 
vetoed, as certain champions of 'science* (Clifford, Huxley, etc.) had
claimed it ought to be. It was a function that might lead, and probably
6
does lead, into a wider world." Also, it should be kept in mind that ref­ 
erence to verification is constantly implied throughout his treatment of 
this question, and verification must be by results of practical working; 
faith must justify itself by works. Further, he insists that a man can
4. Ibid., p. xi.
5. "Faith and the Will to Believe", Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society. N. 3., Vol. IV, 1903-1904, p. 91. Of. pp. 87-110.
6. Letters of William James, Edited by Henry James, Jr., Boston: The 
Atlantic Jfonthly Press, 1920, Vol. II, p. 207.
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"always doubt his creed". James is no doubt partly responsible for this
misunderstanding of his view, as has been suggested, by failing at times 
to express his teaching as clearly as he might have, and by permitting his 
enthusiasm to lead him into unguarded expressions which could easily be 
turned against him in criticism. But in view of the above reservations, 
there seems to be no reason to regard his doctrine as sanctioning un­ 
bridled belief.
Considerable confusion has arisen concerning "The Will to Believe" due 
to the failure to distinguish between this doctrine and pragmatism. A 
brief consideration of his view of knowledge will help to eliminate this 
confusion. There are three areas of human knowledge according to James. 
Professor R. B. Perry states James's view of the threefold nature of 
knowledge very clearly and accurately as follows: "Human knowledge may 
then be represented by three concentric areas. There is a nucleus of im­ 
mediacy where existence and its characters are immediately present; beyond 
this lies an area of theoretic judgment in which belief is supported by 
reasons, embracing consistency with other judgments and veriflability in 
terras of experience; beyond this, finally, lies the area of faith, in which
beliefs which transcend immediacy and are only negatively or partially sup-
8 
ported by reasons are still justified on moral grounds." His theory of
"knowledge of acquaintance" applies to the first area, and we have dealt 
with it at length in considering his theory of consciousness. Here the 
object is immediately presented in cognition. His pragmatic theory of 
knowledge deals with the second area which he calls "knowledge about". It 
supplements the former by enabling the experient to deal with the content
7. W. B., p. 95. ~~~~
8. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 72.
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of the given when the object is not immediately present to consciousness. 
His fideism covers his view of knowledge in the third area. Now, in 
pragmatism he applies practical principles to the theoretical process it­ 
self, while his fideism is an attempt to justify, on moral and practical 
grounds, belief which lacks sufficient theoretic evidence. "The one dis­ 
covers the practical procedure of theoretic proof, the other affirms the
9 
practical right to believe in the absence of such proof." It is obvious,
therefore, that the theory of pragmatism which teaches that verification 
itself is a practical process is quite a different doctrine from that of 
fideism which holds that belief is, in certain cases, justified in the ab­ 
sence of verification. We shall have occasion to emphasize the importance 
of the distinction between his fideism and pragmatism more fully when we 
come to the consideration of the latter doctrine.
The basic principles of thought underlying the "Will to Believe" are 
rooted in the faith of James f s youth, and the view as set forth in this 
essay is in reality a reaffirmation and amplification of a faith of long 
standing. At the early age of nineteen years we find him resorting to 
this faith when thinking about such a trivial matter as what to do during 
the Thanksgiving vacation. In the fall of 1861, while a student at Har­ 
vard, he wrote to his family as follows: "The time will come—Thanksgiving 
in less than two weeks and then, oh, thenj—probably a cold reception, half 
repellent, no fatted calf, no fresh-baked loaf of spicy bread,—but I dare
not think of that side of the picture. I will ever hope and trust and my
10
faith shall be justified." Two years later, while still a student at Cam­ 
bridge, he expressed the same conviction in writing to his cousin,
9. R. B. Perry, Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
10. Letters. Vol. I, p. 42.
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Mrs. William H. Prince, in regard to his vocation. "The worst of this 
matter," he said, "is that everyone must more or less act with insuffi­ 
cient knowledge— f go it blind*, as they say. Few can afford the time to
11 
try what suits them." These two citations give us an insight into his
personal attitude towards life many years before he was known to the world 
as an advocate of the "will to believe", which view expresses his profound- 
est thought concerning religious faith. For the most part, his youth was 
a time of ill health, accompanied by moods of despondency, of uncertainty 
and vacillation of purpose, all of which served to give him a somewhat pes­ 
simistic outlook upon life. He was able to lift himself out of this un­ 
happy state of mind by the adoption of an attitude of faith towards life in 
general. An entry from one of his notebooks dated April 30, 1870, enables 
us to see how he went about it, as well as to suggest in germinal form the 
philosophic outlook that was later to give comfort and courage to unnum­ 
bered readers. "I think," he wrote, "that yesterday was a crisis in my 
life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's second *Essais* and see no 
reason why his definition of Free Will— f the sustaining of a thought because 
I choose to when I might have other thought*—need be the definition of an 
illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present—until next year— 
that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in
free will. For the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the mere
e
speculation and contemplative Grublei in which my nature takes most delight,
fi.
and voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading books 
favorable to it, as well as by acting. After the first of January, my 
callow skin being somewhat fledged, I may perhaps return to metaphysical 
11. Ibid., p. 441
160
Mrs. William H. Prince, in regard to his vocation. "The worst of this 
matter," he said, "is that everyone must more or less act with insuffi­ 
cient knowledge— f go it blind*, as they say. Few can afford the time to
11 
try what suits them." These two citations give us an insight into his
personal attitude towards life many years before he was known to the world 
as an advocate of the "will to believe", which view expresses his profound- 
est thought concerning religious faith. For the most part, his youth was 
a time of ill health, accompanied by moods of despondency, of uncertainty 
and vacillation of purpose, all of which served to give him a somewhat pes­ 
simistic outlook upon life. He was able to lift himself out of this un­ 
happy state of mind by the adoption of an attitude of faith towards life in 
general. An entry from one of his notebooks dated April 30, 1870, enables 
us to see how he went about it, as well as to suggest in germinal form the 
philosophic outlook that was later to give comfort and courage to unnum­ 
bered readers. "I think," he wrote, "that yesterday was a crisis in my 
life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's second 'Essais* and see no 
reason why his definition of Free Will—*the sustaining of a thought because 
I choose to when I might have other thought*—need be the definition of an 
illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present—until next year— 
that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in
free will. For the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the mere
e 
speculation and contemplative Grublei in which my nature takes most delight,
r~
and voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading books 
favorable to it, as well as by acting. After the first of January, my 
callow skin being somewhat fledged, I may perhaps return to metaphysical 
11. Ibid., p.
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study and skepticism without danger to my powers of action....Hitherto, 
when I have felt like taking a free initiative, like daring to act origi­ 
nally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world 
to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my dar­ 
ing into; now, I will go a step further with my will, not only act with
it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative
12
power." Three years later, after he had begun to teach at Harvard, he ex­ 
claimed to his father on one occasion: "Bless my soul, what a difference 
between me as I am now and as I was last spring at this timej Then so 
hypochondrical." His father states that William attributed this change in 
himself to several things: "The reading of Renouvier (particularly his vin­ 
dication of freedom of the will) and of Wordsworth, whom he has been feed­ 
ing on now for a good while; but more than anything else, his giving up the 
notion that all mental disorder requires to have a physical basis....He saw
that the mind does act irrespectively of material coercion, and could be
13 
dealt with therefore at first hand, and this was health to his bones."
It is interesting to note that, according to R. B. Perry, the final 
statement of the doctrine of the will to believe came also at a time of 
emotional disturbance in the life of James. He had completed the writing 
of The Principles of Psychology, which required several years of arduous 
labor. This stupendous task had been quite exacting upon his time and 
energies and had proved somewhat of a drudgery to him; but having finished 
it, he was no longer subject to the restraint and the discipline which this 
work had imposed upon him. He was especially apt to fall into brooding 
melancholy, and he again felt the need of a saving gospel. Also, social
12. Ibid., pp. 147-148.~~~
13. Ibid., pp. 169-170.
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and political activities of the time had stirred his human sympathies. 
He was deeply moved by the Spanish War, and the Dreyfus case. His inter­ 
est in psychical research had revived his sympathy with religious mysti-
14 
cism, and he was hopeful of being able to find some justification for it.
It may be said, then, that this essay, which was delivered in the summer of 
1895, before the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities, is a
restatement and amplification of a view which carried through many years of
> 
James thinking, and which, as we have seen, in the preceding chapter, was
already present in his earlier examination of the "motives for philosophiz­ 
ing". It may also be regarded as a justification of his earlier views. 
We have seen from the quotations given above that James was strongly influ­ 
enced by Renouvier. Professor Perry points out, also, that the influence
of Hodgson is apparent in James's position that "all thinking is inspired
15 
by a voluntary faith in truth."
It may be shown that the will influences belief in a number of differ­ 
ent cases. First, an effort of will may be exerted in order to retain some 
conception which has come to possess such a deep sense of reality for us 
that when doubt begins to operate we actively resist its corroding and dis­ 
turbing tendencies. For example, we may refuse to believe in aspersions 
cast upon the character of a friend of long standing in whom we have implic­ 
it confidence. Again, it often becomes desirable or necessary to uproot 
some deep-seated conviction by an exercise of the will so as to make room 
for an incompatible conception which appears to be the nobler and truer of 
the two. That is, we may come upon a new view of some matter, the truth
14. R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, " 
p. 208.
15. R. B. Perry, op. cit., foot note, p. 209.
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of which is beyond question, but which runs counter to some belief deeply 
rooted in our nature by tradition and custom. We are forced to choose 
between them. A situation of this kind may occur to a scientific inves­ 
tigator when some new discovery renders it necessary for him to discard
some theory to which he has adhered for years, and which he has used to
16 
support conclusions which he regards as quite important. Finally, the
will may be used to break the deadlock which occurs when confronted with 
two incompatible conceptions between which we are unable to decide upon 
theoretic grounds either because evidence is absent or the available evi­ 
dence is inconclusive. In this case, we may either allow doubt to remain 
or the influence of the will may overthrow the doubt and we may choose to 
believe in one of the two alternatives and resist belief in the other. 
It is only in such cases as this that James defends the right to believe as 
being morally justified. He does so in opposition to the champions of 
science whose maxim, as we have seen from his letter to Baldwin, runs like 
this: "Believe in nothing which you can possibly doubt." But his defense 
of the right to believe here is not based upon intellectual, but upon 
ethical, considerations. It is restricted to certain well defined cases, 
and does not apply to this class of beliefs as a whole.
If the will does influence belief, as James has argued that it does, 
the question arises as to whether or not we shall believe, or persuade 
others to believe, when sufficient theoretical evidence is lacking to pro­ 
duce belief. This is a practical question which must ultimately be dealt 
with in moral terms. In other words, as Professor R. B. Perry says, the 
inculcation of belief by using its non-evidential causes, on the one hand,
16. H. B. Marshall, "On Noetic Stability; and Belief", Journal of Philoso­ 
phy, Vol. I, No. 19, Sept. 15, 1904, pp. 511-12. C£. pp. 505-512.
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and the drastic restriction of belief within limits of theoretic proof, on
17 
the other, become practical alternatives. Now it is obvious that while
these alternatives are not mutually exclusive throughout, they are in some 
measure incompatible, and at certain points of conflict it becomes neces­ 
sary to choose between them. Our choice is prompted by moral considera­ 
tions and we must be able to support it with moral reasons. It is possible 
to give three moral grounds for accepting only theoretically supported be­ 
liefs: It can be argued that the intellect occupies a position of supreme 
dignity in the moral hierarchy; that intellectual activity serves as a 
means of common action and feeling, since it is non-competitive; and, final­ 
ly, that since the intellect enables us to exercise vast control over the 
forces of nature, its utility entitles it to first consideration. This 
last argument presupposes that it is good that man should be able to con­ 
trol the forces of nature, and that man's physical life and well-being 
should be promoted; this is a specific ethical presupposition to occidental 
minds. The last argument also assumes that general human goods are better 
than those of the private individual, or of limited groups. Now, accord­ 
ing to the same creed which justified the cult of evidential belief and es­ 
tablishes its priority in case of conflict, it is also possible to justify, 
in certain cases, non-evidential belief. For the creed is broader than 
its cult, and the cult is not its only implication. "To deny this, or to 
place a prohibition on non-evidential belief, would be to treat the cult as 
though it were a complete and fundamental creed. To defend such an ethics 
of intellectual abstinence, one should take a position similar to that of 
17. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 181. Of. pp. 178-182.
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the ancient sceptics, who justified their negation of belief by appeal to
the simplification of life. He who reduces his beliefs thereby reduces
18 
his commitments."
Proceeding upon the assumption, then, that evidential belief is to be 
preferred to non-evidential belief whenever the two are in conflict, there 
are three positive reasons for non-evidential belief in absence of such a 
conflict. First, non-evidential belief is justified when belief is a con- 
dition of, or an aid to, evidential belief. That is, faith is permissible
when it helps to find evidence. "One finds what one looks for, and one
19 
looks for what one believes can be found." Belief that evidence can be
found must precede our search for it. Our search for truth implies the 
faith that truth is attainable and our attempt to arrive at a rational con- 
ception of the world implies that we believe such a view is, in some meas- 
ure at least, attainable. The scientist labors to verify his hypotheses 
in the faith that such verification is possible. In short, any procedure 
requiring commitment is accompanied by some measure of belief in advance of 
evidence. A second case in which non-evidential belief is justified is 
when the evidence in question is psychological and belief creates the evi- 
dence. Here, as James says, the thought "becomes literally father to the
20 
fact, as the wish was father to the thought." The individual's belief in
his own powers is the best known example of this class. For instance, an 
individual, in climbing a mountain, suddenly discovers that he is in a posi- 
tion from which escape is possible only by a tremendous leap. The indi-
18. R. B. Perry, Ibid., p. 190.
19. Ibid., pp. 190-191.
20. W. 13., p. 103.
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vidual has never been in such a predicament before and does not know from 
experience whether or not he can accomplish this feat. He may do one of 
two things. He may view the matter calmly and confidently thereby enabl­ 
ing himself to make the jump successfully; or, he may become nervous and 
distrustfully cautious, hesitating to make the effort until, finally, he 
stands upon the brink of the precipice, exhausted and trembling. At
last, in a moment of desperation he awkwardly flings himself forward but
21
loses his foothold and falls into the abyss. There are, of course, innum­ 
erable experiences of life in which it is necessary for an individual to 
believe in his own powers and possibilities if the end in view is to be 
achieved. This does not mean that other causes are not operative, nor 
that they can be ignored; but, all things being equal, the individual who 
has confidence in himself for the task at hand is most likely to carry it 
through to successful completion. This is true in sports, in business, in 
the realm of politics, in temptation,and in illness. As Professor Perry
puts it: "The man who puts his trust in God is on that account more likely
22 
to prevail, provided he also keeps his powder dry." Belief also has an
effect upon other minds. This truth is at the bottom of the frequently 
tendered advice, "if you want to have friends be a friend." As a rule, 
other people respond to the attitudes which we assume towards them. If 
we let them know that we respect and trust them, they usually attempt to 
prove worthy of such esteem and confidence and thereby verify our opinion. 
This principle operates with greater potency when several individuals unite 
in some common aim, whether it be in business, politics, war, or what not; 
the self-confidence which the group has is a factor in achieving the
21. W. B., pp. 96-97.
22. Op. cit., p. 193.
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purpose it has in view. In situations of this kind a lack of such confi- 
dence may prove fatal. Finally, non-evidential belief is justified in 
the case in which faith borrows evidence. The majority of our beliefs 
are of this sort. Ordinarily we do not take the time nor expend the en- 
ergy required to discover the theoretical reasons for our judgment. This 
holds good in every avenue of life. The scientist and scholar are no ex- 
ceptions to this rule since they also depend upon the investigations and 
discoveries of others in their respective fields. Thus, in the faith 
that finds, creates, and borrows evidence non-evidential belief attends
evidential belief. It is justified by the same argument which supports
23 
certified knowledge inasmuch as it is a means of obtaining the latter.
It obviously follows,as the above argument shows, that the obligation 
to theoretical evidence is not regarded as the ultimate consideration in 
determining beliefs, but that it is itself derived from underlying ethical 
premises. It does not have the last word in regard to non-evidential be- 
lief which has no connection with evidential belief. That is to say, 
whether or not it is permissible to admit beliefs for which evidence is ab- 
sent, and for which the available evidence is inconclusive, cannot be de- 
termined on the basis of fidelity to theoretical evidence. This question, 
too, must be determined from the standpoint of ethical considerations rather 
than from that of theoretical evidence. Such belief is excluded, by 
definition, from the standpoint of loyalty to theoretical evidence. It 
really becomes a question, then, as to whether the ulterior ethical prem- 
ises, from which the obligation to theoretical evidence receives its sup- 
port, excludes this type of belief. For if they are capable of giving 
23. Cf^. R. B. Perry, op. cit., pp. 190-195.
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sanction to evidential belief, they are also capable of fixing limits and
24 
of granting exceptions.
James insists that loyalty to theoretic evidence should govern in
most beliefs; "the dispassionately judicial intellect with no pet hypothe-
25 
sis, saving us, as it does, from dupery at any rate, ought to be our ideal."
Such fidelity is so important a condition of personal and social good that 
we should never sacrifice it for non-evidential belief if the evidence is 
attainable and conclusive. This is true in scientific questions, and in 
human affairs in general. It is better to postpone action than to run 
the risk of believing falsehood. Here the risk of losing truth is not as 
important a consideration as the danger of incurring error. To cultivate 
the habit of believing without appeal to evidence is eventually to weaken 
our respect for such evidence arid to endanger intellectual integrity. It 
is wise, therefore, to discourage such tendencies; they may have deleteri­ 
ous effects upon our quest for truth. In short, the attitude of sceptical 
balance is, for the most part, the absolutely wise one if we are to avoid 
mistakes and do justice to the ideal of knowledge. This much being grant­ 
ed, we may ask, then, are we ever justified in believing without evidence 
or when the evidence at hand is inadequate? The answer to this question 
defines the cases in which we are morally justified in "willing to believe."
The same general principles apply to both cases in question, that is, 
when there is no evidence, and when what evidence we have is not conclusive. 
In the former case there is no disloyalty to fact if the absence of evidence 
is recognized. In all other beliefs where evidence can be secured, fidel­ 
ity to evidence is strictly adhered to, and this guards against habitual
24. Ibid., pp. 196-197.
25. V/. !B., p. 22.
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credulity. But the belief we are considering brings hope to the individ­ 
ual who cherishes it, and gives greater meaning to life. He is thus 
stirred to worthy moral action. In this instance, there is no good 
reason why abstinence from belief should be exercised since it is not a 
matter of weighing evil results against good; the results are good. It 
is a case of losing the good consequence altogether if the belief is re­ 
jected. The latter situation arises out of the need for action before 
sufficient evidence has been obtained to enable theoretical considerations 
to determine the decision. It is necessary to act upon the evidence at
hand. In choosing a vocation, as James wrote his cousin; "Few can afford
26 
the time to try what suits them." The business man, the statesman, the
soldier, the social worker, the farmer, and all others, are forced to act 
when it is not evidently certain what the outcome will be; the insuffi­ 
ciency of available evidence renders such certain knowledge impossible. 
IShen this situation prevails, and circumstances combine to form what James 
calls a "genuine option*, it is not morally apprehensible to believe. 
Three factors unite to form a "genuine option". When we can place cre­ 
dence in both hypotheses which are competing for belief the option in
question is "living". When we cannot avoid a decision, when there is "no
27
standing place outside of the alternative", it is a "forced" option. Fi­ 
nally, when the opportunity it presents is unique, when something of tremen­ 
dous significance is at stake, and when the decision is irrevocable, it is 
"momentous". James's main thesis, therefore, is that"our passional nature 
not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, 
whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on
26. Letters, Vol. I, p. 42.
27. W. B., p. 3.
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intellectual grounds; for to say under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, 
but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision,—just like
deciding yes or no,—and is attended with the same risk of losing the
28 
truth." fthen we add to this consideration the further fact that faith in
the cases discussed above creates its own verification, we have the condi­ 
tions under which we are justified in willing to believe. "And where 
faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic
which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the
29 
'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking being can fall." This
is true of all beliefs concerning the future when that future is determined 
in some measure by the will. In short, then, we are justified upon moral 
grounds in believing without full evidential warrant when refusal to be­ 
lieve or suspension of judgment means losing the chance of truth, or is 
tantamount to disbelief which can no more be supported by sensible facts 
than the positive and more beneficial belief; and when the conviction helps 
to create the very facts needed for its verification.
James's main thesis rests upon two presuppositions. The first one 
has epistemological foundations in empirical dogmatism. It makes two as­ 
sumptions: that there is truth which it is the destiny of our minds to at­ 
tain, and that we cannot know for certain when it has been attained. Its 
dogmatism lies in the first assertion, and its empiricism in the second. 
James says it is one thing to know and quite another thing to be sure that
we know. The only indefectibly certain truth is that the present phenom-
30 
enon of consciousness exists, and this is the bare starting point of
knowledge. Every truth, however evidently certain it may have been
28. W. £., p. 11.
29. Ibid., p. 25, Cf. pp. 22-25.
30. W. J3., pp. 14-15.
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regarded, has at some time or another been called into question. Think­ 
ers have never been able to agree upon a concrete test for truth. In
short, "there is indeed nothing which some one has not thought absolutely
31
true, while his neighbor deemed it absolutely false. 11 To abandon the doc­ 
trine of objective certitude does not mean, however, that the empiricist 
relinquishes as hopeless the quest for truth. He does not. Further, he 
is little concerned with its origin; "he may have acquired it by fair means 
or by fo\4; passion may have whispered or accident suggested it; but if the
total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means by
32 
its being true. w Inasmuch, then, as objective certitude is not obtained
by means of an infallible intellect, and since no bell rings in us to let 
us know when we have arrived at the truth, we are not bound in loyalty to 
any infallible faculty; nor are we obliged to wait for any such bell to 
ring. Se may do so if we choose. We incur the same risks, however, and 
assume the same attitude which accompany our decision to go ahead and be­ 
lieve without sufficient evidence. It may be remarked here that James 
should logically go further than he does with reference to our knowing when 
we have attained truth. That is to say, his position implies that he ac­ 
knowledges himself to be in possession of a certain measure of truth. His 
empirical doubt as to our certainty of knowledge is based upon reasons,
and, as A. K. Rogers says, "reasons imply that already we take ourselves to
33 
be in possession of something in the nature of truth."
The second presupposition upon which his main thesis rests is that it 
is our duty to seek the truth rather than to avoid error. These two prin­ 
ciples are logically distinct since it is possible to avoid error without
51. Ibid., p. 161"
32. Ibid., p. 17.
33. "Scepticism", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13, No. 6, Nov. 1904, 
p. 631. C£. pp. 627-641.
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getting any nearer to the truth. At bottom, it is a matter of choice as to 
which one we shall follow. To choose the latter imperative as our guide in 
this matter, out of fear of running into error, is similar to the action of 
a general who admonishes his soldiers to keep out of battle in order to 
avoid the risk of being wounded. Since we are certain to incur error in 
spite of our efforts to avoid it, it is foolish to exercise such undue 
caution trying to escape it. It is our duty, therefore, not to shun er­ 
ror, but to seek truth. This principle is limited, as we have seen, to 
the two cases which we have cited as justifying non-evidential belief, but 
it is the presupposition which guides James in making these two exceptions 
to belief on strictly theoretical evidence.
We have now to consider the application of this doctrine to religious 
questions. James states the nature of the religious hypothesis in various 
ways. For example, in the essay entitled "Reflex Action and Theism", he 
asserts that God is the object of religious belief, and that it is essen­ 
tial to conceive Him as the deepest power in the universe. Also, he must 
be conceived as a mental personality since he ascribes worth to certain 
things and recognizes our attitude towards them. He is a power, not our­ 
selves, "which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which
34 
recognizes us." In The Varieties of Religious Experience, he conceives
the religious hypothesis as including the following beliefs: that the 
visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its 
chief significance; that union or harmonious relations with that higher 
universe is our chief end; and, finally, that through inner communion with 
its spirit we receive an influx of spiritual energy which produces effects 
34. W. B_., p. 128.
173
35
in the phenomenal world. Whatever formula James uses to express the con­ 
tent of the religious hypothesis, it always makes two significant affirma­ 
tions. The first is "that the best things are the more eternal things,
the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last
36 
stone, so to speak, and say the final word." It is obvious that this is
an affirmation which cannot yet be scientifically verified at all. The
other affirmation of religion is that "we are better off even now if we be-
37 
lieve her first affirmation to be true." Now, if the religious hypothesis,
as we have defined it, be true, and the possibility of its truth must be ad­ 
mitted before discussion is possible, it follows that it involves a live op­ 
tion. Religion also presents itself as a momentous option. Our belief 
is supposed to bring us a certain vital good, whereas disbelief means the 
loss of that good. And so far as that good goes, religion is a forced op­ 
tion. If we suspend belief pending more conclusive evidence, we do avoid 
error in case religion is untrue, but we miss the good as truly as if we had
chosen to disbelieve from the beginning. The option cannot be avoided by
38 
scepticism;"this attitude is option of a certain particular kind of risk."
The decision of the sceptic is not dictated entirely by the intellect as 
against all passions. He permits his fear of error to offset any hope that 
he may have that the religious hypothesis is true. It is thus a case of 
intellect with one passion for him. There are two other considerations 
which serve to render the position of the sceptic still more untenable. 
The first is the fact that religion takes the personal form. "The more
35. P. 485. Of. "Is Life Worth Living?", tf. 13.,pp. 51 ff. Also, "The 
Energies of I/fen", in Memories and Studies, London and New York: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1911, pp. 229-264.
36. jM. B., p. 25.
37. Ibid., p. 26.
38. Ibid., p. 26.
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perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our re­ 
ligions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere It to
us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible
39 
from person to person might be possible here." Since this personal element
enters religion, we cannot receive any response whatever unless we make some 
effort at sociability and express some portion of our sympathetic nature. 
It is out of the question, therefore, to ignore our willing in this matter. 
The second consideration arises from the fact that belief is measured by 
action. If the religious hypothesis does not produce action different from 
that which the naturalistic hypothesis inspires then religion is superfluous 
and we are justified in discarding it. This intimate connection between 
belief and action complicates the matter further for the sceptic. When he 
refuses to accept the religious hypothesis as true, pending arrival of con­ 
clusive evidence, he acts meanwhile more or less as if religion were not
40 
true.
It is obvious from the nature of the religious hypothesis that it is 
incapable of the same type of verification which characterizes science; re- 
ligious belief transcends experience. "It is the attempt of finite man to
41
live in the light of a hypothetical omniscience." Religion demands, there- 
fore, a belief without full evidential warrant. But religious belief may 
help to bring about its own verification. When an act of faith is fol- 
lowed by a sense of the presence and saving power of God the faith has 
helped to secure the evidence. When religious faith makes life more worth 
living, and, consequently, moves us to worthy and beneficial activity, the
59. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
40. Ibid., pp. 29-30. Note
41. R. B. Perry, o£. cit., p. 203.
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faith in question has helped to create the evidence. And James says, "I 
confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may 
not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to
the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and
42 
increase of very being from our fidelity." The religious belief of the
great majority of mankind draws upon the deeper insight of those who have 
carried on "as seeing him who is invisible." But since religion calls for 
a belief that surpasses evidence such belief does not involve disloyalty to 
theoretical evidence.
Two things may be said about theoretical evidence so far as the reli­ 
gious hypothesis is concerned. First, the evidence for it is not conclu­ 
sive. It is not theoretically possible to demonstrate the reality of God,
43 
freedom and immortality. In the case of God, there are the dynamogenic
effects upon the moral and spiritual emergies of those who believe them-
44 
selves to be in communion with him. Evidence for freedom is offered by
45 
the experience of our personal "activity-situations;" by the lack of uni-
46 
formity in nature which enables chance or novel events to occur; and by
the fact that no concrete bit of perceptual experience is exactly like any
47 
other that has gone before, or comes after, it. For immortality we have
the evidence that while our "soul's life may be in literal strictness the 
function of a brain that perishes," our life may continue on after the 
brain itself is dead, since the brain may serve to transmit thought rather
42. W. B.. p. 61. Cf. Varieties, pp. 485 ff.
43. Varieties, p. 455.
44. Ibid., p. 485. Of. Also, Memories and Studies, pp. 241 ff.
45. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 151.
46. Ibid., p. 149, Pragmatism, p. 119.
47. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 148.
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48
than to produce it. Thus evidence in religion carries us only part of 
the way; faith must do the rest. While this evidence is inconclusive, if 
we consider the practical reasons in favor of religion as adduced from the 
type of option which religion constitutes, we have a belief which does full 
justice to the demands of our emotional and volitional nature. The second 
consideration in regard to theoretical evidence for religion which offers 
an additional advantage to religious faith is the fact that while there is 
no conclusive evidence for religion, there is none against it; that is, 
there is not sufficient evidence by means of which the religious hypothesis 
can be proved to be false. But while it is not possible to prove religion 
either true or false, by means of theoretical evidence, we can put it to 
the practical test; for if we act upon the religious hypothesis and thereby
find that "it works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is
49 
true." It follows, then, that there is but one thing we need to do: we
need only to act as if it were true, and keep on acting as if it were true,
and it will eventually end by growing into such an intimate relation with
50 
our life that it will become true.
The full significance of this doctrine cannot be adequately appre­ 
ciated without taking into consideration the religious situation to which 
it is addressed. The latter part of the nineteenth century was a time of 
intellectual uneasiness and the general opinion that the foundations of 
religion had been undermined, if not destroyed, was, in scientific circles 
at least, gaining wide currency. Enthusiasm for the comparatively infant 
doctrine of evolution was running high, and many of its adherents felt
48. Of. Human Immortality, A New Edition with Preface in Reply to His 
Critics. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1899, pp. 10 ff. Cf_. Also, 
R. B. Perry, op. cit., pp. 303-204.
49. Pragmatism, p. 299.
50. Cf_. Principles, Vol. II, p. 321.
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that it meant the end of religious faith. New facts were brought to 
light daily which served to weaken the claims of religion. These facts 
called for new interpretations. Scientific generalizations, such as the 
conservation of energy, the correlation of the physical forces, localiza­ 
tion of the functions of the brain, and the theories concerning biological 
and cosmical evolution were regarded as sufficiently established to render 
necessary such changes in our ways of thinking as the new discoveries de­ 
manded. These facts, for the most part, were interpreted on the basis of'
51 
"a crude sense realism", to use the expression of B. P. Bowne, which was
strongly tinged with materialism and atheism. At that time there was at 
hand no adequate philosophic equipment by means of which these facts and 
theories of science could be adequately interpreted so as not to weaken 
the position of religion. Consequently, mental chaos and deep uncertainty 
prevailed. James was among those who, while warmly receiving the new de­ 
velopments in scientific thought, were unwilling to permit science to rule 
religion out of court. The doctrine in question, being enunciated with 
this situation in view, had a tremendous influence in checking the rapidly 
advancing tide of naturalistic science, and served to strengthen the cause 
of religious faith. J. B. Pratt, writing of its influence in this con­ 
nection, in 1909, says, "I shall be justified in saying that James's •Will
to Believe 1 has been one of the greatest influences for genuine religious
52 
faith that have appeared in the last half century." As to the value which
James sets on religious faith, and the importance which he assigns to a 
persistent and heroic attitude of determination, Th. Flournoy writes as 
follows: "I hold this point is perhaps the most important in all his
51. B. P. Bowne, "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation", 
The Hibbert Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, July, 1910, p. 885. Of. pp. 884-893.
52. Op. cit.. p. 194.
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philosophy for intellectual men (I do not say intellectualists!), and that 
there is nothing for which we owe him deeper gratitude than for the empha­ 
sis which he puts on the will to believe, supported as this is by his own
53
personal example." As an attempt to meet the situation which has been de­ 
scribed above, the real merit of the doctrine lies in the fact that the em­ 
pirical opponent cannot drive the religious man from this position. While 
it is his last trench, it enables him to remain there unless it is possible 
to produce some unquestionable metaphysical argument against the hypothesis 
of religious faith. There is no possibility of being able to do this. 
If, for example, evidence against the belief in the existence of God were 
brought forward, the man who believes is not entirely outdone. He could 
reply that there was still some chance, however small it may be, that his 
belief is not false, and pinning his faith to that chance and taking into
consideration the demands of his practical nature, he intended to go on
54
living as if his religious hypothesis were true. When, therefore, the em­ 
pirical method is taken to be the only one available for the discovery of 
truth, and we are left finally with a choice between two sets of probabil­ 
ities, the sceptic cannot gainsay our right to solve, in this manner, the 
problem which such a situation creates for us. As A. K. Rogers puts it:
"That I have a right to believe, is the one thing scepticism cannot touch.
55 
It must presuppose the right in order to be scepticism.**
It is a caricature of James's position to interpret it, as many 
critics have done, as equivalent to saying that we may believe anything
53. Th. Flournoy, The Philosophy of V/illiam James, Eng. Trans. by E. B. 
Holt and William James, Jr., New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917, p. 177.
54. Cf. R. H. Thouless, An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931, p. 275.
55. Op. cit., p. 639.
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whether it be true or false, if the belief in question has sufficient
practical value to warrant our holding on to it. L. T. Hobhouse places
56
this interpretation upon it. That this criticism misses the mark is ob­ 
vious from the fact that James assumes that the belief is a live one which 
would not be the case unless we thought credence possible; that is, unless
we thought it likely to be true. Nor is there any justification for the
57 
criticism urged by D. 3. Miller to the effect that James fails to separate
the will to believe from the will to know the truth. This separation is 
not possible even for the sake of argument. Truth is that which corre­ 
sponds to reality, but if we may, with J. M. Baldwin, define reality as 
"that kind of experience which satisfies one or more of the needs of the
individual;" and belief as "the consciousness of the presence of that
58 
thing as fitted to satisfy a need," it is obvious that reality sustains
some relation to our will or our practical activity. Vt/e deem that true 
which affects our volition in a constant and invariable manner. We con­ 
cur in Van. Caldwell's defense of James's position in this connection when 
he asserts: "From neither a psychological, nor a logical, nor an ethical,
nor a metaphysical point of view can the will to know the truth be sepa-
59 
rated from the will to believe."
The doctrine of the will to believe is James's characteristic way of 
saying that man invariably wants to believe that the universe is friendly 
to man, and that if offers satisfaction to the deeper necessities of his 
nature. For as F. Paulsen says, "No one believes and no one can believe
56. Op. cit., pp. 91 ff.
57. D. S. Miller, "The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt", The Inter­ 
national Journal of Ethics, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1899, p. 173. Cf_. pp. 169-195.
58. Op. cit., p. 171.
59. "The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt", The International Jour- 
nal of Ethics, Vol. IX, No. 3, 1898-1899, p. 375. Cf. pp. 373-378.
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that reality is wholly indifferent or even hostile to that which seems to 
him to be the highest goal and good. And though a man might, in prin­ 
ciple, deny the validity of the belief that reality has regard for human 
values, yet, as a matter of fact, he presupposes such an agreement. The 
materialist, too, believes in the victory of the good cause, in the ascend­ 
ency of reason, truth, and right: he believes, therefore, in a moral world--
60 
order." Even the pessimist clings to the same belief, for otherwise he
would not be a pessimist. This is not merely a reduetio ad horrendum
61
argument, as J. E. McTaggart seems to think it is, but it has deep underly­ 
ing biological foundations. The fact that beliefs arise out of funda­ 
mental needs accounts for the widespread existence and stubborn persistence 
of beliefs of this nature, often in the "teeth" of facts to the contrary; 
they express a hope that will not down because they are based on a need 
that will not die. G. F. Stout says, "where there is a practical need to 
form a belief, because indecision would paralyze activity, the mind must 
rest on whatever objective indications or suggestions it can find, however
slight these may be. On the other hand, where there is no interest to be
62 
satisfied, there will be no tendency to form a belief." We are not at
present contending for the truth of such beliefs merely because they per­ 
sist, but are concerned to show that such beliefs express a need; of course, 
they are believed true. Constituted as we are, then, W. R. Wells is es­ 
sentially correct in saying that "it is biologically impossible that pes­ 
simistic beliefs should survive in the race, since, for biological reasons,
60. F. Paulsen, op. cit., p. 321.
61. J. E. McTaggart, "The Inadequacy of Certain Grounds of Belief", The 
Hibbert Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1, Oct., 1905-1906, pp. 125 ff. Cf. pp. 123 ff,
62. Manual of Psychology, p. 677.
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a pessimistic race would perish from the earth." It is conceivable that
science and philosophy might agree that a naturalistic creed which ignores 
these fundamental human needs is the true conception of the universe; but 
such a view still would be inadequate to satisfy the part of man's nature 
which gives rise to these needs, just as one which is repellent to his in­ 
tellectual nature fails to satisfy his needs. The psychological and bio­ 
logical difficulty would still remain for a larger number of people. On 
the other hand, beliefs which do satisfy man's moral and emotional nature 
may be practically universal and yet fail to meet the strict requirements of 
rational standards of truth, or be incapable of scientific verification. 
Without disparaging reason, in any way, we may say that, in a situation of 
this kind, reason will probably have to submit to temporary defeat and re­ 
gard the attainment of a perfectly hermonious insight as out of the ques­ 
tion for the time being. For, to use the words of A. K. Rogers: "Better
a fullness of life which outstrips the logical insight, than an intellec-
64
tual satisfaction won by reducing life to Procustean limits." It may be,/*•
however, that in the long run, a belief which continually refuses to harmon­ 
ize with the findings of our rational insight will sufficiently arouse our 
suspicion concerning its truth to cause it to be ultimately discarded. For 
man can neither deny nor escape the fact that he is a rational creature. 
But any intellectual construction concerning the scheme of things which pro­ 
vides for man's moral and emotional life stands an immeasurably better 
chance of winning his acceptance than one which denies or ignores the role 
played by this part of his nature.
65. w- R. Wells, "The Biological Foundations of Belief". Journal of 
Philosophy. Vol. XVI, No. 10, May 8, 1919, p. 267. Cf. pp. 259-271.
64. A. K. Rogers, "Rationality and Belief", The Philosophical Review, 
Vol. XIII, No. 1, Jan., 1904, p. 45. Cf_. pp. 30-50.
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James saw clearly and preached boldly that our most precious convic­ 
tions express a fundamental need and that they are deeply and vitally 
rooted in the whole of our nature. The real significance of the doctrine 
of the will to believe lies, as F. C. S. Schiller says, "in its recognition
df how very much more than logical reasoning goes to the making of all hu-
65 
man beliefs." In maintaining that there are legitimate beliefs that cannot
be proved, and, therefore, not amenable to complete rationalization, he 
helped to correct the extravagances of an extreme rationalism. For belief 
has a vital and practical root as well as a logical and speculative one. 
Life and action cannot be sacrificed to logical processes. The funda­ 
mental needs, interests, and instincts are basic in cognition or life. The 
intellect is motivated and guided by interest; our thinking has teleological 
foundations. It arises out of our need to preserve and enrich life. we 
are creatures with powers and aspirations which cannot be put into syllogis­ 
tic form; our beliefs are often the expression of the deeper urges of the 
soul. We use them as rules to facilitate our quest for the good life. We 
prove them by their effects upon our energies and conduct. They satisfy us 
intellectually and work well practically; and this is a valid test for con­ 
crete truth. The result of this view of belief has an important bearing 
upon religious belief in that it can demand that the testimony of life, his­ 
tory, and action be taken into consideration as well as that of logic and 
speculation. That is, it can demand that we trust our moral and religious 
nature as well as our intellectual; for it is as detrimental to morals and
religion to distrust our moral and spiritual instincts, as it is to science
66 
and intellect to distrust our cognitive instincts. And, as has been well
65. F. C. S. Schiller. "William James and the Will to Believe", Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, No. 16, Aug. 4, 1927, p. 438.
66. Of. B. P. Bowne, op. cit., pp. 892-893.
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expressed by J. B. Baillie, the certitude of science "differs from the cer­
titude of religion in that the former proceeds primarily from the intellect
67 but the latter from the personality as a whole." Further, the emphasis
which James lays upon the practical nature of our beliefs serves to accentu­ 
ate the fact that our deepest convictions and certainties pertain to the 
primary moral values. In spite of the possibility which is always open to 
us to doubt our creed, there is always the urgency to act in the direction 
which leads to the realization of the highest possible values. There are 
things which we know to be worth doing and which we cannot avoid doing with­ 
out running the risk of losing something which is strongly desired and 
therefore extremely valuable. James weakens his position at this point, 
however, by the admission that it is not necessary to postulate God to give 
validity to the ethical claim. He makes this postulate for himself but 
holds that it is not necessary to believe in God in order to establish the 
validity of the ethical ideal. "TShether a God exist, or whether no God
exist," he says, "in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an
68 
ethical republic here below." Values are entirely dependent on human in­
terests: "Any desire is imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes
69 itself valid by the fact that it exists at all." Also, "every de facto
70 
claim creates in so far forth an obligation." To argue, as he does here,
that our moral values can stand alone, and then to bring God into the pic­ 
ture to help us realize them not only assigns to Him merely an instrumental 
role, but undermines the foundations of both morality and religion. For,
______ _________________ _67. J.yg. Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, New York; CharlesScribner's Sons, 1928, p. 376.
68. W. £., p. 198.
69. Ibid., p. 195.
70. Ibid., p. 195.
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as J./B. Baillie points out, the fundamental truth of religion "will never 
be endangered until somebody succeeds in presenting us with a consistent 
theory of morals which does full justice to the deepest things in our
knowledge of good and evil without in any way relating them to a reality
71 
beyond ourselves." It is true that James makes the religious postulates
both personal and authoritative. God's claims are as truly personal as 
any claims can be and at the same time they are more compelling than any­ 
thing human. But, ultimately, it is personal desires which determine 
values since God f s own standard of right must be in harmony with our de­ 
sires before it is to be accepted as final for us. "But the only force of 
appeal to us, which either a living God or an abstract ideal order can
wield, is found in the 'everlasting ruby vaults* of our own human hearts,
72 
as they happen to beat responsive and not irresponsive to the claim,"
This weakness in his argument is mitigated to some extent by his strong 
insistence upon religion as a means of giving deeper meaning to life and a 
deeper significance to our values, and by his own belief that the theistic 
view is superior to any other in this respect.
In addition to the importance attached to James's emphasis upon the 
subjective and practical factors in belief, he has made a worthy contribu­ 
tion to religious philosophy in stressing the creative part which man him­ 
self plays in the making of reality. It must be remembered that for James 
belief is an active assertion concerning what shall be real for us, and 
that both belief and will resolve themselves into attention which, by 
dwelling upon one possibility more than others, admits it to reality over
71. Op. cit., p. 352.
72. Ibid., p. 196.
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them and thereby brings new reality into being. Of course, belief is 
part of this entire process of selection and it also creates as it chooses 
and holds. Thus, that to which belief or faith attaches becomes our real­ 
ity and when by an act of faith we bring into existence that which before 
was not, and would not have been, without faith, we have demonstrated the 
creative power of faith. It is undoubtedly true that there are some re­ 
gions of reality in which the creativity of man helps to shape and deter­ 
mine things by his own will. If our wills could not help to mould the 
parts of reality that are pliable there would seem to be little reason for 
our possessing them. A great many religious beliefs lie in this sphere in 
which choice and creation operate. "To my mind," writes Professor W. E. 
Hocking, "I must admit, nothing more illuminating has ever been put forward 
than just such interpretation of many a religious doctrine; nothing truer 
to the way in which religious picturing and myth-building does actually take 
place in the human consciousness....! do not doubt that in religion as in 
human experience generally, each will sets the level of its own life, de­ 
termines in large measure its own destiny, and helps to create spiritual
reality for all other human life. A faith without a large ingredient of
73
will, is no faith at all." But just how much the will has to do in de­ 
termining reality is a question concerning which there is a wide difference 
of opinion. Nor is it entirely clear just how far James conceives the will 
as carrying us in this respect. We have good reason to believe that he 
does not intend to make of belief or faith a purely subjective creation of 
reality. For example, in the creation of reality through attention, he 
holds that our part in the process is done by the act of attending. "The
75. The Meaning of God in Human Experience, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, London: Humphrey Milford-Oxford University Press, 1928, pp. 149, 150.
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rest is done by nature, which in some cases makes the objects real which we
74 
think of in this manner, and in other cases does not." And pragmatism
75 
certainly does not ignore the external world of fact. It is inconceivable,
however, how our fidelity could in any way increase the "very being" of
76 
God. It is also open to question whether Professor Hocking is justified
in making the statement that it is doubtful "whether immortality is any
such predetermined reality that it exists for any person apart from that
77 
person's will to make it real." He says further: "The future life may
well be such an object as my decision can make real or unreal, so far as
78 
my own experience is concerned." This is substantially the same position
James takes as regards immortality. But it would seem that the being of 
God and the question of the fact of immortality are as far beyond the 
reach of man's will to determine as the facts of life and death themselves. 
Man may have, and actually does have, according to the teaching of the 
Christian religion, a great deal to do with the quality of life after death, 
but there are apparently no good grounds for believing that he can by his 
own power of will determine its reality. For J. M. Baldwin, the will to 
believe is effective, or enters into the determination of reality, "only 
in so far as the belief postulates the result as already accomplished: The
existence of the thing believed enters into the psychosis and determines
79 
the act of will." He goes on to say that the will, from the psychic point
74. Principles. Vol. II. pp. 520-521. Of. also, Pragmatism, p. 235.
75. Pragmatism, p. 233.
76. Cf. ]7. B_., p. 61.
77. 0£. citT, p. 141.
78. 0£. cit., pp. 141-142.
79. J. M. Baldwin, "Limits of Pragmatism", The Psychological Review, N. S., 
Vol. II, No. 1, Jan., 1904, p. 46.
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of view, is as much determined by real existence as is any other sort of 
intentional act such as moving the head to escape a blow, because psycho­ 
logically the reality or existence is accepted as true in the act of be­ 
lief. Thus, for him, belief does not involve the postulation of unreal-
80 
ized reality. Baldwin's position is essentially sound, especially with
reference to religious faith. It is of the essence of faith to assert, 
not create, the reality of its object and, as we have already seen, to re­ 
fer to a transcendent Object. But James's view concerning the creative 
role played by man in making truth and reality enriches our conception of 
faith and enables us to regard it as purposeful vision which runs ahead of 
things as they are and which, with loyal and courageous determination, 
grasps them as future actualities well worth whatever risk our commitment 
to their realization involves. It emphasizes anew the old truth that en­ 
deavor is a condition of attainment, and that discovery is the result of 
patient seeking; it assures us that when a man gets an insight into some 
reality beyond, and greater than, himself he sets out to realize it in his 
own life with a zeal and zest that enable him to endure anything which may 
happen to him in his mundane existence rather than lose that which makes 
life worth living.
The will to believe places squarely on the shoulders of the believer 
part of the responsibility for the realization of the belief he entertains; 
and the achievement of the values embodied in the belief becomes a moral 
duty. It warns him against regarding the religious life as one of compla­ 
cent and passive enjoyment of fruits for which he has neither incurred risk 
80. Ibid., p. 46.
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nor expended effort. Thus, as an appeal to the individual as a moral 
being this doctrine is certainly of importance. Moreover, the will to 
believe may produce and maintain a belief long enough at least for the 
individual who holds it to prove its value. Of course, it cannot indef­ 
initely maintain a belief which appears to receive no endorsement from ex­ 
perience. Many religious beliefs begin with the will to believe, and 
subsequent experience confirms their value and they remain unless they ob­ 
viously conflict with rational insight; they may even persist for a time 
and prove beneficial in spite of this conflict. As to the scope of this 
doctrine, it is obvious that it would not make any appeal to large numbers 
of people who have no intellectual difficulties concerning religious be­ 
liefs. Also, it would not be acceptable to those who regard it as advo­ 
cating wishful thinking or arbitrary belief; the "privileged souls", and the
"positive minds", as Th. Flournoy describes them, would have no use for such
81
a doctrine. There are others, however, for whom the religious problem re­ 
mains and, for whom, at times, it is more or less poignant. They have 
their doubts along with a vital sense of need for the things which religion 
can offer them. To such as these the will to believe may come as an op­ 
portunity of settling, temporarily at least, the burning issues of religion 
which press upon men and women in everyday life. It is not possible to 
ascertain the exact percentage of people belonging to this class. If we 
may rely upon the findings of J. B. Pratt, only about eight per cent belong 
here. Out of three hundred sixty-seven persons who responded to his 
questionaire concerning belief in God, only twenty-nine claimed that their 
81. Th. Flournoy, op, cit., pp. 178-179.
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belief was based on the will to believe. Professor Pratt regards these
figures as presumably untrustworthy, and thinks that many respondents who
82 
belong to this group gave other reasons for their faith. It may be true
that the beliefs of most of us contain an element of the will to believe 
and that while we may not be conscious of it, it is there and operative 
throughout our entire structure of convictions. For we are persuaded of
the truth of the statement: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of
83 
the doctrine."
We have now to consider some of the more obvious defects in this doc­ 
trine as they appear to us. We have been chiefly concerned to show the 
value of the doctrine merely hinting from time to time, as we proceeded, 
our objections to points under consideration. The chief objection to 
James's account of the will to believe is his conceiving the essence of 
religion in terms of belief rather than in terms of the object believed in. 
Every belief involves two things: an object and the attitude of belief.
The object must be regarded as acutely real, independent of our belief in
84 
it which can evoke the believing attitude. While, as we have already
pointed out, faith does not reach its object by the process of theoretical 
knowing, it none the less asserts the reality of its object. That is to 
say, faith cannot be satisfied merely to postulate values without inquiring 
into the ontological status which they possess. The religious mind cannot 
entertain the possibility that the object is perhaps illusory; this would 
be the death of faith. "Man cannot worship what he feels may turn out to
82. J. B. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, Mew York: The Macmillan 
Company, 19E8, p. 317.
83. The Gospel according to John 7:17.
84. Of. H. M. Kallen, "Is Belief Essential to Religion?", The Interna­ 
tional Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Oct., 1910-1911, pp. 51-67.
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be a mental fiction. n Tradition, orthodoxy, theologians and instinctive
sense agree in saying that the important thing in religion is not the in­ 
trinsic character of belief but the object believed in. F. R. Tennant 
expresses this truth as follows: "Spiritual efficacy, or capacity to promote 
pious and moral life, is one thing; Reality of the ideal Objects figuring in 
efficacious doctrines, is another. It is in asserting the Reality of such 
Objects, that faith essentially consists: not in appreciating the value of 
statements concerning them, while their ontological status is left a thing 
indifferent....That moral valuations are closely intertwined with the de­ 
velopments of religious faith and practice, is historical fact; that the es­ 
sence of faith is worth-appreciation of any kind higher than what is in­ 
volved in satisfaction of practical need, is too limited a description of 
faith to be adequate. Moreover, unless theological dogmas, in which re­ 
ligious faith ultimately issues, be existential propositions, underivable
from value-judgments pure and proper, they cannot be more than pictorial
86
rules for conduct. 1* It follows that if religion is thus to have its meta­ 
physics, it cannot be derived from considerations concerning values alone. 
We cannot infer the existence of a reality from the worth of an ideal ob­ 
ject, nor from the value which belief in an ideal object may possess; reli­ 
gion cannot depend upon the pragmatic value of its beliefs to take the place 
of its metaphysics. As Professor A. N. Whitehead says, in maintaining that 
science and religion both must have their metaphysics: "But science can 
leave its metaphysics implicit and retire behind our belief in the prag­ 
matic value of its general descriptions. If religion does that, it admits
85. Q. Galloway, op. cit., p. 59^
86. 0£. cit. t p. 302.
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that its dogmas are merely pleasing ideas for the purpose of stimulating
87
its emotions. H This is precisely what religion does not, and cannot ad­ 
mit. It is true that religion receives its chief support from consider­ 
ations as to values, but these valuations are and must be appreciations of 
the existential. Thus, as F. R. Tennant argues, they presuppose existen­ 
tial and theoretic "knowledge" of the world and men, "in order to gain 
purchase and to yield any theistic argument; while there is no room but 
for blind hope in their conservation, till the universe is theoretically
found to be of such nature as at least to admit of their conservation be-
88 
ing possible."
A second objection to James's doctrine is that he attempts to reduce 
theoretic knowledge to a minimum and thereby creates a "probability" too 
small to bear the weight of his argument for the will to believe and for 
the conservation of values. That is to say, we are not called upon to be­ 
lieve in God without good reasons and James's reasons, as they stand, are 
not enough to offer a reasonable probability for the perplexed believer. 
In the first place, we have no reason for supposing that religious experi­ 
ence alone offers a satisfactory apologetic for religion. R. H. Thouless
rightly maintains that we must take whatever indications with which it
89 
may provide us in conjunction with all other sources of knowledge. It
does not strengthen the argument for religion to reject theoretical evi­ 
dence which, while not demonstrative, serves to support whatever evidence 
may be derived from religious experience, and thereby increases the prob­ 
ability involved in the religious hypothesis and diminishes the gap left
87. A. N. IVhitehead, op. cit., p. 85.
88. Op. cit., p. 304.
89. Op, cit., p. 272.
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for faith to transcend. Of course, if the traditional arguments for the 
existence of God demonstrated His existence, we would have no need of faith. 
But we cannot transcend probability in the theoretical realm; this, however, 
does not warrant us in closing the doors of access to God which the theo­ 
retical approach offers. Further, if it be true, as we have maintained 
throughout, that the theistic hypothesis completes and explains more fully 
the scientific hypothesis concerning the rationality of the world, it fol­ 
lows that the order of the world cannot be understood without intelligence 
as its cause, and that without God reason is thrown into hopeless despair 
and discord. In the former instance, God is a necessary hypothesis for 
the understanding of the facts of the world; and in the latter, God appears 
as a necessary implication of the rational life. Such a view as this im­ 
plies that the laws of thought are valid and that over against the "subject-
90 
ive necessities of thought are corresponding objective necessities;" and
this assumption underlies our whole system of knowledge and is not confined 
to theism. That is to say, the idea of God is not only a postulate of 
reason as practical; it is also a "regulative idea" for reason as theoret­ 
ical. As J. Ward points out, mere pluralism, which begins with the world 
and marches on in empirical fashion, has to accept the undeniable unity, 
which is implied in the very idea of a world, as an ultimate fact which we 
can neither explain nor consider as self-explanatory. "The theoretical de­ 
mand for the ground of the world then, as well as the practical demand for
91 
the good of the world, is met by the idea of God." Now, if the idea of
90. B. P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 35; Gf. pp. 35 ff,
91. J. Ward, op. cit., p. 421.
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God is "a regulative principle" for theoretical reason, there appears to 
be no good reason why we should not trust it. In criticism of Kant, 
Dr. F. L. Patton, in Fundamental Christianity, lifts the question: "If 
the regulative judgments about existence beyond sense are as much a part 
of our nature as our constitutive judgments, how can Kant question our
right to say that a necessary belief in a necessary being is adequate
92 
reason for believing in the existence of that being?" He then adds:
"But if the same rigid test were applied to the argument based on the 
practical reason* that is applied to the principle of the 'regulative
reason,* the moral argument would deserve no better fate, for demonstra-
93 
tion is as impossible under the one as the other." This last statement
is true for two reasons so far as the doctrine of the will to believe is 
concerned. In the first place, as we have seen the religious hypothesis 
cannot be verified in the same way that a scientific hypothesis can be. 
Also, it offers no genuine or sufficient criterion by which to judge be­ 
liefs. It is not only possible for different people to hold different be­ 
liefs, according to this view, but it may be interpreted so as to justify 
the position that, in certain cases, different people ought to hold differ­ 
ent or even contradictory beliefs. Moreover, as F. R. Tennant maintains, 
moral considerations are but the coping stone of the teleological argument,
not a substitute for it, and we must establish theism before we are entitled
94 
to use its moral corollaries. "Had Butler*s suggestion been followed,"
Tennant says, "that probability is the guide of life; and had the deistic 
tenet, that revealed religion presupposes natural religion, not been evaded: 
the nineteenth century would have done better than expend much of its
98. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926, p. 88.
93. Ibid., p. 91.
94. 0£. cit., p. 304.
194 
theological strenuousness in pursuing blind roads that had the look of
short cuts, and eventually, in sheer weariness, beating the tracks of su-
95 
perficial pragmatism and airily nonchalant subjectivism." While this
statement puts the matter strongly, it does emphasize the essential weak­ 
nesses in the attempts to construct a religious view of the world based up­ 
on moral considerations, or value-judgments, and immediate feeling.
Finally, James is never able to overcome the old dualism between faith 
and demonstrable knowledge. He cannot fully harmonize theoretical and 
practical truth; his ultimate solution is to subordinate intellectual in­ 
terests to free will or practical efficiency. This becomes especially 
prominent in his abandonment of the problematic attitude in favor of volun­ 
tary belief. Also, the limitations which he places upon faith assume that 
the intellect is absolutely authoritative in all cases in which it is in 
position to render a decision. It is even regarded as authoritative when 
it cannot decide the issue if practical urgency plays no part in the matter. 
Thus faith or free belief is permissible only when it is necessary to act 
without sufficient theoretical evidence. That is to say, theoretical truth 
and moral conviction exist side by side, but the latter must not contradict 
the former, and is not legitimate so long as we are in the realm of scien­ 
tific knowledge. Thus, he is never quite able to reconcile theoretical 
truth and practical effectiveness; they remain separated throughout. Fur­ 
ther, in spite of the fact that he grounds all knowledge in faith, faith is 
less certain than knowledge when the latter is in position to speak at all. 
Lastly, as J. Lindsay points out, it is "his complete final identification 
95. Ibid., p. 504.
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96 of cognition with will that is so unsatisfactory." Both Lindsay and
J. Laird, following Sigwart and WindJfeband, maintain that the problematic / 
judgment is a true theoretical judgment, and not a decision or result dic­ 
tated by volition and feeling; for them, the decision that there is a con­ 
flict of evidence more or less evenly balanced is not a "passional decision"
97 
just like deciding yes or no, as James maintains that it is; but it is an
intellectual decision and, therefore, does not belong to voluntary belief. 
If they are justified in their contention, and there are good reasons for 
supposing that they are, the argument for the will to believe is fallacious 
at an essential point. But whatever shortcomings and mis judgments this 
doctrine contains, its vital principle remains intact: that the whole man 
is involved in life's deepest convictions, and that these, whether scien­ 
tific or religious, are alike rooted in faith. James thus built more 
wisely and more permanently than he knew; in spite of the defects and fal­ 
lacies of his argument his conclusion is true and extremely important, and 
will find a permanent place in the philosophy of the future. J. Royce's 
remark concerning Schopenhauer is quite applicable to James here, as well
as at other points in his philosophy: "We may refute a great thinker's ac-
98 
cidental misjudgments; we can seldom refute his deeper insights."
96. J. Lindsay, The Psychology of Belief, Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1910, p. 34.
97. Lindsay, Ibid., p. 34; pp. 38 ff; J. Laird, Knowledge, Belief,and 
Opinion, p. 153; Of. ju_ Bj_, p. 11.
98. J. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, Boston and New York: 




THE HUGMATIC THEORY OF MEANING -AND METHOD
The latter part of the nineteenth century was characterized by the 
so-called "war" between religion and science. At the same time, Kantian 
idealism and naturalism were engaged in an uncompromising conflict. Due 
to the fact that idealism, or rationalism, as James usually speaks of it, 
was allied with religion in opposition to the mechanistic doctrines of nat­ 
uralism, the struggle between idealism and naturalism was associated with 
the conflict between religion and science. Because of this situation
rationalism became connected with religion and empiricism with "inhumanism
1 
and irreligion." As James construes the situation, rationalism is too far
removed from the concrete facts of everyday life adequately to meet the re­ 
ligious needs of man, and empiricism lacks the religious qualities necessary 
to meet such needs. "You find," he says, "an empirical philosophy that
is not religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical
2 
enough." In order to resolve this dilemma in philosophy, and to softer the
conflict between religion and science, James offers pragmatism as a mediat­ 
ing philosophy which, as he conceives it, is capable of meeting the demands 
of both religion and science. He writes of pragmatism in this respect as
follows: "It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same
3 
time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts."
That is to say, pragmatism, according to its leading protagonist, retains the 
good points of idealism and empiricism, but rejects the objectionable features
1. Pragmatism, p. 20.
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
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in both of them; it is relicious and at the same tine it is true to the 
facts of life.
Of the many influences which led to the genesis of the doctrine of 
pragmatism, the first to be noted is that of science. Ti.e modern scientific 
view of the use and meaning of Hypotheses played a large and an important 
part in bringing the new philosophy into bein^. The pra^iatist viev: incorpo­ 
rates the hypothetical method of induction and the "economical" account of 
scientific theories. Lavs for science are not unchangeable principles, but 
t-.ey are made by man and subject to change in accordance with his purposes, 
hypotheses are nothing more than convenient v.^yr, of expressing wnat has oc­ 
curred, or what nay be expected to happen in the future; when they have ren­ 
dered this service, they are of no further use. Their whole meaning, for 
the scientist, is exhausted TV hen the;.' have performed this function. Thus 
the one question of importance concerning hypotheses is whether or not they 
accomplish the purpose for which they have been adopted, that is, whether or 
not they work. Their usefulness is always a more important consideration 
than their truth. If they successfully perform thtir practical function, 
they are accepted as true; but if they fail to work, there is no reason to 
regard then as true. Obviously, then, for the scientist, both truth and use­ 
fulness are forms of value, and the question i.nether hypot-hes^s are true be­ 
cause they are useful or useful because true is comparatively irrelevant. 
Du^ to the acceptance and persistent application of the scientific method of 
procedure by the expoaents of pragmatism, Professor II. 3. rerry does not 
overstate the case when he sa^s, "the whole 'experimentalist' tendency in
English science and philosophy may be said to have anticipated the pra^rnatist
4 
theory that truth is achieved by the tryin: of hypotheses."
4. H. n. Perry, present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 1£V.
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The Darwinian hypothesis of evolution also played an important part 
in the rise of pragmatism. The evolutionary conception of mind assigns 
thought a functional role, along with other organic functions, in the ef­ 
forts of the organism to adjust itself to its environment in the persistent ' 
struggle for existence. Thought is regarded as P product of vital adjust­ 
ment. The intellect has no intrinsic value of its own, but is considered 
as an instrument of the will which has arisen out of the efforts of will to 
cope with new experiences. Ohan.^es in the environment call for correspond­ 
ing adaptations on the part of the organism; and it is the function of 
thought to produce, as economically and successfully as possible, the neces­ 
sary changes of belief demanded by each new situation in which the organism 
is placed. The forms of thought, like those of evolution, are not unchange­ 
able and eternal, but mutable and relative. They arise out of adaptations 
to new conditions in an ever changing environment. "It is an evolving pro­ 
cess which keeps pace with the evolution of reality and the changing situa-
5 
tion of mortal life." Thus truth, like everything else in an evolving world,
has its history; thought is no exception to the ^rincirle of chon-je and in­ 
stability. Truths gerve as {;uid.es to reality but -^s soon as they fail to be 
of use in this respect, they ore discarded. If they cannot meet the nevr 
situations which arise they must perish like any other organic forr rv.ile 
their more successful rivals carry on the work which they have ^ailed to do. 
Thus the history of truth is the history of the attempt of the intellect to 
meet the needs of life and action. i^.fi ^ rst attest in philosophy c^n- 
pletely to esslr.iln.te the .doctrine of evolution was made ry pT> r jrr.atism,
''Thy "new psycliolo^y" of the latter part of the nineteenth century was 
~. ~. ^. Lurr&y, ?re- atisn:, London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1912, p« 7.
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another factor which contributed to the rise of the philosophy of pragma­ 
tism. As a cotter of fact, the influence of evolution upon pragmatism 
came, for the most part, through the alignment of the latter nith the more
recent develcpr^ri^s in psychology. James is regarded as the father of
6 
"functional psychology." which sets out from the evolutionary point of
view and attempts to discover what needs of the organism are met by sense 
perception, by mental ir:ages, by emotion, and by thinking. The chief p.irn
of functional psychology is to give psychology a place in the general field
7 
of biological sciences. Now James was the first psychologist to make a
consistent and thoroughgoing application of the evolutionary principle to 
psychology. The Principles of Psychology, his first and greatest work, 
which appeared in 1890, was not only of epoch-making importance ir- the his­ 
tory of psychology, but was eventually to bring far reaching changes in 
philosophy es well. For the two central ideas which govern his later phil­ 
osophical thought — the activity and unity of consciousness — receive explicit 
formulation in his earlier work in psychological terns. "James's theory 
of knowledge," writes Professor R. B. Perry, "was developed from this psy­ 
chological standpoint, and is throughout dominated by its two main charac­ 
teristics: its emphasis on the categories of interest and practice; and its 
reduction of relations, substances, activities, and other alleged transcend­ 
ent elements to the continuities of sense-experience. The former motive in
James's thought led to his voluntarism and pragmatisr.i, the latter to his 'rad-
8 
ical empiricism.'" Thus one of the chief characteristics of the new psy­
chology, namely, that which construes consciousness as selective, interested,
6. R. S. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, "ew York; The 
Ronald Press Co., 1931, p. 45.
7. Ibid. , p. 46.
8. R. B. Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Pasj, New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1926, p. 189.
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teleological, became a dominating principle in the new philosophy, due to
the fact that James was instrumental in originating both.
The birth and development of the new psychology, with its emphasis on 
will and purpose, served to bring into the foreground the weakness of ab­ 
stract intellectualism which looks to the scholastic logic-chopping exer­ 
cises as the source of the soul's satisfaction. It may be said, then, that 
pragmatism arose as a revolt against this abstract and vicious intellectual- 
ism which overlooks the rest of human nature. Pragmatism rebelled against 
this "inhuman" tendency in both naturalism and absolutism and contended that 
man is iiore than intellect and that, consequently, he does not live by intel­ 
lect alone. It is no doubt possible to account for some of the extravagances 
of pragmatism by the fact that it reacts so violently against those theories 
which regard everything as logically necessary, and place p.ll upon the same 
level without distinction of values, that it swings to the opposite extreme 
as a corrective measure to what it regards as an intolerable intellectualism. 
It may be well to consider more fully the relation which pragmatism sustains 
to these two schools of thought. Pragmatism is opposed to naturalism inso­ 
far as the latter assigns the mechanical categories the fundamental place, 
but there is not such a wide difference between them as there is between prag­ 
matism and absolutism. For pragmatism and naturalism have much in common 
apart from the opposition of the former to a universal mechanism which the 
latter holds. Pragmatism, as Professor R. B. Perry says, "may even in a 
sense be called 'naturalistic'. For it identifies reality with 'this world,'
with the sort of thing that is going on here and now; and regards perception
9
as the most reliable means of knowledge." Tims pragmatism is chiefly con­ 
cerned with attacking absolute idealism. Pragmatism opposes the mathematical 
9. R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 198.
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and dialectical met nod of absolutism; end would make all Hypotheses submit 
to the test of experience. It rejects the monism, determinism, o^uietism 
of absolutisn by proclaiming anci defending pluralism, indeterrriinisi;;, and 
meliorism. Pra-n-jtism concoives the logical unity of the v/orld, which is 
fundamental to absolutism, as a meaningless abstraction. "That v.hich for 
absolutism is mere appearance-— the world of space and time, the interaction 
of man und nature, and of mar: and man, is for pragmatism the quintessence of
reality. f :nhe one is the philosophy of eternity, the other ti.e philosophy
10 
of ti/.'!.e.' f ?3rr>?.,p3 it is not too much to say that pragmatism opposes thvt
which is fundamental to absolutist, while absolutism denies that r.hioh is 
fundamental to prarmatism.
Finally, ther.3 is an historical connection between pragmatism and Want's 
doctrine of the "prinacy of the practical reason," and the Tichtean Ideal­ 
ists. Kant maintained that, although we are unable to prove the existence 
of God, freedom, and immortality, it is our ri,;jht and duty, as volitional, 
active, end rational creatures, to postulate their reality because they are 
absolutely essential to moral action. For ..unt the consciousness of duty 
is a profounder insight than knowledge of objects although the latter is more 
scientific. As to the connection between the philosophy of Fichte &nd pra -
isi'i, Josiah Boyce says, 'Tichte's philosophy is a deliberate synthesis of
11 
v.ith Absolutism." Thus while it is inadvisable to attempt to
identify pi-agmotisn too closely with -my of the doctrines that bear a resem­ 
blance to it, it appears certain that it is related to the Kantian and Fichtean 
forms of voluntarism as well as to o^her traditional trends of thought. 5ut 
the naturalistic and empirical tendencies of pra^natisrn serve clearly to dis-
11. J". i: jyce, M Th« eternal and the Practical /' The Philosop.-ical Reviev;, Vol. 
XIII, No. 2, 1904, p. 114.
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tinguish it from the idealistic form of voluntarism. There are several 
important respects in Tsrhich contemporary pragmatism differs from the Kantian 
position. The former emphasizes the part which choice plays in belief 
while Kant insists upon the necessity of belief. Kent's argument arises 
out of the needs of our moral nature and reaches out after beliefs capable 
of supporting it. v«e do not have to wait upon experience to dictate what 
we are to believe. Pragmatism, on the other hand, takes its instructions 
concerning what we are to believe froir experience. Again, Kant's concep­ 
tion that the moral sense gives us our only clue to reality leads him to hold 
that our moral interests may determine beliefs. But pragmatism allows a 
wide range of interests to determine belief; every known interest is impor­ 
tant to belief. Kant's appeal to the will is for the establishment of only 
the three ideas which have already been mentioned; all of these belong to the 
sphere of religion. Pragmatism holds that basic scientific beliefs have the 
same foundation; we cannot prove that all events have a cause, but we postu­ 
late it in the interest of scientific knowledge. Pragmatism maintains that 
we are constantly using beliefs which we cannot prove. As has been shown 
in our discussion of the doctrine of the "will to believe," the scientist 
also "lives by faith" in objects which he cannot directly observe or discov­ 
er; "inaccessible objects" such as gravity, electrons, energy, and so on.
Such beliefs can be judged only by their effect in guiding action; if they
12 
give us the right direction they are true.
Pragmatism is not an essentially new doctrine. It has affinities with 
nominalism in that it appeaJs to particulars; it agrees with utilitarianism 
in emphasizing practical aspects; and, like positivism, it steers clear of
12. Cf. fl. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy, New York: Charles Scr1-n?r'- 
Sons, 1929, pp. 150-151.
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verbal solutions, superfluous questions, and metaphysical abstractions.
In short, as the title of James's book on pra^itisn suggests, i* is " a nev? 
name for some old ways of thinking." It is not an easy matter to give a 
summary definition of pragmatism. For, strictly speaking, it is not a phil­ 
osophy; it is more accurately regarded as a general point of view, or as a 
certain v,<ay of looking at things, rather taan as a systematic doctrine. One 
may say that it is a criterion, an attitude, or a method, which one adopts 
in dealing with matters of philosophic concern. The doctrine of pragmatism, 
as such, supposedly does not commit itself to any particular results in meta­ 
physics, but merely insists on an application of the teleological method. 
James uses the illustration of Papini, the Italian pragmatist, v/hich describes 
pragr.atism as resembling a corridor in a hotel which opens into several dif­ 
ferent chambers. One may find a free-thinker in one engaged in a polemic 
a :ainst the belief in God; in a second, t.hero may be a man upon his knees 
prav.ing for faith and strength; in a third, a scientist noy b c. occupied v.ith 
laboratory investigations; in a fourth, it nay be that a system of idealistic 
metaphysics is being expounded; and in a fifth some one may bo proclaiming
the impossibility of metaphysics. "ach thinker may use the method of prag-"l* 
mat ism.
In Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, James defines 
pragmatism as the "doctrine the* the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses 
itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of con­ 
duct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the con- 
Q(3-)tion be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and 
must be different from the consequences by \vhich the meaning of other conceot-
13. PraiyT.^tism, pp. 53-54.
14. Ibid., p. 54.
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ions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to 
have other consequences, then it must be only the first conception under a 
different name. In methodology it is certair that to trace and compare
their respective consequences, is an admirable way of establishing the dif-
15
ferin^ meanings of different conceptions." It is characteristic of prag­ 
matism to regard the categories of life as fundanental. And it should be 
remarked, as Professor R. B. Perry suggests, "that the pragmatist means by 
'life', not the imaginary or ideal life of any hypothetical being, not the 
'eternal* life or the 'absolute' life; but the temporal, operative life of
animals and men, the life of instinct and desire, of adaptation and environ-
16 
ment, of civilization and progress." It is the bio-centric philosophy and
stresses man's mundane existence. It is a bodily philosophy which magnifies 
the desires, powers and interests of man for this life. It glories in man's 
accomplishments, and in his ability to achieve still greater things by the 
free exercise of his powers.
There are two cardinal elements in pragmatism: its doctrine of method 
and its theory of truth. 'ie shall consider first the pragmatic method 
and theory of meaning which is an essential and basic principle of pragma­ 
tism. We shall reserve for the following chapter our treatment of the prag­ 
matic conception of truth. In 1898 James delivered an address at Berkeley,
California, entitled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,"
17 
in which he introduced his new theory to the 7/0rid. He sets out from
a principle which C. 3. Peirce had enunciated to the effect that the
15. Dictionary of philosophy and Psychology, edited by J. M. Baldwin, 
New York: The Laomillar Co.; London: Kacmillan and Co., Ltd., 1902, Vol. II, 
p. 381.
16. R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 197.
17. The University Chronicle, September, 1898, Reprinted in Collected As­ 
says and Reviews, ^ondon and Now York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920, Edited 
by R. 13. Perry, pp. 406-437.
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meaning of every idea v.nich has no sense-imagery in it may be discovered, if
18 thore is any meaning in the idea, in the sense-effects which it leads to.
The solo ^unction of thought, according to Peirce, is to produce r.abits of 
action, that is belief. If • uy part of a thourht makes no difference in
the practiced consequences of the thought, then, tLst part is merelv an ac-
19 
cretion to it, but no part of it. "To develop its meaning, re have, there-
"'o: 1 :-, sir.ply to determine what habits it produces, for ;.hat a thin," .means is
20 
simply what habits it involves. >T Tlxus the conduct which p thought is fit­
ted to produr»3 constitutes for us its sole significance. For Peirce , "there 
is no distinction >'>f neanins so fine as to consist in auythiu^ but a possibleo-|
t-J J.
difference in practice." 7:/r excii::^le, Fheri we say ';;.ut a bod,, is heavy ve
mean sly-ply that in the absence of opposin;; force, the b^ \-j r^ill fall. 
\viie:i we call a tiling hard we moan th^t other substances cannot scratch it. 
Iu each case the whole conception of the quality in question lies in its con-'~>9
ceived effects. ''Our idea of anythuv; i_s_ our idea of its sensible effects; 
and if we fancy that ^e have any other T.ve deceive ourselves, and :nistake a 
mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thou-jLt itself. It 
is acsui'd to say that the thought has any r:.eaniiir; unrelated to its 'niy fun­ 
ction. It is foolisn for Catholics p.nd Protestants to fancy thenselves in 
disagreement aboU'> the elerjtnts of the sacr&rients. if they a^ree in regard to
or? ~j\j
all other sensible effects, here or hereafter." Janes modifies and enlarges 
this principle as held by .Peirce because he places a different -j>nd broader
18. :;. j. Teirce, ir:iow to ?• ake Our Ideas 31ear," Popular Science monthly, 
January, 18?8. Reprinted in 31^nee, Love, vii.' Lo.;ic, eoitH by I . ;-.. JoL^n. 
Hew York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Cf_. p. 45.
19. Ibid., p. 43.
20. Ibid., p. 43.
21. Ibid., p. 44.
22. Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
25. Ibid., p. 45.
207
interpretation on the tern "practical" than Pcirce's statenent allows. 
"Thile admitting that the ultimate test of the meiriing of a truth lies in 
the conduct it dictates ?r inspires, he thinks it foretells some perticul?-r 
turn in our experience which sr.all call for that particular type of conduct 
which fact accounts for its inspiring that conduct. He expresses this 
broader conception of Peirce's principle by saying "that the effective mean­ 
ing of any philosophic proposition cen alt-ays be brought down to some par­ 
ticular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or
passive; tne point lyint : rather in the fact that the experience must be par-
24 
ticular than in the fact that it must be active." THUS, for him, the term
"practical" is tai:en to mean concrete and ^articular rather tLsa referring 
primarily to action. Tnis aspect of his doctrine is essentially the same as 
his empiricism vhich, a^ a method, consists in traciri.: to a positive, con­ 
crete, and particular terminus every substitution, representation or meaning. 
His empirical method, like his empirical account of knowledge, is o. descript­ 
ion of a definite process in a world the very nature of which is duration, 
flux, process, both continuous and discrete. If any part of it is taken in­ 
trinsically, it is "a that which ia not yet any definite what, tho ready to 
be all sorts of v;hats; full both of oneness and of rnanyuess, but in respects 
that don't appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases 
interprnetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be 
caught.... Jut the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself 
with emphases, and these salient parts become identified and fixed and ab­ 
stracted; so that experience now flows as if sho: through with adjectives end 
nouns and prepositions and conjunctioiiG... In all this the continuities and 
triL discontinuities are absolutely co-ordinate matters of immediate feelin ;.
^ * • '^/ * _^m ±y*_* j I-"1 • ^t -L --; •
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The conjunctions are as primordial elements of Tact ' -js are th^ distinctions25 
and disjunct ioas." lowing in such a world begins with significances, that
is, with knowledge of acquaintance, and passes on to significations, or know­ 
ledge about, which, in order to be true must lead back to and be lost in sig­ 
nificances. "^very meant , even in error, is more aiul ricuer than the meaning 
which envisages it, never completely forsoen by it, always eclipsing it, and 
existentially additive to it. livery meant is a possession, not a transition; 
it is a significance which is held, when known, as directly and imrcodiately 
' satisfactory. ' Satisfaction is the relation which balances the organisr.1
witii environment. It is awareness itself, external to its object and in-
26 trinsicall; apprehending and poss^ssinr it."
Ti:e pra^natic doctrine of method is based on the sane observation and, 
therefore, is essential!., no different from the method of empiricism. It in­ 
volves the ''attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categor­
ies, ' supposed necessities; end of looking towards last things, fruits, con-27 
sec;u£nces, facts." It proceeds by reducing the muanin.f of propositions,
as we have seen from James's statement, to particular consequences, it passes 
from ideals to existences, from facts to principles, and returns to facts. 
It is characterized by experimentation rather than by legislation, and it ex­ 
pects future experience to bring change., in everything; such chen.jes may, 
or may not, follow a certain order, obey a particular law, or follow some 
faniliar pattern. It is ever ready to face any eventuality that the course 
of experience may dictate. The essentially ^logical nature of experience 
renders the ordinary logic of method inadequate. Janos conceives the world
25. £. J7] >p. 34?, -49. ~~~
26. H. 1.:. i:allen,'tPrar;riKtism and its 'Principles'," Journal of Philosophy , Vol. VIII, Uo. 23, 1911, p. 625. £f . pp. 623 ff. 7   ??-•-•• : tio.vi. pp. 54-55.2
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as a place in which everything struggles for trie mastery; opportunity, rath- 
er than achievement, is the order of the day. Eve;- item is equally there 
with every other item, but no one is entitled to claim special privileges. 
The one and only requirement for victory is the ability to demonstrate super- 
iority in the constant struggle for a place in the pervasive flux. Thus 
classes, concepts, universals, laws, hypotheses, theories, regardless of 
their origin, are external and additional data in the world of facts which 
they help to explain and control. They must prove their efficacy by a re- 
turn to the flux, and by fusing their assences with it. '-i-'hey can claim a 
right to survive only if they are fit to survive; that is, if they can con- 
trol the data to which they are applied. For these data, each being its 
own standard and judge, will not allow anything external to legislate for 
them or explain them without struggle. "The truth which attains it, the 
interest which means it, it consumes and assimilates, so that it comes fi- 
nally to the mind with no veils between. The differentia of its presence
28 
is 'satisfaction,' and process which leads to its truth."
The pragmatic view of meaning may be said to have a twofold aim: First, 
it attempts to offer a definite, exact, and technical theory concerning the 
nature of meaning; to show what constitutes meaning and when we have it and 
when we do not. Second, it tries to give us a method by which v.e may choose
our problems which will enable us to eliminate meaningless questions and con-
29 
centrate our attention only on problems which are worth discussing. For
the pragmatist, then, it is simply a waste of time to consider any theories 
which make no difference in experience, which do not have some specific mean- 
ing in terns of experience. It would put an end to many controversies by
28. H. L. Kallen, op. citT, p. 626, Of_. pp. 625-626.
29. Gf. J. B. Pratt, Vvhat is Pragmatisn?, New York: The ^acnillan Co., 1909,
p. 20.
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eliminating all theories in vrnose differences no issue that would make a 
difference can be found. James applies the pragmatic method to several 
classic controversies, such as the dispute between materialism and theism, 
the problem of free will, the quarrel between pluralism and monism, and the 
question of the absolute. In each case he asks "'.hat difference does it 
make?" if one theory is regarded as true rather than the other. If no dif- 
ference in concrete experience is discovered between the results of one 
theory over those of another, then the two theories about which the contro- 
versy centers differ in words only, not in fact. Theological controver- 
sies form no exception to this principle. "If theological ideas prove to
have a value for concrete life, they v.ill be true, for pragmatism, in the
30 
sense of being good for so much."
The application of the pragmatic doctrine of method to theological ques- 
tions leads him to rather sweeping conclusions. First, when it is applied 
to God's metaphysical attributes, as distinguished from His moral attributes,
the result leads James to conclude that all such attributes are destitute of
31 
"all intelligible significance." He cannot see that a single one of these
attributes in any way makes any difference insofar as practical consequences 
go; these qualities make no definite connection with our life, nor call for 
any distinctive adaptation of our conduct. Thus the question of their truth 
or falsity is a matter of irrelevance; they in no way affect one's religion. 
God's asiety, His i;materiality, Kis simplicity, His personality, apart from - y^L 
its moral qualities, His self-sufficiency, and so on, these are "but a 
shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary-adjectives, aloof from morals, 
aloof from human needs, something that might be worked out from the mere word
30. Pragmatism, p. 7 r6.
31. Varieties, p. 445.
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'God' by one of those logical machines of wood and brass which recent in­ 
genuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood... (lAe) r.ets- 
phyr-ical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless 
invention of the scholarly mind." As to God's moral attributes, such as 
holiness, omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, and so on, the pra^nytic 
method leaves th^r standing as bein^ of definite value. T^oy enter into 
definite connection with our religious life; they determine our fears, our 
hopes and expectations. "If dogmatic theology really does prove beyond dis­ 
pute that a God with characters like tnese exists, she may well claim to give
a solid basis to religious ser'tirnont. But verily, how stands it with her
33 
arguments?'' "The theological arguments for Hod's moral attributes are no
better than those for His existence; they do not prove that God is a moral
beinr. Mis final conclusion is that we must "bid a definite ^-ood-by to do^-
34 
matic theology. In all sincerity our faith must do v.ithout that warrant."
The pragmatic theory of method also determines the relation between phil­ 
osophy ;-nd religion. Ke says that philosophy, which is always a secondary 
function in the sphere of religion, can become useful to religion provided it
-' f
forsakes nota^h/sics and deduction for criticism and deduction and assumes the-*"•*• «- &**~~
form of a science of religions rather than that of theology. Thus it can 
criticize the religious concepts, eliminating the local and accidental elements; 
and remove the historical incrustations from both doy/ia and worship. It can 
serve to eliminate religious doctrines which run counter to established scien­ 
tific conceptions, leavinr, only as tenable religious views those which accord 
with the results of natural science. "'hose that remain may be dealt with as 
hypotheses, testing them in the same way hypotheses are tested, thereby dis-
\-2,. laid., pp. ',46, ^47.
33. Ibid., p. 447.
34. Ibid., p. 448.
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covering which ones should be discarded and which ones are worthy of preser­ 
vation. It can place its stamp of approval upon the latter in proportion 
as they are verified or verifiable. These hypotheses may be further re­ 
fined by separating the "innocent over-belief" and symbolical in them from 
literal fact. This will enable philosophy to become a mediator between 
believers who differ in opinions, and serve to produce religious belief 
which represents a concensus of opinion. Eventually, it may be possible 
to win as wide e public recognition for religious views of this sort as 
has been attained by physical science. Even those who are personally 
non-religious might come to accept these religious beliefs, very much as a 
blind person accepts the facts of optics. Of course, those who have first­ 
hand religious experience are the only ones entitled to speak with authority,
and the science of religions would always have to depend upon personal ex-
55 
perience for its critical reconstructions.
Theology and philosophy have both proved inadequate, according to the 
pragmatic theory of method, so far as rendering a positive and constructive 
service to religious thought is concerned. we have now to consider what 
the pragmatic method itself can do when applied to philosophical and theolog­ 
ical problems, that is, what conclusions it enables us to reach concerning 
questions in these fields of thought when we proceed solely on the ground of 
the significance for life of the conceptions examined. First, we shall 
follow him in the application of the pragmatic theory of method to the is­ 
sue between materialism and theism. If the world should come to an end 
this very moment, the entire contents of it having been once for all ir­ 
revocably given, what difference can we find between these two rival theories 
55. Ibid., pp. 455-456.
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concerning the universe? By hypothesis, the world is complete, it has no 
future; there is no more experience. He supposes that the two views are 
equally successful in explaining the facts of the world. For the pragma- 
tist there is nothing here which can make any difference in the rival doc­ 
trines. There is no experience to which he can return in which to look 
for differences; both views have shown all the consequences that can possibly 
ensue. Thus, in spite of the differences which occur in the statement of 
materialism and theism, they are identical doctrines. For if God's work 
were finished and His world ended, He is worth only so much as His world is 
worth. If, then, we made matter responsible for the world and left God 
out, we could not possibly suffer any loss. Both God and matter mean 
exactly the same thing, that is, the power which could make just such a 
world as this; either conception can mean neither more nor less than this. 
So whether we view the world as governed by the laws of matter or a con­ 
trolled by the providence of God, so far as the past goes, it amounts to the 
same thing. But when we look into the future, the issue betifeen material­ 
ism and theism assumes an entirely different form. For the theory of 
mechanical evolution holds for us a very dark and blank picture. "Trat is 
the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the cosmic weather, though 
many a jewelled shore appears, and many an enchanted cloud-bank floats away, 
long li:.j;ering ere it be dissolved—even as our world now lingers, for joy— 
yet when these transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely nothing re­ 
mains, to represent those particular qualities, those elements of precious- 
ness which they may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone utterly 
from the very sphere and room of being. without an echo; without a memory; 
without an influence on aught that may come after, to make it care for
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similar ideals. This utter and final wreck and tragedy is of the essence 
of scientific materialism as at present understood. The lower and not
the higher forces are the eternal forces, or the last surviving forces
36 
within the only cycle of evolution which we can definitely see." On the
other hand, when taken prospectively, the idea of God brings promise in
37 
that "it guarantees an ideal order shall be permanently preserved."
Thus while materialism means the denial that the moral order Is eternal 
and the loss of our ultimate hopes, theism means the affirmation of an 
eternal moral order and creates hope. Materialism, in short, renders 
hope impossible, and theism makes it inevitable. "A world with a God in 
it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of 
him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to brirg them elsewhere to 
fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, 
and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. This need 
of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast....Here 
then, in these different emotional and practical appeals, in these adjust­ 
ments of our concrete attitudes of hope and expectation, and all the deli­ 
cate consequences which their differences entail, lie the real meanings of
materialism and spiritualism—not in hair-splitting abstractions about
38 
matter's inner essence, or about the metaphysical attributes of God."
James later admits a flaw in this illustration due to the fact that even if 
matter could do everything which we usually conceive God as doing, the hy­ 
pothesis of God would remain the truer because of our need for a being who
36. Pragmatism, u. 105.
37. Ibid., p. 106.
38. Ibid., pp. 106-107,
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39 
recognizes us and judges us sympathetically.
James's empirical method when applied to the idea of "God" leaves hirr. 
with the following beliefs:
"1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from 
which it draws its chief significance;
2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is 
our true end;
3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that 
spirit 'God 1 or 'law'—is a process wherein work is really done, and spir­ 
itual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, 
within the phenomenal world.
Religion includes also the following psychological characteristics: —
4. A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the 
form either of lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.
5. An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to
40 
others, a preponderance of loving affections."
Now if we take these beliefs and these psychological characteristics to­ 
gether, "and treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard 
to the question of their 'truth', we are obliged, on account of their ex­ 
traordinary influence upon action and endurance, to class them amongst the
41 
most important biological functions of mankind." That is to say, apart
from the truth of religion, religious beliefs and the "faith-state" play
such a useful part in human life, make such obvious differences in our
action and general attitude towards life, that religion vindicates her
39. K. T_., pp. 189-190, Note.
40. Varieties, pp. 485-486.
41. Ibid., p. 505.
216
right to a place among the interests of mankind. ?rom a purely subjective 
point of view, religion f s usefulness entitles her to claim that she per­ 
forms a permanently valuable function for mankind. As to the intellec­ 
tual content of religion, in spite of all the differences in religious 
creeds, there is a common element which binds all religions together.
All religions appear to unite in testifying to the fact that there "is
42 
something wrong about us as we naturally stand," and that "we are saved
43 
from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers."
In proportion as the individual is conscious of this wrongness, he is 
in possible touch with something higher, if such exists; he realizes that 
there is a better part of him along with the wrong part. When he reaches 
the point of salvation, he identifies his real being with this higher part 
of himself, be it ever so small. "He becomes conscious that this higher 
part is conterminous and continuous with a more of the same quality, which 
is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in work­ 
ing touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all
44 
his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck." But the question arises
as to the objective truth of the content of such experiences. Does this 
"more" of our experience really exist, or is it merely a figment of our own 
imagination? Its value cannot be doubted, but ere we so certain of the 
truth of its existence? i;hat is it like? V/hat is its form? Does it
act, as well as exist? How snail we conceive that "union" with it which
i a
religious genuises claim to have? Here James, in keeping v?ith his sugges- 
tion that an impartial science of religions might select a common body of
42. Ibid., p. 508.
43. Ibid., p. 508.
44. Ibid., p. 508.
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doctrine v;hich would be acceptable even to ncientists, offers his own hy­ 
pothesis concerning the "more", of religious experience. It is that this
"more" is on "its 'hither' side the subconscious continuation of our con-
45 
scious life." Now, it is objectively true as far as it goes that the
"conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving ex-
46 
periences come." The rest is "over-belief." The real effects which
flow from our contact with this unseen region are exerted on the personal 
centres of energy of individuals. This higher part of the universe James 
calls God. Since the effects upon our lives are reel and manifest therr.- 
selves in our character and conduct, God, who produces them, is also real. 
Further, most individuals believe that these effects extend over a wider 
range than the experience of personal union with God, namely, throughout 
the whole universe of beings to whom God is present. lie offers security 
for all. That is, God must do more than enter the experience of the indi­ 
vidual, He must have cosmic relations. He thus becomes the "guarantee of
47 
an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved." Then, and only then,
will the individual's confidence and peace be justified. Thus the reli­ 
gious view gives the world a nature essentially different from that which
a materialistic world would have. "It must be such that different events
48 
can be expected in it, different conduct must be required."
V/e have followed James's attempt to apply the pragmatic doctrine of 
meaning to the materialistic-theistic controversy, and to the conception of 
God at some length in order to bring out a radical ambiguity in the doctrine
45. Ibid., p. 512.
46. Ibid., p. 515.
47. Ibid., p. 517.
48. Ibid., p. 518.
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which renders his treatment of the subject confusing throughout. Profes­ 
sor A. 0. Lovejoy points out that James overlooks the difference made by
49 
believing a certain doctrine and that made by a doctrine's being true.
He says that the future consequences in concrete experience, whether active, 
or passive, to which a significant proposition must point may be either: 
(1) Future experiences which are predicted as about to occur, regardless as
to whether it is believed true or not; (2) or future experiences which take
50
place only provided the proposition in question is believed. If we con- 
strue James's theory of meaning one way it means that only propositions 
which predict certain sensations or occurrences in concrete experience of 
some consciousness in time have real meaning. But if we interpret it the 
other way, it is not necessary to hold that the propositions pertain to the 
future. The only thing necessary in this case is that they be carried in 
some one's mind into the future as beliefs which have the power, emotional- 
ly or otherwise, to change that person's experiences so that they will be 
other than they would have been without the beliefs. That is, there are 
emotional or subjective differences which may follow from a certain belief, 
but which do not depend upon the belief's being either correct or verified. 
Thus there is quite a difference in the results of this doctrine when.inter- 
preted in one way and those which follow when it is taken in the other 
sense. If we take it in the first sense, that is, stripped of the emo- 
tional differences which a belief may make, it is allied with positivism 
and Occam's razor, in which theories are reduced to terms of verifying data,
49. A. 0. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. V, No. 1, 1908, pp. 8 ff. Of. pp. 5-12.
50. Ibid., p. 8.
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and all concepts which do not have that meaning are eliminated. Used 
in this sense, James finds tnat the only difference between materialism 
and theisr is reducible to the difference each nakes in our anticipation 
concerning a specific cosmic or personal future. This issue resolves 
itself to a "conflict between esthetic preferences." Thus it is easy to 
eliminate as pragmatically meaningless many of the questions which have
divided theologians and metaphysicians. It is possible, according to 
this version of the matter, to discard as without significance most of the
theological creeds and most of the theories of speculative philosophy. 
For as Professor Lovejoy points out, "these largely refer to alleged per­ 
manent, unvarying factors of reality, from which no specific contents of 
experience (beyond. . .the experiences directly arising from the recognition 
of the presence of those factors) can be clearly deduced. The trinitarian
presumably does not necessarily anticipate f concrete future experiences*
51 
different from those anticipated by the Unitarian." The behavior of the
universe may be expected to remain the same for the p^.rtheist and the p}u- 
ralistic theist.
If the theory is interpreted in the second sense, that is, so as to 
include "future experiences" which depend upon belief in the propositions, 
the doctrine then becomes so universal and inclusive &.s to deny real mean­ 
ing to no proposition which makes the slightest emotional difference in 
the life of any individual. Thus, all beliefs which have been touched by 
human emotions must be admitted by the pragnatist as having significance. 
It could not even exclude the sentiment of the woman who liked to hear the
51. Ibid., p. 10.
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word ''Liesopotamia" pronounced because of the pleasing effect its sound 
had upon her; it made her feel better. The belief in a future event, 
for example, the ultimate triumph of righteousness, is unverifiable. 
v»"e cannot secure evidence to prove that this will be the final issue of 
things. But this belief gives the believer more courage to live, enables 
him to enjoy life, and inspires him to make sacrifices which otherwise he 
would not make. The difference in the believer in this case does not de- 
pend upon the correctness of the belief, but upon the belif itself. It 
is obvious tnat this aspect of James's doctrine of method cLoes not belong 
to the strictly pragmatic theory of meaning, but more properly to his doc- 
trine of the will to believe. For in the former, the difference is made 
by the theory's being true, and in the latter by the emotional effect of 
the belief whether the theory is true or not. James does not adhere clear- 
ly to this distinction in his application of the pragmatic method, and his 
failure to do so renders his treatment confusing, and accounts for the di- 
vergent results which flow from the net hod when applied in these tv-o dif- 
ferent senses. In applying the pragmatic method to the issue between ma- 
terialism and theism he follows the strict pragmatic sense which considers 
theories the same if they are not translated in different experiential 
terms. But his treatment of the conception of God departs from the nar- 
rower method and interprets the significance of the conception in terms of 
the dynamogenic effects of the belief in God upon the believer. Y-o are 
not concerned with this aspect of his doctrine of method here since it is 
dealt with in the treatment of the doctrine of the will to believe, but we 
have followed his application of it somewhat in detail so as to shor the
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precise difference between it and the more strictly pragmatic method. 
For due to the confusion of the two aspects of his theory of meaning, the 
bearing of pragmatism upon religion is frequently misconstrued; it is only 
in the phase of the pragmatic method which properly belongs to the doc­ 
trine of the will to believe that pragmatism can be said to offer positive 
and valuable support for religious conclusions. In fact, it may not be 
too much to say that the strict pragmatic theory of method, as such, under­ 
mines a great deal of the support which the doctrine of the will to be­ 
lieve offers for religion. The pragmatic theory of method, to quote Pro­ 
fessor Lovejoy again, "gets its appearance of novelty and of practical
serviceableness in the settlement of controversies, from its one meaning;
52 / 
and gets is plausibility entirely from the other." He says further, "But
> 
(when the distinction is made) in the sense in which the theory might be
logically functional, it seems hardly likely to appear plausible; and in
the sense in which it is plausible, it appears destitute of any applicabil-
53 
ity or function in the distinguishing 'real' from meaningless issues."
Let us consider further this tneor.y of method in the narrow sense. 
It is of the essence of this doctrine to claim that the meaning of any 
proposition which we entertain consists in some reference to the future, 
that is, to some "concrete future experience." *my judgment which con­ 
tains or implies no such future reference cannot be said to have any mean­ 
ing at all. The meaning of a proposition is fully exnausted when it has 
been made clear what that particular and concrete future experience is to 
which it refers. kerely as a theory concerning the meaning of propositions,
52. Op. cit., p. 11.
53. Op. cit., p. 11.
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it cannot approve or disapprove any particular significant propositions; 
it can only rule out as meaningless those propositions which, by having 
no practical future consequences, are without meaning. It does not at­ 
tempt to tell us what beliefs are true, but wnat beliefs contain enough 
value in terms of meaning to be worth our time to discuss. It is true 
that this theory of meaning leads, for James, to a theory of the meaning 
of truth, that is, to a theory as regards the way in which judgments are 
verified. for if all judgments must be predictive, their verification 
consists in realizing the experiences to which the prediction refers. 
If the experiences predicted actually arrive, the judgments are true; and, 
strictly speaking, are known to be true only by their arrival along with 
the chain of intermediary experiences which the prediction contains. But 
this theory of the meaning of truth is not the same as the theory of mean­ 
ing, and does not necessarily follow from it.
In the first place, it is obvious that James's theory of meaning 
which makes all meaning of a thing to consist in its consequences cannot 
be applied as a definition. Viie distinction between what a thing is and 
what it means cannot be overlooked. I<iow, as Professor D. C. L.lacintosh
suggests, a definition must be reversible, but this is not possible with
54 
special pragmatic meanings, no more than the relation of cause and effect.
He says that even if we regard it from the standpoint of an acceptance of 
the pragmatic method, a universal minimum of pragmatic meaning is stated in 
the definition: what a thing may mean for certain purposes, or the conse­ 
quences which s'uall follow if it is used in a particular way, as means to 
a certain ultimate end. Thus "Y.hat it is" is its most "proximate meaning," 
54. D.1T. Macintosh. The problem of iaio'..ledje, p. 429.
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while "what it means", means what it is "more ultimately in special cases." 
To regard the natter as James does is to ignore meaning in the sense which 
is expressible in a reversible proposition, or definition, and to confine 
it to the numerous "special pragnatist meanings." To ignore this impor­ 
tant aspect of meaning is just as one-sided as the tendency of the intel- 
lectualist to confine meaning to that which is capable of being expressed 
in a reversible proposition, and to ignore the fact that all meaning, even 
definition, is relative to purpose. This oversight on the part of James 
becomes nore serious when he passes from his theory of meaning to the theory 
of the meaning of truth, and attempts to make his special "pragmatic mean­ 
ings" do service as a definition in the case of truth. Thus he lays him­
self open to the charge that he regards his pragmatic meaning of truth as
56 
true in "the i intellectual istic sense."
The assertion that a proposition contains no meaning beyond some par­ 
ticular future consequences is plainly not applicable to many of our judg­ 
ments. For instance, I may at tais moment believe that a certain friend 
of mine consciously exists, that he lives in such and such a place, and 
that he is probably engaged in performing certain tasks v.hich I have known 
him habitually to perform in the past. The chances are that I shall never 
have the opportunity of verifying his existence, at any future time, and so 
far as I know, there seems to be nothing in the future by \vay of conse­ 
quences which I may expect to flow from my present belief about his present 
existence. Undoubtedly, my belief refers primarily to the present rather 
than to the future and does not reach beyond the present moment in which it
> Ibid<> p. 429. 
56. Ibid., p. 429. J. 3. Pratt, op. cit ., p. 128.
224
arises. A strictly past or present reference characterizes many of our 
beliefs; many, pernaps nost of our beliefs are related to things uhiah 
have a date, and it is not always future. If I recall Calvin's acquies­ 
cence in the death of Servetus, the part of my meaning vvnich specifically 
refers to the remote past in wnich the incident took place seems to have 
nothing at all to do with any future particular consequences either in my 
own, or in another's experiences. The amount of future reference which 
such a proposition implies seems to constitute only the means of verifica­ 
tion. For the most part, beliefs which pertain to facts in the past, 
and which have no implications concerning future experience, cannot 
properly be said to be subject to verification at all. Further, this 
theory of meaning renders all questions concerning past or present facts
meaningless. For example, to say at the end of the world, that Judas
\j
Iscariot was cricified would mean the same thing as to say that Christ^
was, since neither statement carries no further consequences, and no fu- 
ture consequences are to be expected. Or, again, it would mean the same 
thing to say that Hitler was President of the United States in 1938, as 
it would to assert that r. D. Roosevelt was. This holds true of all such 
questions once we accept the pragmatic view. As J. B. Pratt argues, "if 
all meanings can be brought down to consequences f in our future practical
experience,' and if, by hypothesis, we have no future practical experience
57 
....there can no longer be any meaning in anything." Thus all questions
which have no future consequences must be pronounced meaningless. The 
historicity of Mark, the authorship of the Pentateuch, or that of the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, and the date and manner of Paul's death, are all
b7. J. B. Pratt, op. cit., p. 31.
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questions which appear to be without future consequences to us and must, 
according to the pragmatist theory, be regarded as absolutely meaningless. 
"In short," to quote Professor Pratt again, "from history, geology, biol­ 
ogy, astronomy,—from every field of human thought,—come questions over 
which scholars are spending years of research, yet which are certainly 
even now fully as meaningless as the theistic-rnaterialistic controversy
will be at the end of time, and which, according to the pragraatist doc-
58 
trine, are purely verbal disputes."
We have no warrant for holding that future consequences alone deter­ 
mine the meaning of a proposition. \,-e know the meaning of the statement 
that a certain star or planet is so many miles from the earth irrespective 
of any consequences, either future or past, to us or to anyone else. Or 
if it were the end of time, we would know the difference between saying 
that there are two grains of sand in a place, or that there are two mil­ 
lion grains. Even such a trivial instance as the latter shows that mean­ 
ing is present when no consequences of any kind can be connected with the 
proposition. It is also obvious that this narrow view of the doctrine of 
method must exclude countless questions which are pursued out of intellec­ 
tual interest; for if this view be strictly adhered to, it matters not how 
deeply we may be interested in a question, if it has no future consequences, 
it is not worth discussion, it is meaningless. Yet it is quite possible 
for one to have a much greater interest in some question which appears to 
have no future consequences than in one which obviously does have. For 
instance, there are many people who would rather be able to settle the 
question of the authorship of the Pentateuch than to know the future of 
58. Ibid., p. 33.
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aviation for, let us say, the next twenty-five years. Yet the develop­ 
ment of aviation nay tremendously affect their own lives in the future, 
while the question concerning the authorship of the Pentateuch belongs to 
the "dead" and meaningless past, according to the pragmatist. The prag- 
rnatist, then, is forced to deny meaning v/here it is obviously present, 
and allow our desire for knowledge to play no part in choosing what ques­ 
tions we shall discuss. further, even if v-e agree with the pragmatist 
that beliefs which have no future reference, or which do not affect our 
future behaviour, are without meaning and interest, or are of no moral or 
religious value, we may yet ask whether or not beliefs of this kind really 
exist. If so, v;here are they to be found? For, as Professor A. 0. Love- 
joy says, "any belief which I am supposed to be capable of carrying with 
me into the future, ipso facto constitutes an item of my future experience; 
it will in that future engender its own concomitant states of thought and 
feeling and call for its appropriate reaction, and it will therefore have
importance and efficacy correspondence to the degree of interest and of in­ 
fluence which there attaches to it—no belief, while held, being wholly
59 
destitute of such interest and influence." The pragmatic doctrine of
method appears, then, to be of little use to us as a means of determining 
our questions for discussion or controversy, in any field of thought, in 
that it must either reject meaning v,here it seems impossible to deny it 
and rule out many questions which interest and influence us, or submit to 
such a broad interpretation that it virtually includes all beliefs v.hich 
persist because of their interest and influence. Janes does not regard
59. A. 0. Lovejoy, "Pragmatism and Theology," The American Journal of 
Theology, Vol. XII, Ho. 1, 1908, p. 131.
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this theory of meaning as applying to "necessary truths," but holds that
60 
they are immediately verified; they nave power to coerce the nind. He
does not always appear to adhere to this exception, however, but apparent­ 
ly attempts to make a universal application of his theory concerning the 
way in which judgments are verified. de asserts, "but all roads lead to 
Rome, and in the end and eventually, all true processes must lead to the
face of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere, which some-
61 
body's ideas have copied." Moreover, James f s doctrine of method is not
compatible with his admission that there are "necessary truths," or "eter­ 
nal truths." "Necessary truths" are automatically self-verifying; the 
truth of a self-evident proposition is known without reference to the ver­ 
ification of future facts which it may include. If we admit eternal val­ 
ues of any kind, eternal truths which deal with eternal or past matters, 
or if we admit the existence of an eternal God, we render James's theory 
inadequate, for truths concerning eternal realities are not amenable to 
his pragmatic method. If James admits the existence of "necessary 
truths," he is not justified in ruling out, as he apparently does, the 
elaborate systems of metaphysics and rational theology built up by the 
whole series of Post-Kantian idealists which "constitute affirmations 
which do not imply the possibility of their own verification, for our
^o O(l
minds, by any future sensible experience,'' because they cannot be verified 
in this manner. These systems start with some generally admitted fact of 
human experience and attempt, by following certain necessary and inter- 
60. Pragmatism, p. 209.
£1 TK •! A r, 91 K
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61. Ibid., p. 215.
62. A. *. Love joy, op. cit., p. 126.
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related truths, to arrive at the ultimate logical implications of that 
fact. His sweeping repudiation of dogmatic theology and philosophy can 
be understood only in the light of a denial of the existence of the neces­ 
sities of thought.
It is also open to question whether the pragmatic doctrine of method 
can be of any real value with reference to moral questions. ""he ethical 
dilemma is essentially different from a practical aituation in that it is 
primarily a conflict of values; it involves more than a mere Knowledge of 
all of the factors involved, and the use of analysis. Here all of the 
factors may be taken into consideration, the various courses of action 
which it may dictate may be known, and yet doubt may remain as to the eth­ 
ical implications which careful analysis of the situation possesses; be­ 
cause, in itself, it possesses no ethical implications at all. Usually, 
in respect of our moral questions it is not uncertainty concerning conse­ 
quences which leaves us in doubt about a certain course of action, but pre­ 
cisely the fact that we are aware of the consequences which are likely to 
follow. It is quite true that it is often important and necessary to 
trace out the consequences of a contemplated course 01' action, but we do 
so as a means for the application of one of our "intrinsic evaluations." 
But in arriving at the latter pragmatism does not, and apparently cannot 
help us; and this element must be regarded as of supreme importance in 
any moral dilemma. The importance of this aspect of an ethical situation 
increases as the question under consideration increases in gravity and 
scope. Thus pragmatism cannot help us to decide the really important and 
Lieanim-jful moral questions. It should be observed also that it is not 
true, as the pragmatic method implies, that each moral situation is unicue
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and new. This is no doubt true of many ethical situations, but it cannot 
be said that all are. It may even be said that no moral situation is com­ 
pletely unique; there is air/ays some element in each one which bears 
close resemblance to preceding ones.
It is generally admitted that all known differences do have a prac­ 
tical significance, to register another objection to the pragmatic doctrine 
of method, but, as Professor R. B. Perry points out, the fact that a known 
difference does make a difference "may serve as .a rough and ready test of 
conceptual distinctions, but it will still be true that to discover the 
content of the conception or the precise nature of the difference we must
resort not to the practical applications, but to the region of experience
63 
of v;nicn the concept purports to be a description." For, as he further
suggests, while scientific concepts differ only insofar as they reveal dis­ 
tinctions in possible practical situations, since real differences in nat­ 
ural science are experimental differences due to the fact that most of its 
truths are experimental truths, this offers no support for the pragraatist 
argument. This simply shows that things are as the scientific descrip­ 
tions say they are. It does not prove anything concerning the truth of 
arithmetic and algebra which, unlike the descriptions of science, do not 
deal with spatial and temporal redistributions. "To lose sight," he says, 
"of the abstract elements in experience to which mathematical systems refer, 
and to identify them with the practical coordination into which they enter,
is to be guilty of the same fundamental confusion to vrnich the pragmatist
64 
objects in the case of the conceptions of physics."
65. R. B. Perry, "A Review of Pragmatism as a philosophical Generalize- 
tion," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, Ho. 16, 1907, p. 425. 
64. Ibid., p. 425.
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V/hen the pragmatist evaluates only the effects of a concept or propo­ 
sition it is obvious that he entirely ignores the situation which gave 
rise to the proposition. For example, the metaphysical attributes of God, 
which James is quite certain cannot be rendered intelligible according to 
the pragmatic method, were the product of a certain kind of intellectual 
atmosphere and were not entirely isolated from religious experience. Fur­ 
ther, they had very definite practical connections for the scholastics. 
Tve cannot understand the full significance of these speculations for them 
without reference to the actual situation v7iiich produced then. They do be­ 
come meaningless verbal terms, "pedantic dictionary-adjectives," if we re­ 
move them from their original context and continue to regard them as valid. 
The pragmatist would, no doubt, place the immortal controversy between Atha- 
nasius and Arius in the category of the "meaningless," but to do so is to 
reveal an amazing ignorance or neglect of the real situation which gave 
rise to this hotly debated issue; that is, it would be to ignore the exper­ 
iences out of which it grew and to shov: a failure to catch the practical 
significance which the controversy had for that time. Religious creeds 
are the result of profound religious experiences which greatly influence 
life; because ;,e are no longer able to share or recapture such experiences 
we have no right to ignore their reality or practical significance for 
those to whom tney were real and important. This is true of most, if not 
all, of the great issues of Christian thought. For, as Kmil Brunner ar­ 
gues, "had not Paul and the Reformers been convinced that their doctrine of 
righteousness by faith had also a decisive practical significance, they 
would not have wasted a second reflecting upon it. The seemingly unspirit- 
ual, pragmatic criterion—By their fruits ye snail know then—that is, by
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the practical usefulness of their doctrine—was decidedly their criterion."
L'en are seldom willing to sacrifice honor, position, the means of liveli­ 
hood, time-honored institutions, and citizenship, for mere verbal quib­ 
bles. Issues for which they make such sacrifices may appear to be so 
many empty words to those of succeeding generations, but this certainly 
is not the case with the actual participants in such controversies; they 
regard tneraselves as trying to settle the "burning" questions of tneir 
time. \ie can regard them as irrelevant or meaningless questions only by 
overlooking all the factors in the actual situation out of which the con­ 
troversies rose. I. King rightly suggests, in this connection, that the 
failure of the pragmatists to analyze the psychological postulate that 
consciousness leads to some s> rt of movement is responsible for their am­ 
biguous position which maintains y on the one hand, that every true differ­ 
ence in thought must make a difference in action, arid, on the other, that
66 
every mental content does make a difference.
Thought is functionally related to experience both before and after 
the situation, and the effects can be adequately evaluated only by taking 
into account the entire situation. If v;e consider only the effects which 
any given thought produces, an essential part of the process has been 
neglected. For if we regard experience as an active process, we must in­ 
clude the entire process which renders it necessary to take tiiougnt as an 
organic part of experience as a whole. If we view the matter in this 
light, then, there "is no such thing as a merely verbal concept nor a 
meaningless or erroneous idea. whatever exists has moaning and validity,
65. Bnil Brunner, God and l.;an, English Translation by David Cairns, 
London: 3tudent Christian Movement Press, 1936, p. 71.
66. I. King, "Pragmatism as a Philosophical method," The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. XII, ito. 5, 1903, p. 524.
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if not in one context in another; and the task of philosophy is not one
67 
of selecting and rejecting, but of finding the setting of that which is."
Further, it is quite conceivable that a concept could have possible ef­ 
fects which we fail to discover. For instance, Emil Brunner says that 
the "thought that faith in the triune God might have some relevance to the 
slums of the great cities, that the Christian doctrine of reconciliation 
might have some relevance to the problem of nationalism, seems almost ab­ 
surd, not only to those who are alien to Christianity, but even to Chris- 
68
tians and theologians themselves." Yet he thinks that both of these doc­ 
trines are of tremendous practical significance and that they should have a 
decisive influence upon conduct in the various relationships of humanity. 
LToreover, the pragmatic doctrine that if two apparently different defini­ 
tions of reality before us have identical consequences, those two defini­ 
tions would really be identical, may lead us to incredibly absurd vagaries 
of thought. For instance, one person may conceive God as a tyrant and as 
a God of vengeance; consequently, he serves Him out of servile fear and 
produces "fruit meet for repentance." Another person may think of God in 
terms of love, and as a Heavenly Father. His service is rendered out of 
love and gratitude. Now, it is conceivable that these two persons may go 
through life with these different conceptions of God, being differently 
motivated in their service of God, but their lives, so far as all outward 
appearances go, bring forth identical fruits; such as honesty, loyalty, 
morality, piety, and so on. ihall we take this to mean that there is no 
difference between conceiving God in terms of fear and thinking of Hin as 
a God of love? Do fear and love here mean identically the same thing?
67. I. King, op. cit., p. 524.
68. .i. Brunner, op. cit., p. 71.
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It would seem so from the point of view of the pragmatic doctrine of 
method, and yet no pragmatist is willing to say that serving God out of 
fear is as worthy a motive as service born of love, even if the visible 
results are the same. But his position forces him to admit that a judg­ 
ment based merely upon effects, insofar as they can be known, places them 
upon the same level; that is, fear and love are made to appear identical 
as motives in religious conduct.
To proceed according to the pragmatic doctrine of method is tacitly 
to assume greater knowledge about objective reality than is warranted, and 
such an assumption is in keeping with traditional philosophy from which 
pragmatism attempts to free itself. I. King states the case as follows: 
"To hold that the idea which has arisen out of a vital difference in the 
constitution of things may be distinguished by its effects, is to assume a
knowledge of a coherent order of objective reality; for without such a
69 
knowledge, how could the proper effects be known as such?" Further, a
phenomenon familiar to students of the history of thought is that of some 
doctrine, or belief, which has been of epoch-making significance for a cer­ 
tain period but which time and change have left behind. After years, or 
perhaps centuries, it is taken up again and it becomes as influential upon 
human thought and conduct, and as far reaching in its effects upon contem­ 
porary life as it had been at its earlier appearance. In the period be­ 
tween its first and second appearance it was regarded as of little impor­ 
tance, or neglected because of certain undesirable features, or simply 
buried midst the enthusiasm for some other doctrine which was discovered 
or rediscovered. In cases of this kind, and there are many of them, the 
practical significance, or effects, of the revived conception were poten- 
69. Op. cit., p. 520.
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tially present but were not discerned during the interval. It is not 
possible to hold that during the time of its neglect it was a meaning­ 
less doctrine. Yet, according to the pragmatic theory of meaning, we 
would be justified in taking this position. It may have been meaning­ 
less so far as the people of that period were concerned but it was not 
meaningless in itself. The conclusion to which we are led, then, is 
that pragmatism, as a method, helps us to see that it is a good "rule
never to discuss anything unless it has some genuine interest, unless it
70 
makes a real difference to someone," but when it attempts to do more than
this, that is, when it tries to tell us what questions to exclude from, 
and what ones to include in, our controversies and discussions, it proves 
unequal to the task. Further consideration of the pragmatic theory of 
method will be involved in our treatment of the pragmatic doctrine of 
truth as set forth in the following chapter. 
70. J. B. Pratt, op. cit., p. 59^
VII 
THE PRAGMATIC DOCTRINE OF TRUTH
The central doctrine of pragmatism is its conception of truth. ^c- 
cording to the correspondence theory of truth, ideas are true if they cor­ 
respond to reality. ..hen examined, this notion of truth has its diffi­ 
culties in that it assumes that we can know reality apart from our ideas 
of it and compare it with those ideas to see if the two correspond. Ob­ 
viously, this is impossible, since what knowledge ?/e may have of reality
must be derived from our ideas of it. Another notion of truth, namely,
1 
the coherence theory, holds that "the truth is the whole"; and coherence
or consistency means "the consistency so far as attainable, of the whole
2 
body of experience with itself". The difficult;/ with this theory is that
onl. the whole of truth can be absolutely self-consistent, and we cannot 
reach certainty short of the absolute, or complete omniscience. H. Y.. 
Joachim, in The Nature of Truth, concludes that no theory of truth as co­ 
herence could be completely true since it must be "other" than the truth
"a:out" what it is. This theory fails to attain that concrete coherence
3 
which must characterize complete truth. Pragmatism makes much of the
weaknesses of these two theories of truth and presents as a more satisfac­ 
tory view of truth the notion that truth is a value; something v/hich happens 
to ideas, rather than a logical characteristic of ideas, and that they are 
validated by their j/ractical use. It should be observed, before proceed­ 
ing to give James's pragmatic notion of truth, that there is a confusion in
0
1. ~. Bosanquet, . c^i?, or Ti.o morphology of ..no vie ̂ :., C-iford; "^ Clar- 
endon Press, 1911, Vol. II, Lk. II, 2nd hd., p. 264.
2. Ibid., p. 267.




James's treatment of the subject which corresponds to the ambiguity that rce 
nentioned concerning his doctrine of method, that is, his failure to adhere 
to the distinction between pragmatism proper and the fideistic aspect of 
his voluntarism. TVe must bear in mind that, in reality, these two aspects 
of his philosophy are distinct, and, in spite of his frequent mixing them 
up, he regards them as different doctrines. In the fideistic phase of 
his doctrine, as v,e have seen, we have a right to believe in the absence of 
evidence, or without sufficient evidence. Pragmatism is the formulation 
of a theory of strict truth in terms of a certain operation which culminates 
in its verification. Both arise out of his empiricism, but they are act­ 
ually distinct doctrines. It is important to emphasize this distinction here 
because of the difference in the bearing of the two phases of thought upon 
religion. His fideism is more servicable to religion than his pragmatism. 
In fact, there is much in the latter that may be considered inimical to re­ 
ligion. In discussing his theory of truth, we shall attempt to keep clearly 
in mind this difference between these two aspects of his doctrine which are 
often treated as identical.
It is important to remember that, for James, immediate knowledge, or 
"knowledge by acquaintance", that is,knowledge which is consummated in ex­ 
perience, constitutes knowledge in the ultimately preferred sense. "Know­ 
ledge about" is at best merely a substitute for the former. All knowledge 
is virtually direct or presentative; representation is cognitive only in so 
far as it is a virtual presentation. "Knowledge about" is not completed 
until the object is exhibited to the mind. "The maximal conceivable truth
in an idea would seem to be that it should lead to an actual merging of
4 
ourselves with the object, to an utter mutual confluence and identification."
47 M. T., p. 156.
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5 
To know by acquaintance "is for mental content and object to be identical."
In short, "knowledge about", with which pragmatism is concerned, is inci­ 
dental to "knowledge by acquaintance" and is used merely as a means of wid­ 
ening the scope of the latter by substitution. The necessity for "know­ 
ledge about" arises out of the limited scope of immediate knowledge. Prac­ 
tically, the mind is forced to transcend sense-experience to such an extent 
that one must say that it is characteristic of knowledge or belief to refer 
to the region beyond one's immediate experience. For the greater part of 
our knowledge pertains to yesterday, to tomorrow, or lies beyond spatial 
regions which are immediately accesible to one. Only on rare occasions is 
the reality immediately present. Due to this fact, most of what we call 
knowledge or belief is a result of limitations; but this should not be inter­ 
preted to mean that immediate knowledge is any the less important or funda­ 
mental. For it sets our norm of knowledge and that which passes for know­ 
ledge, most of the time, does not give the satisfaction which immediate know­ 
ledge itself does. Thus "knowledge about" is a device which the empiricist 
uses to compensate for a lack of confidence in the capacities of thought to 
know that uhich is not immediately present, for his rejection of a priori 
knowledge, or knowledge of universals, and dialectic processes of ideas. It 
is only by some such practical remedy that he can emancipate himself from the 
limits of space and time which his view of immediate knowledge, as basic, 
imposes upon him.
17 e may ascertain the value of "knowledge about" by a brief glance at 
vrhat James conceives the function of knowledge to be. The function of "know­ 
ledge by acquaintance" is to get things directly acted upon, or directly 
5. IvI. T., p. 50. ~~
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introduced into life. This type of knoivledge is characterized by the fact 
that "any one and the same that in experience must figure alternately as a
thing and as a knowledge of the thing, by reason of two divergent kinds of
6 
context into which, in the general course of experience, it gets woven."
In other words, in this type of knowledge the thing itself is acted on and 
felt about in a way peculiar to an individual conscious field; the most fa­ 
miliar instance of this is sense-perception. Here the only difference be­ 
tween the knowing and the known is that the knowing is simply the context 
into which the thing known is received. The function of "knowledge about" 
is to supply us with substitutes for things which it is not possible to know 
directly so that the original function of knowledge nay be widened in scope. 
"The towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing lies in the 
fact that an experience that knows another can figure as its representative,
not in any quasi-miraculous ''epistemolo^ical' sense, but in the definite
7 
practical sense of bein^ its substitute in various operations." In other
words, the function of this typo of knowledge is to give us access to the 
object when it is not actually present. This view involves two fundamental 
things, namely, that we have a right to believe what our theoretical operat­ 
ion leaves unproved, that is, fideism; and that verifying knowledge is itself 
a practical operation, that is, pragmatism. It is of the essence of prag­ 
matism to maintain that our theoretical tests are practical or quasi-practical 
processes.
For pragmatism, ideas assume a functional role. An idea is anything 
which performs the function of meaning something. Anything which exercises 
the function of meaning is, in this sense, an idea, such as words, symbols, 
images, and so on. If I use a word to convey meaning it is an idea. If
6. "The jJssence of Humanism," Ibid. , p. 187.
7. E. H. E., p. 61.
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I havo a visual image of tuc city of London, and I use it to mean the city, 
then, my visual picture would be an idea. In short, according to the fun­ 
ctional view of ideas, it does not matter what ideas are just so we "nean", 
or intend something with them. The primary relation, then, that an idea 
sustains to its object is to "inean", to designate, or point to, that particu­ 
lar object. An idea must also "agree" with its object, but before we can 
know whether or not it "agrees" with it, the object must be identified as the 
object "meant." Thus "it is not by dint of discovering which reality a feel­ 
ing 'resembles' that we find out which reality it means. \7e become first
aware of v-iiich one it means, and then we suppose that to be the one it re-
8 
senbles." "The Tigers of India," for instance, must be identified as the
tigers which my idea intended before I can know that my idea of them is in 
agreement with them. Now that towards v;nich an idea points, that which it 
means, is that towards which action is directed. The tigers form a terminus, 
or a goal, towards whicii action leads, for had it not been for some plan of 
action or purpose, with reference to the tigers, I would not have an idea of 
them at all. In other words, pointing is essentially a practical affair. 
"The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known simply and solely as a 
procession of mental associates and motor consequences that follow on the
thought, arid that would lead harmoniously, if followed out, into some ideal
9 
or real context, or even into the immediate presence of the tigers." The
thing intended may at first be indefinite, vague or equivocal, but as the 
process develops increasing clarity and definiteness characterize it until 
identification of the idea with the object is completed by actually getting
*
hold of the object, or even by pointing to it. If the idea develops itself 
to this point we may be fully certain that the object we touch or point to
8 . r.J . 1 . , p • *i*3 •
9. Ibicf. , pp. 44-45.
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is the selfsame thing v;e intended all the time. But where action on the ob­ 
ject does not take place, that is to say, when the series of intermediary 
experiences are not followed to their ultimate terminus, we may regard the 
idea as intending the object to the extent that had we pursued the process 
to the end we would have arrived at the object. Thus, although I do not 
go all the way to see the tigers in India, I may rest assured that if I 
followed my idea of them through the context which the world supplies, I 
would eventually come upon the tigers race to face. In short, I have access 
to the tigers, by means of my idea of them, although they are not actually 
present.
In order for an idea to "agree" with its object, it is not necessary 
that it be identical with it, nor that it resemble it; it is merely necessary 
that it perform the practical function of leading up to it; that is, agree­ 
ment means primarily a practical connection with the object. "In the whole 
field of symbolic thought," he says, "we are universally held both to intend, 
to speak of, and to reach conclusions about——to know in short——particular 
realities, without having in our subjective consciousness any mind-stuff that 
resembles them even in a remote degree. ,.e are instructed about them by 
language which awakens no consciousness beyond its sound; and we know which
realities they are by the faintest and most fragmentary glimpse of some re-
10 
mote context they may have and by no direct imagination of themselves."
The best example of such agreement is to be found in the agreement of words 
with their objects since there is no resemblance between words and their ob­ 
jects. A word agrees with its intended object by leading to it, or by bring-
11 
ing us into its neighborhood. The cognitive relation, then, "consists in
intermediary experiences (possible, if not actual) of continuously developing
10. Ibid., pp. 50-31.
11. Ibid., p. 31.
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progress, and, finally, of fulfilment, v.hen the sensible percept, xvhich is 
the object, is reached. The percept here not only verifies the concept, 
proves its function of knowing that percept to be true, but the percept's
existence as the terr.-.inus of the chain of intermediaries creates the
12 
function." Thus the entire process of knowledge is "ambulatory," not
"saltatory"; we are able to move along the chain of intermediary experiences 
which extends from the ideas to the object, and there is no self-transcenden­ 
cy, no "leaping of the chasm", about the idea or image whatever; consequent­ 
ly, "their starting-point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an ob-
13 
ject meant or known." Ideas are merely instruments by means of v.'hich we
are able to get hold of objects, or enabled to find them, and their role is 
purely a functional one.
This brings us to the consideration of the pragmatic doctrine of truth, 
for if the idea prepares me for the thing it intends, or means, we have truth; 
if it fails to do so, we have error. Truth, then, is the agreement of the 
idea with its object; and error is the failure of the idea to agree with its 
object. Truth is not, for the pragmatist, an "inert static relation/' nor
a "stagnant property" which inheres in an idea. "Truth happens to an idea.
14 
It becomes true, is made true by events." Truth arises out of, and does
not exist apart from, the relation of ideas to their objects. The series of 
experiences which follow upon the idea, which connect it with reality, form
and are "the concrete relation of truth that may obtain between the idea and
15 
that reality." The idea is made true by these mediating events. The idea
itself is also a concrete event, and truth in the singular is, for the prag-
12. £. R. E. t pp. 60-61.
13. Ibid., p. 57.
14. Pragmatism, p. 201.
15. M. T.,p. 201.
242
i;.atist, simply a "collective name for truths in the plural; these corioist-
16 
in^ always of series of definite events". Tnu^ James prefers to speak
17 
of "true ideas" rather than of "the truth".
It is extremely important always to bear in i.iind that, for the prag- 
matist, truth refers to some particular situation in which an idea is re­ 
lated to its object. T-.. ignore this f*ct is to fail to get the signifi­ 
cance of the ^ragmatic notion of truth. James attributes much of the mis­ 
understanding of pragmatism on the part of Lis critics to a failure to ^eep 
this distinction clearly in mind. lir admits, then, with the intellectual -
ists, that truth "is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their
18 
'agreement', as falsity means their disagreement, with 'reality'." But
he ports company Fith them when it cones to e,.^laini..i^ the meming of the 
terms "agreement" and "reality". In order to bring out the precise differ­
ence between his view and the one which lie rejects, he posits in his uni-
19' 
verse of discourse a reality and a mind with, ideas. iie then asks, "./hat
can make those ideas true of that reality?" In what does truth in this 
case consist? Or, again, "What does the word 'true' mean when we say that 
those ideas are true of that reality?" :./hat relation do those ideas sustain 
to that object, or that reality which makes those ideas true in this specific 
instance?" 1'ow, merely to answer in a sort of vague or general way that 
those ideas must "correspond" to, cr "agree" with, th^t reality does not sat- 
isf^ the pr ;.ig,.,;<tist ' s pencnaiit for concreteness and particularity. He is 
satisfied with nothing short of a concrete, detailed account of what we i.-iy&i. by 
agreement. For ^hen he s^ys that those ideas "agree" with that reality ,
1C. I'. id., p.
17. "1 ..,- : tJ3il. t L). 201
18. I''_i., A.. 198.
•I O T ' rn ,, TQ"1J. \* . i . J- » , ^ . •*- - - j - »
243
he means something very definite, namely, that they must point to, or lead 
towards that reality and no other, and that the pointings and leadings must 
issue in satisfactory results. Further, he conceives the pointing and lead­ 
ing, throughout the entire process, to be the work of other portions of the 
same universe to which the reality and the mind belong; that is, it is the
work of "intermediary verifying bits of experience v.dth v/hich the mind at
20 
one end, and the reality at the other are joined." When, then, are the
ideas true of that reality? 'i'ne pragmatist gives some such answer as the 
following to this question: The ideas which one has of that reality owe 
their existence to some contemplated course of action which has been prompted 
by some practical need of one's life, or bv some vital interest which one has, 
For if it were not for the existence of conscious beings who act, who are in­ 
terested, puzzled, curious, and doubting, there would be no ideas at all, 
and, consequently, no truth process, nor truths. The same thing holds true 
of the "meaning" or "intention" of the ideas, which relates them to that 
reality; it also arises out of some practical need or interest, and would not 
exist apart from beings with needs and interests. Thus, one f s ideas of that 
reality are "true" \vhen the needs or interests which motivated one's selec­ 
tion of those ideas and led one to connect them T.:ith that reality are satis­ 
fied. In short, one's ideas of that reality are "true" 7hen they success­ 
fully perform their function of "agreable leading" one into, or up to, or
21 
towards, that reality.
For the pra^natist, then, ideas are true v.hen they work; that is, when 
they are successful, when they fulfil their function, or do that vaiich the:/ 
have been called into existence to do. "True ideas are those that we c-m
20. Ibid., pp. 191-192.
21. Cf. " -•• -tio;., pp. £01-202.
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assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that 
we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true
ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth
22 
is known-as." Truth is the result of a process, it is an achievement.
Truth is something which we make. "Its verity is in fact an event, a
process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication.
22 
Its validity is the process of its valid-ation." Ideas are not images,
they are instruments. They do not image their objects, they lead us to 
them. An idea need not resemble its object any more than a word resembles 
what it denotes. "^hatever resemblance there may be between the idea and 
its object is purely accidental and irrelevant. It has nothing to do with 
the truth of the idea. Just as the proof of any instrument is in the using, 
the proof of an idea is in the use we make of it. If a sew cuts well we 
say that it is a "good" saw. If an idea puts us in prosperous connection 
with its object, we can say that it is a "true" idea. It is obvious, there­ 
fore, that James means something quite different by the term "agreement" 
from the ordinary interpretation of the word. His conception of truth, 
while he employs the same terms, is a radical departure from the view common­ 
ly held by philosophers and common sense which maintains that the truth of 
ideas consists in their resemblance to their objects. James's view attempts 
to bridge the gap between cognition and the object without appealing to any 
mysterious faculty of self-transcendence, whereas the traditional view holds 
that reference to trans-empirical reality is necessary before a satisfactory 
account of truth is possible.
The fundamental thing in the pragmatic notion of truth is that in the 
making of truth we have a process which terminates in verification. Before
22. Ibid., p. 201.
23. Ibid., p. 201.
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the moment of verification, there are conditions, or stages, which lead to 
truth, but no truth. Since truth is something which we make, it is in 
the making so long as the process is in progress. It is prospective and 
comes into being in the actual course of history. Truth has happened in 
this way in the past, and so long as there are human beings who act, and 
have needs and interests, we may expect truth to be in the making. Our 
theories and hypotheses have proved true in the past, we are proving them 
true today, and we shall continue to prove them true in the future. But 
since the truth of an idea consists in its working, its truth is not known 
until it has been verified; that is, until it has actually worked. In 
other words, a theory consists in its application to experience. It is 
true if it prepares the mind for certain experiences, and enables us to con­ 
trol the realities to which it refers. If it fulfils the anticipation in 
experience it is true, but this can be known only after the experience to 
which it refers has arrived; only after it has been tested or verified. Thus 
the question of the truth or falsity of any theory which we may affirm points 
to the future, rather than to the past, for its answer. This is also true 
of historical judgments. If I say, for example, that Christ was born in the 
year 5 B. C., the truth of this statement points to certain efforts of in­ 
vestigation, certain operations, by which the statement may be shown to be 
true or false. That is, the statement is a candidate for truth, it is a 
"truth-claim;" it may possibly be true, but the realization tf its truth 
belongs to the future, not to the past. V/hatever relation lay statement may 
bear to the event, it cannot be said to bear the cognitive relation. The 
evidence for historical judgments lies ahead of us, not behind us; it is yet 
to be found. A retrospective judgment expresses that which was true, even
246
if there had been no past thinker there. "The present sheds a backward 
light on trie world's previous-processes. They may have been truth-pro­ 
cesses for the actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the
24 
later revelations of the story." There is always the possibility of a
better truth than that v.hich we now possess. Wnat we call true today r we 
may have to pronounce false tomorrow. Truth of past centuries, such as 
Ptolemaic astronomy, and scholastic metaphysics, was expedient for the cen­ 
turies in which it was adhered to, true within those "borders of experience." 
But we have transcended those limits and the truth embodied in those systems 
is now regarded as only relatively true. For experience "boils over" and 
has "boiled over" since those systems were invoked to explain certain facts. 
Thus we may have to change our present formulas as new experiences come and 
prove them false. "The Absolutely' true, meaning what no farther exper­ 
ience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine 
that all our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on all fours
with the perfectly wise man, and with the absolutely complete experience;
25 
and, if these ideals are ever realized, they will all be realized together."
3o long, then, as new experiences await us, there is the possibility of new 
truth; and just so lon^ will truth be in the making. Truth is essentially 
prospective rather than retrospective; it remains so until experience is com­ 
pleted and verification is no more.
.;h-it is meant when it is said that an idea is true if it works or succeeds? 
Or, in what does verification consist? oince the success of an idea is rela­ 
tive to its use, its verirication consists in successfully using it. If we 
do not include the emotional effects of an idea or belief, which belong to
24.-. Pragmatism, pp. 223-224.
25. Ibid., ppT 222-223.
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the fideistic aspect of James's voluntarism, Jar^s uses three tests of truth, 
or modes of verification. mhe first one is that of consistency. "Above 
all we find consistency satisfactory, consistency between the present idea 
and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our
sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our
26 
whole stock of previously acquired truths." These constitute reality, for
Jnnes, and any belief, in order to be accented as true, must fit in harmon­ 
iously with these realities. If it proves to be in hac :o.'iy with them, it 
is true so far forth. Thus verification by consistency places the burden 
of proof on a belief which conflicts with previous beliefs. For Janes, how­ 
ever, this is not the final test, for experimental evidence- carries greater 
weight than consistency, and nay lead to the rejection of a belief which 
passes the test of the latter. At this juncture, James eliminates the co­ 
herence theory of truth in that, while it is good so far, it may be over­ 
ruled by other tests. Then, there is verification by "active" rather than
by "passive" experience, or verification by practice or "subsequential utili-
27 
ty." According to this criterion, a belief which I may have is true in so
far as the plans which I make as a result of holding it work out or succeed. 
A belief means that the object to which it refers is capable of being used 
for some specific purpose. For example, if I believe that my typewriter is 
something with which I can write, and, because of this belief, I plan to 
write a letter by means of it, my being able to write the letter verifies 
the plan and affords me practical knowledge of the machine. I am thus en­ 
abled to use it, and I know how to behave towards it. But, in the final 
analysis, this test may be said to resolve itself, for James, into the third,
26. lj_. T., p. 192. ~ "——————
27. M. T., p. 210.
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28 
namely, verification by "objective experience.'' AS we have seen, a belief
is verified when it agrees with previous beliefs, but previous beliefs have
themselves been built upon other criteria, auch as practice and "objective
experience." Ultimately, then, both consistency and practice are reduced
to "objective experience." This fact arises out of his application of the
pragmatic method, according to which "some particular consequence in our
29 
future practical experience" is the sole meaning of a proposition. Thus
"objective experience" is the final and supreme test. That James does re­ 
gard the matter in this light is evident from his statement that a theory
"must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it
30 
must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly."
It is the particulars of experience to which every truth must finally resort 
for the ultimate stamp of approval. "Uhen a moment in our experience, of 
any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that
sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of
31 
experience again and make advantageous connexion with them." That is to
say, an idea is an expectation of sensory experience which awaits us. The 
idea is verified when the experience which occurs comes with a feeling on 
our part that the thing which takes place is precisely the thing for which we 
had looked. That is, if we can say of an experience, ''this is the very thing 
which I anticipated all along," the idea is true; it works for the results 
are satisfactory. In other words, when there is no feelim? of disharmony, 
or surprise, but a facile, smooth transition from expectancy to fulfilment, 
the idea is verified; the experience yields satisfaction. Truth in this
28. Professor R. B. Perry uses this term in his lectures on ""./illiam James 
and Henri Bergson," Harvard University, 1938.
29. LI. T_. , p. 210.
30. Pragmatism, p. 216.
31. Ibid., p. 205.
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sense is truth in the preferred sense, for James, and takes precedence over 
all other tests which may be applied. It should be remarked that when 
James defines truth in terms of satisfaction he does not mean to say that 
an idea is true simply because it is satisfactory. "The 'satisfaction 1 , 
in turn," he says, "is no abstract satisfaction uberhaupt, felt by an un­ 
specified being, but is assumed to consist of such satisfactions (in the^ 
plural) as concretely existing men actually do find in their beliefs." 
An idea must be satisfactory for a particular purpose and under particular 
circumstances. Before an idea can be said to be satisfactory, according to 
James, we must take into consideration certain conditions which arise from 
both the environment and from the interest which gave birth to the idea. 
The idea has been called into being for the purpose of performing a specific 
task and before it can be regarded as true it must successfully fulfill that 
mission. Only then does it bring satisfactory results.
We have thus far attempted to deal exclusively v;ith his pragmatic theory 
of truth. But James does not always adhere strictly to this view but in­ 
volves himself in innumerable difficulties by confusing satisfaction in terms 
of fulfilled expectations and satisfaction as value or as the result desired.
Some passages may be interpreted to mean either. Again he undoubtedly uses
34 
value as a criterion of truth. In dealing with the relation of truth to
utility he, at least in certain cases, means to define the true in terms of 
the useful. "To 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality," he says, "can 
only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or
to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something
35 
connected with it better than if we disagreed." Again, he regards "the true"
32. lu. T. , p. 192.
33. Cf. Pragmatism, pp. 58, 64.
34. Cf. Ibid., pp. 73, 299, 76.
35. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
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as "only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is
only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any
36 
fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course." Here
it is general utility which constitutes the criterion of truth. Ideas are 
true in so far as they work. The discovery that they serve us is their 
verification. If we find new ideas that v;ill serve us better, the old ideas 
that were true become untrue; and the new ones become true because they are 
found to work, and remain true only so long as they work.
It is worth while to get clearly in mind James's attitude towards 
"theoretical truth," in as much as pragmatism is frequently regarded as pri­ 
marily an appeal to action. James does not intend to disparage theory and 
strongly resents the fact that pragmatism "is usually described as a charac­ 
teristically American movement, a sort of bobtailed scheme of thought, excel­ 
lently fitted for the man on the street, who naturally hates theory and wants
37 
cash returns immediately." He accords the theoretical motive a place in the
formulation of ideas for the purpose of having a "compact and easily stored" 
access to these things, by the use of ideas which are different from the
things themselves, -f in order to be able to find, should one want them, more
38 
things than there are room for within the mind at any one time." From the
theoretical point of view, then, an idea is true of its object when by means 
of the idea ivhich is more "compact" than the object, I have access to the lat­ 
ter. Its success as an idea depends upon the extent to which it presents to 
me the real and complete nature of its object. But the idea is never able 
to do full justice to the object, and it is always better to have the object 
itself at hand. Vie may get a more adequate conception of the way in which
56. Ibid., p. 222.~~———————
37. k. jT-f P- 185 «
38. R. B. Perry, Present Pnilosophical Tendencies, p. 362.
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Jai'iws regards applied and theoretical truth from the following statement 
which is taken from an interview in The New York Times, in 1907: "In 
point of fact, the use of riost of our thinking is to help us to change the 
world. i/e must for this know definitely what we have to change, and thus 
theoretic truth must at all tines come before practical application. But 
the pragraatist writers have sho?m that v;hat we here call theoretic truth 
...will be... irrelevant unless it fits the...purpose in hand... And, 
liioreover, it turns out that the theoretic truth upon, which men base their 
practice today is itself a resultant of previous human practice, based in 
turn upon still...previous truth...so that we may think of all truth what­ 
ever as containing so much human practice funded... Thus we seem set free 
to use our theoretical as well as our practical faculties—-the practical
here in the narrower sense——to get the world into a better shape, and all
39 
with a good conscience."
It follows, from James's view that truth is in the making, that reality 
also is unfinished; it is in the making, and ve help to make it. That is 
to say, reality is additive, cumulative; it gro?;s. It is obvious, however, 
from the account of James's conception of the cognitive process as we have 
followed it, that James is a realist in his epistemology. His pragmatism 
differs at this point from tnat of F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey. For 
both of these thinkers the cognitive process itself is taken as a sample of 
reality, whereas James has a metaphysics in addition to his theory of know­ 
ledge. He maintains throughout that there is a real "core" of reality within
40 
the "successive man-made wrappings" of knowledge. Both Schiller and Dewey
recognize it only as a "limit," to the process of mediation, or a material 
with such plasticity that thought can shape it at will. Janes identifies
39. Quoted by R. 3. Perry, The Oharacter and Thought of 'xilliain James^ 
Vol. II, p. 4:79. " ————'
40. Pragmatism, p. 249.
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that "core" with sensible experience. He v/rites in this connection as 
follows: "Pent in, as the pragmatist more than any one else sees himself 
to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the p?st and 
the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he feels the
immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their
41 
operations?" He starts with two things, "the objective facts and the
clairns," whereas Schiller starts with the subjective pole of the chain, 
that is,with "truth-claims." James thinks that ultimately the two views
would coincide in that Schillor must finally arrive at the "independent ob-
42 
jective facts" and iiis own theory must end with a subjective view of truth.
Due to the influence of the school of British empiricism James places par­ 
ticular emphasis upon the importance of sense perception and upon the immedi­ 
acies of experience in general. Thus, while he admits that our categories 
are the product of human thought and that the hunan factor is strong in all 
of our thinking, he qualifies his humanism by the assertion that there is 
known in immediate experience a kernel of reality which is independent of the 
pragmatic operation, and without which the latter has no application or mean­ 
ing.
The difference between James and ^cniller with reference to the question 
of making reality is obvious when we observe the extent to which we make 
reality according to the latter. For him all knowledge is pragmatic and pro­ 
visional. This applies also to the knowledge of so-called facts. He holds
that the object is always what it is for a subject. His reason for this is
43 
that so to conceive the object yields satisfaction. He says that our making
41. Ibid., p. 235."'
42. H. T., pp. xviii-xix.
43. F. C. 3. Schiller, Studies in Humanism, i^w York: I^c UJkae:.;illan 
Co., London: Llacmillan Co., Ltd., 1907, p. 185.
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of truth really alters "subjective" reality. "It first 'makes' real ob-
44
jects of interest and enquiry, and then 'finds' realities to satisfy them." 
;,<hen we apply our knowledge we alter "real reality," and unless it can be . 
applied it is not real knowledge. In some cases, for example, in human
intercourse, "a subjective making is at the same time a real making of reali-
45 
ty." The opinions of others affect human bein/s; that is, their actions
are different when being observed from what they would be if no one was there
to observe them. Finally, the knower is alwa;;s altered by his knowing; ''and
46 
as the knower is real and a part of reality, reality is really altered."
He says, "even though the Pragmatic Hethod implies a truth and a reality which 
it does not make, yet it does not conceive them as valuable. It conceives 
them only as indicating limits to our explanations, and not as revealing the 
solid foundations whereon they rest. All effective explanation, however, 
starts from the actual process of knowing, which is pragmatic, and not from
hypothetical foundations, v,hich are dubious. And all effective truth and
47 
reality result from the same pragmatic process." James, on the other hand,
says that unatever ''propositions or beliefs may, in point of fact, prove true, 
... the truth of thera consists in certain definable relations between them and 
the reality of which they make report...the first vague notion of 'agreement' 
with reality becomes specified into that of innumerable ways in which our 
thoughts may fit reality, ways in which the mind's activities cooperate on 
equal terms with the reality in producing the fit resultant truth.... Iviind 
engenders truth upon reality.... Our minds are not here simply to copy a 
reality that is already complete. They are here to complete it, to add to 
its importance by their own remodeling of it, to decant its contents over, so
44. Ibid., p. 458]~
45. Ibid., p. 458.




to speak, into a more significant shape."
This difference with reference to the part reality plays in the truth 
process leads to a corresponding difference concerning truth. .then reality 
is treated simply as a "limit," as in the case of Dewey and Schiller, truth 
is regarded as the process of verification which takes place within experi­ 
ence; and it is conceived as consisting in the successful working of the idea,
in the concrete events or steps within consciousness which connect the unveri-
49 
fied claim and the full and satisfactory issue. James holds to the view
that the trueness of an idea is constituted by two things; the process 
of leading through these intermediary experiences and the subjective satis­ 
faction which follows; and the actual presence of the object or reality which 
the idea intends. Thus, for Janes, the object must be actually present if 
the iaea is to be true; that is, it must exist independently of our experience, 
and in certain cases outside of it. Here truth is a relation between the 
idea and a reality which may transcend the experience of the individual know- 
er; it is not wholly within our experience. It ceases to be merely a process 
or a felt transition from one part of our experience to another. Also, 
James's admission of an external reality as an essential element in the truth 
situation enables him to hold that an idea may be true before verification 
takes place. ^he other conception, on the other hand, maintains that since 
truth consists in the actual process of verification, the idea must be proved
to be trufi before it is true. But for James, verifibility "is as good as «--/
50 
verification." Thus he maintains that the successful operation of an idea
proves it true, wuile the more extreme view holds that the consequences make 
it true or constitute its truth. According to James's view of tne matter,
48. Quoted by R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 479.
49. Of. J. 3. Pratt, op. cit., p. 98.
50. Gf. Prafyiatism, p. 207.
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ideas that are useful may be considered true apart from, and in advance of, 
their utility since their objects must actually be present before they are 
capable of successful use. You may say of an idea that "'it is useful 
because true' or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these phrases
mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that .jests fulfilled
51
and can be verified." His view steers a "Middle of the road" course be­ 
tween the extreme pragmatic position and the correspondence theory, and may 
be said to be more in harmony v.dth the latter notion of truth than xvith the 
extreme view of other pragma-Gists. It is unique in that it purports to be 
based on a thoroughgoing epistemolo^ical realism but at the same time attempts 
to connect the idea with the object without appealing to any mysterious 
faculty of transcendence of a different kind from the concrete experiential 
things which it joins. This he does by means of the "context;" that is, by 
taking into account the existences that intervene between the experience and 
the object end unite them into a single world.
By taking this iaore moderate position James is able to avoid some of 
the difficulties involved in the extreme pragmatic view, but he is apparent­ 
ly led into an irresolvable contradiction, namely, that of maintaining that 
"satisfactions" and the concrete events of experience are indispensable to 
truth, on the one hand, and that an idea can be true apart from, and in ad­ 
vance of, these consequences and series of events, on the other. If he 
emphasizes the former assertion, his view still differs from the extreme prag­ 
matic tueory in tiiat it insists that the object must really be there, and 
that the consequences and "leadings" are insufficient, yet he must hold that 
a verifiable belief is not true until it has been verified. If, however, he 
emphasizes the latter assertion, the unique feature of his theory disappears
51. Ibid., p. 204.
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and the correspondence theory is restored. In other words, if he admits
the existence of a world outside one's own stream of consciousness, and 
that we judge concerning its constituent parts, be they things or persons, 
he must go further and admit that the validity of such judgments depends 
upon their relation to those objects of thought. To do this is to for­ 
sake the praginatist's essential contention concerning truth. On the other 
hand, if he denies any such relation between our judgments and their ob­ 
jects, he virtually denies that there is a world outside one's conscious ex­ 
perience in that, if it does exist, it is negligible and meaningless so far 
as human experience goes.
Our account of James's doctrine of xaethod and theory of truth serves 
to bring out futurism as an essential and characteristic feature of prag­ 
matism. According to this aspect of pragmatism, beliefs are tested by the 
consequences v.hich issue from them in the future; good consequences are a 
mark of their truth and bad consequences indicate their falsity. They are 
meaningless unless they make a difference in the life of the one who holds 
them. Thus they may harmonize perfectly with the body of established 
truths, and they may successfully copy present reality, but unless concrete 
consequences flow from them, they cannot properly be regarded as true; that 
is. true in any significant sense. When interpreted in this manner prag­ 
matism becomes primarily an "epistemological inter-temporalism," to use Pro- 
53 
fessor ;.. 0. Love joy's term. Janes construes "meaning" and ''truth" in
54 
terms of "interteraporal relations between successive phases of experience,"
instead of defining them in terms common!/ used which either did n.)t recognize 
temporal distinctions of before and after, or which apparently transcended
52. Cf. J. B. Pratt, op. cit., pp. lub flf!"~~
53. A. 0. Lovejoy,"uilliam James as Philosopher'; Tno International Journal of Ethics, Vol. .GCI, No. 2, 1911, „. 149. —————————— —————
54. Ibid., p. 149, cf. also p. 150.
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all such distinctions. Truth had usually been conceived as some sort of 
"cross-wise" relation; a judgment was regarded as in sora-j v,ay correspond­ 
ing with its object, or with the eternal knowledge possessed by an absolute 
mind. James interprets the entire affair as ono of "length-wise" relations. 
He conceives a judgment as essentially the act of an individual who occupies 
a particular place in the stre^i of time, and who faces the future prepared 
to act, and who pu^lies out into the future even as he renders a judgment. 
The futuristic emphasis of pragmatism takes its cue from theoretical science 
which, whilu it holds that an hypothesis must explain present facts, and har­ 
monize v;ith past knowledge, it must also open the ;vay for an increase of know­ 
ledge and prove itself capable of exporierental verification and applications 
to new conditions. Liow it is the last phase of the scientific conception 
which pragmatism elevates to a place of supreme importance to the neglect of 
the other two. It insists that this principle is applicable to philosophical 
theories and historical movements of the social and religious order. The­ 
ology is no exception to this rule, for creed and ritual must be referred to 
their future consequences for their chief, if not their only, significance.
James's intense conviction, and true insight concerning the significance 
for epistemolo. .y of th<j temporal, and trie essentially forward-looking, antici­ 
patory nature of human thinking seem at tines to blind hi:.! to the fact that 
the past and present are also parts of the temporal process. Without deny­ 
ing the truth contained in his emphasis upon the future, v/e recognize that 
there are limitations to the attitude in life and science which fails to take 
into account the past and present. As Professor Lovejoy puts it, "it ob­ 
viously will not do to define the import of a judgment or the nature of truth 
in a v.ay which prevents judgments from truly referring to these phases, 
——uhich tries to metamorphose the whole meaning of pastness and contempora-
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neity into pure futurity." Plainly it is not possible to confine the
"meaning" or "truth 4' of either scientific hypotheses or of social and re­ 
ligious movements to their consequences in the future. For, as .. r:;.f essor 
W. F. Lor.tague points out, most theories are adaptations of principles which 
have been established in the past. In both science and the social order 
there is a presumption in favor of a theory or principle which past experience 
has tested. The fruitful results which a hypothesis makes possible are due 
to the fact that it is in harmony with the present structure of reality. 
professor Llontague compares a scientific hypothesis to a kay which unlocks a 
door, it does so because it fits the structure of the lock. Similarly, an 
hypothesis works because it fits into present reality. He holds that the 
extent to which a theory copies reality does not depend upon the resemblance
of its terms or qualities to those of reality, "but on the resemblance of
56 
its relations to the relations between facts." For him, it is relational
and not qualitative resemblance or identity which constitutes meaningful 
truth. "In general, when theories that are apparently contradictory prove 
useful in dealing with reality it does not follow that reality is arbitrary 
or indeterminate, and that on account of it can be true only in a pragmatic 
sense. The utility of such theories will always be due not to their qual­ 
itative difference from one another and from the facts, but to their rela-
57 
tional resemblance, or correspondence to one another and to the facts."
The scientific procedure of induction carries on with the assumption 
that there are certain data, the "facts" with which our facts must harmonize. 
Tntt is to say, there are truths of fact which precede the entire inductive
55. I'oid., pp. 149-150. ~~—————————
56. W. P. i..-;:tague, The ..ups of lino win ̂ , or Llethods in Philosophy, London: 
George A.llen and Unwin Ltd., Hew ",r- : Vl-3 Lacrnill".:: do., 1925, p. 144. 
Cf_. also -p. 143-144.
57. Ibid., p. 145.
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process. Now these must be "true" in some sense otner than that of merely 
producing satisfactory consequences. But James asserts that what is "fact" 
is to be regarded as neither true nor false but as something which comes be­ 
fore the distinction between truth and falsehood. "Day follows day, 1 ' he 
says, "and its contents are simply added. The new contents themselves are 
not true, they simply come and are. Truth is what we _say_ about them, and
when we say that they have come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive
58 
formula." A working hypothesis must work theoretically for science; that
is, all of its verifiable consequences must be true. For example, the law 
of gravitation is true for science if it enables us to determine the motions 
of the heavenly bodies so as to ascertain their position, so far as they are 
observable, at a certain place and at a given time. This is what it means 
when it says that a law "works." It has nothing to say concerning the con­ 
sequences of trds law so far as our future welfare or interests are concerned. 
It may be quite incompatible with these and yet it may still be said to "workn 
in the scientific sense, for it harmonizes with observed facts. It is ob­ 
vious, then, that science means a very different thing by "working" from that 
which the pragmatist means when he assumes that "working" is the essence of 
truth. It is true, as the pragmatist contends, that truth here is a partic­ 
ular species of "truth," and the working of a scientific law is a specific 
example of their general conception of working. For the law in question is 
true in the pragmatic sense in that it enables us to calculate the notions of 
the heavenly bodies in keeping with our inquiry concerning them. But it 
does not substantiate the claim of the pragmatist concerning the essence of 
truth. Further, while a scientific hypothesis must conform to established 
truths, new facts may at any time render it inadequate. Thus only tentative
58. Prajn'-'tism, p. 62.
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assent is accorded it. If, then, the pragmatist takes the scientific con­ 
ception of truth as his sole criterion, he is depending upon cases in which 
there is least assurance that truth is present. As a method of procedure, 
this does not carry a great deal of hope or promise. If it be said that 
our belief in a hypothesis or theory increases with its demonstrated success 
in working, it may be replied that in that case there is less likelihood 
that another one would also work so as to render the one we now hold false.
Futurism fails adequately to account for th^ great social and religious 
movements of history. For, as Professor I'ontague states, "even the most
novel and revolutionary of these movements are profoundly and professedly
59 
motivated and guided by ni^tory." He cites Larxian Socialism as a notable
example of the fact that any movement is deeply rooted in the past. This 
movement is based on a philosophy of history, namely, a materialistic or 
economic interpretation of history, vmich is based on a sort of "inverted 
Hegelianism;" and without regard to the truth or falsity of the interpretat­ 
ion, we cannot understand this new social trend without reference to, or 
study of, the past. Future planning is based upon the past. There are al­ 
ways certain factors and elements which are given and which serve as the 
basis for future planning which consists largely in a redistribution of, and 
new emphasis upon, these more or less permanent factors. Similarly, it is 
impossible to interpret the social philosophy of the movement in the United 
States which is popularly called the "Hew Deal", and led by /'resident ?. D. 
Roosevelt, apart from the history of our political and social life from the 
early beginnings as a nation. /specially since the American Civil ".Tar the 
conditions which made something like the "I7ew iv-al" inevitable have been cuiiu- 
lative and did not begin v.ith the administration of ex-/resident Herbert 
59. Y*r . P. Lonta.^ue, op. cit. , p. 141. " ~~~
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Hoover, nor with the uorld War. As a matter of fact, Woodrow Wilson was 
attempting many of the social and political reforms which President Roose­ 
velt has undertaken; perhaps he would have carried many of them to a success­ 
ful completion had not his attention been diverted from these domestic prob­ 
lems to those of international scope as a result of the War. It should be 
remembered, also, th;>t President Roosevelt received much of his political 
training under Woodrow Wilson. Another phase of our social life which the 
"New Deal" Was brought to the front is strikingly similar to tl.e situation 
which precipitated the American Civil War—the ill-feeling betxveen New 
Zn^Iand and the South. The Civil War freed the slaves but it did not re­ 
move the basic conditions which brought on the \var, for example, the econom­ 
ic inequality which exists between an agricultural and an industrial section 
of the United States. Similar conditions still exist and they are now loom­ 
ing up as a somev/nat serious problem due to the fact that the South is begin­ 
ning to recuperate from the damage suffered during the Civil .ar and Recon­ 
struction days. Consequently, the South is now threatening the industrial 
interests of the North and liiast which have had almost exclusive financial con­ 
trol since the conflict between the states. Slavery enabled the South to 
threaten these interests in the first half of the nineteenth century. Now 
it is cheap labor, a more favorable climate, cheaper living conditions, and 
lower taxes along with other factors which bring tack upon our hands this 
problem over which the Civil War was fought. But the basic principles in­ 
volved are the same as those which brought on the Civil 'Aar without the ques­ 
tion of slavery, which served as a means of keeping the real issue hidden, and 
gave it the appearance of a struggle over a great principle of humanitarianism, 
The "New Deal" has helped to strengthen the hands of the South and has made 
the present a propitious time to attempt to regain much of that which it lost
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during th&.t war. Thus the situation .which exists in this country today 
under President Roosevelt is wholly inexplicable apart from the conditions 
which existed a century ago, und the developments which have taken place in 
the meantime.
The past is especially important in the interpretation of religious 
movements. Christianity, for example, is so deeply rooted in Judaism that 
many of its characteristic features can be understood only in the light of 
its historical connection with the development of the social, political and 
religious life of the Jewish people. The experience of the early Christ­ 
ians, at Pentecost, remains a source to \;nich Christianity must ever turn 
for a renewed understanding of har primitive power, as well as a source of 
renewed inspiration for the future. Every appeal such as "Back to Jesus," 
or "Back to Pentecost," which modern Christianity makes means that the pr<st 
is pregnant with significance, and that the present cannot be interpreted 
without such reference, and that, without it, the future is impossible. In 
so far, then, as pragmatism places exclusive emphasis upon the future it fails 
satisfactorily to explain the great social and religious movements which al­ 
ways grow out of the past and which derive much of their significance for 
the present find future from their past.
The emphasis which pragmatism places upon the future has been of real 
value and serves as a corrective to any view which minimizes or neglects this 
aspect of thought and life. It has given philosophy and theology a permanent 
modification in its conception of futurism, and the influence of this view 
shall remain with us in our consideration of social and religious movements. 
i.'hen a new movement is under way, this principle will enable us to study the 
past as a means of helping us to determine the future course of that movement. 
The use which we nay make of the past vith reference to the future will set
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us to the task of verifying history and lead us to give it.a prospective 
and selective emphasis. The status quo in social or religious fields, its 
customs and institutions will be accepted for what they are worth. Our 
respect for the established order will not be blind and automatic, but 
reasoned and' self-conscious. We shall not regard "the new as not true, and 
the true as not new," without further ado. When the old confronts new con­ 
ditions it must assume the burden of proof and if it fails to cope with the 
new situation it must give way to the new. For example, to refer to the 
"New Deal" in the United States once more, President Roosevelt's chief source 
of power and much of his success may bo attributed to the fact that the 
leaders of the Republican party had no wa" of meeting the crisis which con­ 
fronted the nation as a result of the economic situation from 19C9 to 1933. 
Plainly, their economic and political philosophy had failed to solve the dif­ 
ficulties which perplexed our country during those years of adversity. As a 
result,regardless of how much they disagree with President Roosevelt's methods, 
and in spite of their disparagement of his actual achievements, they are forced 
now to concede that in case they get control of the government in 1940, they 
would attempt to carry out similar reforms, and aiiu at practically the same 
objectives which characterize the "New Deal." For the most part, they simply 
claim that they vail do the samo things that president Roosevelt is doing, 
but that they will do them far more effectively and 'with less danger to our 
democratic form of government and institutions than Llr. Roosevelt has been 
able to do thus far. Tho Republicans can do little more, then, than charge 
him and his administration v.ith failure to achieve what they nov- conceive to 
be legitimate reforms^but ten years ago they would have strenuously opoosed 
these reforms as such. Thus the pragmatic emphasis upon the future contains 
an important element of truth, namely, that the old becomes obsolete and na^
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be an obstacle to progress when it proves inadequate to meet new situations 
in a changing world. There are many cases in which the only proof that a 
theory does agree v/ith the hard facts of the present is to be found in future 
consequences. The pragmatist view contains this element of truth: while the 
consequences do not constitute the truth of & theory, they may disclose its
truth. "They are its ratio cognoscendi," as Professor Montague puts it,
60 
"though never its rat Io essendi."
A second essential feature of pragmatism is its practicalisn which is 
closely connected with futurism. There are three types of practicalisrn in
pragmatism which Professor Llontague calls "empirical," "humanistic," and
61 
"biological" practicalism. Empirical practicalism characterizes James's
pragmatism. He uses the v.ord "practical", as we have seen, in the sense of 
the particular, the concrete, the specific, as against the universal and ab­ 
stract. :iis usage of "practical" in this sense is closely connected with 
pragmatism as a method which, as has been shown, is essentially the same as 
his radical empiricism when the latter is considered as a method. 'Since it 
bases truth upon particular facts of perception rather than on abstract and 
universal principles of reason, it is virtually the same as nominalistic 
empiricism. "Humanistic" practicalism holds that truth satisfies our per­ 
sonal needs and desires as contrasted with tne notion that truth merely meets 
a supposed impersonal and merely intellectual ideal. This type of practical­ 
ism pervades the pragmatism of .jchiller and is dominant in James's doctrine 
of the will to believe. Finally, "biological" practical ism offers the purely 
pv'jhological theory of thought. Both in the human race as a whole, or 
pi-'.„ logenetically, and in the individual members of tho race, tLat is, onto-
60. 1" f . p. ...^utague , op. cit. , p. 147.
61. Ci1 . Ibid., pp. 148ff.
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genetically, thought has arisen out of the needs and demands of practical 
life. It also maintains from both logical and ethical considerations that 
utility for the preservation and betterment of our practical life constitutes 
the standard or goal of thought. This latter emphasis which deals with the
validity and value of thought arises out of the former which has to do with
63 
the manner in which thought arose. It is not necessary to deal separately
with each of these types of practicalism in order to taring out the distinct­ 
ive teaching of this aspect of pragmatism.
For the pragmatist, as we have; seen, the mark of the truth of knowledge 
is the satisfying character of the practical transition from the cognitive 
expectation to fulfillment. And James does offer satisfaction as a criteri­ 
on of truth but due to his realistic tendencies his view does not commit him 
to subjectivism, or to the notion which holds that the knower has it vithin 
his power to cause judgments to be true or false. Satisfaction for him is, 
as has been pointed out, a specific, determined .sort of satisfaction. IVe 
do not ourselves determine which beliefs will afford satisfaction. We may 
want to believe one thing but discover that the only satisfactory solution to 
the problem at hand may be to believe the opposite. If seme tragedy should 
occur to an intimate friend, for instance, the only satisfactory course to 
pursue is to believe that v.hich I least desire to believe. I never would 
have chosen to believe what the facts of the case force upon ray belief. Un­ 
less I believe this undesirable thing my relationship with my environment 
may not only turn out to be unsatisfactory, but may prove disastrous as well. 
Thus it does not mean that a judgment which expresses my desire is true. l'y 
belief arises because it enables me to realize a better adjustment between 
myself and my environment. When James departs from this more fundamental 
62. Of. Ibid., pp. 154 ff. ~~" " ~~ '
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principle of his prajiatic theory and conceives satisfaction in terms of 
value or utility he confuses truth a:id the "good." The latter term is 
ordinarily used to describe objects in so far as they satisfy our desires 
and needs. In seeking the good we attempt to change the environment so 
as to make it conform to our needs and desires. V/e use the term truth to 
describe our ideas v.hen they agrey with reality, that is, in so far as they 
assert a fact. Here we try to make our ideas and judgments harmonize v;ith 
reality. Thus it is one thin: to say that truth is useful, or "good," and 
quite another to say that its truth consists in its usefulness. There is 
no warrant Tor confusing these two different and opposite ways of trying to 
affect an adjustment between tho individual and his environment, by regard­ 
ing the satisfaction of reason and desire for knowledge and that of senti­ 
ment and desire as the same sort of satisfaction. The former is truth, 
the lattbi1 is goodness, and however closely related and overlapping they may 
be, they cannot be completely identified. MT..e can, to some extent, determine 
reality by our desires arid shape the course of nature to our needs. But the 
overwhelming majority of the things in the ;vorld are beyond our power to 
change, though not beyond our power to know. The things that we knov; to be 
true, but cannot and should not regard as good, are equalled in number only 
by tho things which we can and should regard as good, but which we know are 
not true: To close our oyes to this tragic aspect of existence, and to insist 
with the humanistic pragmatists that there must be a correlation of the true 
and the desirable, is as vicious and futile as it is false. Our main hope 
of improving the humr-n world lies in a clear and unflinching recognition of
the difference between facts and ideals, between what we find to be true and
63 
what we wish to be true.'' To maintain that the adequacy of truth depends
63. VL P. Montague, Ibid., pp. 153-154. '
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on the degree to which it satisfies the individual and society as a whole 
does not do justice to the facts of human experience. For in a vast 
realm of experience, as R. B. Perry puts it, the "human tendency is not in 
the direction of the formation of more congenial beliefs, the construction of 
a universe -chat shall best answer given human needs and hopes, but in the di­ 
rection of an adjustment of these needs and hopes to things as they are found 
to be. Enlightment is far more likely to bring disillusionment than confirm­ 
ation of hopes, and this is true not only of the individual, but of the race. 
Undoubtedly we do try to find evidence which shall suit us, but such suiting 
does not constitute or even strengthen the evidence. Equilibrium between
life and its environment is reached in the end not by getting a truth to suit
64 
our uses, but by getting used to reality."
As to the pragmatic contention that knowledge adds to, and modifies 
reality, James is considerably limited in this conception by his realism, as 
we have seen, and in so far as he remains a realist he cannot follow the more 
extreme humanistic tendencies of pragmatism. On realistic grounds a thing 
is not modified simply by being known. It is true that knowledge modifies
knowledge since that which is known is likely to be acted upon and thus rnodi-
65 
fied. "It is undoubtedly true that knowledge adds what knowledge is."
livery act of knowing renders the world richer. Thus the range and systematic 
unity of the world of knowledge are widened and constructed from day to day. 
But knowledge does not modify the past and the remote. The past which con­ 
tinues into the present, or the remote which is brought close may be modified, 
but before modification is possible there must be greater proximity than that
64. R. B. Perry,"^ Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization," 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. IV, No. 16, 1907, p. 426.
65. R. 3. Perry, Ibid., p. 426.
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which is required for mere knowledge. Unless we have access to a past 
event as it v/as, or to a remote event as such, we cannot really be said to 
know the former as it was rior the latter as remote. It is not possible to
knov, historical events at all if we are unable to know the past "for to every
66 ^ / , 
event its own particular time is an inalienable past." This restricted 7 / '
modification by knowledge which an epistenological realism inposes does not 
seem to be compatible with the view that the world is of our making. Just 
how far James conceives the world to be of our making he never makes expli­ 
cit. If we adopt the conception that experience is in its "pristine purity" 
chaotic, the merely determinable, without any definite inner structure, it 
is not possible to work it up into anything whatever; it would not tolerate 
the additon of a predicate. James says that it is no.v enveloped in predi­ 
cates which have been historically worked out. This implies that it never 
was the "pui-e" sort of "stuff" he claims that it was. He concedes what tho 
realist asks for, namely, three parts of reality, sensations, relations, and 
previous truths, but he does not make it clear just to what extent knowledge 
does modify or add to being. In so far as James it: a realist he cannot say 
that knowledge makes the v.orld, for plainly this is untenable. To quote 
R. B. Perry again, "Knowledge does make its \ :orld, it may even be said to
make our world; but there is a tremendous significance, practical, philosoph-
67 
ical and religious, in this difference between our world ana the world."
He says further, "if the difference be retained : ] nd construed strictly in 
terir.s of a realistic theory of knowledge, then iiunieriisra is not a .:h?tPip!:y,-,ics
but a philosophy of history; not a theory of bein^, but an interpretati^r of
68 
life." riie error of the pragmatist lies in the fact th^t he disregards
66. Ibid., p. 427.""
67. Ibid., p. 427.
68. Ibid., p. 427.
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the distinction between psychological genesis and oiitological reality; for him 
reality cannot be other than v,hat it is known us bein^. Things exist apart 
from the knov/er in space and time, but what thoy are is v-hat they are con­ 
ceived—— soraetir.e, somewhere, by some body—-to be, or what they would be 
perceived as being if there were a perceiver present. This, for the pra.^- 
matist, is vmat they really are. In themselves they are not something else. 
The result of this procedure is that we are offered a hypothetical pure ex­ 
perience as the primordial stuff from which all things proceed --and a function­ 
al psychology which is elevated to the queen of the sciences. But the in­ 
sistence upon the instrumental character of sense and thought has done much 
to make prominent the purposive character of our mental life, anO the human 
element in the building up the body of scientific truths.
Pragmatism as practicalism maintains that all truth has practical cor­ 
ollaries. The intellect is subservient to life and we c-^n show the manner 
and method of its working and the purpose it serves. Truth is a utility. 
Thus far we may agree with the pragmatist but it is quite another thing to 
assert that the ideal of the intellect, the end for which it strives,is it­ 
self nothing more than a utility. For, as H. 'V. Garr shows, unless we at­ 
tach meaning to truth other than its "workableness", and independent of, and 
distinct from, its practical consequences it is difficult to see v;hat value 
we can assign the intellect at all. "Trie very essence of its service is 
reduced to naught; for what else but the conception of an objective truth, a 
logical reality independent of any and every psychological condition, is the 
utility that the intellect juts us in possession of? It is this conception 
alone that constitutes it an effective mode of activity. Therefore, if we 
hold with the pragmatist that the intellect is subservient to life, truth is 
indeed a utility, but it is a utility just because it has a ii-^anin-; distinct
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from usefulness. On the oth«r hand, to condemn any knowledge as 'useless'
69 
is to deny utility to the intellect." It is quite true that all truths
have many practical corollaries and may be related to various human interests, 
but the relation of collateral interests to truth is accidental, and these 
do not make or unmake truth. It is possible to conceive of some knowledge 
which has long been useful to the human race ceasing to exist. 3ut the fact 
that it ceases to exist does not render the truth it contains false. Intel­ 
lectual activity does not make an idea true nor does inactivity make it false. 
Existence is rooted in reality, not in knowledge. Reality does not depend 
on truth. Truth is the intellectual apprehension of reality. Usefulness 
is something which flows from the character of the reality which is selective­ 
ly known rather than something which constitutes a criterion of truth.
\Ve are warranted in regarding with suspicion any attempt to identify the 
truth of ideas with their effectiveness either in discourse or experiment. 
As F. J. E. Woodbridge points out, it appears that "the effectiveness must be 
of a particular kind. Ai:6 that particular kind, v.'hen it takes on an adject­ 
ive to qualify it, always seems to clamor for the adjective in dispute. Be­ 
liefs are obviously effective v/rien they are not true, and no long run of their
70 
effectiveness seems adequate to remove them from suspicion." It v.ill not
do to assert with the pragmatists that an idea is true simply because it works 
As Professor \1. 2. Hocking shows, the logical error of this teaching of prag­ 
matism is a false conversion of "All true propositions work," into "All pro-
71 
positions that work are true, :t which is not logically allowable. To say
that all crows are black is not the same thing as to say that all black birds
69. H. W. 'Jarr, The Problem of Tr^th. London and Edinburgh; T. C. and 
J£. C. .Tack. New York: Dodge Publishing Co., 1913, ^. 57.
70. F. J. E. V7ood.bridge,"The Promise of Pragmatism,"Journal of Philosor- •-, Vol. XXVI, No. 20, 1929, - . 542. " "————— — ——————=~^~'
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are crows. Professor Hocking says that the pragmatic principle "Whatever
73 
works is true," can be regarded "as neither valid nor useful." He suggests
a negative sort of pragmatism as a means of detecting the presence of error.
74 
"That which does not work is not true," is the principle which he adopts.
According to this negative pragmatism, "if a theory has no consequences, or 
bad ones; if it makes no difference to men, or else undesirable differences; 
if it lowers the capacity of men to meet the stress of existence, or diminishes 
the worth to them of what existence they have; such a theory is somehow false, 
and we have no peace until it is remedied. I will even go farther, and say 
that a theory is false if it is not interesting: a proposition that falls on 
the mind so dully as to excite no enthusiasm has not attained the level of
truth; though the words be accurate the import has leaked away from them, and
75 
the meaning is not conveyed." At a glance, Professor Hocking f s view of the
matter seems to be an improvement upon the positive principle of pragmatism, 
but closer scrutiny reveals that this negative interpretation of the pragmatic 
principle itself involved some sort of positive pragmatism. That is, as
D. C. Macintosh argues, there is no warrant for it unless positive pragmatism
76 
is in some sense true. As he points out, "we cannot be critical and say,
*A11 that works is true'; but it seems very improbable that we should be cor­ 
rect in saying, 'Nothing that does not work is true*, unless it were also true
that some positive relation of importance existed between working and truth,
77 
that some kind of working might rightly be regarded as a criterion of truth."
It would seem, then, that we must either grant that there is an element of
72. Of. Ibid., p. 164."——————————————————
73. W. E. Hocking, The Meaning of God in human Experience, Preface, p. xiii
74. Ibid., p. xiii.
75. Ibid., p. xiii.
76. D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 413-414.
77. Ibid., p. 414.
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truth in positive pragmatism or return to the position which holds that 
the truth of a jud^raont in no way depends upon its practical function.
Obviously the pragmatic principle that truth is that which works does 
not always hold good. 7/orld conditions today shov: that we cannot use it 
to decide the truth of the principles of democracy. Mussolini and Hitler 
proclaim quite confidently and vociferously that democracy is a failure, 
and that our child-like faith in it is falsely placed. On the other hand, 
British :.md American statesmen and citizens clin^ to democracy as the ulti­ 
mate hope of the world. liussolini and Hitler assure us thrt it did not 
work in Italy and Germany, and they seem to be just as certain that it can­ 
not work elsewhere. We believe that it does work in Great Britian and in 
the United states and that it would work in Italy and Germany if these two 
countries would actually give it a fair chance and trial. A;/,ain, there is 
the question of the working of Christianity. Russia has discarded it, and 
all forms of religion, for that matter, as t? an opiate of the people," and 
regards it as a failure in that country. Other countries regard it as 
the one v/ay out of the chaotic conditions in which our world is floundering 
at present. During the World War and also during the financial depression 
of recent years many people have said that Christianity is a failure; that 
is, it is a false belief according to the pragmatist. We may ask whether it 
has really been tried in either case in which it has been pronounced a fail­ 
ure. It would appear that it is not so much that "it has been tried and 
found wanting, but that it has been found difficult and not tried." Further, 
such a view must declare that many of the ideals of Christianity are false 
because the hard facts of life and human nature have prevented their success­ 
ful operation on anything like a universal scale in the past. For instance, 
the principles of honesty and unselfishness in business and politics do not
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always enjoy a privileged status, and rigid adherence to these principles is 
frequently regarded as impracticable and impossible. There always seems to 
be some element of compromise between that which ought to be and that which 
is, the former being considered impossible of attainment. But does this ac- 
knowledged failure to practice the ideals in question, because from a sheerly 
practical point of view men deem them impossible, render them false? Is 
honesty a false principle because the man who practices it in a world of "cut- 
throat competition" goes bankrupt? Is unselfishness a false principle because 
the man who follows this course loses out where others apply the "tooth and 
claw" policy? It would seem so according to the pragmatist notion of truth. 
Loreover, there are the cases in which that which is renown to be false does
work. As \i. H. Carr points out, the hypothesis of ether vjorked, but it has
78 
proved to be non-existent. -.hen the United otates entered the '..orld l-ar,
7'oodrow Wilson stirred the people of this country to a loyal and patriotic 
support of the nation's cause by proclaiming that "We are fighting a v.ar to 
end war." Subsequent events have proved his statement false but it success- 
fully achieved the purpose he had in mind, which was to unite his fellow 
countrymen in a common aim. dtill more, there is the instance used by Pro- 
fessor i>. "E. Hocking of the perfect imitation. There are tv/o bags of coins 
in which there is an equal number of similar coins. One individual takes 
the bag which belongs to anotrier, and the other person takes the one which is
left. liach individual thinks that he nas uis ov*n bag. Are these beliefs
79
true? Vie are justified in the conclusion, therefore, that while true propo- 
sitions do v.ork, not all propositions which work are true, and not all propo- 
sitions whicn fail to work are false. perhaps it is not too much to sa^ with
78. ;.. H. Carr, op. cit., pp. 60 ff.
79. Cf. > !f. i. aocking, ^ypes of Philosophy, p. 16£.
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J. L. Perrier, that ' : of all the aspects of pragmatism, the one which James
mostly emphasized, namely, the consideration of practical results, is pre-
80 
cisely the one that is bound to disappear."
ive have now to consider a third essential characteristic of pragmatism, 
namely, its relativism. The relativism of the epistemolo/y of pragmatism
arises out of its nracticalism. The thourou-chroins; application of the evo- e
/
lutionarv principle to psychology with the resultant conception of mental 
processes as teleolo deal leads to the confusing of the logical interest in 
achieving cognitive satisfaction with the ethical interest in realizing prac­ 
tical satisfaction, f,nd subsumes the former under the latter. Tne utilitar­ 
ian principle of expedienc^ in the field of etnics is broadened to include 
the realm of truth. 'I'i.e former makes our noral values relative, that is, 
depending upon *:hti satisfaction tLoy produce in v,ay of conduct, and the exten­ 
sion of this principle to truth renders the tr,'th relative. Th-t is to s-j, 
truth is made to depend upon the practical satisfaction v.hich it brings. 
Utilitarianism dispenses v?ith the idea of a "good" that is absolute and inde­ 
pendent of our changing desires, and pragmatism does away with the notion of 
truth as absolute and independent of the changing beliefs of individuals. 
For pragmatism, then, both ethics and truth are relativistic. neither the 
good nor the true h;.s an;/ absolute ocntent apart from the desires and interests 
of individuals; man becom-s the measure of all things. Pragmatism starts 
with the impulsive, striving, purposive life of man and builds its pnilosophy 
of truth and of reality around him. It concentrates upon the conative aspect 
of his life and derives its cognitive aspect from the former. It conceives 
man as an active creature, attempting to adapt himself to his environment and
80. J. L. Perrier,"The j\-rmaubiit Contributions of the Pragmatists,"Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol. ^III, No. 10, 1916, p. 269.
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trying to control it e.nd force it into service in the interest of his preser­ 
vation and well-being. Changing environmental conditions demand correspond­ 
ing changes in his mode of reacting or of adaptation. This situation affords 
the pragnatist his basis for the determining of truth and of value.
\Ve cannot acquiesce in the opinion of the pra^matists that our judgments 
of value are completely relative to human desires and interests. We must 
recognize, however, that significant changes do occur in our standards of 
value from time to time; our standards do grow. 3ut we do not believe that 
we are warranted in applying the evolutionary principle to every aspect of 
human life and thought, and thereby render all values relative. D. T. How­ 
ard puts the matter rightly when he states, "the.t on- might have a firn 'be­ 
lief in the efficiency of organic evolution in the field of biology without
81 
conceding it a similar potency in the field of mind • nd morals." Professor
E. V,. Lynan argues that the intuitive character of many of our judgments of
value render it possible to maintain that a sweeping claim for relativity of
82 
values is out of the question. He takes, for example, what he considers the
supreme principle of ethics, namely, that the "fullest development of every
human personality through the co-operative creation of a world-wide community
83 
of persons," and shows that it is not relative solely to human desire -c.nd
interest. "It involves the direct appreciation of personality as haviru in­ 
trinsic worth, and it involves also a direct recognition of the equalitarian
principle——namely, that every personality has intrinsic worth, and that hence
84 
no person can rightfully be made a mere means to other persons' ends." Now
he maintains that ^n intuition of this sort is not something belonging to mere
*"-.. TX'T. Ho \vard, "The Pragmatic l-.iethod, "Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XII, T'o t 
6, 1918, p. 154.
82. E. iic. Lyman, The Keanin>_- _and Truth of Religion, New York 
and London: Charles tjcribner's Jens, 192-3, pp. 181 ff.
83. Ibid., p. 181.
84. Ibid., p. 182.
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instinct. It possesses a cognitive quality \;hich instinct and impulse lack. 
"An intuition is, in its intent, an apprehension of something objective, be­ 
ing in this respect akin to perception. But an intuition also gives under­ 
standing of things objective; it goes beyond the new data or stubborn opaque
facts which may be all that perception gives and grasps them in their in-
85
trinsic nature, in their meaning, in their connection with significant wholes." 
Thus it resembles reasoning and inference. But intuition differs from these 
in that it gets its understanding with •>->. directness and immediacy which mark 
perception. "But the point of special importance for us now is that intuit­ 
ion ranges itself with perception and with inference as one way of knowing
86 
objective reality." How desires and interests are subjective in character;
they arise within the suoject and are decisively determined froai within. In­ 
tuitions, on the other hand, are objective in their purport find receive their 
decisive determination from objective reality however much it may be subject­ 
ively conditioned. Subjective activity is undoubtedly necessary in intuition 
just as in perception there must oe some contribution made by the percipient; 
but intuition must render knowledge of objective reality if it is to be of 
any value to us. "And when intuition is concerned with the good, it is 
still not simply a registration of desire or interest, but is a cognizing of 
the good which niey help in determining the goodness of desire or interest. 
It affords a way of laying hold of something deeper, more objective, and more 
universal about the good than desire or interest as such can discover... 
But intuition also yields objective truth which is irresponsible for judging 
the goodness of our interests and desires."
A consideration with which any view of the relativity of values must
8b. Ibid., p. 185."~""
86. I.)id., p. 183.
87. Ibid., p. 186.
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reckon ir> that the moral obligation appears to hold universal sway. VTher. 
some plain moral alternative of honesty or dishonesty, or purity or impurity, 
of justice or oppression, of selfishness or love, something within man says 
thLt ./iio of the alternatives is the better one to pursue. He may not al­ 
ways be able to know clearly what is best, but it is characteristic of man's 
moral consciousness immediately to recognize that it is his duty to perform 
that which he sees to be the Good. "The moment we do detect the Good," 
writes D. S. Cairns, "as between two alternative courses of action, something 
else becomes manifest in it, something shining and formidable. It becomes 
not simply higher and finer, it becomes 'imperative.' I know that I ought 
to do it. Tue Good in this sense is not simply something v,<iser, preferable, 
more beautiful, more desirable. It has a thread of steel in it, a quality
of adamant. It is the only course open to me that is 'right', and every
88 
other course is 'wrong.™ Morality would be impossible if man did not
have the sjuse oi' the Good and Right. Tsut if all judgments of good and bad, 
right and wrong are purely subjective and relative, \,e cannot account for man's 
having this sense of supreme value of hunan beings, or his recognition of the 
unconditional imperatives of morality. T.;hile we :;nist reject the pragmatic 
contention concerning the relativity of our values, as the above considerations 
concerning the 'Good and the Hight show it to :>e untenable, v;e recognize the 
service it has rendered in the emphasis it places upon active ?nd intelligent 
control of human life and upon proper adaptation to environment in the inter­ 
ests of human progress. It serves as a corrective to an extreme otherrorld- 
liness, or to an obscurantist attitude towards thou.ht and life. 8ut it also 
has its dangers in that it say be satisfied with mild coraproi-.isss \vLea rad­ 
ical alterations in tilings ns they exist are really needed; or It nay clamor 
88. D. 3. Cairns, The Riddle of the World, p. 1UQ.——————————
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for change as such and develop an unwholesome .disregard for achievements of 
the present or past. tie must ever keep our eyes open to ayv- values but 
that does not mean that they must be closed to old ones; for some of our 
values are objective and imperishable. But vith the exercise of proper re­ 
straint in those respects pragmatism may render valuable service in the 
field of law, education, political, economic and religious "reform by brinr- 
inc; greater flexibility end efficiency to the methods of procedure one! by 
adhering more closely to the concrete questions at issue.
TLe pratjnatists have accepted the relative element in the realm of 
valuec as exhaustive of that field and have proceeded to extend .the sane prin­ 
ciple r.hich they received from utilitarianism into the field of truth. Again, 
the influence of evolution upon pragmatism is strong. All tainrs are con­ 
strued as boinrj subject to cuu:i ; "e, and lo^ic is not regarded as an exception. 
This is unwarranted. As Professor V. P, I onta.^ve points out, change itself 
is meaningless unless the terms of thd process remain fixed. If 7.e are to 
speak of changing from : outh to «ge, the terrr.s "youth" c.:;'i "a-^e" must retain 
their meanings throughout. The same thing holds true of propositions which 
are relations betv/een terms. If tr.e earth has been spherical in shape from
tha first until nov., but should change its shape tomorrow, it will always be
89 
true that it was round. He insists that the following maxim: "True for
one, true for all, and once true, alvays true," must apply "not only to all 
abstract or non-existential propositions, but to all other propositions in 
so far as they are made thoroughly unambiguous v:ith respect to the time and 
space of the facts asserted. Chunje resides only in physical processes end 
psychological processes by which we become aware of physical processes. 
Rut betf.'.ioii those processes and the logical relations which they reveal there
39. \i. jp. ,.cntague, op. cit., pp. 163-164.
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is a fixed gulf which no change can cross."
When ^rag'iatism insists that there is no impersonal, absolute truth; 
no truth with a capital T; and that if there were such truth independent of 
anyone's belief in it or knowledge of it we could not attain it or recognize 
it as such; it differs somewhat from the older doctrine of the "relativity'' 
of knowledge, but at bottom it is open to the same criticism. It differs 
froKi agnosticism in that while the latter generally i-aintains thet the in­ 
most reality of things & both unknowable and unrelated to human purpose and 
knowledge, the nra-iutic view holds, in so far as is logically possible, that 
human volition does reveal something concerning the inward meaning of things; 
"that the 'develo^entnl' view of things is, vhsn properly interpreted, the
real view, that reality is at least what it comes to be in our 'purposes'
91 
and idosls, and not something different from this." A\ao, pragmatism uses
"truth" in the subjective sense, that is, it is what is believed, whereas 
scepticism uses it in. the same sense that other methodological theories do, 
namel., in its objective sense. *!! individualistic views of truth suffer 
from similar defects. John Watson, in discussing Plato's criticism of I ro- 
tagoras, st-.ys that Plato has put his finger on the weak spot of all such notions 
of truth. "The individualist must assume at' least," he writes, ''that his 
doctrine has a universal meaning; and, if he attempts to limit it by saying 
that it has no meaning except for himself, he obviously lays himself open to 
the reply that such a view denies that his judgment has a rae-aning even for 
himself. The criticism, as it seems to me, applies to ever., possible form 
of individualism,... There is no way of proving the absolute relativity of 
knowledge, for the simple reason that the doctrine that knowledge is absolutely
90. Ibid., p. 164.
91. Wm. Caldwell, r'rag/ '-.tisrn and I' alism, L-.^on: «.dar. and Charles Black, 
1913, p. 142. Jf. also pp. 141-142.
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relative, must be either universally valid, and so not relative, or it is
92
utterly meaningless." In other words, such a doctrine contradicts it­ 
self. For if v/e maintain that there are no absolutely true judgments, we 
make the so-called relatively true judgments absolute. Tiius if there are 
absolutely true judgments which are contrasted in principle with the ones 
which come within our experience, we involve ourselves in the contradiction 
of asserting that there is an absolutely true judgment, namely, that there 
are no absolutely true judgments. It is not only self-contradictory, but 
fails to account even for the existence of particular judgments. A judg­ 
ment, in order to be true, must affirm, what has some bearing upon reality. 
If its validity is confined to the human sphere of action, to quote the
same author again, "it must at least have the truth implier?. in its being a
93 
true statement of what actually obtains in that connection." To claim
truth in this sense while denying the possibility of judgments being true 
in the sense of revealing "the real nature of things" leads to further con­ 
tradiction, unless "the real nature of things" be taken to mean the notion
of an unknowable realm of which we can say nothing, since there is nothing
94 
to be said. ,,e concur in ilato's criticism of the ancient doctrine of
the "relativity" of knowledge and believe that it is equally applicable to 
the relativistic teaching of pragmatism however much it may be seasoned with
the "acids of modernity." 95 
Josiah Royce, in his essay, "The Eternal and the practical,'1 uses the
pragmatic belief in evolution to show the self-refuting nature of the prag-
9°. John VI at son, "Plato and Protagoras," The Philosophical Review, VoTi 
.171, Uo. 5, 1907, p. 485. Of. pp. 469-487.
93. Ibid., p. 487.
94. Ibid. , :v. 487.
95. The .--ilosovhlcal Review, Vol. XIII, Mo. 2, 1904, pp. 126 ff.
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matic conception of truth as relative, ilow according to the pragmatic con­ 
ception, i.iiich arises out of its connection uith evolution, ^11 our beliefs 
are results v.-hich have been brought about by the character of our organisms, 
by the environment which pl?./ys on us, and by our own inner desires. Our 
thoughts and their inner products, like all other modern achievements or in­ 
cidents of evolution, reveal a reality in the making. Pra-ynutism is a corol­ 
lary of evolution. You can observe what evidence there is for pragmatism as 
your present thought and its objects. 'Jhe evidence for evolution must be 
based upon beliefs which pertain to a large number of objects v:hich must some­ 
how be supposed to exist before any human being could have been present to 
acknowledge them. If the pragriatist says that he believes evolution to be 
true, in the pragmatic sense, that is,"as the object of my present conscious
and constructive thought, which conceives evolution as a truth, because just
96 
now I need so to conceive it," he may be asked, "iiow, then, can this belief
in evolution,—a belief which is a mere instance of your pragmatism, lend 
back any of its borrowed authority to furnish a \.arrant for your belief in
the very doctrine called pragmatism, a belief you presuppose in expressing
17 
your evolutionary creed?" If he answers, on the other hand, that evolution
is a universally valid result of modern science, and is to be accepted whether 
or not we believe it, that is, in the non-oragmatic sense, because it is true, 
he ceases to be a pragmatist and becomes either a realist or an absolutist. 
Then his belief in evolution does not support his prj-.r/iatic contention, for
he has forsaken that conception in order to describe the kind of truth he has
9R 
assigned to the former doctrine. The progrnotist is thus unable to ylve a
satisfactory account of the universality of truth and is hard put to explain
96. Ibij.', p. 128. " ~~ '———————————-——
97. Ibid.., p. 1?.8.
98. Ibid.., p. 129.
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the character of logical universality which he, at least in argument, appar­ 
ently assigns to his own view. It is "on the whole," for James, but we say 
in the particular. For either we are not warranted in assuming the logical 
universality of truth, since it cannot always be practically verified, in 
which case it may, when convenient, be rejected; or it is warranted due to 
the fact that it is found to apply in many or most instances. Then the ap­ 
peal is to mere numbers. But when the discussion tries to convince by argu­ 
ment, the principle itself is invoked not merely on the ground that it works 
but because it seems to be the necessary condition of ultimately effective
and harmonious working in a world characterized by rationality and community
99 
of interests.
It is apparent from our treatment of pragmatism thus far that, strictly 
speaking, it is neither religious nor irreligious. Its primary concern is 
with the notion of meaning, truth, and knowledge. Its chief interest lies 
in the fields of epistemology and logic rather than in those of metaphysics, 
theology, ethics, or religion. It is true, however, that one's metaphysical 
and religious interpretations are determined, as a rule, by one's epistemology. 
That is to say, the application of pragmatic epistemology to certain philo­ 
sophical and theological questions ought logically,(and usually does), to 
issue in a certain attitude towards those problems. Of course, the indi­ 
vidual pragmatist need not apply his pragmatic principles consistently or 
follow the implications of his doctrine to logical conclusions. The atti­ 
tude of the pragmatist is favorable to religion; his general approach to the 
meaning and values of life lead him to an appraisal of the world and of life 
which is definitely religious. Pragmatism, however, as a strict philosophical
99. Cf_. H. N. Qardiner, "The Problem of Truth," The Philosophical Review^——— Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1908, p. 137. ———————————————'
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doctrine, when its implications are followed out to the logical conclusion, 
does not lead to an especially religious conception of the world; it renders
meaningless and without foundation many of the convictions which the prag-
100 
raatic attitude declares to be necessary.
In conclusion, we may say that, after we have eliminated much of the 
teaching of pragmatism that is untenable and ephemeral, and after we have 
corrected many of its extravagant claims, there remains a great deal in 
the doctrine that entitles it to a permanent place in the history of philos­ 
ophy. It has forced philosophy to take account of the temporal character 
of reality, as contrasted with the view of absolute idealism which has 
given almost exclusive emphasis to its eternal and immutable character. 
Pragmatism has rightly insisted upon the importance of time in its philosoph­ 
ical accounts of reality and has thereby made more explicit the implications 
of the philosophy of evolution for human life and thought. In its insist­ 
ence upon the human element in building up reality, it has rendered it im­ 
possible for philosophy to regard man as merely a spectator of the cosmic 
scene. In spite of the fact that it has exaggerated the part that man ac­ 
tually does play in the vast enterprise of making reality, its assertion 
that he does have a vote in the "cosmic council" has brought about a general 
recognition that there is an essential element of truth in the pragmatic 
contention which cannot be denied by any philosophy except at its own peril. 
To pragmatism belongs the credit for pointing out the human factor in the 
building up of the body of scientific truths, and for having accurately ex­ 
pressed the value of the scientific use of hypotheses. It has sought to
unite culture and efficiency, the ideal and the practical, and our greatest 
^ Below> p 393.
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human values and most necessary and useful instruments such as the state, 
school, and the church, for the purpose of bringing all together under one 
general aim—to enhance and enrich man's earthly existence and, insofar as 
possible, to enable him to live more abundantly here and now. The valu­ 
able service that it has rendered in this respect serves somewhat to miti­ 
gate its obvious deficiency: its apparent neglect of the fact that man is 




PLURALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS THOUGHT
Ever since the tine of Plato, arid before, the problem of the One and 
the Liany, or the question as to whether the world is to be construed in 
terms of monism or pluralism, has been uppermost in philosophy. James 
regarded this question as one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy, 
In his introduction to The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James, in 
speaking of the pluralistic tendencies of popular religion, he says that
"the deepest of all philosophic differences is that between this pluralism
1 
and all forms of monism whatever." He expresses the same conviction in
another connection by saying that the "difference between monism and plural-
2 
ism is perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy."
His able treatment of the question did much to give the term "pluralism" 
prominence in modern thought.
Pluralism may be defined as the doctrine that the universe or reality
3 
"consists in a plurality or multiplicity of distinct beings." It holds
that they are interrelated so as to constitute a world which is one in sev­ 
eral respects. For example, as a subject of discourse, we can speak of 
"the universe"; it is continuous in space and time, and is subject to con­ 
tinuous lines of influence such as gravity and heat conduction. Also, men 
are united in a vast network of acquaintanceship, and many things in the 
world minister to a common purpose. The acquaintanceship, however, is not
1. Edited by V.illiara James, Boston: James R. Osgood and Co., 1885, p. 116.
2. _</. B_., Preface, p. viii.
3. J. Dewey, Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 306.
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perfect, not every one is acquainted with every one else, hence the chain 
may be broken; purposes frequently conflict, and interests are not always 
in harmony. Thus the teleological union is not complete. Neither is 
the aesthetic union complete. There is no respect in which the world may
be said to be perfectly unified. Monism, on the other hand, is the theory
4
which asserts "the essential and ultimate unity of all being." Or as 
A. E. Taylor defines strict monism, it is the doctrine "that all assertions 
are ultimately predications about one and the same real individual or sub- 
ject of predicates, and that this ultimate subject of all predication is
5
the only genuine individual existent." Another type of monism as dis­ 
tinguished from that which attempts to subsume everything under the abso­ 
lute, is materialistic monism which reduces everything to a single principle,
Pluralism arose as a protest against both of these monisms, but its attack
6 
was chiefly aimed at the former.
Strictly speaking, as F. C. S. Schiller maintains, pragmatism and 
pluralism are not necessarily connected. Pragmatism is concerned with
logical method while pluralism is a concern of metaphysical speculation,
7 
and the use of a method does not entail adoption of a metaphysic. Yet,
in the case of James, there is an intimate relation between the two doc­ 
trines. In the first place, he frequently applies the pragmatic method
and standard of truth for the purpose of proving pluralism and disproving
8 
monism. Also, he regards the pragmatic theory of knowledge as affording
4. J. Dewey, op. cit., p. 506.'
5. A. E. Taylor, "A Symposium, Why Pluralism?", Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Vol. IX, 1908-1909, p. 202.
6. R. B. Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals, New York and London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1918, p. 316.
7. "A Symposium, Why Pluralism?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian So­ 
ciety, Vol. IX, 1908-1909, p. 194. —
8. Of. P. U., pp. Ill ff.
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a special case of pluralistic metaphysics. As we have already noted, he
considers the acceptance of pragmatism, as a theory of truth, as "a step
9
of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail." Pragma­ 
tism not only supplies a method which can be used in metaphysics, but by 
bringing the whole process of cognition within the field of possible exper­ 
ience, it furnishes a metaphysics of truth which bears out the general 
metaphysical view which James champions. Monism receives its chief sup­ 
port from intellectualism, whereas empiricism and voluntarism tend to be 
pluralistic. If we accept the data of the senses and of the feelings, as 
reported by immediate experience, the infinite variety and number of such 
data will not lead to a belief in the essential unity of the world. The 
intellect searches for, and finds, identities and bonds which it accepts 
as a fact. "But despite that respect of order which, thanks to science, 
nature now presents us, there still remains a vast and apparently inex­ 
haustible residuum of disconnected and unique particulars. Taking the 
world as we find it, the most that could be claimed would be that there is
a frame of order enfolded and surrounded by a variegated and nebulous dis-
10 
order." If, then, one believes that there is absolute order and unity in
the world, it is due to the fact that one f s intellectual bias has led one 
to disregard the actual facts as they appear in immediate experience. 
Since monism is the product of inteilectualism, a repudiation of the in­ 
tellect as the chief instrument of knowledge is at the same time a revolt 
against monism. Voluntarism tends to be pluralistic because a man f s 
action is an expression or assertion of himself, his own desire or his own
9. M. T., Preface, p. xii. "——————"—————————' 
10. R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 317.
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decision. But when a man thinks he merges himself with the empirical 
principles and systems which he contemplates. Thus pragmatism, as Pro
­ 
fessor R. B. Perry observes, "both in its negative attack on intellect,
and in its positive affirmation of the rights of will or feeling, incli
nes
11 
to pluralism in its metaphysics."
James's opposition to monism arose out of deep-seated convictions 
which would not permit him to acquiesce in this influential doctrine. 
He 
would have retained a belief in it if it had been possible, for he did 
not 
fail to appreciate its beauty and value. "As a rule," he says in his 
psy­ 
chology, "we believe as much as we can. We would believe everything i
f we
12 
only could." But he simply could not believe the monistic doctrine fo
r
personal, moral, philosophical and religious reasons. His personal pe
n­ 
chant for variety and change rebelled against the monotonous implication
s
of monism which seemed, as J. Dewey puts it, "to make change a mere inci
-
13 
dent in the totality of being, or even a partly illusory phenomenon." 
He
struggled to establish an objectively valid dynamic view; that is, he co
n­ 
tended for the possibility of real change. He revolted against the "ti
me­ 
less" character of the absolute as stressed by the absolutists. Time, 
for
James, must be conceived as "real as anything, and nothing in the univer
se
14 
is great or static or eternal enough not to have some history." Monism
ran counter to his moral convictions; he was not willing to compromise 
good 
with evil, or the individual with the universal. He could not acquiesc
e 
in the view that the evil facts of life, which he regarded as a genuine
11. Ibid., p. 317. ~——————————
•
-L2 * Principles, Vol. II, p. 299.
13. J. Dewey, op. cit^., p. 306.
14. P. U., p. 49. Cf. Lecture II.
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portion of reality, could ever be so taken up into the good as to render
15 
them ultimately good or any the less evil. Nor could he look with approv­
al upon any attempt to regard individuals as "but syllables in the mouth of 
the Lord." James was above all interested in individuals and regarded all 
individuals as having "insides of their own", and he was anxious to estab­ 
lish the possibility of real variety and distinctness with reference to 
persons. He could not bring himself to view all differences between indi­ 
viduals as simply limitations of the one being. The philosophical roots 
of his pluralism are to be found in his empiricism, especially in his ex­ 
perimental ism. His moral proclivities, along with the voluntaristic as­ 
pect of his empiricism, serve to lead him towards an ethical pluralism or 
monadism. Thus he conceives the universe in terms of "a republic of semi-de­ 
tached consciousnesses," with a God who is simply primus inter pares. His 
limitations and external relations make it possible to relieve him of all 
responsibility for evil. The third motive is prominent in his A Pluralis-
tic Universe. An empirical account of the world shows that "the sundry
16 
parts of reality may be externally related." Everything in the world has
an external environment; that is, it is\ related to something which is gen­ 
uinely other than itself, and of which it must take account without having 
any sort of previous complicity. Relations are just as they are found in 
experience rather than necessary or constitutional. "Things are 'with 1
one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything or dominates
17 
over everything." There Is free movement between the parts of experience
they "lean on" one another; they exist together but do net lose their
15. Cf. Ibid.. Lecture III. Especially pp. 117 ff. Also
16. P. U., p. 321.
17. Ibid., p. 321.
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identity. "The relations are not all what the French call solidaires
18
with one another." "Ever not quite" must be written after the best at­ 
tempts at all-inclusiveness. Things are real when taken in their "each- 
form", that is, individually, rather than as taken in their "all-form", or
19 
together. His pluralism when construed in this manner is the same as his
"radical empiricism". Closely allied with this third motive is the re­ 
ligious conviction that it is impossible to worship the absolute principle 
of monism. "The*0ne and only Being,* however, the Universal Substance, 
the Soul and Spirit of things, the First Principle of monistic metaphysics, 
call it by names as theological and reverential as we will, always seems, 
it must be confessed, a pale, abstract, and impersonal conception compared 
with that of the eternal living God, worshipped by the incalculable major­ 
ity of our race. Such a monistic principle never can be worshipped by a
20
majority of our race until the race's mental constitution change." Plu­ 
ralism, therefore, constitutes the basis of his religious philosophy.
As James conceives it the leading representatives of monism, namely, 
Lotze, Royce, and Bradley, present philosophy with a false dilemma between
complete unity and utter irrelevance. According to Lotze, if two things
21 
are in any sense separate they cannot interact. Royce argues that knowledge
is impossible between two things which are in any sense separate; and that,
22
consequently, there is no independence of being apart from being known.
Bradley contends that if things are two it is impossible for them to be re­ 
lated. These protagonists of monism conclude, therefore, that since in­ 
teraction and relationships do exist as a fact, and are implied in any
18. Ibid., p. 3251~"——————————————'————————
19. Ibid., p. 34.
20. The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James, p. 114.
21. P. U., pp. 55 ff.
22. Ibid., pp. 61 ff.
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doctrine of plurality, we are forced to relinquish any view of independence 
and distinctness. Unity or oneness must be accepted as the reality while 
plurality must be relegated to mere appearance. Two further presupposi­ 
tions of monism which James conceives to be fundamental to this doctrine
are, the view that truth is coherent and that mind can only cognize that
23 
which is mental and that the real is mental. He attacks the monistic
view root and branch. He asserts that the arguments of those who support 
monism are based upon a "vicious intellectualism" and are vitiated by ab­ 
straction. His attempt to refute monism is for the most part an attack 
upon intellectual ism as such. He says that the absolutists are guilty of 
a double rationalization and falsification of the continual flux of sensible 
experience. There is "a loyal clinging to the rationalist belief that
sense-data and their associations are incoherent, and that only in substi-
24 
tuting a conceptual order for their order can truth be found." Further,
"the substituted conceptions are treated intellectualistically, that is as 
mutually exclusive and discontinuous, so that the first innocent continuity 
of the flow of sense-experience is shattered for us without any higher con­ 
ceptual continuity taking its place. Finally, since this broken state of
things is intolerable, the absolute deus ex machina is called on to mend it
25
in his own way, since we cannot mend it in ours." But for James, experi­ 
ence is a continuous process and the discrete and atomic nature attributed 
to its constituent parts by absolutism results from a falsifying psycholog­ 
ic, c'cal analysis. It starts by selecting some aspect of a concrete thing to
25. Ibid., p. 72. ———————————
24. Ibid., p. 72.
25. Ibid., p. 72.
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the exclusion of all the rest, and then identifies the thing in question 
exclusively with that aspect of it. It ends by denying that the thing 
contains the aspects which have been excluded. "The treating of a name
as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails posi-
26 
tively to include, is what I call 'vicious intellectualism.'" If we
want to Icnow, according to James, how concrete things do interact, and 
how they are related, we need only to return to experience. Experience 
reveals that they do interact, that they are, in fact, related, and that 
the arguments which are concerned with the question whether or not they 
can interact or be related are unnecessary. Experience says that they 
are capable of interaction and of entering into relations with one 
another, which is sufficient.
One of the chief objections which James urges against absolutism is 
the familiar difficulty involved in the existence of evil. Evil remains 
a speculative problem to monism, both intellectually and morally. "Its 
perfection is represented as the source of things, and yet the first ef­ 
fect of that perfection is the tremendous imperfection of all finite ex-
27 
perience." James is unable to understand why the absolute should "ever
have lapsed from the perfection of its own integral experience of things,
28 
and refracted itself into all our finite experiences." For pluralism, on
the other hand, there is no theoretical problem of evil. The existence of 
evil is accepted as an ultimate datum and the pluralist need only to at­ 
tempt to eliminate or change it. The question which confronts the plu­ 
ralist with reference to evil is not "Why does evil exist?" but "How can
26. Ibid., p. 60."~~~
27. Ibid., p. 117.
28. Ibid., p. 120.
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we get rid of it?" God is finite, and He, too, is striving to remove the 
evil for which he is in no way responsible; He is as anxious to get rid of 
it as we are. He needs and seeks our cooperation in this gigantic task 
and because we know that He needs our help, and needs it constantly, we
must ever be "up and doing" in order to help Him accomplish His purpose;
29 
for without our help he may not succeed. He also objects to the absolutis-
tic conception because of its sterility in helping us to understand the 
world in which we live. "Whatever the details of experience may prove to 
be, after the fact of them the absolute will adopt them. It is an hy­ 
pothesis that functions retrospectively only, not prospectively. That,
whatever it may be, will have been in point of fact the sort of world which
30 
the absolute was pleased to offer to itself as a spectacle." Finally, he
objects to the absolutistic contention that the absolute is the "all- 
knower," on the ground that if this representation be true the absolute is 
forced to contemplate perpetually all that is only negatively true, useless, 
trivial and silly. Thus the rubbish in its mind would "appear easily to 
outweigh in amount the more desirable material. One would expect it fairly
to burst with such an obesity, plethora, and superfoetation of useless in-
31 
formation." James does not claim to have completely refuted absolutism in
urging these objections, but he does think that the defects in this doctrine 
which his criticism makes patent expose the error in the claim of the ab­ 
solutists that their doctrine is not a hypothesis but a "presupposition im­ 
plicated in all thinking, and needing only a little effort of analysis to
32 
be seen as a logical necessity." He thinks that by showing this claim of
the absolutists to be without foundation he has succeeded in opening the
29. Ibid., pp. 124-125.
30. Ibid., p. 126.
31. Ibid., p. 128. Cf_. pp. 126 ff,
32. Ibid., p. 52.
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way for the consideration of pluralism as a plausible hypothesis. For the 
most part, his objections are valid, but it is open to question whether his 
objection to the absolute as the "all-knower" does justice to the absolute's 
sense of proportion and perspective. The objection is justified only in 
case the unimportant thoughts of the absolute are elevated to an important 
place in the general scheme of things and are allowed to distract attention 
from things which are of more importance. Our limited span of conscious­ 
ness does not allow us to waste either the time or the energy when consider­ 
ing the positive characteristics of a table to ponder over the fact that it 
is not a chair, not a rhinoceros, not a logarithm, not a mile away from the 
door, and so on. Also, negative propositions have positive correlates; 
negative characters flow from, and are consequences of their positive char­ 
acters. The former are considered empty and barren only when separated 
from the latter, for if Y/e consider the negative qualities of things tho­ 
roughly we shall discover that in fact we are really doing nothing more 
than "turning over in our minds" their positive relations to one another. 
For instance, to say that a table is not a chair and not a logarithm is a
sort of negative preparation for the expression of the fuller and more posi-
33 
tive truth that it is a table.
James is not satisfied merely to point out the weaknesses in the 
monistic doctrine, but he develops a metaphysical system of his own which 
he offers as being more tenable than that of monism. We have seen in deal­ 
ing with his view of the self and of consciousness that James attempts to 
bring within experience the dualities of knowledge such as those of self
53. Cf. W. P. Montague, "A Pluralistic Universe" and "Tha T.ng ir> ?f jr_——— 
rationalism", Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VII, No. 6, 1910, p. 145.
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and not-self, of knower and known, of idea and object, and, finally, the 
distinction between mind and body. It remains for him to take the final 
and culminating step, which is that of identifying experience with the 
metaphysical reality. The "stress of consciousness" which had proved so 
useful to him in the development of his psychology is now converted to the 
uses of metaphysics in his doctrine of "radical empiricism." He is en­ 
abled to overcome whatever doubts he entertains concerning this radical 
step by accepting Fechner's view of the hierarchy of souls. Fechner con­ 
ceived the universe in terms of a series of souls which overlap. He be­ 
gins with God and carries his conception down through the earth-soul to 
man, and from man to the psychic states below the threshold of his con­ 
sciousness which are not open to observation. Thus, according to his meta­ 
physics, there are different levels of consciousness in which the plurality 
of the lower constitutes the unity of the higher. Mental fields can com­ 
pound themselves and the universe is thereby rendered continuous. James's 
previous loyalty to logic had prevented him from accepting any such view as 
this. But his doctrine of "pure experience" identifies reality with the 
field of consciousness which implies that it is possible for two or more
minds to hold parts of the field in common. In other words, portions of
34 
the field of consciousness could be "identical parts of conscious wholes."
This new metaphysics cannot be reconciled with his earlier psychology and 
logic. We have had occasion to deal with his struggle at this point some­ 
what in detail, and need not repeat it here. But it is at this point that 
the anti-intellectualism of Bergson proves useful to James, and enables him 
to forsake his psychological and logical scruples which had held him in
34. IS. R. JS., pp. 76 ff. ~~•""———————•
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bondage for so long and leaves him free to elevate "experience" to the rank 
of ultimate reality. The doctrine of "synechism," as advocated byPeirce, 
also enables him to take this final step. His problem here is that of 
reconciling the conviction of common sense that the same things can be at 
once both distributively and collectively known, with the logical prin­ 
ciple which makes it impossible for the experience of things as parts to 
be identical with the experience of things as a whole. He admits that if 
he accepts the hypothesis of a soul there is no difficulty involved for it
is conceivable that different souls can synthesize differently the same
35 
mental states. But James refuses to entertain this hypothesis and adopts
that of the compounding of consciousness instead.
Before we follow him in his solution of the problem of the compound­ 
ing of consciousness, however, it is necessary to see the part which his 
doctrine of "relations", which is the central doctrine of his "radical em­ 
piricism", plays in helping him to achieve the solution he desiderates. 
He follows Bergson in subordinating concepts, in limiting their applica­ 
tion, and in the recognition of the continuity of experience. He gets to 
the crux of the question, so far as his solution is concerned, by realizing 
and emphasizing the importance of the question of relations. He is 
anxious not only to secure the realization of their existence, but also to 
establish the validity of our experience of them. The denial of external 
relations by monists, and their efforts to explain them away as states of 
the terms related logically leads, in the final analysis, to the position 
that there is nothing in the universe but the whole or the absolute, and 
that it is impossible for us to have any complete knowledge until we know 
35. p_. U., pp. 206 ff. "" ""————'——————
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the absolute. According to B. Russell, the consequence of denying that 
there can be no relations between things is "either that there can be only 
one thing in the universe, or, if there are many things, they cannot pos­ 
sibly interact in any way, since any interaction would be a relation, and
36 
relations are impossible." Now James insists that any one who examines
experience "in concrete must see that relations of every sort, of time, 
space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, are just as 
integral members of the sensational flux as terms are, and that conjunctive
relations are just as true members of the flux as disjunctive relations
37 
are." He opposes the view that sensations are disjoined only by insisting
that "conjunctions between them are just as immediately given as disjunc­ 
tions are, and that relations, whether disjunctive or conjunctive, are in
their original sensible givenness just as fleeting and momentary (in Green's
38 
words), and just as 'particular', as terras are." Both terms and relations
are universalized later as they are conceptualized and named. But the im­ 
mediate and relatively unnamed phases of experience reveal its thickness,
39 
concreteness, and individuality.
The answer to the question of the compounding of consciousness is now 
at hand; we need only to see that a certain conscious state is and is not 
the same as another. This is impossible according to conceptualist prin­ 
ciples, but where logic says "No," experience says "Yes." If we return to 
experience, we get behind and beyond the "conceptual function altogether." 
Here the "concrete pulses of experience appear pent in by no such definite
36. B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate, 
New York: Henry Holt and Co., p. 148.
37. P. U., pp. 279-280.
38. Ibid., p. 280.
39. Ibid., p. 280.
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limits as our conceptual substitutes for them are confined by. They run 
into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate. What in them 
is relation and what is matter related is hard to discern. You feel no
one of them as inwardly simple, and no two as wholly without confluence
40 
where they touch." These bits of immediate experience are their "own
others" both internally and externally. "Inwardly they are one with their
41 
parts, and outwardly they pass continuously into their next neighbors," and
if logic says this is impossible so much the worse for logic. In other 
words, your experience and mine are the same objectively, but not subjec­ 
tively. It may be conceived in both ways so long as we do not confuse 
the experience with the conception of it, and whether this two-fold manner 
of conceiving it is permissible is not a question of logic but one of fact.
Reality is essentially of such a nature, for James, that its parts are ca-
4E 
pable of being both identical with, and different from, their neighbors.
Thus the doctrine of the "stream of consciousness," with which he began in 
his psychology has developed into a metaphysical conception of the "endosmo- 
sis of adjacent parts of living experience."
James f s reasons for rejecting logic will become more evident as we fol­ 
low his description of the nature of reality somewhat in detail. Some of 
the essential characteristics which he conceives reality to possess have 
been implied in identifying it with experience. It will be remembered 
that, for James, the "deeper features of reality are found only in percep­ 
tual experience. Here alone do we acquaint ourselves with continuity, or 
the immersion of one thing in another, here alone with self, with substance, 
with qualities, with activity in its various modes, with time, with cause,
40. Ibid., p. 282T "———————————————
41. Ibid., p. 285.
42 • 2£-J£li«» PP- 285 ff -
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43 
with change, with novelty, with tendency, and with freedom." Reality is
qualitative, for James; it consists of color, tone, hardness, sweetness,
"and all the innumerable and nameless nuances by which such qualities are
44 
shaded, mixed, and related." In the next place, reality is characterized
by concreteness. Concreteness plays an important part in James f s thought 
because he conceives thought as essentially a selective operation which 
disregards all that is not immediately useful. Due to this fact it dis­ 
torts the real nature of things. "We extend our view when we insert our 
percepts into our conceptual map. We learn about them, and of some of 
them we transfigure the value; but the map remains superficial through the 
abstractness, and false through the discreteness of its elements; and the 
whole operation, so far from making things appear more rational, becomes 
the source of quite gratuitous unintelligibilities. Conceptual knowledge 
is forever inadequate to the fullness of the reality to be known. Real­ 
ity consists of existential particulars as well as of essences and univer-
sals and class-names, and of existential particulars we become aware only
45
in the perceptual flux." Reality is the plenum from which thought se­ 
lects. The abstraction which characterizes metaphysics is not reality. 
Reality is that from which the abstraction is made and to which it returns. 
When we are unaware of the part which mind plays, we can take whatever 
comes as reality and insofar as we make allowances for the selective activ^ 
ity of mind. Reality includes that which has been selected from it, and 
that which selection ignores; both exist together in the original plenum
45. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 97.
44. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 103. Cf_. P_. U., 
pp. 256 ff. ~~
45. Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 78-79.
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which must be of such a nature as to permit division according to the se­ 
lective purposes of thought. "It must be a field of eligibility. As
46 
such it is a world suitable to the exercise of freedom."
A further characteristic of reality is its continuity. He conceives 
reality as essentially a flux of pure experience in which there is nothing 
that is absolute, determinate or static. This immediate flux contains 
all life f s dynamisms. In Bergsonian fashion he regards the elan vital or 
driving principle of this flux as evolving thought as a secondary or sub­ 
sidiary activity. It is the function of thought to depict the qualities 
of the flux in terms which are conducive to adjustment to, and control of, 
it. These qualities which thought extracts from the flux, and which mod­ 
ify it, are preserved in static form as concepts. In other words, con­ 
cepts are abstractions, cuts, excerpts, taken from the flux of reality by 
an interested act of selection. These concepts are useful in that by ob­ 
serving the relations which subsist between them we are enabled to antici­ 
pate and control the course of life. But these concepts fail to give us 
the dynamic aspect of reality. These abstract concepts "are but as 
flowers gathered, they are only moments dipped out from the stream of time,
snapshots taken, as by a kinetoscopic camera, at a life that in its origi-
47 
nal coming is continuous." That is to say, we may photograph a moving
body in the successive positions which it occupies, but the photograph 
never catches the movement itself. Immediate experience alone can give 
the element of continuity which characterizes reality. This accounts for 
the failure of intellect to solve such problems as those with which Zeno
46. R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 104.
47. P. U., p. 235. Of. Lectures VI and VII.
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grappled: those growing out of space, time and motion; and the difficulty 
involved in attributing to one and the same system the each-form of dis­ 
tributive plurality and the all-form of collective unity is that the es­ 
sentially continuous nature of living reality cannot thus be expressed. 
The intellect introduces discreteness, sharp outlines, distinctness, and 
presents reality as assuming the aspect of a schematism which is not true 
of reality. Geometry gives definite relationships, but there is always 
an "ever not quite" about reality; thus things in reality are not quite 
circular in the geometrical sense, never quite straight as in geometry, 
As.R. B. Perry suggests continuity "has to be reconciled with the 
discreteness of those moments of experience which grasp change 'all at 
once,* and thus embrace it within themselves; and with that distinctness
which is implied not only in James's emphasis on qualitative uniqueness,
48
but in his moral individualism." James attempts to overcome this diffi­ 
culty in his conception of reality by regarding reality as interpenetra-
49 
tive, as "a manifold of overlapping particulars." If we let £, b_, and c
stand for three separate bits or moments of experience, we have a continu­ 
ous transition from ji to c_. Experience b_, that is, the present moment of 
experience, the now, is retrospective insofar as it takes up into itself a 
part of £; and it is prospective insofar as it reaches forward and takes 
into itself £. In short, there is an element of the past and an element 
of the future in every present moment, yet each moment has its own element 
of distinctness. Similarly, each individual is unique, but individuals 
have a community of experience. "Every existent element has its own dis- 
criminable character, and yet it is soaked as well as bathed in the context
48. R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 109. ~~————————————
49. Ibid., p. 109.
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in which it is immersed; and there is a chemistry by which each synthesis
50 
possesses a uniqueness of its owns."
Reality is also characterized by change and novelty. Reality, in 
its native, primitive conditions has the nature of perpetual change, and 
this change occurs by means of a novelty which never quite repeats itself. 
James's unqualified acceptance of the all-pervasive character of change 
marks him as a modern Heraclitean and puts him in full accord with Berg- 
son's view of reality as ceaselessly changing. Thus, for James, the "es-
51 
sence of life is its continuously changing character;" nothing remains
just as it was, there is always an element of novelty involved. But our 
experiences do not come as entirely new. "Their changes are not complete 
annihilations followed by complete creations of something absolutely novel. 
There is partial decay and partial growth, and all the while a nucleus of 
relative constancy from which what decays drops off, and which takes into
itself whatever is grafted on, until at length something wholly different
52 
has taken its place." Finally, reality is pluralistic. Its parts, so
far as sense-perception acquaints us with them, are not parts of a whole. 
Experience comes in units, buds; it is strung-along, and there is no inner 
necessity which binds them together. These units of experience have inti­ 
mate relations with one another, but the occurrence of one does not neces­ 
sitate the occurrence of another. Our universe is not a place in which 
every part is necessitated by every other part. It is not a "block-uni­ 
verse", but one in which there is casualness, irrelevance of part to part; 
there is no all-pervading unity. What unity it has is of "the strung-along
50. Ibid., p. 109. Cf. P. U., pp. 287 ff,
51. P. U., p. 253.
52. Ibid., p. 258.
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type, the type of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation... .you may call
53 
it the synechistic type." James carries this conception into his view of
man. The individual is a unique, distinct unit and cannot be reduced to 
the social group. It also applies to religion; good cannot be reduced to 
evil, nor evil cannot be made good, each is just what it appears to be. 
For things in the real world are very much as they come in sense experience.
The history of the real world is characterized by the same richness, 
variety, and fecundity which mark its internal composition. Ihile we are 
able to predict to some extent what may happen in our world, it is at bot­ 
tom a world which cannot be completely reduced to law and order or be made 
perfectly to fit into any preconceived pattern. For the most part, it is 
unpredictable, full of surprises; it is a world in which the unexpected is 
always occurring. It is uncultivated, wild, and this feature predominates 
over that of its predictability. We can never be quite certain just what 
awaits us "around the corner." Consequently, there are risks, hazards, 
dangers; we never know when the "primitive" element of the world may assert 
itself and render vain our carefully worked out plans and fondest hopes. 
James prefers this sort of universe to one in which everything is known and 
assured in advance. It appeals to our love for conquest and adventure, and 
stimulates our courage. It challenges our powers and stirs our "sporting 
blood." Thus it is not only a fact of experience that the world is of this 
nature, it is also the most interesting and exciting kind of world in which 
to live.
We have now to examine the method by which James is led to his plural­ 
istic conclusions, after which we shall deal with some of the implications
53. Ibid., p. 325.
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of the doctrine of pluralism. We have postponed our final treatment of 
his dilemma with reference to the compounding of consciousness until after 
we set forth his general pluralistic doctrine upon which his rejection of 
logic is based. We have pointed out that he ultimately abandons the tra­ 
ditional logic and accepts the irrationalism of Bergson which enables him 
to accept intellectualistic contradictions since logical concepts and 
their relations are simply imperfect instruments to which we resort for 
the practical purpose of controlling the flux of experience, or reality, 
which is inherently irrational. In the first place, the dilemma as to 
how the same things can be at once both distributively and collectively 
known in view of the logical principle which makes it impossible to iden­ 
tify the experience of things as parts with the experience of things as 
a whole is real for James only because, in A Pluralistic Universe, he
proceeds upon the assumption of idealism that the thing experienced is
54 
the experience of that thing. This is a real dilemma for the idealist
who is forced to admit that there are as many objects as there are wit­ 
nesses. According to the idealistic principle that esse is percipj, to 
witness or experience an object constitutes the object experienced. If 
it be true that the world is objectively one system of facts there is no
way of avoiding the conclusion that there is only one real self or &*- wit-
55 ness—the absolute—of whom all finite selves are mere appearances. Once
we accept this assumption of idealism, it does follow, as Professor W. P. 
Montague suggests, that it is impossible for things which are experienced
54. Of. W. P. Montague, op_. cit., pp. 148 ff."~AIso, R. B. Perry, The" 
Thought and Character of William James. Vol. II, pp. 591-592. ——
55. Of. Ibid., p. 149.
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collectively, as in the case of the absolute, to have anything in common
with things experienced distributively by us, since the experience of a
56 
whole is not numerically identical with the experience of its parts.
R. B. Perry says that James's position here is uncertain. He points out 
that James's rejection of the absolute as a universal mind which includes 
all experience leaves three alternatives. Reality beyond the horizon of 
human consciousness may consist in the possibility of experience. This 
view, however, is incompatible with James's "frequent admission that a
possibility must always involve the actuality of some of the conditions of
57 
its realization." Then, there is the solution offered by panpsychism
which enables him to regard residual existence as consisting in experience 
of infra-human minds, whatever is not regarded for man or some higher sub­ 
ject is conceived of as "for itself." But Professor Perry is of the 
opinion that James never quite goes over to this view. Finally, experi­ 
ence may be distinguished from the experienced. Existence and the con­ 
tent of experience would then coincide but the fonrer would not depend 
upon any act of experiencing by the mind. This view, according to Profes-
;>/or Perry, is more in keeping with James's relational theory of conscious-
58
ness. But this does not help us a great deal because if we accept Pro­ 
fessor Perry's version of the matter, it is difficult to understand why 
James overlooks what appears obvious to W. P. Montague; namely, that 
James has at hand the solution to this problem in the relational theory 
of consciousness. "If the object experienced," he says, "is not identical
56. Ibid., p. 149. " ~~~————————
57. R. B. Perry, op_. cit., p. 592. G£. pp. 591-592.
58. Ibid., p. 592.
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with the act of experiencing it, that is, if we conceive experience realis­ 
tically as a cognitive reference to an object other than the reference,
there is no more contradiction in thinking of many witnesses of the same59 
object than in thinking of many people pointing at the same object."
Whether or not it is possible to solve the problem under consideration 
by means of the relational theory of consciousness, without the hypothe­ 
sis of a soul, as Professor Montague suggests that it is, does not concern 
us at this juncture. We are merely trying to show that James's attempt 
to answer this question without attempting to apply his theory of con­ 
sciousness, serves to indicate that he is proceeding upon the assumption 
of idealism rather than upon that of realism.
In the next place, James leaves us in doubt as to whether or not he 
has really solved the problem by declaring reality to be irrational. In 
fact, it does not solve the conflict between logic and experience to rele­ 
gate one of them to the status of unreality. Zeno's solution was to de­ 
clare appearance an illusion and experience unreal. James seeks the so­ 
lution in the opposite extreme; that is, by declaring that irrationality 
is at the heart of things. But it is inconceivable that we have to solve 
one of the profoundest problems which the universe presents by the accept­ 
ance of either acosmism or irrational ism. As J. A. Leighton puts it: 
"Philosophy does not get out of the supposed deadlock between the discrete 
and the continous, the one and the many, either by throwing away one term 
of the antithesis, or by plunging headlong in the pre-reflective stream of
59. W. P. Montague, op. cit. t pp. 148-149.
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60 
crude sense-experience. There is no need to resort to this heroic remedy."
In the case of Zeno, it may not be that motion is irrational, but that he 
fails to discover its rationality; his use of logic may be at fault. Sim­ 
ilarly, when Janes asserts the irrationality of the collective-distributive 
identity, it may be that he has simply failed to discover its rationality. 
For the intellect itself demands both identity and continuity or difference 
and discreteness, and both are present in sensible experience, though in 
a less fully articulated form. Sense-experience is always accompanied by 
some measure of thought. When James takes the position that it is not 
logically possible for the same thing to be viewed under different aspects, 
but only illogically so, he fails to give a relevant answer to the problem. 
It is tantamount to saying that the problem really has no solution, rather 
than offering a solution for it. Further, as Professor W. P. Montague 
points out, when James attributes to thought the ability to extract certain 
elements from reality he falls into the same confusion that characterizes
the "vicious intellectualism" which he repudiates, namely, that of ascrib-
61 
ing "to objects of thought the properties of thought symbols." And we
have precisely the same fault that is charged to "vicious intellectualism", 
according to which the activity of thought is regarded as being in some
Vt1
way "constitutive or reconstitutive of its own objects." When the judg­ 
ment is made that A is B, it does not extract or tear out these attributes 
from the living unity of experienced reality and then attempt to put them 
together again by means of the word "i_s". These oral symbols in no way
60. J. A. Leighton, "On Continuity and Discreteness", Journal of Philos- 
ophy, Vol. VII, No. 9, 1910, p. 237.
61. W. P. Montague, op. cit., p. 153.
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affect the objective qualities which they signify. The judgment simply
recognizes that these attributes exist alongside each other in the same
txv. \
object. When they are separated and the united the objective qualities j 
which coexist in the object are in no way disturbed. "A judgment about
an object is not an event in the life of that object, but only in the
62 
life of the person making the judgment." Thus there is no warrant for
asserting that a flux or movement is rendered static or discrete merely 
by becoming the object of thought, or by having judgments foimed concern­ 
ing it. This charge against the intellect can be substantiated only on 
a basis of "vicious intellectualism", which James rightly condemns. "So 
far is it from being true," writes J. A. Leighton, "that the outcome of 
intellectual activity is solely the breaking up of the primitive continu­ 
ities of immediate experience into discrete elements that in fact the 
actual work of intellect is synthetic as well as analytic and consists
quite as much in linking the immediately discrete by threads of continuity
63 
unearthed by a reflective quest."
The assertion that the intellect is incapable of apprehending change 
fails to take into consideration a great deal of intellectual activity in
which the intellect obviously does demonstrate its ability to grasp change. 
As the writer just quoted points out, if evolution or "pure becoming" be 
real, it is not discovered by sense-feeling or intuition. The notion of 
oosmical evolution is not derived from immediate experience. This is 
also true of the various forms of continuity which are true for science.
62. Ibid., p. 154^
63. J. A. Leighton, op. cit., p. 233.
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We do not immediately perceive the continuity of the acorn with the oak, 
or of the jelly-fish with the mammalia. Scientific generalizations, 
such as the law of gravitation, and the conservation of energy, are the
result of the search of the intellect for continuities and identities
64 
which are not open to immediate experience. Further, we are constantly
using thought for the purpose of overcoming such discontinuities in our 
everyday experience as those between our needs and desires and the condi­ 
tions which stand in the way of satisfying them. It is through the exer­ 
cise of the intellect that we bridge the gap between discomfort and com­ 
fort, poverty and plenty, hunger and food, and the like. Furthermore, 
James attributes to thought the practical role of enabling us to adjust 
ourselves to the changing conditions of our environment, or to new situa­ 
tions. This practical function of thought accounts for its breaking up 
the continuities of the flux of experience into discrete elements. But 
this function which he assigns to thought implies that thought plans for 
the future as a result of past experiences which indicates the ability of 
thought to comprehend the continuity of the future with the past. We may 
conclude, then, with Professor Montague, that to say "that the intellect 
falsifies a reality that is continuous and mobile because it breaks it up 
into cross-sections that are discrete and static, is as wrong as to say 
that the eye can only see space as a system of colored points. The eye
has no difficulty in seeing space as continuous and the intellect has no
65
difficulty in apprehending change." Instead of saying that thought dis­ 
torts reality, thought should be regarded as the selection of various
64. Ibid., p. 233.
65. W. P. Montague, op. cit., pp. 154-155.
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elements, qualities, and relations of the reality which is being attended 
to, and concepts or symbols should be considered as means of expressing 
or recording that which has been observed.
We turn now to some of the important implications of pluralism for 
philosophy and religion. One of the significant contributions which James 
makes to religious thought in his pluralistic philosophy lies in the value 
which he assigns to the individual. His originality is seen in his ac­ 
ceptance of the manyness and differences of the world as ultimate and irre­ 
ducible. It is characteristic of James to welcome this manyness and di­ 
versity not only as a fact, but as the great redeeming feature of the world. 
James rejoices in this aspect of the world. He believes that the prac­ 
tical consequence of his pluralistic philosophy "is the well-known demo-
66 
cratic respect for the sacredness of individuality." Because pluralism
does preserve that which is unique in the particular individual, by its 
doctrine of separateness and distinctness, it is, for James, far superior 
to monism which makes the human soul a part 01, of an element of, or as­ 
pect of, and, therefore, in some sense as identical with, the divine. 
\7hile we cannot subscribe to the pluralistic contention that other souls 
are independent of God, we believe that its view of separateness and dis­ 
tinctness of the individual is justified as against the monistic view. 
"According to monism there is no value in any individual except so far as 
he sings his part in the chorus, or plays his instrument in the symphony. 
Unless one can by a comprehensive and synthetic apprehension catch the
harmony of the whole, then one can find no value whatever in the activities
67 
of the individual." Some monists, Royce, for example, have attributed
66. Talks to Teachers, New York: Henry Holt and Company, Preface, p. v.
67. R. B. Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 218.
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value to the individual, as such, but, for the most part, the above quota­ 
tion states accurately the attitude of monism towards the individual. The 
extremes to which some monists are carried in their rejection of any value 
in the individual may be seen from the following statement: "I wish to 
make open and plain to you whither and past what I have been or am carried; 
what in looking I close my eyes to, what in searching for knowledge I ig­ 
nore. What in desire I resist, what in feeling I harden my heart against, 
is what I may call in a word Individuality. Wherever any part, anything 
less or other than the whole, sets up a claim to stand by itself....I dis­ 
allow its claim. I oppose its pretensions, I counter its efforts, I deny 
its worth. Its individuality is mere seeming, a hollow and delusive mask, 
the word a synonym for futility, worthiessness, insignificance, unreality. 
Of individuals—of all individuals—I feel bound to say that none is or 
can be what it seems to be. They are less than nothing and wholly van­ 
ity. It is too little to say of them that they are*bubbles on the sea 
of matter (or spirit) borne,' which f rise and fall and to that sea return,' 
for their happening also is individual and so unreal, and neither it nor 
they tell us anything of what lies behind their appearance." This writer 
goes on to say that some monists have excepted persons or personalities 
from their arguments against pluralism or individualism. He then adds: 
"For myself, I must avow that I cannot only find no intellectually satis­ 
factory grounds for this exception, but that in no sense which I am able 
to attach to the words 'person' or 'personal' do I find what is so quali­ 
fied unconditionally valuable or overwhelmingly attractive. The beings
68. J. A. Smith, "The Issue Between Monism and Pluralism", Proceedings" 
of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XXII, 1925-1926, pp. 15-16.
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or goods which I here and now characterize as f personal* seem to me often 
and thereby to contain the seeds of intestine weakness, unworthiness, dis­ 
solution and mortality, and by contrast what is impersonal to be more 
worth caring for and striving after, more deserving to survive and prevail, 
more likely to be durable or eternal. In a word, 'Personality* seems to
carry with it limitation and finitude, bonds and restrictions which I
69 
would fain see dissolved." Here we have a vivid contrast between the
type of monism which assigns no value to the individual and the type of 
pluralism which James advocates as guaranteeing the value of the individ­ 
ual life but leaves the value of the whole in doubt. For James, the only 
guarantee which the value of an individual life needs is its own inward
feeling. He does not conceive it as deriving its value by some remote 
reference to collective mankind, or to a whole. He utterly refuses to 
reduce the infinite variety of individuals either to the "abstract generic
principle human nature, or to some single all-enveloping life like that of
70 
the absolute.**
The supreme fallacy of absolute monism, as H. Rashdall points out, is
the assumption "that what constitutes existence for others is the same as
71 
what constitutes existence for self. 1* Even Royce, who tries harder than
other absolutists to assign a place and destiny to finite selves in the
absolute, does not succeed in escaping this fallacy by substituting "mean-
72 
ing** or "purpose" for self or spirit. He fails precisely because meaning
69. Ibid., p. 16.
70. R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 318.
71. H. Rashdall, "Personality: Human and Divine", in personal Idealism, 
Edited by H. Sturt, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., New York: The Macmil- 
lan Co., 1908, p. 38E.
72. The World and the Individual, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., New 
York: The Macraillan Co., 1901, Second Series, p. 347. Gf. Lectures VI, VII, 
VIII.
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or purpose is simply thought content which two or more selves may hold in 
common, while they, themselves, remain distinct from it and from each 
other throughout. Unity of purpose or meaning does not constitute unity 
of being. As H. Rashdall argues, "the esse of a person is to know him­ 
self, to be for himself, to feel and to think for himself, to act on his 
own knowledge, and to know that he acts. In dealing with persons, there­ 
fore, there is an unfathomable gulf between knowledge and reality. What 
a person is for himself is entirely unaffected by what he is for any 
other. No knowledge of that person by another, however intimate, can 
ever efface the distinction between the mind as it is for itself, and the
mind as it is for another. The essence of a person is not what he is
73 
for another, but what he is for himself." Thus he rightly insists that
the essence of a person lies in his own knowledge, his own experience of 
himself, and not in what can be known about him. To regard the essence 
of a person as consisting of what can be known about him is to assume 
that feeling and will are not constitutive of reality, but that knowledge I 
alone constitutes the whole of reality. It is possible to enter through 
sympathy into the lives of others, to understand them, to know something 
of their joys, sorrows, and heartaches, it is even possible, through simi­ 
lar experiences, to feel very much about certain things as others feel, 
but the life of another is forever a thing apart and distinct from my own, 
and my life remains equally apart from that of another. "Two loving 
hearts may beat as one, but they are forever two." For as A. E. Taylor 
puts it: "The unique individuality of the self as a centre of immediate 
73. Ibid., p. 585.
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experience is a datum which as philosophers we are called upon to explain,
74 
if we can, but are equally called upon not to explain away." 7/e believe,
therefore, that pluralism which recognizes and emphasizes the unique value 
and destiny of the individual is more in keeping with the teaching of 
Christianity concerning the value of human personality than absolutism 
which denies value to the individual as such. The latter school of 
thought which was so influential in Europe and America during the latter 
part of the nineteenth century» cannot be regarded as being in harmony 
with the historic position of Christianity. It was, as Professor A. N.
Whitehead says, "undoubtedly a reaction towards Buddhistic metaphysics on
75 
the part of Western mentality."
We cannot follow James, however, in his individualistic pluralism 
which carries the doctrine of the separateness and distinctness of the in­ 
dividual so far that it creates a gulf between God and His human worship­ 
pers which renders immanence impossible. To make human selves entirely 
independent of God fails to meet the full requirements of personality and 
of religious experience. Monism fails to coordinate with personality be­ 
cause of its recognition of immanence only; and pluralism equally fails in 
this respect due to its recognition of transcendence only. The funda­ 
mental weakness of pluralism in its various forms is, as J. W. Buckham 
points out, that it "is so taken up with plurality, it is so sensitive to 
the distinctness and autonomy of each separate self, that it fails to 
take due note of that intimacy of relationship by which finite selves enter
74. A. E. Taylor, op. cit., p. 205.
75. Op. cit., p. 141.
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into each other (each preserving still his own centre of selfhood) and
76 
dwell in each other, while the Supreme Self enters and dwells in all,"
If the universe is comprised of the quite independent wills of the human 
species and possibly other intelligent beings in other parts of space, 
alongside the will of God, it is inconceivable how, on such a basis, God 
can directly influence human life at all. A purely transcendent view of 
God excludes the possibility of the exercise of divine discipline and 
providence in the life of individuals; it apparently leaves no room in 
the life of these weak and unstable creatures for the exercise of divine 
grace and control. God is forced to stand aside from the course of human 
life as an anxious and sympathetic spectator watching us all too often mar 
and ruin our souls, but He is as impotent to help us because of the bar­ 
riers between Himself and us, as we are to help ourselves. Plainly, such 
a conception as this fails to do justice to the religious consciousness, 
and to the needs of human personality. In order fully to satisfy the de­ 
mands of the religious consciousness, and the requirements of human person­ 
ality, we must believe that the Being whom we worship, to use the words of 
J. B. Baillie, "is higher and greater than we, a supreme Soul whose ways 
and thoughts are not as the ways and thoughts of the souls of men; and yet
we must conceive Him as working in and through the souls of men, and of
77 
these as having their life, and all that is in them of good, from Him."
Professor Baillie goes on to say: "If there be any truth at all in religion, 
ultimate reality must be so constituted that both sides of this statement 
are true and (in some fashion hardly to be understood of us) cohere
76. J. W. Buckham, "Monism. Pluralism and Personalism", Harvard Theolog­ 
ical Review. Vol. I, No. 4, 1908, p. 484.
77. Op. cit., p. 397.
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78 
together." The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is the outcome of the
attempt to harmonize and unify these two complementary truths—immanence 
and trasncendence—and while it may seem a long way from Jesus to the 
Athanasian controversy, in reality, as J. W. Buckham writes, "from the
personality of Jesus to the personality of God is a straight and unavoid-
79 
able path." The only finally satisfactory doctrine of personality, then,
must regard God as both immanent and transcendent, rather than as either 
the sum of all existence or as an entirely separate unitary individual. 
We are in agreement with Professor A. 3eth Pringle-Pattison at this point 
when he suras up this question as follows: "However impious and intolerable 
one may feel the image of the potter and the clay, however certain one may 
be that the integrity of the self-conscious being is involved in the very 
perfection of the divine nature, still the relation between the finite
spirit and its inspiring source must be, in the end, incapable of state-
80 
rnent in terras of the relation of one finite individual to another."
We have next to consider the implications of pluralism with reference 
to freedom. James's pluralism and indetermini am, as Professor Perry sug­ 
gests, "lie in his viewing the world as a field in which determination is
proportional to proximity, and in which forces and influences are centrif-
81 
ugal rather than centripetal." This conception of the universe gives
support to the doctrine of freedom which monism renders impossible. The 
kind of determinism which James attacks is what he calls 'soft determinism* 
rather than the old-fashioned 'hard determinism. 1 He describes it as
78. Ibid., p. 397^
79. J. fa. Buckham, op. cit., p. 490.
80. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent 
Philosophy, 2nd Edition, New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1920, 
p. 320.
81. R. B. Perry, In the Spirit of William James, p. 112.
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professing "that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely 
appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no 
ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present 
is compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than 
the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and
every part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron
82 
block, in which there can be no equivocation or shadow of turning." It
was this "soft determinism" of absolute idealism, which James regards as 
being as deterministic as hyper-Calvinism or materialism, that he is pri­ 
marily concerned to refute. In contrast to this doctrine which denies 
"ambiguous possibilities" to the future, James's indeterminism "says that 
the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the 
laying down of one of them does not necessarily determine what others 
shall be. It admits that possibilities may be in excess of actualities, 
and that things not yet revealed to our knowledge may really in themselves 
be ambiguous. Of two alternative futures which we conceive, both may now 
be really possible; and the one become impossible only at the very moment
when the other excludes it by becoming real itself. Indeterminism thus
83 
denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact." James connects his
indeterminism with the concept of novelty; and novelty, for him, apparently 
means pure indeterminiation and contingency. "That we ourselves," he
t
says, "may be authors of genuine novelty is the thesis of the doctrine of 
free-will. That genuine novelties can occur means that from the point of
view of what is already given, whet comes may have to be treated as a
82. Ibid., p. 150.
83 • Ibid., pp. 150-151.
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84 
matter of chance." By use of the term "chance" he means that which
comes, in a world in which real alternatives exist, that which comes as
85 
a "free gift"; it is "not guaranteed, that it may fall out otherwise."
There are two motives which govern James's advocacy of freedom as 
against determinism. In the first place, James wants to be assured that 
man's present will plays an important and decisive part in events subse­ 
quent to his choice. If man's decision makes no real difference in the 
world, if man has nothing to do with determining the nature of the world, 
there is apparently nothing to spur him to action at all; and he is de­ 
ceived in thinking that his choices are a matter of importance. In other 
words, unless the world contains real possibilities, genuine novelties, 
unless the past and present environment provide for more than one possible 
deed, so that man's present act of will alone determines which of the pos­ 
sibilities shall occur, there is no reason for regarding his choice as 
real or crucial, or in any way decisive. In order for this to be possible 
no act can be regarded as absolutely predictable; there must be something
in every act which is really of its own, "something that is not the uncon-
86 
ditional property of the whole." It must come as a matter of chance, a
87 
contingency, as a "free gift or not at all." An act can come in this
fashion only in a world in which there is "free-play" between its parts, 
and in a universe that belongs to a plurality of semi-independent forces 
between which there is mutual opportunity for helpfulness or hindrance. 
James covets the dignity which one feels when there is the realization that
84. Problems of Philosophy, p. 145.
85. W. B. 9 p. 154.
86. Ibid., p. 154. Cf. pp. 150, 175.
^ Ibid., p. 154.
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one's own choice helps to fashion the world; and the sense of gravity 
which accompanies the assurance that such a choice may have something de­ 
cisive to do with the making or marring of reality. In the second place, 
freedom enables us to exercise "judgments of regret" without falling into
pessimism. He thinks that the only deterministic escape from pessimism
88
is everywhere to abandon the "judgment of regret." For, according to de­ 
terministic philosophy, the worst conceivable crimes and vices are inev­ 
itable. They are so essentially a part of the scheme of things in a 
world which is all of one piece that they must be considered as necessary 
from all eternity. But our "judgments of regret" lead us to say that 
such crimes and vices ought not to be; our universe would be infinitely 
better without such, and if such things as these are inextricably and in­ 
evitably bound up with the nature of the w>rld so as to render their oc­ 
currence necessary, we must hate or "regret" the "whole frame of things" 
of which these repugnant aspects are members. As James sees it, there is
no escape from this pessimistic conclusion for the determinist, unless our
89 
"judgment of regret" is entirely given up. Determinism, then, leads to
pessimism.
It is possible to abandon our "judgment of regret" and to interpret 
the evil facts of life in terms of a higher value. That is, we may take 
"the strictly dramatic point of view and treat the whole thing as a great
unending romance which the spirit of the universe, striving to realize its
90
own content, is eternally thinking out and representing to itself." Ac­ 
cording to this view, the tragic conflict caused by evil is attributed a
86. Ibid., p. 162.
89. Of. Ibid., pp. 159 ff.
90. Ibid., p. 170.
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spiritualizing value. "Not the saint, but the sinner that repenteth, is 
he to whom the full length and breadth, and height and depth, of life's
meaning is revealed. Not the absence of vice, but vice there, and vir-
91 
tue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal human state." This view
James calls "subjectivism," and it is open to two objections. First, 
vice has virtue by the throat; instead of repentance on the part of the 
evil-doer for his evil deeds, he boasts about and glories in them. Again, 
in real life, virtue and vice mingle on equal terms; both are of equal im­ 
portance and dignity in the cosmic romance. The optimism which this sub-
jectivistic view fosters eventually turns to "an ethical indifference,
92 
which infallibly brings dissolution in its train." Sensitiveness to, and
serious concern about, the evil of life, an uncompromising determination 
to uproot it, and sincere resentment of it are replaced by moral compla­ 
cency towards, and acquiescence in, the evil of the world. The subjectiv- 
ist point of view reduces all outward distinctions between good and evil 
to a common denominator. The dilemma which confronts determinism, there­ 
fore, is either a hopeless pessimism or a destructive subjectivism.
James sees but one way of avoiding this impossible situation: that 
is to believe that we live in a world in which evil might have been avert­ 
ed, and in which it is possible to get rid of evil. For unless we are 
enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and natural way, we 
cannot possibly realize any zest or excitement out of achieving the right 
way. There is no sense in condemning ourselves for taking the wrong way 
if we do not at the same time feel that the right way was open to us.
91. Ibid., p. 1691
92. Ibid., p. 171.
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"I cannot understand the belief that an act is bad, without regret at 
its happening. I cannot understand regret without the admission of 
real, genuine possibilities in the world. Only then is it other than 
a mockery to feel, after we have failed to do our best, that an irrepa­ 
rable opportunity is gone from the universe, the loss of which it must
93
forever after mourn." Only in such a world es contains real possibili­ 
ties can we praise the virtuous and condemn the vicious, and pass judg­ 
ment upon the evil without at the same time condemning the good. This 
is the only sort of world that permits us to get rid of the evil without 
also destroying the good. This kind of world makes an appeal to our 
wills however repugnant it may be to our intellects; we may and can re­ 
solve to achieve that which we think should be, or to get rid of that 
which we abhor. But it is only a pluralistic conception of the universe 
that makes this solution of the question of evil possible because it alone 
offers us a world in which things are separately and independently placed, 
and their connections are casual rather than vital or necessary. Because 
of this feature of the pluralistic world we can appraise each aspect of 
the universe separately and accept or reject it according to its real value, 
or disvalue. Thus we do not have to take the world mixed as it is with 
good and evil; we can accept only so much as is good and reject the bad. 
We can go further, we can attempt to construct a world in which there is 
only the good and from which the evil has been banished. Thus we must 
have a world of "ambiguous possibilities," a world of contingencies, a 
world with chance in it, in short, a pluralistic world, if our "judgments 
95. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
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of regret" are to mean anything more than empty words.
James's doctrine of freedom delivers him from both philosophic pessi­ 
mism and religious optimism, and enables him to regard the universe in 
terms of meliorism; that is, in terms of a moral or qualified hope that 
the improvement of the world is at least possible. The attempt to 
eliminate evil is neither doomed to utter defeat nor assured of absolute 
success. We simply regard the ultimate defeat of evil as a possibility 
the achievement of which is contingent upon our own and others' efforts. 
God is even more interested in getting rid of evil than we are, but He 
needs our support in this tremendous cosmic struggle. Without our help 
He may labor in vain. Moral agents are given an opportunity of conquer­ 
ing evil decisively, "by dropping it out altogether, throwing it overboard
and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe that shall forget its
94 
very place and name." But this glorious task may involve "real losses
95 
and real losers", and there may be "no total preservation of all that is."
"I can believe in the ideal as an ultimate," he says, "not as an origin,
96
and as an extract, not the whole." Our attitude towards this ideal par­ 
allels that of the puritans who were willing to be damned for the glory of 
God. Even though this lost element may be one's self, there must be no 
turning back, no crying "I will not play." The danger must be courageously 
faced; the adventure must be steadily pursued. The attitude of the indi­ 
vidual in respect of this adventure is that of the ancient Greek sailor 
expressed in the following epigram:
94. Pragmatism, p. 297.
95. Ibid., p. 296.
96. Ibid., p. 296.
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"A shipwrecked sailor, buried on this coast,
Bids you set sail.
Full many a gallant bark, when we were lost, 
Weathered the gale."
This view of the matter is in line with James's conception of the 
universe as temporalistic which implies the reality of time. Time does 
not fall within the world as one of the components of an eternal and 
changeless whole, but the world falls within time, and undergoes prodi­ 
gious changes. The past is not regarded as essential to the unitary mean­ 
ing of eternity, and thus conceived as occupying a permanent place there, 
but it is considered as being entirely left out. The evil may be annihi­ 
lated and forgotten, and the world may become as though it never had ex­ 
isted at all. It may be completely purged of its evil and attain an in-
98 
nocence which is untainted by the evil of the past. By applying the idea
of growth or progress in time to the universe as a whole with the new pos­ 
sibilities and new horizons which such a view opens up, we are delivered 
from "a rationalistic block-universe," which renders impossible the utter 
annihilation of evil. For James, as his view of reality indicates, the 
fixed laws and stable arrangements of the world have been gradually devel­ 
oped as a result of the efforts of the "semi-independent forces" of the 
universe in their struggle for the best "modus vivendi." With which to 
start, the world contains no established order, no reign of law, no system 
of conditions within which purposive action, the chief characteristic of 
conscious life, takes place. On this supposition, laws and uniformities 
of nature, being the results of evolution, are not to be regarded as abso­ 
lute, or as necessarily obeyed. Thus there is an element of indeterminacy,
97. Of. Ibid., p. 297.
98. Ibid., p. 296.
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spontaneity, or chance in nature.
we are entirely in sympathy with James f s efforts to establish the doc­ 
trine of freedom, but we do not believe that there is any necessity to choose
between deterrainism and indeterminism. James construes this choice to be 
necessary as a result of a faulty psychological description of will in which 
he fails to do justice to the activity of the self due to his strong scien­ 
tific desire for analysis. As Vv. R. Boyce Gib son has pointed out, "the 
necessity for choosing definitely between these two rival theories arises on­ 
ly when the issue is restricted to the abstract consideration of some specif-
100 
ic volitional act." Gibson attempts to define the issue by insisting that
freedom is the essence not only of self-conscious volitional activity but of 
consciousness itself, and he rightly maintains that we cannot profitably
discuss its possibility unless we start from the relation in which the
101 
conscious subject stands to its object wituin the unity of experience. As
we have already seen, James's theory of ideo-motor action represents appro­ 
priate action as occurring when an idea is able to maintain itself before
the mind. Here the consciousness of an alternative being possible, as
102 
in the case of free effort, is for Janes, a most certain delusion. Thus
his refusal to admit that freedom is the essence of consciousness itself, 
a permanent attitude of the conscious subject, forces him to take the 
drastic step of accepting an element of chance in his view of freedom 
to compensate for his deterministic assumption. For he admits that de­ 
terminism and indeterminism are on a par theoretically. AS Professor
99. Ibid.., p. 119.
100. V/. H. Boyce Gibson, "The Problem of Freedom in its Relation to Psy­ 
chology", Personal Idealism, pp. 160-1.
101. G£. Ibid., pp. 161-162.
102. 3f. Principles, Vol. II, pp. 522 ff.
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J. B. Pratt puts it, "his strange unwillingness to acknowledge the reality
of a genuine self makes it impossible for him to recognize self-activity, 
and throws him (when he speaks as a philosopher) into the arms of complete 
Indeterminism and mere chance. At the other end, so to speak, of his 
psychological doctrine of will, this refusal to recognize the self forces 
him to a form of analysis which sounds suspiciously like the associationist
type of thought against which he so often protests. Efforts sole achieve-
103 
ment consists in getting a given idea to stay before the mind." Having
thus set the problem from its own restricted, abstract point of view, 
there is nothing left to do except to choose between the absolutely uncon­ 
ditioned and the absolutely predetermined, between fatalism and chance; 
for from this standpoint no meaning can be assigned to freedom in terras 
of self-determinism, or a relative independence. Such radical discontin­ 
uities as James advocates in the name of freedom are not necessary if we 
take experience as a whole from the beginning; and this is the only way to 
approach the problem. We are then enabled to carry the possibility of
freedom with us from the start and do not have to resort to the Deus e_x 
machine, to save us from determinism. The author just quoted correctly
states that "the self discussed in this problem is the same self that is 
the subject of knowledge, the being that compares and judges, that feels 
and thinks, and that possesses a type of unity which nothing else does.
It is this unitary self that also decides. It decides according to its
104 
character on those matters where its character is definite." But in-
determinism does not seem to derive freedom from the nature of anything.
103. J. B. Pratt, Personal Realism^* 328.
104. Ibid., p. 328.
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Not only does it fail to show that it arises out of the fundamental charac­ 
ter of immediate experience, but it also fails to account for freedom in 
the nature of the free subject himself. It conceives freedom as beginning 
suddenly; it is like "a bolt out of the blue." Plainly, it is inconceiv­ 
able how, on the basis of the pluralistic conclusion of absolute contin­ 
gency; that is, without either the pre-existence of a stable system of con­ 
ditions, or a subject as the source of freedom, spontaneity can have any 
meaning at all. For as Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison points out, 
the actions peculiar to conscious life, which, according to pluralism, have 
reduced the primeval chaos of the universe to its present state of compara­ 
tive orderliness, cannot be given intelligent consideration apart from the 
notion of stimulus and response. When this aspect of action is taken 
into consideration, "spontaneity can only mean unhampered response accord­ 
ing to the joint nature of the interacting factors. The idea of sponta­ 
neity in the abstract, apart from such a reference, must reduce itself to
105 
sheer wilfulness."
It is open to question whether James is warranted in basing the case 
for freedom on the connection which he attributes to indeterminism and 
novelty. His conception of novelty, it will be remembered, is that of 
absolute novelty; it is the arising of something the like of which has 
never been before in the universe. James thinks that indeterminism im­ 
plies this kind of novelty. That is to say, instead of holding with de­ 
terminism that, let us say, a and b_ are so related that a's occurrence 
105. Op. cit., p. 187. Of. p. 9.
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always necessitates the happening of b, inde termini am maintains that a^ is 
sometimes followed by £. The electron, for example, may jump to the 
right or left; it is not predetermined to jump one way or the other. But 
that this gives such novelty as James demands is very doubtful. If all 
of the antecedent circumstances of the electron, at a given moment, were 
known, in what does the novelty consist if it jumps to the left rather 
than to the right? There is no novel element to be found in the fact that 
the object moves to the left. This is simply the repetition of a very
familiar experience. It is not something really hitherto unknown in the 
universe. It would not imply that it had never happened before. Thus
there would seem to be no necessary connection between indeterminism and 
the conception of novelty as James conceives it. Nor is it beyond dispute 
that novelties are possibly only in an indeterministic world; it may be just 
as possible in one ruled by determinism. For instance, two chemical ele­ 
ments, «i and b_, for instance, have never been brought together into chemical 
combination, and when they are combined, the result is something absolutely 
new. We have an example of determinism united with novelty in the philos­ 
ophy of S. Alexander; he gives us a deterministic universe, but every new
106 
quality that appears presents us with genuine novelty. Much of that which
is regarded as novelty may not really be novelty, but unexpectedness, or 
surprise. But all that surprises is not novelty. Novelty in itself is 
not valuable; it may mean the possibility of improvement, or it may mean 
that destruction has set in. We are always justified in striving for the 
better; but we are not justified in reaching for the new as such.
106. 0£. cit., Vol. II, p. 323.
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James's temperallsm, which implies the idea of growth or progress in 
time of the universe as a whole, and according to which novelty means pure 
indeterminacy or contingence, is an attempt to deliver us from the slavery 
of our own past and to free us from the peculiar illusion of determinism 
which, for him and Bergson, the spatialized idea of time produces. In­ 
stead of our future course of action being performed or predetermined in 
the past, James thinks that, "the whole feeling of reality, the whole 
sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in 
it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it
is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages
107 
ago." But when he conceives it to be necessary to introduce contingency
as a means of guaranteeing freedom, he assumes that the present mechanically 
determines the future in much the same fashion as the determinists maintain 
that the past determines the present. That is to say, his emphasis upon 
contingency is due to the persistence of the same notion of time with re­ 
gard to the future that he denies with reference to past. For unless he 
does assume that the present does determine the future in the same fashion 
as determinism holds that the past fashions, in advance, the present the 
necessity for his doctrine of contingency does not arise. Professor A. 
Seth Pringle-Pattison points out, in his criticism of M. Bergson, that if 
we recognize that every being acts from its "own living present," there is 
no occasion to involve ourselves in the same difficulty which the "spatial 
illusion" concerning past time involves by conceiving the future as a sim­ 
ilar line in the opposite direction, and by regarding the present as 
107. Principles, Vol. 1, p. 455.
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fatally and externally shaping the future beforehand, so as to rob future
108
actions, when they take place, of their proper reality. James will have 
nothing to do with the conception that the present is determined in ad­ 
vance, but he apparently assumes that the present does so determine the 
future by asserting contingency at every step. But, as Professor Pringle- 
Pattison says, "if we are true to the doctrine of real duration, we have 
nothing to do with this phantom future any more than with the other phan­ 
tom of the past. We live and act only in the present; and every action 
has its own reality and, in the case of conscious action, its own freedom, 
just as the divine ectivity which sustains and guides the world is to be 
thought of as the expression of present mind and will, not as the conse­ 
quence of past decress which bind God himself like a fate. The whole de­ 
terministic difficulty in its ordinary form arises from our taking time in 
this spatial perspective. If we avoid the error ab initio, therefore, 
the dilemma of determinism or freedom does not arise, and consequently 
there is no temptation to safeguard freedom by the introduction of contin­ 
gency. If, as M. Bergson says, we act with our whole past, and yet are
free, why should this be otherwise in the future, when what is now present
109 
will constitute part of the past which we carry with us?"
There are two qualifications necessary in any doctrine of freedom 
from the religious point of view. First, freedom must not be interpreted 
so as to involve absolute contingency. We have attempted to show that 
contingency is necessary only when a dynamic, active self is denied. We
108. Op. cit., p. 375.
109. Ibid., p. 375.
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have registered our objection to the view that makes such a denial and is 
thereby driven to a belief in contingency to save it from determinism be­ 
cause we do not find it possible to acquiesce in any theory that tends to 
sever our acts from ourselves. Thus the extreme doctrine of indeterminism 
is just as impossible as the extreme view of determinism. In both cases 
the value of moral choice is annulled. If praise and blame are to have 
any significance when ascribed to our choices and actions, we must have 
freedom, responsibility, and the power of initiative and origination. 
But it is inconceivable how any of these things would be possible on the
basis of a doctrine that refuses any determination to our acts. Such a 
view implies that a man's choices and actions are not influenced by his
character and that they do not reveal his character. A man's good and 
evil deeds are equally accidental, and, in neither case, can we say that
they flow from his character. To praise a man for his good deeds, or to 
condemn him for his evil ones, means that we believe him to be the kind of 
man that makes such deeds possible. This is utterly meaningless unless 
the deeds are really his own, unless they are an expression of the man him­ 
self. On any other supposition the term "character" is equally meaningless. 
If we are not to dispense with our moral categories, we must regard our 
acts as determined by ourselves. There must be a certain "predictability 
of character" in each one of us if our human relationships and moral life 
are not to be reduced to chaos. Morality and religion both demand a cer­ 
tain stability of nature in the individual, a certain amount of self-deter­ 
mination, as such terms as "responsibility" and "repentance" clearly show. 
The objection that such a view ultimately leads to determinism since one's
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acts and choices could be predicted beforehand if the total condition of 
things at any given moment were known, is not entirely without force, but 
it appears to ignore the dynamic nature of the self upon which such a view 
is based. For if it is the entire self which determines an act, and not 
some particular series of events, or a single impulse or group of impulses 
which would not involve the whole self; that is, if it were one's own act, 
to be able to predict it with absolute certainty does not at all appear 
possible. For in order to be able to do this, as Professor J. B. Pratt 
says, "would require a direct acquaintance with all your previous experiences
of such an intimate sort as only you yourself could possibly possess*...he
110 
would have to be you."
The other qualification which a satisfactory doctrine of freedom re­ 
quires is that it must not be absolute freedom, or freedom of outright 
creative power as James's pluralistic theory seems to demand. We shall 
have to be content with the freedom granted to finite beings. This is 
quite different from what might be called absolute freedom; but it is free­ 
dom enough. A man has nothing to do with the time, place, circumstances, 
of his birth. It is not his to choose the fairlly, or race to which he is 
to belong. He has no choice as to the hereditary forces that are to work 
through him. All that he has to say concerning his own endowment is the 
measure of improvement his own efforts are able to realize. His early life 
and training are beyond his power to determine and external circumstances
beyond his power of control may hedge in his freedom throughout life. He 
has the freedom to select from and use the various forces of the world, but 
he cannot create those forces. He can change the combination of chemical 
110. Qp. cit., p. 527.
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elements to suit his purpose, but he cannot create those elements. In 
short, man is unable to create, in the outright sense, but he can produce
and, as F. J. McConnell says, "production is but slightly inferior to out- 
Ill 
right creation." In spite of these limitations which the facts of human
experience force us to place upon man's freedom, the achievements of the 
human race bear glorious testimony to the fact that freedom is a tremen­ 
dous force in human life. The wanton destruction and havoc which man has 
wrought from time to time also give evidence of the reality of his freedom 
as a factor in human life. But religion has nothing to gain from the 
view that man f s freedom is absolute, or that his creative power is one of 
outright creativity; for consciousness of dependence upon God is essential 
to religion.
We stated above that a certain measure of self-determination is neces­ 
sarily involved in any religious doctrine of freedom. For without self- 
determination, which is an essential characteristic of man, we cannot see 
how it would be possible for man to be called into fellowship with God. 
But, as Yj'illiam Temple suggests, "it is not the last word of human develop­ 
ment; on the contrary it contains the sentence of endless frustration as 
truly as it affords the opportunity of entry upon the spiritual enterprise. 
For the self which determines cannot carry the self which is determined 
above its own level. Self-determination must fulfill itself in the recog­ 
nition of an Other which may lift it to heights forever out of its own
reach; self-determination fulfills itself in self-surrender to that which
112 
is entitled to receive the submission of the self." In keeping with this
111. F. J. McConnell, Is God Limited?, New York: The Abingdon Press, 1924, 
p. 116. Of. pp. 115 ff.
112. Op_. cit., p. 244.
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line of thought, Temple says that freedom "is not the absence of determina­ 
tion; it is spiritual determination, as distinct from mechanical or even
organic, determination. It is determination by what seems good as con-
113 
trasted with determination by irresistible compulsion." Ultimately, any
view of freedom which may be considered from the point of view of religion 
must take into account man's relationship to an "Other" with whom it is 
possible for him to have fellowship. Such an inquiry would carry us too 
far afield for our present purposes for it would involve a discussion of 
the method by which God makes Himself known to man; that is, it would lead 
to the consideration of how God reveals Himself to man.
James's doctrine of meliorism, or of "melioristic theism", is not 
satisfactory as a religious creed, even though it steers a middle course 
between the pessimism of crude naturalism on the one hand, and the optimism 
of transcendental absolutism on the other. In the first place, James is 
willing to sacrifice the individuals whose freedom he is so careful to as­ 
sure even to the extent of making them independent of God, and whose crea­ 
tive powers he is anxious to extol, for the sake of merely an ideal, namely, 
that of eliminating evil from the universe. And for all we know God Himself 
may suffer a similar fate for the same ideal. Further, it conceives our 
world as a "moralistic and epic kind of universe," the chief characteristic 
of which is progress through effort. This view makes a strong appeal to 
our active nature. But, as Professor Pringle-Pattison suggests, we have 
no reason to believe that we find in the characteristics of our practical
activity "a description in ultimate terms of the fundamental nature of the
114 
universe." He goes on to say that a philosophy "may ultimately be tested
113. Ibid., p. 229.
114. Op. cit., p. 395.
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by its ability to reconcile the attitude and postulate of morality and
115 
religion; but they are not the same." The universe does serve as a
school of moral discipline for man, it does offer an opportunity for mor­ 
al struggle, and the fundamental religious instinct does develop, as an 
essential aspect, into an imperious desire to change the world in which we 
live; but this does not justify us in regarding the universe as exclusively
moral. As w. H. Irige intimates, we do not want an exclusively moral Ood,
116
blind to truth and beauty, whose interest is confined to conduct. More­ 
over, to regard the outcome of the struggle against evil as doubtful, as 
James does, has never been the religious attitude towards this conflict. 
It is the faith that the victory is certain that inspires the nan of reli­ 
gion to carry on as an individual and gives him courage and strength with 
which to face obstacles and temporary defeat. He believes that while his 
and all other human efforts will not suffice to make victory sure, there is 
an eternal power that is strong enough to carry the battle through to ulti­ 
mate victory. If, however, the issue be regarded as doubtful, and depend­ 
ent upon our efforts for a successful completion, since God is not strong 
enough to guarantee the final triumph of good, witi. or without our help, 
there is little ground for confidence, and a lack of incentive to action. 
As Professor Pringle-Pattison says, "experience abundantly shows, the as­ 
surance of victory won and reconciliation achieved is the most powerful dy-
117 
namic that can be supplied to morality." The difficulty involved acre is
that of reconciling the reality of the moral struggle with the certainty of 
the final outcome. James thinks this is impossible and gives up the latter
115. Ibid., p.
116. i7. R. luge, Faith and Its Psychology, London: Duckworth and Company, 
1909, p. 159.
117. GJ. cit., p. 396.
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in order to preserve the former. He is right in holding that the struggle 
is a real one, in insisting that our efforts to really count for something, 
but he errs in thinking that the religious attitude which regards the vic­ 
tory as won renders the conflict unreal, or that a doubtful issue is more 
conducive to the reality of the struggle. Here we have one of the many 
curious paradoxes which characterize religion; the difficulty involved ap­ 
parently does not occur to the religious man himself, but arises as the 
product of philosophical reflection.
IX
JAMES'S CONCEPTION OF GOD
It has been said that the philosophy of James can be made to prove al-
1
most anything we will have it prove. This statement seems to be particular­ 
ly applicable to James's conception of God. For while it is no doubt true,
as Professor J. 3. Bixler suggests in his Religion in the Philosophy ofg —
William James, that nearly all of the various elements in James's philosophi­ 
cal system converge in the conception of God, and bear testimony to the exist­ 
ence of God, he appears never to have arrived at any very definite or settled 
conviction concerning the nature of God aside from his belief in a finite God. 
His extreme pragmatic pluralism and radical empiricism combine to give what
may be regarded as representing the latest stage in the development of his
3 
thought concerning God, and which may be described as "pluralistic pantheism.'1
It is pluralistic in that the super-human consciousness of God is not
all-embracing; God is no absolute all-experiencer, "but simply the experiencer
4 
of the widest actual conscious span." God is finite since, along with other
finite beings, he lias an external environment for which he is not responsible 
and over which he exercises no control. Thus, for James, there is always a 
portion of reality which lies beyond His ken, and out of reach of His exper­ 
ience. He is simply primus inter pares, and consequently, falls within the 
time process arid is subject to growth and development. James is not averse 
to polytheism. "All that the facts require is that the power should be both 
other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only 
it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it 
need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more
1. F. J. I.'lcConnell, op. cit., p. 106.
2. Cf. p. 122.
3. R. B. Perry, The Thought and Charactor of .^illiam James, Vol. II, p. 592,
4. L. T., p. 1257T. U., pp. 31C-311.
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godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated ex­ 
pression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves,
of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it
5 
at all. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us."
James appears at times to be strongly attracted towards some such poly­ 
theistic view. He frequently mentions the possibility of different orders 
of being and, as we have seen, inclines towards Fechner's hypothesis of 
hierarchy of spirits. He regards such a conception as being "thicker" than 
monistic idealism, since the earth soul is something to which we can pray as 
men pray to their saints. "Ordinary monistic idealism leaves everything 
intermediary out...First, you and I, just as we are in this room; and the 
moment we get below that surface, the unutterable absolute itselfI Doesn't
this show a singularly indigent imagination? Isn't this brave universe made
6 
on a richer pattern, with room in it for a long hierarchy of beings?" James
calls this "crasser"1 view "piecemeal supernatural!sm" as compared with the 
more refined view of transcendental idealism. He regards it as being more 
in harmony with the views of uneducated people and with the older theology 
than the refined type is. This is due to the fact that it "admits miracles 
and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing 
the ideal and the real worlds together by interpolating influences from the
ideal region among the forces that causally determine the real world's
7 
details."
This "crasser variety" of old-fashioned supernatural!sn represents the 
extreme to which James's pragmatic and pluralistic imagination leads him. 
But his pragmatism attempts to avoid the extreme position which stresses the
5. Varieties, pp. 525-526, Cf_. P. U., p. 310.
6. P. U.,pp. 174-175.
7. Varieties, pp. 520-521.
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merely subjective utility of the idea of God with no reference to, or con­ 
cern for, its objective validity. While he quotes with approval from the 
well known article of Professor J. II. Leuba, where he maintains that "God 
is not known, he is not understood; he is used-,-^aometiraes as meat-purveyor,
sometimes as moral support, sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of
8 
love," he is not satisfied with this purely subjective rating of religion.
He goes on to point out that religious experience bears testimony to an 
objective power of which we have perceptual experience but which is not to 
be identified with the subconscious self. "But if you, being orthodox 
Christians, ask me as a psychologist whether the reference of a phenomenon 
to a subliminal self does not exclude the notion of the direct presence of
the Deity altogether, I have to say frankly that as a psychologist I do not
9 
see why it necessarily should."
The pantheistic aspect of James's conception of God is a product of his 
radical empiricism as set forth in his theory of the continuity of experience, 
According to this doctrine, it is possible for a single field of conscious­ 
ness to shade off into other fields; that is, into larger and more inclusive 
fields until a super-human consciousness is reached. "Every bit of us at 
every moment is part and parcel of a wider self, it quivers along various 
radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously 
one with possibles not yet in our present sight. And just as we are co- 
conscious with our own momentary margin, may not we ourselves form the margin 
of some more really central self in things which is co-conscious with the
whole of us? Lay not you and I be confluent in a higher consciousness, and
10 
confluently active there, though we know it not?" He then proceeds to
8."The Contents of Religious Consciousness;' The Monist, Vol. XI, 1901, 
p.536, Of. Varieties, pp. 506-507.
9. Varieties, p. 242. Cf. pp. 507 ff. 
10. P. U., pp. 289-290.
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answer the question by asserting that there are religious experiences of a
specific nature which "point with reasonable probability to the continuity
11 
of our consciousness with a wider spiritual environment." Thus God is
conceived, so far as His limits extend, as the "intimate soul and reason"
of the universe and man participates directly in His life in the mystical
12 
experience, for human life is "part and parcel of that deep reality." In
the mystical state, that "deep reality" "seeps" or "leaks" through, by way 
of our subconscious mind, and we are enabled to share that co-consciousness 
which previously was God's alone; the character of isolation or "exness" 
which ordinarily characterizes our consciousness is removed.
The part which God plays in human life and thought, according to James's 
philosophy, may be seen from his answers to a questionnaire concerning re­ 
ligious belief to which he replied, at the request of Professor J. B. Pratt, 
in 1904. Some of the questions and answers are as follows:
Q. "fthat do you mean by God?"
A. "A combination of ideality and (final) efficacity."
Q. "Is He a person——if so, what do you mean by His being a person?" 
A. "He must be cognizant and responsive in some way."
Q. "Or is He only a force?" 
A. "He must do."
3,. "Or is God an attitude of the Universe toward you?"
A. "Yes, but more conscious. 'God,' to me, is not only spiritual 
reality to believe in. Religion means primarily a universe of 
spiritual relations surrounding the earthly practical ones, not 
merely relations of 'value,' but agencies and their activities. 
I suppose that the chief premise for my hospitality towards the 
religious testimony of others is my conviction that 'normal' 
or 'sane' consciousness is so small a part of actual experience. 
What e'er be true, it is not true exclusively, as philistine 
scientific opinion assumes. The other kinds of consciousness 
bear witness to a much wider universe of experiences, from 
which our belief selects and emphasizes such parts as best 
satisfy our needs."
11. Ibid., pp. 299-500.
12. Ibid., p. 30, Of. pp. 28-31,
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Q. "How do you apprehend His relation to mankind and to you personally?" 
A. "Uncertain.**
Q. "Why do you believe in God? Is it from argument?" 
A. "Emphatically no."
Q. "Or because you have experienced His presence?"
A. "No, but rather because I need it so that it 'must' be true."
Q. "Or do you not so much believe in God as want to use Hin?" 
A. "I can f t use Him very definitely, yet I believe."
Q. "Do you accept Him not so much as a real existent Being, but rather 
as an ideal to live by?n 
A. "More as a more powerful ally of my own ideals."
Q. "If you should become thoroughly convinced that there was no God, 
would it make any great difference in your life——either in happi­ 
ness, morality, or in other respects?" 13 
A. "Hard to say. It would surely make some difference."
This statement serves to bring out three important functions which God 
performs in human life. First, His nature is such as to call forth our most 
active response; He appeals to our moral energy. This conception of God 
dominates the first stage of James's philosophjr and is presented from various 
points of view in The_ I/ill to Believe and Other Essays. Here God is defined 
primarily in terms of His function of creating in men the "strenuous mood" 
towards life, an essential stimulus to the most vigorous and highest moral 
life. If we had no other reason for believing in God, it would be necessary 
to postulate such a Being in order to release our energy, quicken our powers, 
and stir us to moral action. "The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so 
deep down among our human possibilities that even if there were no meta­ 
physical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate
one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of
14
existence its keenest possibilities of zest." A merely human world, with­ 
out a God, fails to stimulate our moral energy to its maximal power. The
15. The~Tette'rT~oTl7illiam James, Vol." II, pp. 212-214, 
14. J. J3., p. 213.
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second function which God exercises is that of a saving Pov/er. This view 
of God characterizes what may be regarded as the second stage in James f s 
philosophical development and is set forth, with unusual force and clarity, 
in The Varieties of Religious Experience. While he continues to think of 
God as the releaser of man's active energies, he places greater emphasis upon 
God's power to meet the needs of the human heart. Here it is not so much 
man's active energy, but his capacity to receive help from God that he stresses, 
Man is pictured as playing a more passive role than that which the first con­ 
ception assigns him. It is God who is active. He brings comfort to the 
sick soul, encouragement to the healthy-minded, integration to the divided 
self, assurance and peace in conversion, saintliness to those who continually 
seek Him, and reveals Himself to those who are capable of entering into the 
mystical experience. In short, this remarkable book consists chiefly in a 
description of the results for life which follow upon man's experience of the 
saving power of God. It is the actual power of the religious experience 
with which he deals, for the most part, at this stage of his thinking.
These two conceptions of God reflect the development which takes place 
in James's pragmatic theory. His earlier pragmatism tends to define con­ 
cepts in terms of their practical consequences, and God is conceived in terms 
of the consequences of such a belief for practical life. ^s his pragmatic 
theory develops, an appeal to consequences helps to determine the truth of 
an idea, or the reality of its object. Thus truth itself is defined in 
terms of value. Both aspects of his pragmatism are to be found in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, but he appears to move away from the 
former type, or rather supplement it, by setting up value as a standard of 
truth. Values lead us to truth and particular facts suggest basic ultimate 
principles. "Both instinctively and for logical reasons," he says, "I find
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it hard to believe that principles can exist which make no difference in 
facts. But all facts are particular facts, and the whole interest of the
question of God's existence seems to me to lie in the consequences for par-
15 
ticul-:rs which that existence may be expected to entail." He appears to
be more confident that religion cau claim objective truth, as well as sub­ 
jective value, than formerly he had been. Finally, James conceives God as 
a "more powerful ally" of our own ideals. rle is a "great captain" who leads 
us in the fight against evil. He is the chief protagonist for the cause of 
morality in the world, the strongest enemy of evil. This view of God char­ 
acterizes the latest development of his pragmatic view, as set forth in his 
doctrine of meliorism in the last chapter of his Pragmatism, and is es­ 
sential to his pluralistic conception. God is a larger and more important 
member of this pluralistic v:orld. Tue conception of God as a part of the 
world, and as finite, makes Him more approachable, nnd enables man to regard 
Him as a real leader and inspirer. Thus we enjoy greater intimacy v;ith Him 
than is possible under any other system. "Having an environment, being in
time, and working out a history just like ourselves, he escapes from the for-
16 
ei^:naess from all that is human, of the static, timeless perfect absolute."
Our active and moral nature is quickened by the realization that we are work­ 
ing v.ith Him, and helping Him to achieve goals which we hold in common with 
Him. God's function as an ally of man combines the two conceptions, namely, 
God as saving power, and God as the producer of the "strenuous mood"; it 
demands that the power of God and the pov.-ers of nen be united for the purpose 
01' bringing about real changes for the better in a developing world.
If, as has been suggested, most of the different phases of Jame's
15. Varieties. pp..5£l-5SS.
16. p. U., P. 318.
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philosophy lead to the conception of God, it is also true that many aspects 
of his philosophy lead to the belief in a finite God. Various trends in 
his pragmatism, his pluralism, as well as ordinary common sense, force him 
to conclude that God cannot be infinite. "The line of least resistance... 
both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman 
consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other
words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in
17 
knowledge, cr in both at once. 11 His pluralistic metaphysics helps to make
this view the "line of least resistance." For he is not confronted with the 
theoretical difficulty which faces the Personal Idealists, who linit jod's 
power in order to save His goodness, due to the monistic trend of the Kantian 
premises in their philosophy. James, whose pluralism accepts things just 
as they come, that is, as many and diverse, has no logical difficulty. For 
if the universe is as he conceives it, a plurality of "semi-independent 
forces," there is no theoretical reason why God should not be one of them, 
or rather, if He is conceived to exist at all, He must be regarded as one of 
them. Then, his "moralistic" attitude towards the universe prompts him to 
advocate a finite God. He conceives God as the exponent of man's moral 
ideals. While He is incomparably greater in power and dignity, He is still 
motivated by the same ideals and governed by the same v/ill that characterise 
man at his best. Also, the view of a finite God is the only v/ay to meet the 
problem set by the existence of evil. He writes to G. A. Strong, "my 'God 
of things as they are,' being a part of a pluralistic system, is responsible
for only such of them as he knows enough and has enough power to have ac-
18 
complished."
17. p s U., p. 311.
18. Letters. Vol. II, p. 269.
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The motive of individualism also finds expression in his belief in a 
finite God. He regards God as possessing a unique inner life of His own 
like other finite beings. ,<e must not intrude on His privacy, any more 
than on that of other individuals. "In every being that is real there is 
something external to, and sacred from, the grasp of every other. God's 
being is sacred from ours. To co-operate with his creation by the best and 
Tightest response seems all he wants of us. In such co-operation with his
purposes, not in any chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any
19 
theoretic drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny."
Also, his eagerness to safeguard the freedom of the individual renders it 
impossible for him to look with favor upon any conception of God that inter­ 
feres with that freedom. For James, our freedom can be assured only in a 
pluralistic world with a God who is finite.
His unqualified acceptance of the philosophy of evolution as an ultimate 
principle, with its insistence upon the reality of time, change, purpose, 
conflict, and achievement, alienates him from the static, changeless, purpose­ 
less world which any sort of monism implies. He contends for reality in 
every sphere of life and thought, and will have nothing to do with any theory 
that relegates the real life of the real world to illusion or appearance. 
Tine, change, purpose, and achievement must be as real for God as for us. 
This cannot be unless He is finite. James believes, also, that the conception 
of a finite God is demanded by ordinary common sense. "'God, 1 in the relig­ 
ious life of ordinary men, is the name not of the whole of things, heaven 
forbid, but only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a super­ 
human person who calls us to co-operate in his purposes, and who furthers 
19. jii. _B_., p. 141.
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ours if they are worthy. He works in an external environment, has limits
20 
and has enemies." He says, "The 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent' God of
21 
theology I regard as a disease of the philosophy-shop." It is fundamental,
for James, to keep close to religious experience, and he thinks that the God 
who is worshipped by ordinary men is always a finite God; a Being who sus­ 
tains actual relations to beings other than Himself. Further, he is anxious 
to preserve the purity of God. He deems it more important that the Ideal of 
worship be worthy of worship than that He be worshipped through fear or be­ 
cause of a sense of dependence. "I believe that the only God worthy of the
22 
name must be finite." He maintains that God has an environment even when
in sympathy with the pantheistic view. His hypothesis is empirical and he 
refuses to accept the arguments which are used to substantiate the conception 
of oneness. As against the monistic conception of an all-enveloping idea 
of God, he contends for a God the worship of whom does not imply the worship 
of everything. Due to his strong conviction concerning the moral will which 
endeavors to overcome evil, he can not acquiesce in a view that implies the 
worship of evil as a part of God. For if all is a part of God, including 
evil, to worship God is to worship evil. This is incompatible with his view 
of the moral will.
James defines the issue between traditional theism and pluralism largely 
in terms of "intimacy" and "foreignness." The essential dualism of the the-
istic view leaves "the human subject outside of the deepest reality in the
23 
universe." It makes the world extraneous to God, and man extraneous to both
the world and God. Thus philosophic theism makes impossible any "strictly 
social relation" between God and man. T,7e are outsiders, and our relation to
20. f> U., p. 124.————————————
21. Letters, Vol. II, p. 269.
22. P. U., p. 125.
23. Ibid., p. 25.
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Him remains that of "foreigners." Instead of man being the intimate 
partner of God's, he becomes His mere subject. .Externality vitiates the 
entire theistic conception. God can affect us, but nothing that we do can 
ever affect Kin. "God is not heart of our heart and reason of our reason,
but our magistrate, rather; arid mechanically to obey his commands, however
25 
strange they may be, remains our only moral duty." Since the need for
intimacy is one of the foremost considerations which James advances for his 
belief in a finite God, he must have a God whose place in the world is more 
organic and intimate, than the older monarchical theism allows. In this 
respect James regards absolutism as superior to theism and as more in harmony
with his pluralism. For both his view and absolutism "bring the philosopher
26 
inside and make man intimate." He says that the philosophy of the absolute
agrees with the pluralistic philosophy in that "both identify human substance
27
with the divine substance." Whereas, from the standpoint of orthodox the­ 
ism, "God and his creatures are toto genere distinct...they have absolutely
nothing in common; nay, it degrades God to attribute to him any generic nature
~ 28 
whatever; he can be classed with nothing." A system which makes no better
provision for intimate relations between man and his universe than this type 
of theism does is hopelessly defective midst the rising tide of social demo­ 
cratic ideals in our modern world, and "sounds as odd to most of us as if it
29 
were some outlandish savage religion." Jar^s offers, then, instead of
either the pantheism of absolutism, or the dualism of theism, spiritual plural­ 
ism which combines the best features of these two systems both of v.uicii he 
regards as unsatisfactory,it keeps the closest intimacy by conceiving God as
24. Ibid., pp. 26-27
25. Ibid., p. 27.
26. Ibid., p. 36.
27. Ibid., p. 34.
28. Ibid., p. 26.
29. Ibid., p. 29.
348
continuous with us spiritually, while at the same time we are permitted to
remain morally independent.
The modern conception of a limited God, which as we have seen, finds 
a strong and ardent champion in James, is, as a matter of fact, a very old 
one and may be traced back to the beginnings of thought. Polytheistic
systems of antiquity implied that the gods were limited. "Even the 'Ivlana 1
30 
conception had pluralistic implications." The Greeks were never able to
reduce the fullness and variety of life to a monotonous unity. The more 
perfected system of Plato could not refer the origin of evil to God, and 
that of Aristotle conceived form as struggling with matter. The universal 
sovereignty of the God of the Hebrews appears not to have cone to definite 
expression until the time of the eighth century prophets. The early 
Hebrews ascribed limitations to Yaweh, and often feared the power of other 
tribal deities. The question of a limited God has come to occupy a large 
place in modern religious thought,, It will be remembered that Hume pointed 
out the meaninglessness of the term infinite as applied to Deity, while
setting forth some of the difficulties involved in the conception of a finite
31 
God. The first modern thinker to proclaim the gospel of a finite God was
J. S. Mill. In the Three Essays on Religion, he registers his objection 
to the conception of an infinite God in emphatic form. He says, M it is 
impossible that any one who habitually thinks, and who is unable to blunt 
his inquiring intellect by sophistry, should be able without misgiving to 
go on ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily 
made and capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of 
its inhabitants. The adoration of such a being cannot be with the whole 
heart, unless the heart is first sophisticated. The worship must either
30. J. 3. Bixler, op. cit., p. 140.
31. ^f. Dialogues Concerning natural Religion, Cr.'l. Edition, 
London, 1779, pp. 104 ff.
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be greatly overclouded by doubt, or the moral sentiments must sink to tne 
low level of the ordinances of Nature: the worshipper must learn to think 
blind partiality, atrocious cruelty, and reckless injustice, not blemishes
in an object of worship, since all these abound to excess in the commonest
32
phenomena of Nature." Thus, Lill strongly protests against the use of
two different standards which such worship implies, and he goes on to as­ 
sert that one who has never tried to reconcile these two standards with one
another, but stops with the thought that God's ways are different from man f s,
33 
is worshiping power only. tlill's forceful repudiation of the traditional
conception of an infinite God has echoed throughout the modern philosophical 
world until today there are many advocates of the doctrine of a finite God. 
James was among the first and strongest followers of Llill who thought the 
age-old question "What is God?" could be answered best by placing certain 
limitations on Him.
In seeking to answer this question we may follow one of three courses; 
we i:iay refuse to assign Him any attributes, we may assign Him all attributes, 
or we may exclude some and include others. If we adopt the first method 
of procedure we end up with the zero of Pe.rrjenides. If we follow the sec­ 
ond we land in Astern pantheism. There is, at bottom, no difference be­ 
tween thinking of God as nothing in particular and as everything in general. 
Both are idle, meaningless notions. That is to say, if the term infinite 
or non-limited is taken to mean indeterminate as applied to God, He can mean 
nothing for human thought. It is inconceivable how all positive and nega­ 
tive attributes, if assigned to God, can be compatible with one another. 
Further, in order to be existent, God must be a determinate, definite being,
32. Tur6 ^ I^Lsa^s on Religion, p.
33. Ibid., p. 113.
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of this character or nature and not of that. In short, we must follow 
the third course; God must not only be without some attributes, He must 
have some attributes; that is, v:e must exclude some and include others. 
The difficulty arises in trying to determine which ones to exclude and 
which ones to include. There are two meanings of the term "limit" which 
modern thought takes over from Greek philosophy. AS R. B. Baker points 
out in The Concept of a_ Limited God, Plato and Aristotle used two concepts, 
in seeking to give expression to the profoundest truth concerning Reality. 
The first use they make of the term means a check or obstacle which hinders 
progress toward the good or perfection; this is the ordinary meaning of the 
term. They identify "limit" in this sense with matter or non-being vrhich 
is external to Deity. "Limit" in the second sense means a measure of har­ 
mony, the principal of rational spirit, which enhances progress toward the 
good and gives it meaning. In the sense that the first Greek meaning of 
limit retards and hinders active spirit it is opposed to the second meaning
which has reference to that which alone defines for thought the "free ex-
34 
pressing of active Spirit". Thus "limit" in the latter sense not only
serves to distinguish being from non-being, order from chaos, but also 
marks the distinction between right and wrong. It becomes the principle 
of rational and moral spirit and gives vague expression to what has become
a basic tenet for personalistic idealism. This is expressed by saying:
35 
"That being and doing are one for a spirit Reality." Modern personal
idealists are using the term "limit" in the second Greek sense when they 
object that the infinite One or God of monism has no positive existence 
because of the absence of all limit.
34. Gf. R. B. Baker, The Concept of a Limited God, Washington: Shenandoah 
Publishing House, Inc., 1934, Preface, pp. xiii-xiv.
35. Ibid., p. xiv.
351
Roughly speaking, personalists are divided into two chief types. The
pluralistic personalists hold that the "Ail of Reality is a Leny," and thus 
accord finite selves or spirits a place in the "All of Reality." God is 
Supreme, for them, yet He is One among the Lar.y selves which constitute the 
ultimate Reality. They conceive God as limited, in the second Greek sense 
of the term "limit," to a finite personality. But they also apply the term 
"limit" in the first Greek sense; that is, God is limited in that He has an 
external environment with conditions and forces for which He is not respon­
sible. In short, Ke is limited by an "other." J. S. IJill, James, as we
36 
have seen, and G. H. Howison are pluralistic personalists. The second type,
or the monistic-pluralistic personalists, hold that "rdl Reality is a One 
and a Lany." They advocate the conception of a limited God, but use the 
term "limit" as applied to God, only in the sense of measure, or only in the 
second Greek sense of the term. God, for them, is not only Supreme, but He 
is Creator of all finite reality. God is conceived after the analogy of 
human spirit, but He is regarded as a Spirit of another order; that is, of 
a unique and higher order, than the Lany. God is the Source and living 
Ground of everything that is, hence the notion of "limit" in the first Greek 
sense, that is, as an opposing check or force, fta stuff of the opposite
nature from spirit (non-being) with which spirit must contend and for which
37 38 39 
it is in no way responsible" does not apply. F. J. L.cConnell, J. U-ard,
40 41 
and F. R. Tennant, belong to this group of personalists. H. Rashdall,
36. Cf.~Ti7e Limits of Evolution and Other Assays, pp. 44 ff.
37. R. B. Baker, op. cit., pp. xviii-xix.
38. F. J. kcCOnnell, op. cit., pp. 106 ff.
39. Of. The Realm of lands, Lect. XI.
40. Of. Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, Gh. 5.
41. Cf. Philosophy and Religion, London: Duckworth and Co., 1924, pp. 81 ff.
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42 
and £. S. Brightraan also contend for Reality as a One and a Lany, but
their metaphysical doctrine is so confused with that of the first group 
of personalists that their general theistic theories are in closer har­ 
mony with those of the first type, than with those of the second. But 
Ward, Tennant, and i.lcConnall consistently maintain that Reality is a One 
and a Many, while holding to the view of a United God. While the view 
of the latter group differs in several important respects from the tradi­ 
tional theistic view, the difference between them is not so great as it is 
between that of the first group and traditional theism. Strictly speak­ 
ing, the monistic-pluralistic personalists should not be regarded as advo­ 
cating the conception of a "finite" God, since the limitations which they 
place upon God are quite a different thing from those imposed by the advo­ 
cates of the doctrine of a God who is merely primus inter pares. The lim­ 
itations which the former assign to God are, for the most part, self-lim­ 
itations which God as Creator imposes upon Himself, while those which the 
latter place upon God are external concerning which God has nothing to say, 
and over which He has no control. It is this conception of a "finite" 
God which is so unsatisfactory from the standpoint of traditional theism 
which holds "that the universe owes its existence, and continuance in ex­ 
istence, to the reason and will of a self-existent Being, v.ho is infinitely
43 
powerful, wise and good."
We have now to examine this pluralistic conception of God, as advo­ 
cated by James. In the first place, a God who is only one individual 
among other individuals, even though He be primus inter pares cannot do
42. Cf. The Problem of God, New York: Abingdon Press, 1950, p. 125 ff.
43. Robert Flint, Theism, 10th Edition, Edinburgh and London: YAn. Black- 
wood and Sons, 1902, p. 18.
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justice to the demands of the religious consciousness, and fails to stand 
the strain of religious experience. The motive of dependence is basic 
in religious experience and it prompts man to exalt the Object of his wor­ 
ship above that which is merely finite, transitory and changing. In a 
word, in a changing world, man wants a changeless God; hemmed in as he is 
by all that is finite he seeks that which is infinite; and conscious of 
his own weakness, he tends to exult the immeasurable power of God and to 
take refuge in it. As Professor Flint has said, "the mind of man, although 
finite itself, cannot be satisfied with any object of worship which it per­ 
ceives to be finite. It craves an infinite object; it desires to offer a 
boundless devotion; it seeks an absolute blessedness. The aim of the re­ 
ligious life is the communion of the finite with the infinite; and every
religion, however otherwise excellent, which suppresses tne infinite, and
44 
presents to the finite only the finite, is a failure." He is substantially
right when he says further that the heart "can find no secure rest except 
on an infinite God. If less than omnipotent, He may be unable to help us 
in the hour of sorest need. If less than omniscient, He may overlook us. 
If less than perfectly just, we cannot unreservedly trust Him. If less
than perfectly benevolent, we cannot fully love Him. The whole soul can
45 
only be devoted to One who is believed to be absolutely good." It is not
true, as James asserts,that theism makes God an "outsider" to man. The 
duality which he finds so objectionable in theism is not thoroughgoing nor 
absolute since it conceives man as the offspring of God, and thus regards 
both God and man as spiritual beings. Theism represents God as the Source 
of man's being and life; they are considered as being akin, and the relation
44. Ibid., pp. 41-42."
45. Ibid., p. 301.
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between them is one of spiritual union and communion with each other. 
Surely the term "outsider" is not applicable to Him in whom man is said 
to live and move and have his being. The fellowship which man enjoys 
with God cannot be expressed in terms of the relation between a container 
and its contents; it is a real communion of the finite spirit with the in­ 
finite Spirit which sustain a unique relation to one another. The theis- 
tic doctrine of creation represents man as being made in the image of God, 
and as endowed with special dignity and authority by God, who, in creation, 
has "inspired" His offspring. Thus, as tf. L. Davidson puts it in his 
Recent Theistic Discussion, the "position of Theism certainly is that man 
is not God; but not less is it the position of Theism that man is nothing
apart from God. A duality there is, but it is a duality in spiritual
46 
unity; and the ground of it, and the sole ground of it, is God."
In the next place, the theory of a finite God arises from extreme and 
irrational interpretations of such concepts as "infinite" and "omnipo­ 
tence". As to the infinity of God, there is no reason for calling Him 
"finite" or limited merely because other individuals exist who are dis­ 
tinct from Himself. He is not infinite in the sense that nothing else 
can exist besides or beyond Him. That is to say, God cannot be identi­ 
fied with the totality of things or with the Absolute of the philosophers. 
Theism should be very careful of any facile identification of God with the 
Absolute in this sense. The Absolute must include God, other minds, the 
world of nature and the world of values, and all so intimately related as 
to form a system, and the other parts sustain a special relation to God. 
To speak of God as infinite means that he is the ground of the finite
46. .Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1921, p. 163, Gf_. pp. 162-165.
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and limited "by nothing "other" to His own nature, but it does not mean 
that He is the only existent Reality. Jt e must regard Him as one of many
existences whose existence, as G. Dawes Hicks says, "cannot be the ex-
47 
istence of others, nor the existence of others His." To quote this
author further, "If, then, by Infinite 1 be meant 'the Absolute*, God is 
not infinite. A quantitative whole of Reality, or one Keality that in­ 
cludes everything, would, no doubt, be 'infinite 1 in the sense of mere 
bigness or immeasurable magnitude; 'infinite' in the sense of being qual­ 
itatively perfect and complete it need not, and I should say, would not 
be. But it is 'infinity 1 , I take it, in the latter sense that religion 
is concerned to ascribe to God....God may be 'infinite', not because He 
is the world, nor because the world is part of Him; but because in and
through Him the world has meaning and significance; because His knowledge
48 
of it is complete, and His solicitude for it is perfect." The question
of God's infinity is the old and difficult one of doing justice to the 
facts of divine and human existence. philosophies that give all that is 
claimed for God to the extent of identifying Him with the Absolute leave 
nothing over for man, while humanistic and pluralistic philosophies are so 
jealous for the rights of man that they appear to allow too little to God. 
Either extreme is fatal to the God of religion.
vhe notion of absolute omnipotence makes it impossible to apply the 
laws of reason to the Divine Reason. James, along with others who ex­ 
pound the conception of a finite God, due to their repugnance to the view 
of an omnipotent Being, seems to be attacking a theory of omnipotence to 
which few adherents to theism have held. Omnipotence, as J. v.ard says,
47. The""philosophical Basis for Theism, p. 262.
48. Ibid., pp. 262-263.
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"is one of those question-begging epithets that everybody uses and nobody 
defines. Thus it is not uncommonly taken to imply not merely the power 
to do whatever it is possible to do, but also the power arbitrarily to de­ 
termine what shall be possible; nay even that the impossible shall be
possible; in short that omnipotence absolutely excludes impossibility,...
49Metaphysic of this sort is not met by argument." Such a view of omnipo­ 
tence, for example, as that which J. JL. 1-icTaggart advocates leads to com­ 
plete agnosticism; for if his view be correct, God ceases to be a possible 
object of either thought or speech. He construes imnipotence to mean 
that there is nothing which God cannot do. If God is bound by the law of
contradiction, the law of excluded middle, or personal identity, He is not50 
omnipotent. But to regard God merely as the unconditioned-absolute of
whom no limits, qualifications, or predicates can be asserted inevitably 
destroys theology and ethics. As Professor H. H. Macintosh says, "an k / 
omnipotent being bare of all self-limitation—who in the most literal 
sense was 'capable of anything', no matter how bad or absurd—would not de­ 
serve the name of God, but rather be comparable to an infinite mass possessed
51 
of velocity witnout direction." It is obvious, therefore, that if we press
the idea of omnipotence beyond that of the power freely to choose its own 
conditions, we land ourselves into ti:e type of metaphysics to which V.ard 
refers in the above quotation.
For the most part, those who affirm the omnipotence of God do not 
take it to mean that He is able to override intellectual and moral neces­ 
sities. Christian theology has maintained for centuries that there are
49. Op. cit., pp. 553-354.50. Sgmg"^Ws of Religion, London: Edward Arnold and Co., 193O, pp. 201 ff,51. H7~R. Macintosh, The Christian apprehension of God, London: Student 
Christian Movement, 1929, p. 207.
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certain things which God cannot do. v/e cannot argue that He can at the 
same time ordain that all men shall be saved, and some not saved. It is 
meaningless to say that God can make an odd number divide evenly by two. 
He cannot make true what is false, He cannot act in contradiction of His 
own nature, or of the nature of things which He has made. He is not able 
to bereft Himself of His Divine nature and lie cannot cease to exist. He
j;
cannot, as Professor I,;aaintosh points out, "make a selfish man happy as
long as he remains selfish, cannot force me to love my neighbor, cannot
52 
make vice the one avenue to personal goodness." God is not only limited
in this sense by His own rational and moral character, but He limited Mis 
own will when He created moral beings and granted them freedom in the 
exercise of which they can reject His will and violate His law. Professor 
Flint writes in this connection as follows: "The determination to create 
moral beings was a determination to create beings who should be the causes
of their own actions, and who might set aside His own law. It was a de-
53 
termination to limit His own will to that extent and in that manner." The
familiar doctrine of theism that God overrules man's choice of evil, or 
causes evil to contradict itself, so as to bring ultimate good out of the 
evil choices and acts of man, implies a limitation of the divine will v:hich 
God imposes upon Himself in the creation of man.
Any satisfactory view of omnipotence must hold, with Edwin Lewis, that 
the "only limitations that God is under are the limitations that arise out 
of his own self-determined nature and that naturally go with his chosen pur­ 
pose. Why the nature of God should be as it is—this is one of those ul-
54 
timate questions to which we can give no answer." The omnipotence of God
52. Ibid., pp. 206-207
53. Op. cit., p. 255.
54. Sdwin Lewis, God and Ourselves, New York: The Abingdon Press, 1931, 
p. 95.
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does not mean unconditioned power. This does not mean, however, that
God is not omnipotent in the physical or spiritual world; it simply means 
that He is not omnipotent in an irrational sense. But it is no more per­ 
missible to interpret omnipotence in terms of sheer physical power than it 
is to construe the term infinite as sheer "bigness". Most objections to 
the doctrine of omnipotence, which is a central doctrine of theism, seem 
to emphasize this feature of the doctrine. But moral considerations must 
be given a place in our thought of the view of God's omnipotence. Profes­ 
sor H. R. Macintosh gives timely emphasis to this aspect of the question 
when he says, "what the Bible leaves upon our minds is the ineradicable im­ 
pression that the only omnipotence for which our faith is asked is that of 
holy love. It is not bare omnipotence that the Christian trusts, but the 
omnipotence of grace....What v/e think possible for omnipotence is fixed by
the fact that it is the omnipotence of perfect goodness, not of devilish
55
caprice." Absolute omnipotence is a contradictory conception, and omnipo­ 
tence construed exclusively in terms of power is not a Christian conception. 
Thus without attempting to give any definition of omnipotence, we nay say 
that God is omnipotent in the sense that He has the power to accomplish His
purpose in and for the world, or to use the words of Professor I/lacintosh, He
56
is able "to realize perfectly whatever He wills." Thus we avoid the mean­ 
ingless doctrine of absolute omnipotence, and do not find it necessary to 
rush to the other extreme of belief which adopts a finite God in order to 
preserve the reality of finite experience. For undoubtedly, the pluralist, 
while saving his soul has lost His God.
55. Op_. cit., pp. 208, 210.
56. Ibid., p. 205.
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This leads us to consider the difficulty involved in the type of 
pluralism which James champions; that is, how his pluralistic universe, 
or "multiverse", which is merely a collocation of independent facts with 
each existing in its own right, can give a "universe" at all. There is 
no "back-lying", real, living unity of any sort sufficient to account for 
the multiplicity of particulars being brought together in such a manner as 
to constitute a "universe". It is inconceivable how any sort of system 
can be built up out of independent units. '.That unity or system there 
happens to be in such a world must be purely accidental if it is essentially 
a world without system. To say that the things, or forces, or selves with 
which the pluralist starts get together merely as a matter of chance in a 
world of this kind is to account for the unity of the world in an absurd 
fashion. For as F. J. McConnell says, "Try to work all this through on a 
basis of sheer coincidence—a host of independent units coming into actual 
or fancied relations to a finite God by coincidence,—finding a measurably 
understandable universe, and cooperating, or at least trying to cooperate, 
in that universe. There is no path through these tangles except by as­ 
suming that God and men are alike the creatures or products of some Back- 
57 
lying Being or Force which is mightier than them both." He goes on to
point out that the difficulties involved in this situation lead either in 
the direction of a God who is a Creator or bring back upon us the problem 
of the system which renders it possible for them to come together. That 
is to say, the pluralist cannot stop with the conception of a God who is 
merely primus inter pares; he must either admit a God who is Creator or 
assume an endless regress for the world. In the latter case God's role 
in the universe is somewhat superfluous except as a moral leader and in- 
57. Op. cit., p. 108. ————————-————-——--—————————————————•
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spirer of men. Plainly, this position is incapable of leading to satis­ 
factory theistic conclusions. Professor Ward emphasizes the incomplete 
and unsatisfactory nature of the conception of a thoroughgoing pluralistic 
universe when he says that "plurality of beings primarily independent as 
regards their existence and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon 
each other, an ontological plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological 
unity, seems clearly to suggest some ground beyond itself. The Idea of 
God presents itself to meet this lack. The I.lany depend upon God for 
their existence though still dependent on each other as regards their ex­ 
perience. The idea of God would then be meaningless, unless God were rer-
garded as transcending the I.lany; so there can be no talk of God as merely
58 
primus inter pares." Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison has pushed this
type of pluralism to its ultimate implications when he asserts that mate-
59 
rialism would seem to be the most natural form for it to take. For, as
he says, to "conceive a being of transcendent intelligence and goodness as 
no more than one of the facts in the universe, seems to make it harder than
ever to think of other facts as just happening to be there along with him—
60 
just happening to exist also, and getting in his way actively and passively."
James f s theory doubtless was aimed at Bradleyan monism and as such it of­ 
fers the line of least resistance, but it cannot be regarded as a line which 
terminates in a satisfactory theistic position.
Another objectionable feature of James's conception of God is his 
view that God is a developing^ growing God. In his repugnance towards the 
static and timeless he is unwilling to exclude any part of reality from the
58. Op. cit., p. 241.
59. Idea of God, p. 395.
60. Ibid., p. 396.
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principle of development and change. The position he assigns God in his 
pluralistic universe necessarily brings Him within the time process and 
makes Him subject to the evolutionary principle. We have registered, in 
other connections, our objection to the tendency to make the evolutionary 
principle ultimate which characterizes James's philosophy, but there is no 
part of his system which he vitiates more by this tendency than that which 
pertains to his view of God. There is nothing to be gained for either 
philosophy or religion by a doctrine of merely "blank inexplicable change", 
which any view of the evolution of the universe in its totality implies. 
Plainly, the universe in its entirety cannot be in process of evolution. 
The term "evolution" can apply only to its constituent parts. Evolution, 
as G. Dawes Hicks points out, implies two things. First, there must be 
something which has the capacity to evolve, if there is to be change. Sec­ 
ond, unless we are to have an "absolute becoming", that which changes must 
have an environment which, while it need not be unchanging, must be rela­ 
tively more stable than that which it includes. Also, these two must be
61 
inter-related. "Clearly, therefore," he says, "Reality in its entirety,
the totality of all that is, cannot, as such, be in a condition of evolution,
68 
because there can be no environment of Reality as a whole." To talk of
change on the part of the whole of Reality lands us in contradiction. For, 
to quote the same author further, "whenever we speak of change, we are al­ 
ways assuming that there is a reason for such change, and moreover a reason 
for which we are justified in asking to be furnished. And the reason for 
any change can never be found in that change itself, but must be sought in
61. Op. cit., pp. 185-186.
62. Ibid., p. 186.
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something beyond it. Consequently, if the whole of physical reality be 
in a condition of movement or change, we are logically constrained to the 
admission that this whole of physical reality has a non-physical environ­ 
ment, and that this non-physical environment must be of such a character
as to be capable of determining the direction along which the physical, as
63 
a whole, is changing." It would seem, therefore, that from an ultimate
metaphysical point of view, we are justified in predicating progress only 
of those interrelated and interacting parts which draw upon the nature of 
that which is beyond, and that it is unintelligible when applied to the 
whole.
To deny that the temporal view of things is the ultimate or all- 
conclusive view does not mean that time, change and finite existence are 
unreal to God. The truth of this question lies in giving both the tem­ 
poral and the eternal its place. For, as J. H. Muirhead puts it, "Not
only does eternity assert the conception of the hour but the hour asserts
64 
the conception of eternity." No conception, of God can be true which
leaves no place for movement, process, change. The difficult question of 
the relation of God to time has never been satisfactorily answered. It 
is, as E. S. V^aterhouse suggests, "virtually impossible to have any idea 
upon such a subject that is not in some respect either self-contradictory
or unintelligible, even if only because we can have no real conception of
65
the significance of the term eternity in its relation to time." what­ 
ever view one takes of the relation of the divine consciousness to time, 
unless the reality of human experience is denied, we must conceive God as
63. Ibid., p. 186.
64. "Why Pluralism?, Symposium", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Vol. IX, 1903-1909, p. 190.
65.E. S. Waterhouse, The Philosophical Approach to Religion, London: The
Epworth Press, 1933, p. 195.
363
entering into the life of man which implies that His consciousness enters 
somehow into the time relation. It is not necessary, however, to regard 
God as being subject to time in the same manner that the consciousness of 
a human being must be. -It may be, as V». L. Davidson suggests, that "the 
fact of the progress of the Divine plan towards fuller realization as time 
proceeds changes the aspect of the Divine intuition of the time-process, 
and, we may suppose, affects the Deity Himself with ever-renewed sympathy 
for the human labours, hardships, and sufferings that are conducing towards
the progress and have drawn forth the Divine aid to the conscious aspiring
66 
and travailing souls." But we are not warranted in bringing God entirely
within the time process. James f s view, however, is not without value. 
For the many attempts on the part of modern thinkers to grapple with this 
problem and to arrive at a conception that does justice to both the tempo­ 
ral and eternal aspects bear living testimony to the valuable service which 
the philosophy of James renders in bringing this question to the foreground 
of modern thought. His insistence upon the importance of the temporal has 
made it impossible for philosophers to remain satisfied with any view of the 
world that minimizes the importance of finite existence, or of the reality 
of time and process in our world.
The notion of a developing God who grows in insight and moral wisdom 
through the lessons of experience; that is, emerging from a state of ignor­ 
ance to a state of knowledge, or from a lower to a higher level of character, 
with the passing of time, ia incompatible with theism. For theism primarily 
consists in the assertions that, as ground of this world, God must be an 
intelligent and ethical being, and that He is working in and through the 
world of which He is the Author, to accomplish His soverign purpose, which
66. Op. cit., p. 136,
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is the realization of the perfection in the universe which He designed. 
If God is conceived as working out His own character as any other finite 
creature in the universe there appears to be no reason why He should be 
honored with the name "God" at all. He is essentially an individual of 
the human type regardless of the superior dignity and higher stage of de­ 
velopment He may have attained. As Professor Pringle-pattison says, 
"such a developing demigod would give the same account of his own develop­ 
ment as the moral and religious man among ourselves. He would describe
it as a new insight into the nature of things, due to the leading of a
67
higher God, who would be God indeed." Further, according to this concep­ 
tion of God, we are at a loss to explain why one, and only one, such being 
has attained this measure of importance and higher stage of development. 
This view also renders it impossible to explain why it happened to be this 
particular being who outstripped all the others in this respect. In short,
•
all sorts of difficulties and absurdities arise to perplex us the moment we 
begin to entertain the hypothesis of a growing God. T/e are opening the 
way for the return of polytheism of a somewhat crude sort. It is obvious 
that this view makes a much greater draft on either reason or faith than 
the most extreme views of the sovereignty of God. It is difficult to un­ 
derstand why James regards it as an improvement upon "dualistic theism", 
for whatever the difficulties are which this type of theism may have, they 
are much less perplexing than the problems which are involved in the notion 
of God which he finds acceptable. "The theory of a 'finite* God, of a 
'growing 1 God or of a God in any real sense impotent is not a sign of in­ 
tellectual daring," writes Edwin Lewis, "as is so often assumed, but of 
intellectual hesitancy....Men come upon a wilderness in their thinking, and
67. Op. cit., p. 385,
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instead of resolutely setting themselves to find or make a trail across
the wilderness, they throw up their hands in despair. Instead of con-
68 quering the wilderness they allow the wilderness to conquer them."
we have now to consider the question of evil in a pluralistic universe. 
We have seen that James emphatically rejects the omnipotence and infinity 
of God in order to free Him from responsibility for evil, and declares that 
in a world in which evil and good are not necessarily mixed up the problem 
of evil ceases to be speculative. Thus the only difficulty evil presents 
is the practical one of eliminating it; James makes provision for this by his 
doctrine of improvability, or meliorism. The enigma of evil presents one 
of the hardest problems for theism. It is the century-old dilemma stated 
so inimitably by Hume in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, where 
he says that "Epicurus's old questions are yet unanswered. Is He willing 
to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not
willing? then He is malevolent. Is He both able and willing: whence then69 
is evil?" To attempt to solve this problem by saying that "God cannot
help it", since he is limited by an "other", is merely to recognize the 
problem without trying squarely to face it. For if there is an external 
limit to God which renders Him impotent before the fact of the existence of 
evil, it remains a dull, dark fate for him as well as for man. In fact, 
it must be a deeper enigma to God than it is to man. Ivlan's conception of 
God as the ground of moral values is his fullest expression of the assur­ 
ance that the universe is at bottom in harmony with his moral aspirations, 
and that these values will be conserved and enriched. But if we accept 
James's conception of a finite God, the whole problem breaks out anew in 
the cosmic sphere. For if God is forced to struggle with His environment
68. Op. cit., p. 55.
69. P. 186.
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in a manner similar to that which characterizes human life, lie is entirely
without assurance that the universe possesses an ethical character. Conse­ 
quently, the very nature of things affords no adequate ground for any hope 
that Ha may have of overcoming evil. If another being is postulated to 
solve His difficulty we have the hopeless infinite regress again. Melior­ 
ism is made rational only by belief in a God who is sovereign; He must be a 
God who purposes, provides for, and supports, the final triumph of good. 
For by a curious paradox, as Von Hugel points out, evil in the world pre­ 
sents theism with its greatest difficulty, yet this same theism, which evil
seems to render impossible, is the only system that offers any real promise
70 
for the ultimate defeat of evil.
According to Professor A. U. tlfhitehead, Christianity is less clear in 
its metaphysical ideas, in respect to the treatment of evil, than Buddhism; 
but the former is nore inclusive of the facts. He says that Christianity 
"admits the evil as inherent throughout the world, but it holds that such 
evil is not the necessary outcome of the very fact of individual personality,
It derives the evil from the contingent fact of the actual course of events;
71 
it thus allows of an ideal conceivable in terms of what is actual." Thus
while the presence alike of good and evil in the universe complicates the 
problem, it complicates it much more for the person who believes in a finite 
God than for the man who believes in a sovereign God. The belief in a sov­ 
ereign God, in a God who is the ground of moral values, can admit that there 
is provision for whatever happens, whether it is called good or bad, in the 
very conditions of existence. But to say that evil is provided for by
70. Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion, London: J. i:. Dent 
and Sons, LtdT7"l921, New York: E. P. Button and Company, first series, pp. 
93-94.
71. Ibid., p. 51.
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belief in a sovereign God, does not mean that evil is the final purpose of 
the conditions that make it possible. On the contrary, it is possible to 
maintain that the final purpose is good. This is not possible with the 
adherents to the belief in a finite God.
If God is finite in the sense of being externally limited, and if 
evil and good are isolated in the sense that James holds them to be, the 
Christian doctrine of escape from evil is meaningless. It proclaims a 
doctrine whereby evil is overcome with good, and through the treatment of 
evil, life is elevated to a finer level. But this is not possible with 
a God baffled by evil, and for whom evil remains an unfathomable mystery, 
or if we can no more explain evil by good than good by evil. Thus it is 
impossible to account for the character of both evil and good as revealed 
to deepest thought, or to cherish a sanguine hope of ever overcoming evil 
with good. Professor Whitehead, for example, maintains that evil is es­ 
sentially unstable in character. "The common character of all evil is 
that its realization in fact involves that there is some concurrent real­ 
ization of a purpose towards elimination. The purpose is to secure the
avoidance of evil. The fact of the instability of evil is the moral
72 
order in the world." He says further, "evil promotes its own elimination
by destruction, or degradation, or by elevation. But in its ovni nature
73
it is unstable." He rightly says that this instability does not neces­ 
sarily lead to progress, but that the way is opened for progress towards 
the good when we contrast the nature of good with that of evil. "There
is," he writes, "a self-preservation inherent in that which is good in
74 
itself. Its destruction may come from without but not frorr: within."
72. Ibid., p. 95.
73. Ibid., p. 96.
74. Ibid., p. 98.
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He conceives the purpose of God as "the attainment of value in the tem-
75 
poral world". For him, the Kingdom of Heaven is the overcoming of evil
by good, not their isolation. "This transmutation of evil into good 
enters into the actual world by reason of the inclusion of the nature of
God, which includes the ideal vision of each actual evil so met with a
76
novel consequent as to issue in the restoration of goodness." Paradoxi­ 
cally enough, ;/hitehead does not carry this line of thought, which allows
the world-process to be purposive, to its logical conclusion since it
77 would seem that he feels no need of an eternal purposive Yv'ill or Kind.
But we may, and Christianity must, go further and assert teleology as the 
only method that takes due account of every element in the situation, and 
God as the Ultimate Ground of things. George Galloway says, "«Vhen man 
seeks to conceive that Ultimate Ground of things on which the teleological 
structure of the universe depends, he is justified in interpreting it 
through those ideas which have proved essential to the significance and 
worth of experience. In so doing he carries out the teleological method 
to its final postulate, the postulate which ensures the unity and validity
of all truths and values. God is the final presupposition of all that is
78
true and good, and the assurance of their final harmony." And when we ob­ 
serve that their "final harmony" has not been achieved, it is well to re­ 
member, as Professor Flint says, that history is not yet complete and that
79 
the Good may yet be reached.
There are ethical considerations involved in the question of the re­ 
lation of God to evil which the conception of a finite God seems to ignore,
75. Ibid., p. 100
76. Ibid., p. 155.
77. Process and Reality; An Essay in Cosmology, New York: The Lacmillan 
Co., Cambridge':' The University Press, 1930, Ch. II, part 5, pp. 243-353.
78. The Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920, pp. 359-360,
79. 0£Tcit_., pp. 258-259.
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In the first place, as C. H. Hamilton suggests, in the eagerness to avoid
ascribing evil to God "there is a danger that we ascribe it to other cos­ 
mic forces that are not God, and fail to bear our own responsibility which,
80 
of course, vitiates the conception from a moral point of view." *;hile
Christianity, as Professor Whitehead has suggested, does not hold that evil
81 
is the "necessary outcome of the very fact of individual personality", it
does maintain that human action has something to do with the presence of
evil in the world. This being true, Professor H. R. Macintosh rightly in- k /
A
sists that "Neither the problem of evil nor that of sin is exhausted by
setting it barely and unethically in direct relation to a supposedly sheer
82 
crushing exercise of Divine power", whereas James's treatment of this
question, in spite of his emphasis upon the reality and freedom of the in­ 
dividual, appears to ignore this aspect of the problem. That is to say, 
he apparently assumes that man's will can be dealt with "as if it were
merely a physical kind of force, which without more ado can be overborne
83 
by a stronger force acting irresistibly." But if God possesses a moral
character He cannot deal with the will of man after any such fashion as 
this; He must remain true to His own moral character and recognize the 
moral character of man's will. It is this truth that F. J. I/IcConnell em­ 
phasizes when he says that "God has such respect for human choice that
when a man makes a bad choice God carries out the bad choice to its appro-
84 
priate course in the play and interplay even of havoc-working forces."
To ignore this aspect of the matter is, as Professor Macintosh puts it, 
"to repeat the mistake....of isolating God's omnipotence 'to the detriment
80. "Idealistic and Pragmatic Interpretations of Religion", Journal of 
Religion. Vol. I, No. 6, 1921, pp. 622-623.
81. Op. cit., p. 51.
82. Op. cit., p. 211,
83. Ibid., p. 211.
84. Op. cit., p. 121.
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even to the exclusion of His loftier perogatives'." It is obvious !A, '
therefore, that an adequate treatment of the question involves the dis­ 
cussion of man's relation to God, a thorough handling of sin as alienat­ 
ing and estranging man from God, and what is meant by alienation or es­ 
trangement, and an attempt to ascertain "man's chief end in life", and 
God's purpose for His world. In short, we cannot adequately deal with 
the problem of evil without a consideration of the Christian conception 
of God.
This leads us beyond James, for the conception "that God has become 
man, and that the God man has 'overcome the world'," which is one of the 
most important points of the Christian idea of God, apparently has no 
place whatever in James's philosophy. For, as Professor A. E. Taylor
says in criticism of A Pluralistic Universe, James appears not to appre-
86 
hend the Christian position from the inside and with "sympathetic insight'*.
Professor Taylor's statement that this important work of James's gives no
hint that "the Christian conception of God means to him anything different
87 
from a sentimental variety of Deism", is essentially correct in view of
James's treatment of the matter. It is, indeed, unfortunate that a philos­ 
opher whose dominating interest is religion, and who approaches religion 
^ith an unusually keen sympathy and penetrative insight, should so far lose 
sympathy with Christian thought that he can say, "I have grown so out of
Christianity that entanglement therewith on the part of a mystical utter-
88 
ance has to be abstracted from and overcome, before I can listen."
85. Op. cit., p. 211
86. "Review of A Pluralistic Universe", Mind, Li. 5., Vol. XVIII, No. 72,
1909, p. 585.
87. Ibid., p. 585.
88. Letters, Vol. II, p. 211.
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This fundamental weakness in James's philosophy accounts for much in his 
thinking which is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of Christian thought. 
It especially renders inadequate his treatment of the question of evil 
since he is led to state the problem in terms that are basically unethical 
from the point of view of the Christian conception of God. He is led to 
believe that he has satisfactorily solved it when he places evil beyond the 
control of God. In reality his view merely recognizes the problem. The 
God of pluralism is in reality not a theistic but a deistic God, and cannot 
be identified with the God of Christianity.
The semi-pantheistic tendencies in James's conception of God are as 
antagonistic to religion as the deistic or polytheistic aspects of his 
pluralism at the other extreme. The doctrine that man and God are con­ 
tinuous spiritually, since man in his subconsciousness is a member of a 
continuum which includes also other souls and God, does not afford a solid 
foundation upon which to base religion. The value of this conception lies 
in the fact that the religious consciousness, unlike our ordinary rational­ 
izing consciousness, which assumes a more or less detached attitude towards 
its object, regards itsalf and its object, that is, man and God, as akin and 
as capable of intercommunion. It does not, however, as James's theory de­ 
mands, require that they be actually continuous. Theistic thought, while 
anxious to preserve the warmest intimacy between God and man, has always, 
and rightly so, been suspicious of any attempt to conceive them in any pan­ 
theistic sense. For pantheism, actual or modified, vitiates the religious 
conception of man's relation to God. Nor can it be allowed that the re­ 
ligious consciousness is an unreasoned intuitive one, entirely a matter of 
feeling, and that God always makes Himself known in vague and hidden rather 
than in definite ways. This view of man's approach to God eliminates the
372
possibility of vast numbers of people finding God at all, and James himself
89 
says, "I have no living sense of commerce with a God." It is unfortunate
that James's treatment of this subject was so closely connected with the
H view of thd subconscious-self which he borrowed from F. ".V. B'. Leyers and
which, as J. B. Pratt says, lends itself to all sorts of "popular exaggera-
90tion and cheap metaphysics", and is also "questionable psychology". Fur­ 
ther, the subconscious is as much the "seat" of the lower physiological 
activities as of our higher spiritual ones, and it is as responsible for 
the most vicious and perverted promptings of our nature as for the most 
virtuous and godlike. Again, his appeal to the subconscious really weakens, 
rather than strengthens, his position against the mechanical philosophers. 
They can also use the subconscious as their weapon by saying that it simply 
explains much hitherto inexplicable in ordinary consciousness and may lend 
itself to a mechanical explanation. Then, as J. H. I.Iuirhead says, "that 
twilight, semi-conscious experience of the kind revealed by psychical re­ 
search, seems to bear no relation to the object of religious adoration; nor 
is it easy to see what light can be thrown upon the reality of the latter by 
the proof that human consciousness seems to spring from and contains to the
end within itself a matrix of the former. It weakens religion to hear it
91 
argued on such a basis."
When we consider James's treatment of the self along with his concep­ 
tion with God, it is obvious that he cannot arrive at a satisfactory belief 
in immortality. In answer to Professor Pratt's question, "Do you believe
89. Letters, II, p. 211.
90. "The Religious Philosophy of William James", The Hibbert Journal, 
Vol. X, No. 1, 1911-1912, p. 231.
91. "Prof, /alliara James's philosophy of Religion", International Journal 
of Ethics, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1903, p. 244.
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in personal immortality?" he replies, "Never keenly; but more strongly as
92I grow older. Because I am just getting fit to live." It will be re­ 
membered that we have already pointed out that James cannot logically hold 
to personal immortality since he does not believe in a soul. His scheme 
leaves nothing to survive bodily death. He adopts the transmission theory 
of the relation of the brain to consciousness. Our individual conscious­ 
nesses are but drops of the great "mother" sea of consciousness which en­ 
gulfs us, and the brain of the individual forms the channel through which 
the water of the sea flows. The brain is the means of separating the vast 
unity of consciousness into parts and finite forms. He does not, however, 
interpret the consciousness behind the brain as cfne absolute mind but thinks 
it possible that there may always be many minds in this vague realm. But 
whether he conceives one or many minds behind the scenes, he apparently re­ 
linquishes a belief in personal immortality, since it is still absorption in
93
wider units of consciousness. That is to say, it is not personal immortal­ 
ity in the ordinary meaning of that term. This is true in spite of his as­ 
sertion that "one may conceive the mental world behind the veil in as in-
94 
dividualistic a form as one pleases." For if one f s present personality is
merely an extract of one's larger personality, it is difficult to conceive 
the "reunion" with one's truer self as meaning what the term personal immor­ 
tality is interpreted to mean in ordinary usage. Further, James's denial 
of God as the Ground of the world and Creator of man, makes it impossible 
for him to derive any assurance for immortality from the nature of God. 
And with all due respect to the philosophical arguments which render
92. Letters, Vo. II, p. 214.
93. Of. Human Immortality, Boston and Hew York: Houghton, i.lfflin and 
Company" 1899, 2nd Edition, pp. 10 ff.
94. Ibid., preface, p. vii.
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invaluable service in clarifying and strengthening our belief concerning 
the existence of the soul after death, the strongest argument for immor­ 
tality flows from the Christian conception of the nature of God which con­ 
ceives Him as Creator of the souls of men, and as the God of the living 
rather than that of the dead. It is not to be wondered at, then, that 
James, who rejects both the soul and this conception of God, remains doubt­ 
ful to the end concerning the fact of immortality.
In spite of the criticisms which we have offered to James's doctrine 
of God, he has made a significant contribution to the philosophy and psy­ 
chology of religion at this point. For regardless of the unfortunate al­ 
liance of his treatment of the religious consciousness with the doctrine 
of the subconscious self, his position, which is based on broad empirical 
foundations, has genuine strength. He has forced the deeper thought of 
today to recognize the value of the religious consciousness as a revealer 
of ultimate reality. W. L. Davidson has pointed out that philosophy recog­ 
nizes religion as having a distinct philosophical value, and that religion 
is a personal relationship of the individual with the object of devotion. 
Philosophy now admits that personality must enter somehow into the conception 
of God, and any attempt to justify theism. This was not true in the six­ 
ties and seventies of the last century. Philosophers, as a rule, rather 
scornfully dismissed religion. They regarded it as outside their notice, 
if not beneath it. It belonged either to superstition or poetry. It is 
now generally conceded that if ultimate reality is to be found, the part 
which religion plays in the disclosure of it is of supreme importance. If 
philosophy is to fulfill its function, it must take account of, and explain, 
as best it may, all phases of human experience. ilr. Davidson is right in
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attributing this recently awakened philosophic interest in religion in a 
large measure to the "continued insistence and unwonted vigour (intellectual 
and stylistic) of William James." "He never tired," writes Davidson, "in 
his later years, of driving home the fact of the firm hold that religion 
has, and has had, on mankind—of the variety of its forms and manifestations, 
and of its lasting and obviously salutary effects on the believer....The re­ 
sult is that scarcely a book of any importance in philosophy now issues from 
the press that does not contain a handling (fuller or briefer) of the philo­ 
sophical significance of religion; and, further, a new department of reli­ 
gious study has been created, claiming to be both scientific and philosophic,
95 
and designating itself, 'The Psychology of Religion 1 ."
James's extreme doctrine of God has rendered a further service to the 
philosophy of religion in that it has made it clear that any theism worthy 
of the name must bring God into actual relationship with His world, and 
have an interest in the affairs of man's mundane existence and a genuine 
sympathy for man in his struggles and labors as he pushes on towards the 
higher life. It has definitely brought out the fact that religion has 
little to gain by an easy and uncritical alliance with an absolute ideal­ 
ism which pronounces the life, and even the reality of the individual an 
illusion, a temporary and meaningless phase in the life of the Absolute. 
James has attempted to bring God "down to earth", so to speak, in order 
that He.may have a real part in the cosmic drama which James's universe 
presents. If, in his enthusiasm to give us a God of this kind, he has 
succeeded in giving us merely an "overgrown, friendly sort of man", we 
should not refuse to recognize the value of his contention that God can­ 
not be isolated from the world nor conceived as being "too nice" to 
95. QP . cit., pp. 139-140, Gf. p. 158.
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interest Himself in those things which are of vital importance to mankind. 
Further, James's view of God reveals something of the vagaries of thought 
open to those who attempt to develop a conception of God without taking 
into account the basic teachings of Christianity, and shows that philosophy 
suffers a distinct loss in severing connection with the fundamental prin­ 
ciples of Christian thought. If philosophy profits by the mistake of 
James in this respect his doctrine of God will not have been uttered in 
vain. Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory nature of much of his philosophy 
concerning these fundamental questions, he has earned for himself an endur­ 
ing place "in the republic of philosophers" by his valuable contributions to 
religious thought, both in psychology and philosophy. We are grateful to 
him for his insistence upon the values of the human spirit, and for his 
courageous and persistent declarations, in face of opposition, and even 
ridicule, that human life manifests a need of God upon every hand, that 





Thus far we have dealt with the most important features of James's 
philosophy and have attempted to give a criticism and an appreciation 
of his special doctrines. In a concluding survey of his thought, which 
is now appropriate, we may well consider briefly some of the points at 
which he has influenced religious thought upon which we have not dwelt 
in our general treatment. No man whose range of interests was so wide, 
whose insight so penetrating, and powers of analysis so keen, who was 
blessed with such a diversity of gifts and originality of thought, could 
fail to exert a wide and lasting influence upon the thinking of those 
who come after him. Josiah Royce was no doubt right in acclaiming 
James as one of America's three greatest philosophers. He placed him 
alongside Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo Emerson. His reasons for re­ 
garding each of these thinkers as representative American philosophers 
were two: first, each of them possessed the ability to think for him­ 
self, to think fruitfully with true independence and with successful in­ 
ventiveness. Second, each was able to give utterance to ideas which are
characteristic of a stage and of an aspect of the spiritual life of his
1 
people. According to this appraisal we believe that James is entitled to
be ranked as one of the greatest philosophers of America, and to a lasting 
place among American thinkers. But James's influence has not been con­ 
fined to his own country, nor has his interpretation of the spiritual needs 
and aspirations of mankind been limited to the people of his own country or




language. His influence upon European thought, and the very high regard 
in which he has been held by European thinkers bear testimony to his 
ability to give expression to spiritual longings which are of a universal 
nature. Further, James's earnest plea for the preservation and enhance­ 
ment of certain values for human life, and his linking up of these insep­ 
arably with a philosophic and religious view of the world, have given re­ 
ligion and the values which it cherishes not only a more secure footing in 
the field of science and philosophy, but greater intellectual respectabil­ 
ity as well.
This leads us then to the consideration of James f s influence in over­ 
coming the paralyzing effect of absolute idealism, which had reached mo­ 
mentous proportions in British and .American philosophy at the close of the 
nineteenth century. There has been a noticeable trend towards realism in 
philosophic thinking in the opening decades of the twentieth century. 
Professor R. B. Perry describes this change of direction as follows: "The 
first two decades of the twentieth century witnessed a widespread reaction
against the victorious tide of idealism, and the revival of realism in a
2
more circumspect and stable form." This new movement received encourage­ 
ment and inspiration from James*s courageous efforts to combat idealism.
t
The modern realistic movement contains a wide diversity of opinion within 
its ranks, but there is unity of purpose in one direction—in its opposi­ 
tion to idealism. There are, roughly speaking, two groups among American 
realists. The neo-realists,to whom we have previously referred, constitute 
one group; the other American thinkers who advocate a realistic philosophy 
2. Philosophy of the Recent Past, p. 199.
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are known as "critical realists." A. K. Rogers and J. B. Pratt, both of 
whom we have frequently mentioned, belong to this latter school of thought.
Another well known representative of this group is G. Santayana. The
3 
view of this school of realists is set forth in Essays in Critical Realism.
The former group holds to "the immediate presence both of physical exist-
4 
ence in perception and of logical (or mathematical) subsistence in thought."
The latter group makes a distinction between that which is immediately given 
and the transcendent "existences" to which it refers. That which is imme­ 
diately given is usually termed "essences"; but there is no assurance of 
the object's existence. The existence of the object is a matter of 
"faith". The "what" of the object may be grasped in intuition but not 
its "that". Both groups maintain that there is knowledge of extra mental 
reality and that the object cognized exists independently of its being 
known. Some of the members of these two schools, as has already been 
shown, entertain views which we are forced to consider definitely anti- 
religious. Professor J. B. Pratt, of the critical realistic school, has 
probably made the greatest contribution to religious thought of any of the 
members of these two schools of American realists, but the influence of 
realism in religious thought in America has been definitely felt and can be 
traced to the teachings of James.
The realistic approach to religion is set forth by a group of Ameri­ 
can thinkers in Religious Realism, edited by D. C. Macintosh, as well as
—3. Durant Drake, and others, Essays in Critical Realism; A Cooperative" 
Study of the Problem of Knowledge, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920. 
~R7~B7~Perry, O£. cit., p. 216.
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in the writings of W. M. Horton, among which is his well known work,
5 
Realistic Theology. Professor D. C. Macintosh advocates a realism which
is a modified type of epistemological monism. He is opposed to both the 
pan-objectivism of neo-realism and the dualism of the critical realists,
but he is a thoroughgoing realist in his epistemology. He speaks of his
6
view as "critical realistic epistemological monism." All of these real­ 
istic thinkers have struggled persistently to establish realism as against 
idealism, and the thinking of all of them has been largely influenced by 
James. This tendency towards realism in American thought is a healthy 
sign and shows the waning influence of idealism which had hitherto been 
strong in this country. Thus James f s empiricism, as expressed in his 
realistic theory of knowledge, has an important bearing upon religious 
thought, for Christianity is essentially realistic in its philosophy. As
E. Gilson puts it, "There will always be realism so long as Christianity's
7 
influence continues to make itself felt." While Christian thought can
have nothing to do with the materialistic, behavioristic, and sceptical 
features which frequently color the new tendency towards realism, it can, 
and no doubt will, profit immensely by this renewed defense of realism 
against an erstwhile predominant absolute idealism which Christianity 
must always regard with suspicion. To the extent that it does profit 
by the polemic of the new movement against idealism, which James was 
largely responsible for initiating,.religious thought will reap the
5. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1934.
6. The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 310 ff.
7. Op. ei t., p. 244.
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harvest which comes from his planting of the seeds of realism in the for­ 
mulation of his unique theory of consciousness, arising out of his empiri­ 
cism.
James has had a tremendous influence upon philosophic thought favor­ 
able to religion subsequent to the nineteenth century in his emphasis 
upon the teleologies! and active nature of mind. It has already been 
pointed out that the latter part of the nineteenth century was a time in 
which religion seemed to be fighting a losing battle against mechanistic 
influences in science and philosophy. Professor William McDougall sums 
up the situation accurately as follows: "The history of the psycho- 
physical problem since the middle of the nineteenth century is, then, in 
the main the history of the way in which the progress of the physical, 
the biological, and the psychological sciences has rendered ever more 
confident, and secured a wider acceptance for, the belief in the univer­ 
sality of the laws of mechanism revealed by a study of the realm of physi­ 
cal phenomena; a belief which necessarily involves the rejection of Ani-
8 
mism." He goes on to show that such theories in physical science as the
kinetic view of nature and the law of the conservation of energy seemed to 
offer considerable support to a mechanistic interpretation of all of life. 
Also, in biology, the Darwinian hypothesis of the evolution of species and 
the adaptation of species to their environment by the mechanical operation 
of natural selection served to strengthen the conviction that all animal 
growth and behaviour could be accounted for in mechanical terms. Finally, 
8. Body and Mind, p. 89.
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the advocates of a mechanical view of life gathered weighty evidence for
their conception from physiology and psychology. The failure to find 
the seat of the soul, the doctrine of the reflex type of all nervous 
process, the influence of the association psychology, along with the de­ 
velopment of the mechanical theory of habit, which regarded habitual 
action as very similar to reflex action, were responsible for this view 
of the mechanical nature of physical and psychical processes. These 
considerations, along with the localization of brain functions and the 
dependence of thought on brain functions, led to the formulation of the 
law of psycho-neural correlation or concomitance. According to this
law, "All mental process is accompanied by neural process in the brain,
9 
each thought or idea having its specific neural correlate." These lines
of development of physiological fact and theory all tended to the conclu­ 
sion, to use the words of Professor McDougall, "that the actions of men 
are capable of being fully explained in terms of mechanism—that a suffi­ 
cient knowledge of the structure and physico-chemical constitution of the 
nervous system would enable us to describe completely terms of physical 
and chemical changes the causal sequence of events issues in any action,
no matter how much deliberation, choice, and effort may seem to be involved
10 
in its preparation and determination."
James contended that the mind is essentially teleological and active 
in all of its operations. This characteristic of mind is fundamental to 
his system of thought. It is, as Professor R. B. Perry states, the ulti­ 
mate source from which all his thinking flows. Professor Perry puts it
—9. Ibid., p. 116. Of. pp. B7 ff. 
10. Ibid., p. 112.
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as follows: "With all of his versatility and openmindedness he remained
unconsciously loyal to certain fundamental convictions. It is even per­ 
missible to say that there is one germinal idea from which his whole 
thought grew, provided we do not overlook the even more important fact
that his thought DID GROW. This germinal idea is the idea of the essen-
11 
tially active and interested character of the human mind." In 1934,
J. H. Muirhead gives James credit for initiating what he calls "The Revolt 
Against Mechanism." He writes as follows: "There is a youth movement in 
philosophy as elsewhere. It was significant perhaps that it first started 
and gained prominence in America under the leadership of William James. 
But it since has spread to Europe under various names in the Emergent Evo­ 
lution of some English writers, the neo-idealism of the Italians Croce and 
Gentile, but most powerfully and attractively of all in the Creative Evo­ 
lution of Henri Bergson. Diverse though these manifestations are, they 
have certain points in common. They all claim for the first time 'to be 
taking time seriously'; they all direct attention away from the past with 
its closed doors to the future whose 'gates are open'; they all appeal to 
the spontaneity of feeling and intuition against the supposed tyranny of 
logical system, to the freshness of creation as against the staleness of
imitation and repetition, to the individual as against the institution,
12 
in a word, to the spirit against the letter, mind against matter."
It should be observed in this connection that James turned the Dar­ 
winian theory of evolution, which was accepted by the mechanistic philos­ 
ophers of the period as supporting their interpretation of the nature of
11. £. E. R. , Pref.,p. ix.
12. "The Revolt Against Mechanism," The Hibbert Journal, Vol. XXXIII, 
No. 1, 1934, p. 69.
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things, into a persuasive argument against mechanism. James apparently 
accepted this theory without question for he neither doubted nor defend­ 
ed it. In reality he was the first thinker to realize its full signif­ 
icance and to make a thoroughgoing application of it in his psychology 
and philosophy. Contrary to the trend of his time he did not conceive 
it superficially merely as the last blow struck by science at religion. 
He realized that it cast a profound doubt on the final adequacy of the 
mechanistic philosophy from which it seemed to spring, and of the meta­ 
physical prejudice that this new belief was nothing but a disguised form 
of an old belief. He wholeheartedly adopted the new explanation of the 
development of the universe and made it serve as a means of attacking the 
type of scientific and philosophical thinking out of which the view grew. 
In so doing he rendered valuable service to religious thought: he helped 
to pave the .way for the philosophical recognition of values which have 
always been of importance to religion, and he made it clear that the last 
word cannot be said about reality without coming to grips with the nature 
and value of human personality.
The influence of James's emphasis upon, and recognition of, the mean­ 
ing and value of human personality is increasingly felt in religious 
thought today. His philosophy, which allows persons to take precedence, 
both in certainty and value, of all other forms of reality, has been es­ 
pecially useful to the advocates of personal idealism in America. The
13 14 15 
thinking of such men as E. S. Brightman, J. W. Buckham, A. C. Knudson,
13. Personality and Religion.
14. Christianity and Personality, New York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1936,
15. philosophy of Personal!am: A Study in the Metaphysics of Religion, 
New York: The Abingdon Press, 1927.
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G. A, Wilson, and other Americans who advocate the philosophy of personal- 
ism, can, I think, be traced directly to the influence of James. He, 
along with J. Ward, Lotze, Bergson, Bowne, Royce, and Howison, to name 
only some of those who have stressed the value of personality, has con­ 
tributed much towards the understanding and appreciation of the place 
which personality must occupy in any satisfactory interpretation of the 
nature of things. The modern advocates of a personalistic philosophy 
have been strongly influenced by, and have largely profited from, the 
explorations of their predecessors in this line of thought. Whatever 
our opinion of the philosophy of personality may be, we cannot fail to 
recognize that it is a good corrective to the mechanistic philosophy 
which it opposes because of its failure to allot any place in ultimate 
reality to human personality.
Another direction in which James's influence upon religious thought 
has been strong is that of theological method. The pragmatic philosophy 
has forced theology to become more scientific and historical. This de­ 
velopment is in line with the general movement in theological thought
17 
which stemmed off from the teaching of Schleiermacher, who was a pioneer
in the attempt to work out a system of theological thought based upon 
religious experience. Today, we find few students of religion who deny 
the value of such an approach to theology, and the large number of think­ 
ers in recent times who have made an effort to arrive at sound theolog­ 
ical conclusions, with experience as a starting point, gives evidence 
that this method in theology contains much that is permanently valuable.
—16. Self""and Its World, New York; The Macmillan Company, 1926.
17. F. E.~DT Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, Eng. Trans. of the 2nd 
German edition, Edited by H. R. Mackintosh & J. S. Stewart, New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928.
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It may be added that Catholic and fundamentalist thinkers do not follow 
the empirical approach to theological questions. The former regard it 
with suspicion because of their attempt to maintain a rigidly fixed sys­ 
tem of theological thought. The latter suspect it because it weakens 
their doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration of the Bible, and injects a 
measure of tentativeness into all theological speculations. The value 
of the empirical method has been recognized in American religious thought
by such thinkers as D. C. Macintosh and H. N. Wieman, both of whom have
18 constructed a theological system with an empirical basis. F. R. Tennant's
Philosophical Theology constitutes another able effort in modern theolog­ 
ical thought to ground theology on an empirical basis.
The application of the empirical method, as well as the scepticism 
of pragmatism which emphasizes the tentative nature of all religious con­ 
clusions, has served to render theology more flexible than it was when 
based entirely upon rationalistic presuppositions and methods. The 
static conception that religious truth, "the faith delivered once and for 
all to the fathers," does not admit of changed interpretation has had to 
give way in many quarters before the pragmatic insistence upon the possi­ 
bility of empirical evidence changing existing beliefs. Even a theology 
which stresses the authoritarian view in religion, as does Barthianism, 
cannot entirely escape from the sceptical and tentative influences of prag­ 
matic philosophy. Here, since theology is a human product, it is not en­ 
titled to claim finality for its doctrine. It has erred in the past, and 
is always liable to err. Its work is never done. Of course, its
. n-P. D. G. Macintosh, Theology As an Empirical Science, New York; The Macmillan Co., 1919. Of. H. N. Wieman, Religious Experience and Scientif ic Method, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926.
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standard of appeal, in its work of interpretation, is the Word of God 
itself, and since there is no continuity between it and human thought 
concerning it, it may at any time demand that the responsive theologian 
change any previous interpretation that has been offered. Thus the 
outcome of theological effort is always tentative and always incomplete;
it must recognize its limitations and be willing to work within those
19 
limits rather than assume a note of finality which is unwarranted.
Without in any way minimizing the importance of James's contribu­ 
tion to religious thought at this juncture, we regard his extreme prag­ 
matic emphasis upon empiricism, as a basis for religious thought, as 
both erroneous and dangerous. It makes religious experience the decisive 
fact and ultimate court of appeal by which we test the validity of any 
theological conception, that of God along with others. No such concept, 
however we may define it, is itself any longer absolute or theologically 
necessary. Thus the accepted methods of theologians from the time of 
Origen are thrown aside and are replaced with another. This new method 
does not begin with a definition of God and proofs of His reality, but 
with human experience of whatever has religious significance; and it 
proceeds by tentatively analyzing the experience to determine what light 
it throws on the nature of the world in which it occurred rather than by 
deducing the implications of a definition. In other words, the empiri­ 
cal method in religion begins with religious experience and seeks by anal­ 
ysis the underlying conditions which produce it. And the idea of God, 
if it is retained, will be defined in terms of those conditions and will 
be rendered experientially verifiable. This method would regard the
19. Karl Barth, Word of God and the Word of Man. Trans. by Douglas Hor- 
ton, 2nd edition, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervon Publishing House, 19S2.
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conception of God not only as lacking in finality, but it would construe 
it in terms of what it means in experience. This being true, no con­ 
cept is necessary except that of religious experience itself. We grant 
that God's reality, when interpreted in terms of religious experience, 
may empirically be placed beyond doubt and His nature may be derived by 
analyzing the experiences to which the definition directs our attention. 
But that this means what is ordinarily involved in the religious man's 
conception of God we cannot grant. Belief in God for the ordinary person 
is not merely a belief in future experiences of our own or of another's 
which will be true if God exists, but it is a belief in the actual pres­ 
ent existence of a divine being who by definition is not within the exper­ 
ience of any of us. This is just as true of other concepts which the 
religious man uses. We believe, therefore, that while pragmatism has 
rendered a valuable service in unstiffening theology, if it is to be of 
permanent value to theology it must strip itself of this extreme empiri­ 
cism and allow theology the right not only to deal with the concepts of 
religion because of their usefulness, but also because of their truth.
James has made a distinctive and permanent contribution to the psy­ 
chology of religion in his powerful forthsetting of the value of religion 
for human life. His conception of religion as a means of putting an end 
to the attitude of struggle and inward conflict adds a new dimension to 
life and spreads out a new reach of freedom which makes "easy and felici­ 
tous what in any case is necessary" and has greatly enriched our view of 
the genuine nature of religion and the part that it plays in human life. 
It is true that there appears to be a contradiction in James's view of
390 
the nature and value of religion. First, he thinks of it as calling
forth men's deepest powers; it is a moral stimulus, a sort of tonic 
which brings new life to men in their mundane struggles. This aspect 
of his conception of religion emphasizes the active element in religion. 
Here, such beliefs as those concerning God, freedom, and immortality 
are required by our moral nature, and in order to satisfy its demands we 
have to postulate them. When dealing with this phase of religion, he 
asserts that our power of moral and volitional response is probably the 
deepest organ of communication with the nature of things. But in his 
mystical approach to religion he states that the passive experience, the 
experience of reconciliation, when man touches the power greater than 
himself, which brings a new authority and a new source of strength, con­ 
stitutes the deepest organ of communication with ultimate reality. 
Hence, he lays greater stress upon the passive and the contemplative in 
religious experience. The experience of illumination in mysticism be­ 
comes an end in itself rather than regarding ideas and truth as means as 
he does in pragmatism. Instead of postulates which lead to tentative be- 
lief, the mystical experience affords an access to truths which are in­ 
tuitively certain.
In his pragmatic and pluralistic moments he plays upon the active 
element in religion, and it is this phase of his thinking that leads him 
towards polytheism.. In his mystical moods the passive element comes to 
the foreground, and he is inclined towards pantheism. This approach to 
religion fits into his general attitude towards psychical research and 
spirit-communication. The former strain of thought is prominent in A
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pluralistic Universe and the latter dominates The Varieties of Religious
Experience. These two conceptions overlap somewhat in James f s thinking, 
but in reality they are contradictory. A brief statement concerning the 
differences between these two philosophies will serve to show how funda­ 
mentally diverse they are. The Varieties of Religious Experience main­ 
tains that the universe as a whole is in its essential reality a continu­ 
um, not a complex of discrete elements. Individuation, or differentia­ 
tion of separate individuals out of this continuum, and distinctive desire 
of divine and human personality are afterthoughts in the development of 
the universe. Man appears to be distinct from God only so far as he is 
actively conscious; subconsciously he is continuous with God, The devel­ 
opment of conscious personality is regarded as a process whereby that
which is first "diffuse soul-stuff", and nothing more, becomes a distinc­ 
tive human being through embodiment in some properly prepared physiological 
organism. Religious experience consists in a temporary sinking back of 
the conscious personality into the subconscious sea from which it arose. 
At death, the individual sinks back permanently into the continuum, the 
soul is no longer individualized in the physiological organism, and the 
transmission of thought between the various parts of the universe is no 
longer impeded by the clumsy tool, the human brain. A Pluralistic Uni­ 
verse, however, presents a quite different picture. Here the universe 
is not all of a piece, but a collection of independent beings which do 
not have a common origin. They arose independently, and afterwards en­ 
tered into relations with each other. Things and their relations are
392
data of immediate experience and have no reality beyond that experience 
as given. The God of this universe is finite and man is working with 
Him in building up a better world. It is obvious that if these two 
views are carried out to their logical conclusions they lead in quite op­ 
posite directions.
The inconsistency which is undoubtedly involved in his view of reli­ 
gion first as an energizing power and then as an experience of passive 
contemplation appears to characterize even the best religious thought. 
In order to secure a proper balance between the experience of worship 
and the active life of the world both factors of the religious situation 
must be taken into account. That is to say, the experience of passivity 
with its dynamogenic effects upon the worshipper should ordinarily be 
followed by a period of activity in which the new power, peace, and joy 
which are derived from the mystical experience can find adequate expres­ 
sion in the practical situations of life. Professor W. E. Hocking, in 
dealing with "The Psychology of Mysticism", in The Meaning of God in Hu­ 
man Experience, enunciates what he calls "The Principle of Alternation" 
as a means of resolving this apparently contradictory position common to 
religious thought. He states the meaning of this principle as follows: 
"There is something about our practical attention to any part or parts 
which turns self-defeating, and requires such complete abandonment of 
the parts, and reversion to the whole as religion has demanded, that 
whole which is different from all parts. And there-is also something 
about practical attention to the whole which turns self-defeating, and 
can only be recovered by occupation with the parts. Hence the movement
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20 
of our temporal life must swing between them." James's emphasis upon
these two phases of the religious life shows that he saw both of these 
factors to be necessary to the normal religious person without making 
any attempt to resolve their seeming contradiction. It may be possible 
to account for the differences in his view concerning the fundamental 
nature of the universe,as we have stated them above, as Professor J. B.
Pratt does, when he says that the pragmatic attitude is favorable to reli-
21 
gion while the logical consequences of pragmatism are anti-religious.
He points out that the doctrine of the will to believe is a defense of 
the pragmatic attitude and temperament against the claim of logic to uni­ 
versal authority, and, as such, it is a valuable defense of religious 
faith. But in his pragmatic efforts, James lays so much stress on meth­ 
odology and its anti-religious doctrine of truth that much of his earlier 
defense of religious faith is in a large measure contradictory. The 
pragmatic distinction between useful and useless knowledge, its doctrine 
of truth, and the phenomenalism and pluralism to which it logically leads, 
is destructive to theistic religion. But the real value of James's 
treatment of religion is his deep and abiding conviction, and his repeat­ 
ed assertions that religion is indispensable to human life because of the 
deeper meaning it gives to life and the help it offers to man in his 
earthly pilgrimage. This opinion of the value of religion dominates 
every phase of James's thinking and it is especially prominent in his 
keen and penetrating analysis of the religious consciousness in The Vari­ 
eties of Religious Experience. The real and lasting value of this book
—20. Pp. 411-412. Cf. Chapter XXVIII. 
21. What Is Pragmatism?, pp. 205 ff.
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does not consist in any special doctrines which he sets forth nor in any 
additional facts which he discovers for the psychology of religion, but 
in the fact that throughout this interesting and illuminating treatment 
of religious experience he is thoroughly convinced and persuasively ar­ 
gues that man cannot live his fullest life or achieve his highest destiny 
without the aid and inspiration of religion, nor without the realization 
in his own personal life of those values which religion alone can help 
him to create, enhance, and preserve.
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